Thereis，however，onemethodofexhibitingaprioritheabsolutedutyofTruth，whichwemustnotoverlook；
as，ifitbevalid，itwouldseemthattheexceptionsandqualificationsabovementionedhavebeenonlyadmittedbyCommonSensefrominadvertenceandshallownessofthought。
Itissaidthatifitwereoncegenerallyunderstoodthatlieswerejustifiableundercertaincircumstances，itwouldimmediatelybecomequiteuselesstotellthelies，becausenoonewouldbelievethem；andthatthemoralistcannotlaydownarulewhich，ifgenerallyaccepted，wouldbesuicidal。
Tothisthereseemtobethreeanswers。Inthefirstplaceitisnotnecessarilyanevilthatmen’sconfidenceineachother’sassertionsshould，undercertainpeculiarcircumstances，beimpairedordestroyed:itmayevenbetheveryresultwhichweshouldmostdesiretoproduce:e。g。itisobviouslyamosteffectiveprotectionforlegitimatesecretsthatitshouldbeuniversallyunderstoodandexpectedthatthosewhoaskquestionswhichtheyhavenorighttoaskwillhaveliestoldthem:nor，again，shouldweberestrainedfrompronouncingitlawfultomeetdeceitwithdeceit，merelybythefearofimpairingthesecuritywhichroguesnowderivefromtheveracityofhonestmen。Nodoubttheultimateresultofgeneralunveracityunderthecircumstanceswouldbeastateofthingsinwhichsuchfalsehoodswouldnolongerbetold:butunlessthisultimateresultisundesirable，theprospectofitdoesnotconstituteareasonwhythefalsehoodsshouldnotbetoldsolongastheyareuseful。But，secondly，sincethebeliefsofmeningeneralarenotformedpurelyonrationalgrounds，experienceshowsthatunveracitymaylongremainpartiallyeffectiveundercircumstanceswhereitisgenerallyunderstoodtobelegitimate。Weseethisinthecaseofthelaw-courts。Forthoughjurymenareperfectlyawarethatitisconsideredthedutyofanadvocatetostateasplausiblyaspossiblewhateverhehasbeeninstructedtosayonbehalfofanycriminalliemaydefend，stillaskilfulpleadermayoftenproduceanimpressionthathesincerelybelieveshisclienttobeinnocent:anditremains，aquestionofcasuistryhowfarthiskindofhypocrisyisjustifiable。But，finally，itcannotbeassumedascertainthatitisneverrighttoactuponamaximofwhichtheuniversalapplicationwouldbeanundoubtedevil。Thisassumptionmayseemtobeinvolvedinwhatwaspreviouslyadmittedasanethicalaxiom，thatwhatisrightformemustberightfor`allpersonsundersimilarconditions’。[1]
Butreflectionwillshowthatthereisaspecialcasewithintherangeoftheaxiominwhichitsapplicationisnecessarilyself-limiting，andexcludesthepracticaluniversalitywhichtheaxiomappearstosuggest:i。e。wheretheagent’sconditionsinclude1theknowledgethathismaximisnotuniversallyaccepted，and2areasonedconvictionthathisactwillnottendtomakeitso，toanyimportantextent。Forinthiscasetheaxiomwillpracticallyonlymeanthatitwillberightforallpersonstodoastheagentdoes，iftheyaresincerelyconvincedthattheactwillnotbewidelyimitated；andthisconvictionmustvanishifitiswidelyimitated。Itcanhardlybesaidthattheseconditionsareimpossible:
andiftheyarepossible，theaxiomthatwearediscussingcanonlyserve，initspresentapplication，todirectourattentiontoanimportantdangerofunveracity，whichconstitutesastrong——butnotformallyconclusive——utilitariangroundforspeakingthetruth。{Note}
MEBook3Chapter7Section3Note3
Note——Mr。StephenScienceofEthics，chap。v。§；33explainstheexceptionstotheruleoftruth-speakingasfollows:——
``Therule，`Lienot’，istheexternalrule，andcorrespondsapproximatelytotheinternalrule，`Betrustworthy’。Casesoccurwheretherulesdiverge，andinsuchcasesitistheinternalrulewhichismorallyapproved。Truthfulnessistherulebecauseinthevastmajorityofcaseswetrustamaninsofarashespeaksthetruth；intheexceptionalcases，themutualconfidencewouldbeviolatedwhenthetruth，notwhenthelie，isspoken。’’
Thisexplanationseemstomeforseveralreasonsinadequate。1ifwemaysometimeslietodefendthelifeorsecretsofothers，itisparadoxicaltosaythatwemaynotdosotodefendourown；butafalsehoodinself-defenceobviouslycannotbejustifiedasanapplicationofthemaxim``betrustworthy’’。2Evenwhenthefalsehoodisinlegitimatedefenceofothersagainstattacks，wecannotsaythatthespeakermanifests``trustworthiness’’withoutqualification；forthedeceivedassailanttrustshisveracity，otherwisehewouldnotbedeceived:thequestionthereforeisunderwhatcircumstancestheconfidenceofAthatIshallspeakthetruthmaylegitimatelybedisappointedinordernottodisappointtheconfidenceofBthatIshalldefendhislifeandhonour。ThisquestionMr。Stephen’sexplanationdoesnotinanywayaidustoanswer。
