Nor,Iconceive,canthisargumentbeevadedbyadoptingtheviewofwhatIhavecalled`Æ;stheticIntuitionism’andregardingVirtuesasexcellencesofconductclearlydiscerniblebytrainedinsight,althoughtheirnaturedoesnotadmitofbeingstatedindefiniteformulæ;。Forournotionsofspecialvirtuesdonotreallybecomemoreindependentbybecomingmoreindefinite:theystillcontain,thoughperhapsmorelatently,thesamereferenceto`Good’or`Wellbeing’asanultimatestandard。Thisappearsclearlywhenweconsideranyvirtueinrelationtothecognatevice——oratleastnon-virtue——intowhichittendstopassoverwhenpushedtoanextremeorexhibitedunderinappropriateconditions。Forexample,CommonSensemayseemtoregardLiberality,Frugality,Courage,Placability,asintrinsicallydesirable:butwhenweconsidertheirrelationrespectivelytoProfusion,Meanness,Foolhardiness,Weakness,wefindthatCommonSensedrawsthelineineachcasenotbyimmediateintuition,butbyreferenceeithertosomedefinitemaximofduty,ortothegeneralnotionof`Good’orWellbeing:andsimilarlywhenweaskatwhatpointCandour,Generosity,Humilityceasetobevirtuesbybecoming`excessive’。Otherqualitiescommonlyadmired,suchasEnergy,Zeal,Self-control,Thoughtfulness,areobviouslyregardedasvirtuesonlywhentheyaredirectedtogoodends。Inshort,theonlyso-calledVirtueswhichcanbethoughttobeessentiallyandalwayssuch,andincapableofexcess,aresuchqualitiesasWisdom,UniversalBenevolence,andinasenseJustice;ofwhichthenotionsmanifestlyinvolvethisnotionofGood,supposedalreadydeterminate。
WisdomisinsightintoGoodandthemeanstoGood;Benevolenceisexhibitedinthepurposiveactionscalled``doingGood’’:JusticewhenregardedasessentiallyandalwaysaVirtueliesindistributingGoodorevil
impartiallyaccordingtorightrules。IfthenweareaskedwhatisthisGoodwhichitisexcellenttoknow,tobestowonothers,todistributeimpartially,itwouldbeobviouslyabsurdtoreplythatitisjustthisknowledge,thesebeneficentpurposes,thisimpartialdistribution。
Nor,again,canIperceivethatthisdifficultyisinanywaymetbyregardingVirtueasaqualityof``character’’ratherthanof``conduct’’,andexpressingthemorallawintheform,``Bethis’’,insteadoftheform``Dothis’’。[2]Fromapracticalpointofview,indeed,Ifullyrecognisetheimportanceofurgingthatmenshouldaimatanidealofcharacter,andconsideractioninitseffectsoncharacter。ButIcannotinferfromthisthatcharacteranditselements——faculties,habits,ordispositionsofanykind——aretheconstituentsofUltimateGood。Itseemstomethattheoppositeisimpliedintheveryconceptionofafacultyordisposition;itcanonlybedefinedasatendencytoactorfeelinacertainwayundercertainconditions;andsuchatendencyappearstomeclearlynotvaluableinitselfbutfortheactsandfeelingsinwhichittakeseffect,orfortheulteriorconsequencesofthese,——whichconsequences,again,cannotberegardedasUltimateGood,solongastheyaremerelyconceivedasmodificationsoffaculties,dispositions,etc。
When,therefore,Isaythateffectsoncharacterareimportant,itisasummarywayofsayingthatbythelawsofourmentalconstitutionthepresentactorfeelingisacausetendingtomodifyimportantlyouractsandfeelingsintheindefinitefuture:thecomparativelypermanentresultsupposedtobeproducedinthemindorsoul,beingatendencythatwillshowitselfinanindefinitenumberofparticularactsandfeelings,mayeasilybemoreimportant,inrelationtotheultimateend,thanasingleactorthetransientfeelingofasinglemoment:butitscomparativepermanenceappearstomenogroundforregardingitasitselfaconstituentofultimategood。
