ThedifferencebetweenthesethreekindsofCommonwealthconsisteth，notinthedifferenceofpower，butinthedifferenceofconvenienceoraptitudetoproducethepeaceandsecurityofthepeople；forwhichendtheywereinstituted。Andtocomparemonarchywiththeothertwo，wemayobserve：first，thatwhosoeverbeareththepersonofthepeople，orisoneofthatassemblythatbearsit，bearethalsohisownnaturalperson。Andthoughhebecarefulinhispoliticpersontoprocurethecommoninterest，yetheismore，ornoless，carefultoprocuretheprivategoodofhimself，hisfamily，kindredandfriends；andforthemostpart，ifthepublicinterestchancetocrosstheprivate，hepreferstheprivate：forthepassionsofmenarecommonlymorepotentthantheirreason。Fromwhenceitfollowsthatwherethepublicandprivateinterestaremostcloselyunited，thereisthepublicmostadvanced。Nowinmonarchytheprivateinterestisthesamewiththepublic。Theriches，power，andhonourofamonarchariseonlyfromtheriches，strength，andreputationofhissubjects。Fornokingcanberich，norglorious，norsecure，whosesubjectsareeitherpoor，orcontemptible，ortooweakthroughwant，ordissension，tomaintainawaragainsttheirenemies；whereasinademocracy，oraristocracy，thepublicprosperityconfersnotsomuchtotheprivatefortuneofonethatiscorrupt，orambitious，asdothmanytimesaperfidiousadvice，atreacherousaction，oracivilwar。
Secondly，thatamonarchreceivethcounselofwhom，when，andwherehepleaseth；andconsequentlymayheartheopinionofmenversedinthematteraboutwhichhedeliberates，ofwhatrankorqualitysoever，andaslongbeforethetimeofactionandwithasmuchsecrecyashewill。Butwhenasovereignassemblyhasneedofcounsel，noneareadmittedbutsuchashavearighttheretofromthebeginning；
whichforthemostpartareofthosewhohavebeenversedmoreintheacquisitionofwealththanofknowledge，andaretogivetheiradviceinlongdiscourseswhichmay，anddocommonly，excitementoaction，butnotgoverntheminit。Fortheunderstandingisbytheflameofthepassionsneverenlightened，butdazzled：noristhereanyplaceortimewhereinanassemblycanreceivecounselsecrecy，becauseoftheirownmultitude。
Thirdly，thattheresolutionsofamonarcharesubjecttonootherinconstancythanthatofhumannature；butinassemblies，besidesthatofnature，therearisethaninconstancyfromthenumber。Fortheabsenceofafewthatwouldhavetheresolution，oncetaken，continuefirmwhichmayhappenbysecurity，negligence，orprivateimpediments，orthediligentappearanceofafewofthecontraryopinion，undoestodayallthatwasconcludedyesterday。
Fourthly，thatamonarchcannotdisagreewithhimself，outofenvyorinterest；butanassemblymay；andthattosuchaheightasmayproduceacivilwar。
Fifthly，thatinmonarchythereisthisinconvenience；thatanysubject，bythepowerofoneman，fortheenrichingofafavouriteorflatterer，maybedeprivedofallhepossesseth；whichIconfessisagreataninevitableinconvenience。Butthesamemayaswellhappenwherethesovereignpowerisinanassembly：fortheirpoweristhesame；andtheyareassubjecttoevilcounsel，andtobeseducedbyorators，asamonarchbyflatterers；andbecomingoneanother’sflatterers，serveoneanother’scovetousnessandambitionbyturns。
Andwhereasthefavouritesofmonarchsarefew，andtheyhavenoneelsetoadvancebuttheirownkindred；thefavouritesofanassemblyaremany，andthekindredmuchmorenumerousthanofanymonarch。
Besides，thereisnofavouriteofamonarchwhichcannotaswellsuccourhisfriendsashurthisenemies：butorators，thatistosay，favouritesofsovereignassemblies，thoughtheyhavegreatpowertohurt，havelittletosave。Fortoaccuserequireslesseloquencesuchisman’snaturethantoexcuse；andcondemnation，thanabsolution，moreresemblesjustice。
