BesidestheVirtueofPurity，whichwefounditconvenienttodiscussinthelastchapter，thereremainoneortwoprominentexcellencesofcharacterwhichdonotseemtobecommonlyadmiredandinculcatedwithanydistinctreferenceeithertoprivateortogeneralhappiness；
andwhich，thoughinmostcasesobviouslyconducivetooneorotheroftheseends，sometimesseemtoinfluenceconductinadirectionatvariancewiththem。
Forexample，Courageisaqualitywhichexcitesgeneraladmiration，whetheritisshowninself-defence，orinaidingothers，orevenwhenwedonotseeanybenefitresultingfromtheparticularexhibitionofit。Again，inChristiansocieties，Humilityifbelievedsincereoftenobtainsunqualifiedpraise，inspiteofthelossthatmayevidentlyresultfromaman’sunderratinghisownabilities。Itwillbewell，therefore，toexaminehowfarineithercasewecanelicitaclearandindependentmaximdefiningtheconductcommendedundereachofthesenotions。
TobeginwithCourage。Wegenerallydenotebythistermadispositiontofacedangerofanykindwithoutshrinking。Wesometimesalsocallthosewhobearpainunflinchinglycourageous:butthisqualityofcharacterwemorecommonlydistinguishasFortitude。Nowitseemsplainthatifweseekforadefinitionofstrictduty，ascommonlyrecognised，undertheheadeitherofCourageorofFortitude，wecanfindnonethatdoesnotinvolveareferencetoothermaximsandends。Fornoonewouldsaythatitisourdutytofacedangerortobearavoidablepaingenerally，butonlyifitmeetsusinthecourseofduty。Andeventhisneedsfurtherqualification:forasregardssuchdutiesasthosee。g。ofgeneralBenevolence，itwouldbecommonlyallowedthattheagent’spainanddangeraretobetakenintoaccountinpracticallydeterminingtheirextent:——itwouldbeheldthatwearenotboundtoendureanypainexceptforthepreventionofmanifestlygreaterpaintoanother，ortheattainmentofamoreimportantamountofpositivegood:nortorunanyrisk，unlessthechanceofadditionalbenefittobegainedforanotheroutweighsthecostandchanceoflosstoourselvesifwefail。IndeeditisdoubtfulwhetherthecommonestimateofthedutyofBenevolencecouldbesaidtoamountquitetothis。[2]
When，however，weconsiderCourageasanExcellenceratherthanaduty，itseemstoholdamoreindependentpositioninourmoralestimation。Andthisviewcorrespondsmorecompletelythantheothertothecommonapplicationofthenotion；astherearemanyactsofcourage，whicharenotaltogetherwithinthecontroloftheWill，andthereforecannotberegardedasstrictduties。For1dangerisfrequentlysuddenandneedstobemetwithoutdeliberation，sothatourmannerofmeetingitcanonlybesemi-voluntary。And2thoughnaturallytimidpersonscanperhapswitheffortcontrolfearastheycanangerorappetite，iftimebeallowedfordeliberation，andcanpreventitfromtakingeffectinderelictionofduty:stillthisresultisnotallthatisrequiredfortheperformanceofsuchcourageousactsasneedmorethanordinaryenergy——fortheenergyofthetimidvirtuousmanisliabletobeexhaustedintheefforttocontrolhisfear:e。g。inbattlehecanperhapsstandstilltobekilledaswellasthecourageousmanbutnotchargewiththesameimpetuosityorstrikewiththesamevigourandprecision。[3]
SofarthenasCourageisnotcompletelyvoluntary，wehavetoconsiderwhetheritisadesirablequalityratherthanwhetherwearestrictlyboundtoexhibitit。Andherethereseemsnodoubtthatwecommonlyfinditmorallyadmirablewithoutreferencetoanyendservedbyit，andwhenthedangerswhichcallitforthmightbeavoidedwithoutanyderelictionofduty。Atthesametimewecallamanfoolhardywhorunsunnecessarilyintodangerbeyondacertaindegree。Wherethenisthelimittobefixed？Onutilitarianprinciplesweshouldendeavourtostrikeasexactabalanceaspossiblebetweentheamountofdangerincurredinanycaseandtheprobablebenefitofcultivatinganddevelopingbypracticeahabitsofrequentlynecessaryforthedueperformanceofimportantduties。
