Theremainingvirtuesthatareclearlyandexclusivelysocial，willbeeasilyseentohavenoindependentmaxims；
theconductinwhichtheyarerespectivelyrealisedbeingmerelythefulfilment，underspecialconditions，oftherulesalreadydiscussed。Weneednot，then，enteruponanexhaustiveexaminationoftheseminorvirtues——foritisnotourobjecttoframeacompleteglossaryofethicalterms——:
butforillustration’ssakeitmaybewelltodiscussoneortwoofthem；
andIwillselectforexaminationLiberalitywithitscognatenotions，partlyonaccountoftheprominencethatithashadintheearlieragesofthought，andpartlybecauseofacertaincomplexityinthefeelingswithwhichitisusuallyregarded。ConsideredasaVirtue，LiberalityseemstobemerelyBenevolence，asexhibitedintheparticularserviceofgivingmoney，beyondthelimitsofstrictdutyascommonlyrecognised——forinsofarasitcanbecalledadutytobeliberal，itisbecauseintheperformanceofthemoreorlessindefinitedutiesenumeratedinchap。iv。wedonotlikeexactnesstobesought；acertainexcessisneedfulifthedutyistobewelldone。Andperhapsinthecaseofthepoorthisgracefulexcessisexcludedbyprudence:forthoughapoormanmightmakeagreatsacrificeinasmallgiftweshouldcallthisgenerousbutscarcelyliberal；Liberalityappearstorequireanexternalabundanceinthegiftevenmorethanaself-sacrificingdisposition。Itseemsthereforetobepossibleonlytotherich:and，asIhavehinted，intheadmirationcommonlyaccordedtoitthereseemstobemingledanelementratheraestheticthanmoral。Forweareallapttoadmirepower，andwerecognisethelatentpowerofwealthgracefullyexhibitedinacertaindegreeofcarelessprofusionwhentheobjectistogivehappinesstoothers。Indeedthevulgaradmirethesamecarelessnessasmanifestedeveninselfishluxury。
ThesphereofLiberality，then，liesgenerallyinthefulfilmentoftheindefinitedutiesofBenevolence。
ButthereisacertainbordergroundbetweenJusticeandBenevolencewhereitisespeciallyshown；namely，inthefullsatisfactionofallcustomaryexpectations，evenwhenindefiniteanduncertain；ase。g。intheremunerationofservices，insofarasthisisgovernedbycustom；andevenwhereitisleftentirelytofreecontract，andthereforenaturallydeterminedbyhagglingandbargainingasmarketvaluegenerally，itischaracteristicofaliberalmantoavoidthishagglingandtogivesomewhathigherremunerationthantheotherpartymightbeinducedtotake，andsimilarlytotakeforhisownservicesasomewhatlowerpaymentthanhemightpersuadetheothertogive。Andagain，sincelawsandpromisesandespeciallytacitunderstandingsaresometimesdoubtfulandambiguous，aliberalmanwillinsuchcasesunhesitatinglyadopttheinterpretationwhichisleastinhisownfavour，andpaythemostthathecanbyanyfairmindedpersonbethoughttoowe，andexacttheleastthatreasonablycanbethoughttobeduetohimself:thatis，ifthemarginbe，relativelytohisresources，notconsiderable。[1]AndofamanwhodoestheoppositeofallthiswepredicateMeanness；thisbeingtheviceantitheticaltoLiberality。Hereagainthereseemsnoplaceforthisparticularviceiftheamountatstakebeconsiderable；forthenwethinkitnotmeantoexactone’sownrightstothefull，andworsethanmeantorefuseanotherwhatheoughttohave；
infactinsuchcaseswethinkthatanyindefinitenessastorightsshouldbepracticallyremovedbythedecisionofajudgeorarbitrator。Theviceofmeannessthenis，wemaysay，boundedonthesideofvicebyinjustice:
themeanmanisblamednotforviolationofJustice，but，becausehechoosesatriflinggaintohimselfratherthantheavoidanceofdisappointmenttoothers。Andhere，again，itshouldbeobserved，anelementnotstrictlymoralisincludedinthecommondisapprobationofmeanness。For，aswehaveseen，acertaincarelessnessofmoneyisadmiredasasignofpowerandsuperiority:andtheoppositehabitisasymbolofinferiority。Themeanmanthenisapttobedespisedashavingthebadtastetoshowthissymbolneedlessly，preferringalittlegaintotherespectofhisfellow-men。
