IfthenUltimateGoodcanonlybeconceivedasDesirableConsciousness——includingtheConsciousnessofVirtueasapartbutonlyasapart——arewetoidentifythisnotionwithHappinessorPleasure，andsaywiththeUtilitariansthatGeneralGoodisgeneralhappiness？Manywouldatthispointofthediscussionregardthisconclusionasinevitable:tosaythatallotherthingscalledgoodareonlymeanstotheendofmakingconsciouslifebetterormoredesirable，seemstothemthesameassayingthattheyaremeanstotheendofhappiness。Butveryimportantdistinctionsremaintobeconsidered。
Accordingtotheviewtakeninapreviouschapter，inaffirmingUltimateGoodtobeHappinessorPleasure，weimply1thatnothingisdesirableexceptdesirablefeelings，and2thatthedesirabilityofeachfeelingisonlydirectlycognisablebythesentientindividualatthetimeoffeelingit，andthatthereforethisparticularjudgmentofthesentientindividualmustbetakenasfinalonthequestionhowfareachelementoffeelinghasthequalityofUltimateGood。Nownoone，Iconceive，wouldestimateinanyotherwaythedesirabilityoffeelingconsideredmerelyasfeeling:
butitmaybeurgedthatourconsciousexperienceincludesbesidesFeelings，CognitionsandVolitions，andthatthedesirabilityofthesemustbetakenintoaccount，andisnottobeestimatedbythestandardabovestated。
Ithink，however，thatwhenwereflectonacognitionasatransientfactofanindividual’spsychicalexperience，distinguishingitontheonehandfromthefeelingthatnormallyaccompaniesit，andontheotherhandfromthatrelationoftheknowingmindtotheobjectknownwhichisimpliedintheterm``true’’or``validcognition’’——itisseentobeanelementofconsciousnessquiteneutralinrespectofdesirability:andthesamemaybesaidofVolitions，whenweabstractfromtheirconcomitantfeelings，andtheirrelationtoanobjectivenormorideal，aswellasfromalltheirconsequences。Itisnodoubttruethatinordinarythoughtcertainstatesofconsciousness——suchasCognitionofTruth，ContemplationofBeauty，VolitiontorealiseFreedomorVirtue——aresometimesjudgedtobepreferableonothergroundsthantheirpleasantness:butthegeneralexplanationofthisseemstobeaswassuggestedinBookii。chap。ii。§；2thatwhatinsuchcaseswereallypreferisnotthepresentconsciousnessitself，buteithereffectsonfutureconsciousnessmoreorlessdistinctlyforeseen，orelsesomething，intheobjectiverelationsoftheconsciousbeing，notstrictlyincludedinhispresentconsciousness。
Thesecondofthesealternativesmayperhapsbemadeclearerbysomeillustrations。Amanmaypreferthementalstateofapprehendingtruthtothestateofhalf-relianceongenerallyaccreditedfictions，[4]whilerecognisingthattheformerstatemaybemorepainfulthanthelatter，andindependentlyofanyeffectwhichheexpectseitherstatetohaveuponhissubsequentconsciousness。Here，onmyview，therealobjectofpreferenceisnottheconsciousnessofknowingtruth，consideredmerelyasconsciousness，——theelementofpleasureorsatisfactioninthisbeingmorethanoutweighedbytheconcomitantpain，——buttherelationbetweenthemindandsomethingelse，which，astheverynotionof`truth’implies，iswhateveritisindependentlyofourcognitionofit，andwhichIthereforecallobjective。Thismaybecomemoreclearifweimagineourselveslearningafterwardsthatwhatwetookfortruthisnotreallysuch:forinthiscaseweshouldcertainlyfeelthatourpreferencebadbeenmistaken——whereasifourchoicehadreallybeenbetweentwoelementsoftransientconsciousness，itsreasonablenesscouldnotbeaffectedbyanysubsequentdiscovery。
Similarly，amanmaypreferfreedomandpenurytoalifeofluxuriousservitude，notbecausethepleasantconsciousnessofbeingfreeoutweighsinprospectallthecomfortsandsecuritiesthattheotherlifewouldafford，butbecausehehasapredominantaversiontothatrelationbetweenhiswillandthewillofanotherwhichwecallslavery:or，again，aphilosophermaychoosewhatheconceivesas`innerfreedom’——theconsistentself-determinationofthewill——ratherthanthegratificationsofappetite；thoughrecognisingthatthelatteraremoredesirable，consideredmerelyastransientfeelings。Ineithercase，hewillbeledtoregardhispreferenceasmistaken，ifhebeafterwardspersuadedthathisconceptionofFreedomorself-determinationwasillusory；
thatweareallslavesofcircumstances，destiny，etc。