Thiswillobviouslygiveadifferentresultfordifferentstatesofsocietyanddifferentcallingsandprofessions；asmostpeopleneedthisinstinctivecouragelessincivilisedsocietiesthaninsemi-barbarousones，andcivilianslessthansoldiers。Perhapstheinstinctiveadmirationofmankindforactsofdaringdoesnotaltogetherobservethislimit:butwemaysay，Ithink，thatinsofarasitattemptstojustifyitselfonreflection，itiscommonlyinsomesuchwayasthis；andCommonSensedoesnotseemtopointtoanylimitdependingonadifferentprinciple。
AstheVirtueofCourageisprominentinPaganethics，andintheCodeofHonourwhichmayberegardedasasortofsurvivalofthepaganviewofmorality，soHumilityespeciallybelongstotheidealsetbeforemankindbyChristianity。Thecommonaccount，however，ofthisvirtueissomewhatparadoxical。ForitisgenerallysaidthatHumilityprescribesalowopinionofourownmerits:butifourmeritsarecomparativelyhigh，itseemsstrangetodirectustohavealowopinionofthem。Itmaybereplied，thatthoughourmeritsmaybehighwhencomparedwiththoseofordinarymen，therearealwayssometobefoundsuperior，andwecancompareourselveswiththese，andintheextremecasewithidealexcellence，ofwhichallfallfarshort；andthatweoughttomakethiskindofcomparisonandnottheotherkind，andcontemplateourfaults——ofwhichweshallassuredlyfindasufficiency——andnotourmerits。Butsurelyinthemostimportantdeliberationswhichhumanlifeoffers，indeterminingwhatkindofworkweshallundertakeandtowhatsocialfunctionsweshallaspire，itisoftennecessarythatweshouldcompareourqualificationscarefullywiththoseofaveragemen，ifwearetodeciderightly。Anditwouldseemjustasirrationaltounderrateourselvesastooverrate；andthoughmostmenaremorepronetothelattermistake，therearecertainlysomeratherinclinedtotheformer。
IthinkthatifwereflectcarefullyonthecommonjudgmentsinwhichthenotionofHumilityisused，weshallfindthatthequalitycommonlypraisedunderthisnamewhichisnotalwaysusedeulogistically，isnotproperlyregulativeoftheopinionsweformofourselves——forhereasinotheropinionsweoughttoaimatnothingbutTruth——buttendstotherepressionoftwodifferentseductiveemotions，oneentirelyself-regarding，theotherrelatingtoothersandpartlytakingeffectinsocialbehaviour。Partly，theVirtueofHumilityismanifestedinrepressingtheemotionofself-admiration，whichspringsnaturallyfromthecontemplationofourownmerits，andasitishighlyagreeable，promptstosuchcontemplation。Thisadmiringself-complacencyisgenerallycondemned:
butnot，Ithink，byanintuitionthatclaimstobeultimate，asitiscommonlyjustifiedbythereasonthatsuchself-admiration，evenifwell-grounded，tendstocheckourprogresstowardshighervirtue。Themerefactofourfeelingthisadmirationisthoughttobeevidencethatwehavenotsufficientlycomparedourselveswithourideal，orthatouridealisnotsufficientlyhigh:anditisthoughttobeindispensabletomoralprogressthatweshouldhaveahighidealandshouldcontinuallycontemplateit。Atthesametime，weobviouslyneedsomecareintheapplicationofthismaxim。Foralladmitthatself-respectisanimportantauxiliarytorightconduct:andmoralistscontinuallypointtothesatisfactionsofagoodconscienceaspartofthenaturalrewardwhichProvidencehasattachedtovirtue:yetitisdifficulttoseparatetheglowofself-approbationwhichattendstheperformanceofavirtuousactionfromthecomplacentself-consciousnesswhichHumilityseemstoexclude。Perhapswemaysaythatthefeelingofself-approbationitselfisnaturalandalegitimatepleasure，butthatifprolongedandfostereditisliabletoimpedemoralprogress:andthatwhatHumilityprescribesissuchrepressionofself-satisfactionaswilltendonthewholetopromotethisend。OnthisviewthemaximofHumilityisclearlyadependentone:theendtowhichitissubordinateisprogressinVirtuegenerally。Asforsuchprideandself-satisfactionasarebasednotonourownconductanditsresults，butonexternalandaccidentaladvantages，thesearecondemnedasinvolvingafalseandabsurdviewastothenatureofrealmerit。