Sofar,however,Ihavebeenspeakingonlyofparticularvirtues,asexhibitedinconductjudgedtobeobjectivelyright:anditmaybearguedthatthisistooexternalaviewoftheVirtuethatclaimstoconstituteUltimateGood。ItmaybesaidthatthedifficultythatIhavebeenurgingvanishesifwepenetratebeyondtheparticularvirtuestotherootandessenceofvirtueingeneral,——thedeterminationofthewilltodowhateverisjudgedtoberightandtoaimatrealisingwhateverisjudgedtobebest——;sincethissubjectiverightnessorgoodnessofwill,beingindependentofknowledgeofwhatisobjectivelyrightorgood,isindependentofthatpresuppositionofGoodasalreadyknownanddetermined,whichwehaveseentobeimpliedinthecommonconceptionsofvirtueasmanifestedinoutwardacts。IadmitthatifsubjectiverightnessorgoodnessofWillisaffirmedtobetheUltimateGood,theaffirmationdoesnotexactlyinvolvethelogicaldifficultythatIhavebeenurging。
NonethelessisitfundamentallyopposedtoCommonSense;sincetheverynotionofsubjectiverightnessorgoodnessofwillimpliesanobjectivestandard,whichitdirectsustoseek,butdoesnotprofesstosupply。
Itwouldbeapalpableandviolentparadoxtosetbeforetheright-seekingmindnoendexceptthisright-seekingitself,andtoaffirmthistobethesoleUltimateGood,denyingthatanyeffectsofrightvolitioncanbeinthemselvesgood,exceptthesubjectiverightnessoffuturevolitions,whetherofselforofothers。Itistruethatnorulecanberecognised,byanyreasonableindividual,asmoreauthoritativethantheruleofdoingwhathejudgestoberight——for,indeliberatingwithaviewtomyownimmediateaction,Icannotdistinguishbetweendoingwhatisobjectivelyright,andrealisingmyownsubjectiveconceptionofrightness。Butwearecontinuallyforcedtomakethedistinctionasregardstheactionsofothersandtojudgethatconductmaybeobjectivelywrongthoughsubjectivelyright:andwecontinuallyjudgeconducttobeobjectivelywrongbecauseittendstocausepainandlossofhappinesstoothers,——apartfromanyeffectonthesubjectiverightnessoftheirvolitions。Itisassojudgingthatwecommonlyrecognisethemischiefanddangeroffanaticism:meaningbyafanaticamanwhoresolutelyandunswervinglycarriesouthisownconceptionofrightness,whenitisaplainlymistakenconception。
Thesameresultmaybereachedevenwithoutsupposingsopalpableadivorcebetweensubjectiveandobjectiverightnessofvolitionasisimpliedinthenotionoffanaticism。AsIhavealreadypointedout,thoughthe`dictatesofReason’arealwaystobeobeyed,itdoesnotfollowthat`thedictationofReason’——thepredominanceofconsciouslymoralovernon-moralmotives——istobepromotedwithoutlimits;
andindeedCommonSenseappearstoholdthatsomethingsarelikelytobebetterdone,iftheyaredonefromothermotivesthanconsciousobediencetopracticalReasonorConscience。ItthusbecomesapracticalquestionhowfarthedictationofReason,thepredominanceofmoralchoiceandmoraleffortinhumanlife,isaresulttobeaimedat:andtheadmissionofthisquestionimpliesthatconsciousrightnessofvolitionisnotthesoleultimategood。Onthewhole,then,wemayconcludethatneither1subjectiverightnessorgoodnessofvolition,asdistinctfromobjective,nor2
virtuouscharacter,exceptasmanifestedorrealisedinvirtuousconduct,canberegardedasconstitutingUltimateGood:while,again,weareprecludedfromidentifyingUltimateGoodwithvirtuousconduct,becauseourconceptionsofvirtuousconduct,underthedifferentheadsoraspectsdenotedbythenamesoftheparticularvirtues,havebeenfoundtopresupposethepriordeterminationofthenotionofGood——thatGoodwhichvirtuousconductisconceivedasproducingorpromotingorrightlydistributing。
AndwhathasbeensaidofVirtue,seemstomestillmoremanifestlytrueoftheothertalents,gifts,andgraceswhichmakeupthecommonnotionofhumanexcellenceorPerfection。Howeverimmediatelytheexcellentqualityofsuchgiftsandskillsmayberecognisedandadmired,reflectionshowsthattheyareonlyvaluableonaccountofthegoodordesirableconsciouslifeinwhichtheyareorwillbeactualised,orwhichwillbesomehowpromotedbytheirexercise。
ShallwethensaythatUltimateGoodisGoodorDesirableconsciousorsentientLife——ofwhichVirtuousactionisoneelement,butnotthesoleconstituent?ThisseemsinharmonywithCommonSense;andthefactthatparticularvirtuesandtalentsandgiftsarelargelyvaluedasmeanstoulteriorgooddoesnotnecessarilypreventusfromregardingtheirexerciseasalsoanelementofUltimateGood:justasthefactthatphysicalaction,nutrition,andrepose,dulyproportionedandcombined,aremeanstothemaintenanceofouranimallife,doesnotpreventusfromregardingthemasindispensableelementsofsuchlife。Stillitseemsdifficulttoconceiveanykindofactivityorprocessasbothmeansandend,frompreciselythesamepointofviewandinrespectofpreciselythesamequality:
andinboththecasesabovementioneditis,Ithink,easytodistinguishtheaspectinwhichtheactivitiesorprocessesinquestionaretoberegardedasmeansfromthatinwhichtheyaretoberegardedasinthemselvesgoodordesirable。Letusexaminethisfirstinthecaseofthephysicalprocesses。
Itisintheirpurelyphysicalaspect,ascomplexprocessesofcorporealchange,thattheyaremeanstothemaintenanceoflife:butsolongasweconfineourattentiontotheircorporealaspect,——regardingthemmerelyascomplexmovementsofcertainparticlesoforganisedmatter——itseemsimpossibletoattributetothesemovements,consideredinthemselves,eithergoodnessorbadness。Icannotconceiveittobeanultimateendofrationalactiontosecurethatthesecomplexmovementsshouldbeofonekindratherthananother,orthattheyshouldbecontinuedforalongerratherthanashorterperiod。Inshort,ifacertainqualityofhumanLifeisthatwhichisultimatelydesirable,itmustbelongtohumanLiferegardedonitspsychicalside,or,briefly,Consciousness。
Butagain:itisnotallliferegardedonitspsychicalsidewhichwecanjudgetobeultimatelydesirable:sincepsychicallifeasknowntousincludespainaswellaspleasure,andsofarasitispainfulitisnotdesirable。Icannotthereforeacceptaviewofthewellbeingorwelfareofhumanbeings——asofotherlivingthings——whichissuggestedbycurrentzoologicalconceptionsandapparentlymaintainedwithmoreorlessdefinitenessbyinfluentialwriters;accordingtowhich,whenweattributegoodnessorbadnesstothemannerofexistenceofanylivingorganism,weshouldbeunderstoodtoattributetoitatendencyeither1toself-preservation,or2tothepreservationofthecommunityorracetowhichitbelongs——sothatwhat``Wellbeing’’addstomere``Being’’isjustpromiseoffuturebeing。Itappearstomethatthisdoctrineneedsonlytobedistinctlycontemplatedinordertoberejected。Ifalllifewereaslittledesirableassomeportionsofithavebeen,inmyownexperienceandinthatIbelieve
ofallormostmen,Ishouldjudgealltendencytothepreservationofittobeunmitigatedlybad。Actually,nodoubt,aswegenerallyholdthathumanlife,evenasnowlived,hasontheaverage,abalanceofhappiness,weregardwhatispreservativeoflifeasgenerallygood,andwhatisdestructiveoflifeasbad:andIquiteadmitthatamostfundamentallyimportantpartofthefunctionofmoralityconsistsinmaintainingsuchhabitsandsentimentsasarenecessarytothecontinuedexistence,infullnumbers,ofasocietyofhumanbeingsundertheiractualconditionsoflife。Butthisisnotbecausethemereexistenceofhumanorganisms,evenifprolongedtoeternity,appearstomeinanywaydesirable;itisonlyassumedtobesobecauseitissupposedtobeaccompaniedbyConsciousnessonthewholedesirable;
itisthereforethisDesirableConsciousnesswhichwemustregardasultimateGood。
Inthesameway,sofaraswejudgevirtuousactivitytobepartofUltimateGood,itis,Iconceive,becausetheconsciousnessattendingitisjudgedtobeinitselfdesirableforthevirtuousagent;
thoughatthesametimethisconsiderationdoesnotadequatelyrepresenttheimportanceofVirtuetohumanwellbeing,sincewehavetoconsideritsvalueasameansaswellasitsvalueasanend。WemaymakethedistinctionclearerbyconsideringwhetherVirtuouslifewouldremainonthewholegoodforthevirtuousagent,ifwesupposeitcombinedwithextremepain。
TheaffirmativeanswertothisquestionwasstronglysupportedinGreekphilosophicaldiscussion:butitisaparadoxfromwhichamodernthinkerwouldrecoil:bewouldhardlyventuretoassertthattheportionoflifespentbyamartyrintortureswasinitselfdesirable,——thoughitmightbehisdutytosufferthepainwithaviewtothegoodofothers,andevenhisinteresttosufferitwithaviewtohisownultimatehappiness。