Soagain，thepreferenceofconformitytoVirtue，orcontemplation。ofBeauty，toastateofconsciousnessrecognisedasmorepleasantseemstodependonabeliefthatone’sconceptionofVirtueorBeautycorrespondstoanidealtosomeextentobjectiveandvalidforallminds。Apartfromanyconsiderationoffutureconsequences，weshouldgenerallyagreethatamanwhosacrificedhappinesstoanerroneousconceptionofVirtueorBeautymadeamistakenchoice。
Still，itmaybesaidthatthisismerelyaquestionofdefinition:thatwemaytake`consciouslife’inawidesense，soastoincludetheobjectiverelationsoftheconsciousbeingimpliedinournotionsofVirtue，Truth，Beauty，Freedom；andthatfromthispointofviewwemayregardcognitionofTruth，contemplationofBeauty，FreeorVirtuousaction，asinsomemeasurepreferablealternativestoPleasureorHappiness——eventhoughweadmitthatHappinessmustbeincludedasapartofUltimateGood。InthiscasetheprincipleofRationalBenevolence，whichwasstatedinthelastchapterasanindubitableintuitionofthepracticalReason，wouldnotdirectustothepursuitofuniversalhappinessalone，butofthese``idealgoods’’aswell，asendsultimatelydesirableformankindgenerally。
1think，however，thatthisviewoughtnottocommenditselftothesoberjudgmentofreflectivepersons。Inordertoshowthis，ImustaskthereadertousethesametwofoldprocedurethatIbeforerequestedhimtoemployinconsideringtheabsoluteandindependentvalidityofcommonmoralprecepts。Iappealfirstlytohisintuitivejudgmentafterdueconsiderationofthequestionwhenfairlyplacedbeforeit:andsecondlytoacomprehensivecomparisonoftheordinaryjudgmentsofmankind。
Asregardsthefirstargument，tomeatleastitseemsclearafterreflectionthattheseobjectiverelationsoftheconscioussubject，whendistinguishedfromtheconsciousnessaccompanyingandresultingfromthem，arenotultimatelyandintrinsicallydesirable；anymorethanmaterialorotherobjectsare，whenconsideredapartfromanyrelationtoconsciousexistence。Admittingthatwehaveactualexperienceofsuchpreferencesashavejustbeendescribed，ofwhichtheultimateobjectissomethingthatisnotmerelyconsciousness:
itstillseemstomethatwhentouseButler’sphrasewe``sitdowninacoolhour’’，wecanonlyjustifytoourselvestheimportancethatweattachtoanyoftheseobjectsbyconsideringitsconduciveness，inonewayoranother，tothehappinessofsentientbeings。
Thesecondargument，thatreferstothecommonsenseofmankind，obviouslycannotbemadecompletelycogent；since，asabovestated，severalcultivatedpersonsdohabituallyjudgethatknowledge，art，etc——nottospeakofVirtue——areendsindependentlyofthepleasurederivedfromthem。Butwemayurgenotonlythatalltheseelementsof``idealgood’’areproductiveofpleasureinvariousways；butalsothattheyseemtoobtainthecommendationofCommonSense，roughlyspeaking，inproportiontothedegreeofthisproductiveness。ThisseemsobviouslytrueofBeauty；andwillhardlybedeniedinrespectofanykindofsocialideal:itisparadoxicaltomaintainthatanydegreeofFreedom，oranyformofsocialorder，wouldstillbecommonlyregardedasdesirableevenifwewerecertainthatithadnotendencytopromotethegeneralhappiness。
ThecaseofKnowledgeisrathermorecomplex；butcertainlyCommonSenseismostimpressedwiththevalueofknowledge，whenits`fruitfulness’
hasbeendemonstrated。Itis，however，awarethatexperiencehasfrequentlyshownbowknowledge，longfruitless，maybecomeunexpectedlyfruitful，andhowlightmaybeshedononepartofthefieldofknowledgefromanotherapparentlyremote:andevenifanyparticularbranchofscientificpursuitcouldbeshowntobedevoidofeventhisindirectutility，itwouldstilldeservesomerespectonutilitariangrounds；bothasfurnishingtotheinquirertherefinedandinnocentpleasuresofcuriosity，andbecausetheintellectualdispositionwhichitexhibitsandsustainsislikelyonthewholetoproducefruitfulknowledge。Stillincasesapproximatingtothislast，CommonSenseissomewhatdisposedtocomplainofthemisdirectionofvaluableeffort；sothatthemeedofhonourcommonlypaidtoScienceseemstobegraduated，thoughperhapsunconsciously，byatolerablyexactutilitarianscale。Certainlythemomentthelegitimacyofanybranchofscientificinquiryisseriouslydisputed，asintherecentcaseofvivisection，thecontroversyonbothsidesisgenerallyconductedonanavowedlyutilitarianbasis。
ThecaseofVirtuerequiresspecialconsideration:
sincetheencouragementineachotherofvirtuousimpulsesanddispositionsisamainaimofmen’sordinarymoraldiscourse；sothateventoraisethequestionwhetherthisencouragementcangotoofarhasaparadoxicalair。Still，ourexperienceincludesrareandexceptionalcasesinwhichtheconcentrationofeffortonthecultivationofvirtuehasseemedtohaveeffectsadversetogeneralhappiness，throughbeingintensifiedtothepointofmoralfanaticism，andsoinvolvinganeglectofotherconditionsofhappiness。If，then，weadmitasactualorpossiblesuch`infelicific’
effectsofthecultivationofVirtue，Ithinkweshallalsogenerallyadmitthat，inthecasesupposed，conducivenesstogeneralhappinessshouldbethecriterionfordecidinghowfarthecultivationofVirtueshouldbecarried。
AtthesametimeitmustbeallowedthatwefindinCommonSenseanaversiontoadmitHappinesswhenexplainedtomeanasumofpleasurestobethesoleultimateendandstandardofrightconduct。
Butthis，Ithink，canbefullyaccountedforbythefollowingconsiderations。
I。ThetermPleasureisnotcommonlyusedsoastoincludeclearlyallkindsofconsciousnesswhichwedesiretoretainorreproduce:inordinaryusageitsuggeststooprominentlythecoarserandcommonerkindsofsuchfeelings；anditisdifficultevenforthosewhoaretryingtouseitscientificallytofreetheirmindsaltogetherfromtheassociationsofordinaryusage，andtomeanbyPleasureonlyDesirableConsciousnessorFeelingofwhateverkind。Again，ourknowledgeofhumanlifecontinuallysuggeststousinstancesofpleasureswhichwillinevitablyinvolveasconcomitantorconsequenteitheragreateramountofpainoralossofmoreimportantpleasures:andwenaturallyshrinkfromincludingevenhypotheticallyinourconceptionofultimategoodthese——inBentham’sphrase——``impure’’pleasures；especiallysincewehave，inmanycases，moralorestheticinstinctswarningusagainstsuchpleasures。
II。Wehaveseenthatmanyimportantpleasurescanonlybefeltonconditionofourexperiencingdesiresforotherthingsthanpleasure。ThustheveryacceptanceofPleasureastheultimateendofconductinvolvesthepracticalrulethatitisnotalwaystobemadetheconsciousend。Hence，evenifweareconsideringmerelythegoodofonehumanbeingtakenalone，excludingfromourviewalleffectsofhisconductonothers，stillthereluctanceofCommonSensetoregardpleasureasthesolethingultimatelydesirablemaybejustifiedbytheconsiderationthathumanbeingstendtobelesshappyiftheyareexclusivelyoccupiedwiththedesireofpersonalhappiness。E。g。aswasbeforeshownweshallmissthevaluablepleasureswhichattendtheexerciseofthebenevolentaffectionsifwedonotexperiencegenuinelydisinterestedimpulsestoprocurehappinessforotherswhichare，infact，impliedinthenotionof`benevolentaffections’。
III。Butagain，Ihold，aswasexpoundedintheprecedingchapter，thatdisinterestedbenevolenceisnotonlythusgenerallyinharmonywithrationalSelf-love，butalsoinanothersenseandindependentlyrational:thatis，Reasonshowsmethatifmyhappinessisdesirableandagood，theequalhappinessofanyotherpersonmustbeequallydesirable。
Now，whenHappinessisspokenofasthesoleultimategoodofman，theideamostcommonlysuggestedisthateachindividualistoseekhisownhappinessattheexpenseifnecessaryor，atanyrate，totheneglectofthatofothers:andthisoffendsbothoursympatheticandourrationalregardforothers’happiness。Itis，infact，rathertheendofEgoisticthanofUniversalisticHedonism，towhichCommonSensefeelsanaversion。
Andcertainlyone’sindividualhappinessis，inmanyrespects，anunsatisfactorymarkforone’ssupremeaim，apartfromanydirectcollisionintowhichtheexclusivepursuitofitmaybringuswithrationalorsympatheticBenevolence。
Itdoesnotpossessthecharacteristicswhich，asAristotlesays，we``divine’’
tobelongtoUltimateGood:beingsofar，atleast，asitcanbeempiricallyforeseensonarrowandlimited，ofsuchnecessarilybriefduration，andsoshiftingandinsecurewhileitlasts。ButUniversalHappiness，desirableconsciousnessorfeelingfortheinnumerablemultitudeofsentientbeings，presentandtocome，seemsanEndthatsatisfiesourimaginationbyitsvastness，andsustainsourresolutionbyitscomparativesecurity。
Itmay，however，besaidthatifwerequiretheindividualtosacrificehisownhappinesstothegreaterhappinessofothersonthegroundthatitisreasonabletodoso，wereallyassigntotheindividualadifferentultimateendfromthatwhichwelaydownastheultimateGoodoftheuniverseofsentientbeings:sincewedirecthimtotake，asultimate，HappinessfortheUniverse，butConformitytoReasonforhimself。Iadmitthesubstantialtruthofthisstatement，thoughIshouldavoidthelanguageastendingtoobscurethedistinctionbeforeexplainedbetween``obeyingthedictates’’and``promotingthedictation’’