ThegeneralquestionraisedbyMr。Stephen，astothevalueof``internalrules’’，expressedintheform``Bethis’’，incontrasttoexternalrules，expressedintheform``Dothis’’，willbedealtwithinasubsequentchapterWhenweproceedtoinquirehowfartheminorsocialdutiesandvirtuesrecognisedbyCommonSenseappearonexaminationtobeanythingmorethanspecialapplicationsoftheBenevolence——generalorparticular——discussedinchap。iv。，thedepartmentofdutywhichmostprominentlyclaimsourattention，isthatwhichdealswiththeexistence，anddeterminesthelegitimacy，offeelingsantitheticaltothebenevolent，Foritseemsthatmalevolentaffectionsareasnaturaltomanasthebenevolent:notindeedinthesamesense——formantendstohavenormallysomekindlyfeelingforanyfellow-man，whenthereisnospecialcauseoperatingtomakehimloveorhate，thoughthistendencyisobscuredinthelowerstagesofsocialdevelopmentbythehabitualhostilitybetweenstrangetribesandraces；butstillsuchspecialcausesofmalevolentfeelingcontinuallyoccur，and，inthemain，exemplifyapsychologicallawanalogoustothatbywhichthegrowthofbenevolentfeelingsisexplained。Forjustasweareapttolovethosewhoarethecauseofpleasuretouswhetherbyvoluntarybenefitsorotherwise:
sobystrictanalogywenaturallydislikethosewhohavedoneusharm，eitherconsciouslyfrommalevolenceormereselfishness，orevenunconsciously，aswhenanothermanisanobstacleto，ourattainmentofamuch-desiredend。Thuswenaturallyfeelill-willtoarivalwhodeprivesusofanobjectofcompetition:andsoinpersonsinwhointhedesireofsuperiorityisstrong，acertaindislikeofanyonewhoismoresuccessfulorprosperousthanthemselvesiseasilyaroused:andthisenvy，howeverrepulsivetoourmoralsense，seemsasnaturalasanyothermalevolentemotion。Anditistobeobservedthateachoftheelementsintowhichwecananalysemalevolentaffectionfindsitsexactcounterpartintheanalysisofthebenevolent:astheformerincludesadislikeofthepresenceofitsobjectandadesiretoinflictpainonit，andalsoacapacityofderivingpleasurefromthepainthusinflicted。
Ifnowweaskhowfarindulgenceofmalevolentemotionsisrightandproper，theanswerofCommonSenseisnoteasytoformulate。Forsomewouldsaybroadlythattheyoughttoberepressedaltogetherorasfaraspossible。Andnodoubtweblameallenvythoughsometimestoexcludeitaltogetherrequiresamagnanimitywhichwepraise:andweregardasvirtuesornaturalexcellencesthegood-humourwhichpreventsonefromfeelingevenpaintoamaterialextent——nottosayresentment——fromtriflingannoyancesinflictedbyothers，themeeknesswhichdoesnotresentevengraverinjuries，themildnessandgentlenesswhichrefrainfromretaliatingthem，andtheplacabilitywhichaccordsforgivenessrapidlyandeasily。Weareevenaccustomedtopraisethemercywhichsparesevendeservedpunishment:becausethoughweneverexactlydisapproveoftheinflictionofdeservedpunishment，andholdittobegenerallyadutyofgovernment-andincertaincasesofprivatepersons-toinflictit，wedonotthinkthatthisdutyadmitsofnoexceptions；wethinkthatinexceptionalcasesconsiderationsnotstrictlyrelevanttothequestionofjusticemaybeproperlyregardedasreasonsforremittingpunishment，andweadmirethesympatheticnaturethateagerlyavailsitselfoftheselegitimateoccasionsforremission。
OntheotherhandCommonSenseadmitsinstinctiveresentmentforwrongtobelegitimateandproper:andevenamoresustainedanddeliberatemalevolenceiscommonlyapprovedasvirtuousindignation。