Sixthly，thatitisaninconvenienceinmonarchythatthesovereigntymaydescenduponaninfant，oronethatcannotdiscernbetweengoodandevil：andconsistethinthis，thattheuseofhispowermustbeinthehandofanotherman，orofsomeassemblyofmen，whicharetogovernbyhisrightandinhisnameascuratorsandprotectorsofhispersonandauthority。Buttosaythereisinconvenienceinputtingtheuseofthesovereignpowerintothehandofaman，oranassemblyofmen，istosaythatallgovernmentismoreinconvenientthanconfusionandcivilwar。Andthereforeallthedangerthatcanbepretendedmustarisefromthecontentionofthosethat，foranofficeofsogreathonourandprofit，maybecomecompetitors。Tomakeitappearthatthisinconvenienceproceedethnotfromthatformofgovernmentwecallmonarchy，wearetoconsiderthattheprecedentmonarchhathappointedwhoshallhavethetuitionofhisinfantsuccessor，eitherexpresslybytestament，ortacitlybynotcontrollingthecustominthatcasereceived：andthensuchinconvenience，ifithappen，istobeattributed，nottothemonarchy，buttotheambitionandinjusticeofthesubjects，whichinallkindsofgovernment，wherethepeoplearenotwellinstructedintheirdutyandtherightsofsovereignty，isthesame。Orelsetheprecedentmonarchhathnotatalltakenorderforsuchtuition；
andthenthelawofnaturehathprovidedthissufficientrule，thatthetuitionshallbeinhimthathathbynaturemostinterestinthepreservationoftheauthorityoftheinfant，andtowhomleastbenefitcanaccruebyhisdeathordiminution。Forseeingeverymanbynatureseekethhisownbenefitandpromotion，toputaninfantintothepowerofthosethatcanpromotethemselvesbyhisdestructionordamageisnottuition，buttreachery。Sothatsufficientprovisionbeingtakenagainstalljustquarrelaboutthegovernmentunderachild，ifanycontentionarisetothedisturbanceofthepublicpeace，itisnottobeattributedtotheformofmonarchy，buttotheambitionofsubjectsandignoranceoftheirduty。Ontheotherside，thereisnogreatCommonwealth，thesovereigntywhereofisinagreatassembly，whichisnot，astoconsultationsofpeace，andwar，andmakingoflaws，inthesameconditionasifthegovernmentwereinachild。Forasachildwantsthejudgementtodissentfromcounselgivenhim，andistherebynecessitatedtotaketheadviceofthem，orhim，towhomheiscommitted；soanassemblywanteththelibertytodissentfromthecounselofthemajorpart，beitgoodorbad。Andasachildhasneedofatutor，orprotector，topreservehispersonandauthority；soalsoingreatCommonwealthsthesovereignassembly，inallgreatdangersandtroubles，haveneedofcustodeslibertatis；thatis，ofdictators，orprotectorsoftheirauthority；
whichareasmuchastemporarymonarchstowhomforatimetheymaycommittheentireexerciseoftheirpower；andhave，attheendofthattime，beenoftenerdeprivedthereofthaninfantkingsbytheirprotectors，regents，oranyothertutors。
Thoughthekindsofsovereigntybe，asIhavenowshown，butthree；thatistosay，monarchy，whereonemanhasit；ordemocracy，wherethegeneralassemblyofsubjectshathit；oraristocracy，whereitisinanassemblyofcertainpersonsnominated，orotherwisedistinguishedfromtherest：yethethatshallconsidertheparticularCommonwealthsthathavebeenandareintheworldwillnotperhapseasilyreducethemtothree，andmaytherebybeinclinedtothinktherebeotherformsarisingfromthesemingledtogether。Asforexample，electivekingdoms；wherekingshavethesovereignpowerputintotheirhandsforatime；orkingdomswhereinthekinghathapowerlimited：whichgovernmentsareneverthelessbymostwriterscalledmonarchy。LikewiseifapopularoraristocraticalCommonwealthsubdueanenemy’scountry，andgovernthesamebyapresident，procurator，orothermagistrate，thismayseemperhaps，atfirstsight，tobeademocraticaloraristocraticalgovernment。Butitisnotso。Forelectivekingsarenotsovereigns，butministersofthesovereign；norlimitedkingssovereigns，butministersofthemthathavethesovereignpower；norarethoseprovinceswhichareinsubjectiontoademocracyoraristocracyofanotherCommonwealthdemocraticallyoraristocraticallygoverned，butmonarchically。