Meanness，however，hasawiderspherethanLiberality，andrefersnotmerelytothetakingorrefusingofmoney，buttotakingadvantagesgenerally:inthiswidersensetheoppositevirtueisGenerosity。
InsofarasthesphereofGenerositycoincideswiththatofLiberality，theformerseemspartlytotranscendthelatter，partlytorefermoretofeelingsthantooutwardacts，andtoimplyacompletertriumphofunselfishoverselfishimpulses。Inthewidersenseitisstrikinglyexhibitedinconflictandcompetitionofallkinds。HereitissometimescalledChivalry。ReflectionshowsusthattheessenceofthisbeautifulvirtueistherealisationofBenevolenceundercircumstanceswhichmakeitpeculiarlydifficultandthereforepeculiarlyadmirable。ForGenerosityorChivalrytowardsadversariesorcompetitorsseemstoconsistinshowingasmuchkindnessandregardfortheirwell-beingasiscompatiblewiththeendsandconditionsofconflict:oneprominentformofthisbeingtheendeavourtorealiseidealjusticeintheseconditions，notmerelybyobservingalltherulesandtacitunderstandingsunderwhichtheconflictisconducted，butbyresigningevenaccidentaladvantages。Suchresignation，however，isnotconsideredastrictduty:noristhereanyagreementastohowfaritisrightandvirtuous；forwhatsomewouldpraiseandapprove，otherswouldregardasquixoticandextravagant。
Tosumup，wemaysaythatthetermsLiberalityandGenerosity，sofarastheyarestrictlyethical，denotethevirtueofBenevolenceperhapsincludingJusticetosomeextentasexhibitedinspecialwaysandunderspecialconditions。Andtheexaminationoftheotherminorsocialvirtueswouldevidentlyleadtosimilargeneralresults:
thoughitmightnotalwaysbeeasytoagreeontheirdefinitions。
IconceivethataccordingtothemoralityofCommonSense，anultimateharmonybetween1Self-interestand2Virtueisassumedorpostulated；sothattheperformanceofdutyandcultivationofVirtuegenerallymayberegardedasa``dutytoself’’，asbeingalwaysconducivetotheagent’strueinterestandwell-being。
Butfurther，CommonSenseinmodernEuroperecognisesastrictdutyofpreservingone’sownlife，evenwhentheprospectlifeoffersisoneinwhichpainpreponderatesoverpleasure；itis，indeed，heldtoberightandpraiseworthytoencountercertaindeathintheperformanceofStrictduty，orforthepreservationofthelifeofanother，orforanyveryimportantgaintosociety；butnotmerelyinordertoavoidpaintotheagent。Atthesametime，withinthelimitsfixedbythisandotherduties，CommonSenseconsiders，Ithink，thatitisadutytoseekourownhappiness，exceptinsofaraswecanpromotethewelfareofothersbysacrificingit。This``dueconcernaboutourowninterestorhappiness’’maybecalledtheDutyofPrudence。Itshould，however，beobservedthat——sinceitislessevidentthatmendonotadequatelydesiretheirowngreatestgood，thanthattheireffortsarenotsufficientlywelldirectedtoitsattainment——inconceivingPrudenceasaVirtueorExcellence，attentionisoftenfixedalmostexclusivelyonitsintellectualside。Thusregarded，PrudencemaybesaidtobemerelyWisdommademoredefinitebytheacceptanceofSelf-interestasitssoleultimateend:thehabitofcalculatingcarefullythebestmeanstotheattainmentofourowninterest，andresistingallirrationalimpulseswhichmaytendtoperturbourcalculationsorpreventusfromactingonthem。
Thereare，however，currentnotionsofparticularvirtues，whichmightbecalledSelf-regarding；butyetwithrespecttowhichitisnotquiteclearwhethertheyaremerelyparticularapplicationsofPrudence，orwhethertheyhaveindependentmaxims。OftheseTemperance，oneofthefourcardinalvirtuesancientlyrecognised，seemsthemostprominent。