Theproblem，then，ishowtoreconcilethesediverseapprovals。Evenasregardsexternalduty，thereissomedifficulty；since，thoughitiscleartocommonsensethatinawell-orderedsocietypunishmentofadultsoughtgenerallytobeinflictedbygovernment，andthataprivateindividualwrongedoughtnotto``takethelawintohisownhands’’，——stillthereareinallsocietiesinjuriestoindividualswhichthelawdoesnotpunishatallornotadequately，andforwhicheffectiverequitalisoftenpossiblewithouttransgressingthelimitsoflegality；andthereseemstobenoclearagreementastotherightmannerofdealingwiththese。FortheChristiancodeiswidelythoughttoprescribeacompleteandabsoluteforgivenessofsuchoffences，andmanyChristianshaveendeavouredtocarryoutthisrulebydismissingtheoffencesasfaraspossiblefromtheirminds，oratleastallowingthememoryofthemtohavenoeffectontheiroutwardconduct。Few，however，woulddenythat，sofarasawrongdonetomegivesgroundforexpectingfuturemischieffromtheoffendertomyselfortoothers，Iamboundasarationalbeingtotakedueprecautionsagainstthisfuturemischief；andprobablymostwouldadmitthatsuchprecautionsforthefuture，inthecaseweareconsidering，mayincludetheinflictionofpunishmentforthepast，whereimpunitywouldgiveadangeroustemptationtoarepetitionoftheunpunishedoffence。Ifweask，therefore，howfarforgivenessispracticallypossible，theanswerseemsadmittedlytodependontwoconsiderations:1howfarthepunishmenttowhichresentmentpromptsisreallyrequiredintheinterestsofsociety，and2howfar，ifso，itwillbeadequatelyinflictedifthepersonwrongedrefrainsfrominflictingit。But，obviously，sofarasweallowthequestiontobesettledbytheseconsiderationsweareintroducingamethoddifficulttodistinguishfromtheUtilitarian。
Andweseemledtoasimilarresultindiscussingthelegitimacyofmalevolentfeeling。Hereagainwefindmuchdisagreementamongthoughtfulpersons:formanywouldsaythatthoughtheemotionofangerislegitimate，itoughttobedirectedalwaysagainstwrongactsassuch，andnotagainsttheagent:forevenwheretheangermaylegitimatelypromptustopunishhim，itoughtnevertoovercomeourkindlyfeelingtowardshim。Andcertainlyifthisstateofmindispossible，itseemsthesimplestreconciliationofthegeneralmaximofBenevolencewiththeadmitteddutyofinflictingpunishment。Ontheotherhand，itisurged，withsomereason，thattoretaingenuinekindlyfeelingtowardsaman，whilewearegratifyingstrongimpulseofaversiontohisactsbyinflictingpainonhim，requiresasubtlecomplexityofemotiontoofaroutofthereachofordinarymentobeprescribedasaduty:andthatwemustallowasrightandproperatemporarysuspensionofbenevolencetowardswrong-doersuntiltheyhavebeenpunished。Some，again，makeadistinctionbetweenInstinctiveandDeliberateResentment:sayingthattheformerislegitimateinsofarasitisrequiredfortheself-defenceofindividualsandtherepressionofmutualviolence，butthatdeliberateresentmentisnotsimilarlyneeded，forifweactdeliberatelywecanactfromabettermotive。Others，however，thinkthatadeliberateandsustaineddesiretopunishwrong-doersisrequiredintheinterestsofsociety，sincethemeredesiretorealiseJusticewillnotpracticallybestrongenoughtorepressoffences:andthatitisasseriousamistaketoattempttosubstitutethedesireofJusticefornaturalresentmentasitwouldbetosubstituteprudencefornaturalappetiteineatinganddrinking，ormeredutifulnessforfilialaffection。
Again，adistinctionmaybetakenbetweentheimpulsetoinflictpainandthedesireoftheantipatheticpleasurewhichtheagentwillreapfromthisinfliction；sothat，whileweapprovetheformerundercertaincircumstances，wemaystillregardthelatterasaltogetherinadmissible。
Itwouldseem，however，thatamanundertheinfluenceofastrongpassionofresentmentcanhardlyexcludefromhismindaltogetherananticipationofthepleasurethathewillfeelwhenthepassionisgratified；andifso，hecanhardlyexcludealtogetherthedesireofthisgratification。
If，therefore，itisimportantforthewell-beingofsocietythatmenshouldderiveheartysatisfactionfromthepunishmentofanefariouscriminal，itisperhapsgoingtoofartoprohibitabsolutelythedesireofthissatisfaction；
thoughwemaysaythatamanoughtnottocherishthisdesire，andgloatovertheanticipatedpleasure。
Onthewholewemayperhapssumupbysayingthatasuperficialviewofthematternaturallyleadsustocondemnsweepinglyallmalevolentfeelingsandtheactstowhichtheyprompt，ascontrarytothegeneraldutyofbenevolence:butthatthecommonsenseofreflectivepersonsrecognisesthenecessityofrelaxingthisruleintheinterestsofsociety:onlyitisnotclearastothelimitsorprinciplesofthisrelaxation，thoughinclinedtoletitbedeterminedbyconsiderationsofexpediency，MEBook3Chapter8Section2