Andfirst，concerninganelectiveking，whosepowerislimitedtohislife，asitisinmanyplacesofChristendomatthisday；ortocertainyearsormonths，asthedictator’spoweramongsttheRomans；
ifhehaverighttoappointhissuccessor，heisnomoreelectivebuthereditary。Butifhehavenopowertoelecthissuccessor，thenthereissomeotherman，orassemblyknown，whichafterhisdeceasemayelectanew；orelsetheCommonwealthdieth，anddissolvethwithhim，andreturnethtotheconditionofwar。Ifitbeknownwhohavethepowertogivethesovereigntyafterhisdeath，itisknownalsothatthesovereigntywasinthembefore：fornonehaverighttogivethatwhichtheyhavenotrighttopossess，andkeeptothemselves，iftheythinkgood。Butiftherebenonethatcangivethesovereigntyafterthedeceaseofhimthatwasfirstelected，thenhashepower，nayheisobligedbythelawofnature，toprovide，byestablishinghissuccessor，tokeeptothosethathadtrustedhimwiththegovernmentfromrelapsingintothemiserableconditionofcivilwar。
Andconsequentlyhewas，whenelected，asovereignabsolute。
Secondly，thatkingwhosepowerislimitedisnotsuperiortohim，orthem，thathavethepowertolimitit；andhethatisnotsuperiorisnotsupreme；thatistosay，notsovereign。Thesovereigntythereforewasalwaysinthatassemblywhichhadtherighttolimithim，andbyconsequencethegovernmentnotmonarchy，buteitherdemocracyoraristocracy；asofoldtimeinSparta，wherethekingshadaprivilegetoleadtheirarmies，butthesovereigntywasintheEphori。
Thirdly，whereasheretoforetheRomanpeoplegovernedthelandofJudea，forexample，byapresident；yetwasnotJudeathereforeademocracy，becausetheywerenotgovernedbyanyassemblyintowhichanyofthemhadrighttoenter；norbyanaristocracy，becausetheywerenotgovernedbyanyassemblyintowhichanymancouldenterbytheirelection：buttheyweregovernedbyoneperson，whichthoughastothepeopleofRomewasanassemblyofthepeople，ordemocracy；yetastothepeopleofJudea，whichhadnorightatallofparticipatinginthegovernment，wasamonarch。Forthoughwherethepeoplearegovernedbyanassembly，chosenbythemselvesoutoftheirownnumber，thegovernmentiscalledademocracy，oraristocracy；yetwhentheyaregovernedbyanassemblynotoftheirownchoosing，itisamonarchy；notofonemanoveranotherman，butofonepeopleoveranotherpeople。
Ofalltheseformsofgovernment，thematterbeingmortal，sothatnotonlymonarchs，butalsowholeassembliesdie，itisnecessaryfortheconservationofthepeaceofmenthatastherewasordertakenforanartificialman，sotherebeorderalsotakenforanartificialeternityoflife；withoutwhichmenthataregovernedbyanassemblyshouldreturnintotheconditionofwarineveryage；andtheythataregovernedbyoneman，assoonastheirgovernordieth。
Thisartificialeternityisthatwhichmencalltherightofsuccession。
Thereisnoperfectformofgovernment，wherethedisposingofthesuccessionisnotinthepresentsovereign。Forifitbeinanyotherparticularman，orprivateassembly，itisinapersonsubject，andmaybeassumedbythesovereignathispleasure；andconsequentlytherightisinhimself。Andifitbeinnoparticularman，butlefttoanewchoice；thenistheCommonwealthdissolved，andtherightisinhimthatcangetit，contrarytotheintentionofthemthatdidinstitutetheCommonwealthfortheirperpetual，andnottemporary，security。
Inademocracy，thewholeassemblycannotfailunlessthemultitudethataretobegovernedfail。Andthereforequestionsoftherightofsuccessionhaveinthatformofgovernmentnoplaceatall。