Initsordinaryuse，Temperanceisthehabitofcontrollingtheprincipalappetitesordesireswhichhaveanimmediatecorporealcause。ThehabitofmoderatingandcontrollingourdesiresgenerallyisrecognisedbyCommonSenseasusefulanddesirable，butwithlessdistinctnessandemphasis。
Allareagreedthatourappetitesneedcontrol:
butinordertoestablishamaximofTemperance，wehavetodeterminewithinwhatlimits，onwhatprinciple，andtowhatendtheyoughttobecontrolled。
Nowinthecaseoftheappetitesforfood，drink，sleep，stimulants，etc。，noonedoubtsthatbodilyhealthandvigouristheendnaturallysubservedbytheirgratification，andthatthelatteroughttobecheckedwheneverittendstodefeatthisendincludinginthenotionofhealththemostperfectconditionofthementalfaculties，sofarasthisappearstodependuponthegeneralstateofthebody。And，further，theindulgenceofabodilyappetiteismanifestlyimprudent，ifitinvolvesthelossofanygreatergratificationofwhateverkind:andotherwisewrongifitinterfereswiththeperformanceofduties；thoughitisperhapsdoubtfulhowfarthislatterindulgencewouldcommonlybecondemnedas`intemperance’。
Some，however，deducefromtheobvioustruth，thatthemaintenanceofbodilyhealthisthechiefnaturalendoftheappetites，amorerigidruleofrestraint，andonethatgoesbeyondprudence。Theysaythatthisendoughttofixnotonlythenegativebutthepositivelimitofindulgence；thatthepleasurederivedfromthegratificationofappetiteshouldneverbesoughtperseevenwhenitdoesnotimpairhealth，orinterferewithduty，orwithagreaterpleasureofadifferentkind；
butonlyinsofarassuchgratificationispositivelyconducivetohealth。
Whenweconsidertowhatamarkeddivergencefromtheusualhabitsofthemoralrichthisprinciplewouldlead，wemightbedisposedtosaythatitisclearlyatvariancewithCommonSense:butitoftenmeetswithverbalassent。
Thereis，again，athirdandintermediateviewwhichacceptstheprinciplethatthegratificationofappetiteisnottobesoughtforitsownsake，butadmitsotherendsaslegitimatebesidesthemeremaintenanceofhealthandstrength:——e。g。``cheerfulness，andthecultivationofthesocialaffections’’。[1]Somesuchprincipleseemstobemoreorlessconsciouslyheldbymanypersons:
hencewefindthatsolitaryindulgenceinthepleasuresofthetableisveryfrequentlyregardedwithsomethinglikemoralaversion:andthatthebanquetswhicharegivenandenjoyedbymoralpersons，arevaguelysupposedtohavefortheirendnotthecommonindulgenceofsensualappetites，butthepromotionofconvivialityandconversationalentertainment。Foritisgenerallybelievedthattheenjoymentincommonofaluxuriousmealdevelopssocialemotions，andalsostimulatesthefacultiesofwitandhumourandlivelycolloquyingeneral；andfeastswhichareobviouslynotcontrivedwithaviewtosuchconvivialandcolloquialgratificationsseemtobecondemnedbyrefinedpersons。Stillitwouldbegoingtoofartostate，asamaximsupportedbyCommonSenseinrespectofsensualpleasuresgenerally，thattheyarenevertobesoughtexcepttheypositivelypromotethoseofahigherkind。
Inthelastsectionwehavespokenchieflyoftheappetitesforfoodanddrink。Itis，however，inthecaseoftheappetiteofsexthattheregulationmorallyprescribedmostclearlyanddefinitelytranscendsthatofmereprudence:whichisindicatedbythespecialnotionofPurityorChastity。
Atfirstsightitmayperhapsappearthattheregulationofthesexualappetiteprescribedbythereceivedmoralcodemerelyconfinesitsindulgencewithinthelimitsoftheunionsanctionedbylaw:onlythathere，asthenaturalimpulseispeculiarlypowerfulandeasilyexcited，itisespeciallynecessarytoprohibitanyacts，internalaswellasexternal，thattendevenindirectlytothetransgressionoftheselimits。Andthisistoagreatextenttrue:
stillonreflectionitwillappear，Ithink，thatourcommonnotionofpurityimpliesastandardindependentoflaw；for，first，conformitytothisdoesnotnecessarilysecurepurity:andsecondly，allillegitimatesexualintercourseisnotthoughttobeimpure，anditisonlybyinadvertencethatthetwonotionsaresometimesconfounded。Butitisnotveryclearwhatthisstandardis。Forwhenweinterrogatethemoralconsciousnessofmankind，weseemtofindtwoviews，astricterandalaxer，analogoustothetwointerpretationsofTemperancelastnoticed。Itisagreedthatthesexualappetiteoughtnevertobeindulgedforthesakeofthesensualgratificationmerely，butasameanstosomehigherend:butsomesaythatthepropagationofthespeciesistheonlylegitimate，asitisobviouslytheprimarynatural，end:whileothersregardthedevelopmentofmutualaffectioninauniondesignedtobepermanentasanendperfectlyadmissibleandright。Ineednotpointoutthatthepracticaldifferencebetweenthetwoviewsisconsiderable；sothatthisquestionisonewhichitisnecessarytoraiseanddecide。ButitmaybeobservedthatanyattempttolaydownminuteanddetailedrulesonthissubjectseemstobecondemnedbyCommonSenseastendingtodefeattheendofpurity；assuchminutenessofmorallegislationinvitesmeningeneraltoexercisetheirthoughtsonthissubjecttoanextentwhichispracticallydangerous。
IoughttopointoutthattheVirtueofPurityiscertainlynotmerelyself-regarding，andisthereforeproperlyoutofplaceinthischapter:buttheconvenienceofdiscussingitalongwithTemperancehasledmetotakeitoutofitsnaturalorder。Some，however，wouldgofurther，andsaythatitoughttobetreatedasadistinctlysocialvirtue:forthepropagationandrearingofchildrenisoneofthemostimportantofsocialinterests:andtheywouldmaintainthatPuritymerelyconnotesasentimentprotectiveoftheseimportantfunctions，supportingtheruleswhichweconsidernecessarytosecuretheirproperperformance。
Butitseemsclearthat，thoughCommonSenseundoubtedlyrecognisesthistendencyofthesentimentofPuritytomaintainthebestpossibleprovisionforthecontinuanceofthehumanrace，itstilldoesnotregardthatasthefundamentalpointinthedefinitionofthisruleofduty，andthesolecriterionindecidingwhetheractsdoordonotviolatetherule。
Thereseemtobenosimilarspecialquestionswithrespecttomostotherdesires。Werecognise，nodoubt，ageneraldutyofself-control:butthisismerelyasameanstotheendofactingrationallywhateverourinterpretationofrationalactionmaybe；itonlyprescribesthatweshouldyieldtonoimpulsewhichpromptsustoactinantagonismtoendsorrulesdeliberatelyaccepted。Further，thereisacertaintendencyamongmoralpersonstotheasceticopinionthatthegratificationofmerelysensualimpulseisinitselfsomewhatobjectionable:butthisviewdoesnotseemtobetakenbyCommonSenseinparticularcases；——wedonote。g。
commonlycondemnthemostintenseenjoymentofmuscularexercise，orwarmth，orbathing。Theonlyothercase，besidesthatoftheappetitesabovediscussed，inwhichtheCommonSenseofourageandcountryseemstoregardasrightoradmirabletherepressionofnaturalimpulses，beyondwhatPrudenceandBenevolencewoulddictate，isthatofthepromptingsofpainandfear。
Animportantinstanceofthisistobefoundinthebefore-mentionedruleprohibitingsuicideabsolutely，eveninfaceofthestrongestprobabilitythattherestofaman’slifewillbebothmiserableandburdensometoothers。Butinothercasesalsopraiseisapparentlybestowedonenduranceofpainanddanger，beyondwhatisconducivetohappiness；asweshallhaveoccasiontoobserveinthenextchapter。