Butwenotonlytakepleasureinourownrespectandadmiration，butstillmore，generallyspeaking，intherespectandadmirationofothers。Thedesireforthis，again，isheldtobetosomeextentlegitimate，andevenavaluableaidtomorality:
butasitisadangerouslyseductiveimpulse，andfrequentlyactsinoppositiontoduty，itisfelttostandinspecialneedofself-control。Humility，however，doesnotsomuchconsistincontrollingthisdesire，asinrepressingtheclaimforitssatisfactionwhichwearenaturallydisposedtomakeuponothers。Weareinclinedtodemandfromothers`tokensofrespect’，someexternalsymboloftheirrecognitionofourelevatedplaceinthescaleofhumanbeings；andtocomplainifourdemandsarenotgranted。
SuchclaimsanddemandsHumilitybidsusrepress。Itisthoughttobeourdutynottoexact，inmanycases，eventheexpressionofreverencewhichothersarestrictlyboundtopay。Andyethere，again，thereisalimit，intheviewofCommonSense，atwhichthisqualityofbehaviourpassesoverintoafault:fortheomissionofmarksofrespectissometimesaninsultwhichimpulsescommonlyregardedaslegitimateandevenvirtuoussenseofDignity，Self-respect，ProperPride，etc。promptustorepel。
Idonot，however，thinkitpossibletoclaimaconsensusforanyformulafordeterminingthislimit。
WehavenowconcludedsuchdetailedexaminationofthemoralityofCommonSenseas，ontheplanlaiddowninchap。i。ofthisBook，itseemeddesirabletoundertake。Wehavenotdiscussedallthetermsofourcommonmoralvocabulary:butIbelievethatwehaveomittednonethatareimportanteitherinthemselvesorrelativelytoourpresentinquiry。Forofthosethatremainwemayfairlysay，thattheymanifestlywillnotfurnishindependentmaxims:forreflectionwillshowthattheconductdesignatedbythemiseitherprescribedmerelyasameanstotheperformanceofdutiesalreadydiscussed；orisreallyidenticalwiththewholeorpartofsomeofthese，viewedinsomespecialaspect，orperhapsspecialisedbytheadditionofsomepeculiarcircumstanceorcondition。
Letusnowpauseandsurveybrieflytheprocessinwhichwehavebeenengaged，andtheresultswhichwehaveelicited。
Westartedwithadmittingthepointupontheproofofwhichmoralistshaveoftenconcentratedtheirefforts，theexistenceofapparentlyindependentmoralintuitions。Itseemedundeniablethatmenjudgesomeactstoberightandwronginthemselves，withoutconsiderationoftheirtendencytoproducehappinesstotheagentortoothers:andindeedwithouttakingtheirconsequencesintoaccountatall，exceptinsofarastheseareincludedinthecommonnotionoftheact。Wesaw，however，thatinsofarasthesejudgmentsarepassedinparticularcases，theyseemtoinvolveatleastforthemorereflectivepartofmankindareferenceofthecasetosomegeneralruleofduty:andthatinthefrequentcasesofdoubtorconflictofjudgmentsastotherightnessofallyaction，appealiscommonlymadetosuchrulesormaxims，astheultimatelyvalidprinciplesofmoralcognition。Inorder，therefore，tothrowtheMoralityofCommonSenseintoascientificform，itseemednecessarytoobtainasexactastatementaspossibleofthesegenerallyrecognisedprinciples。IdidnotthinkthatIcoulddispensemyselffromthistaskbyanysummarygeneralargument，basedontheunscientificcharacterofcommonmorality。Thereisnodoubtthatthemoralopinionsofordinarymenareinmanypointsloose，shifting，andmutuallycontradictory，butitdoesnotfollowthatwemaynotobtainfromthisfluidmassofopinion，adepositofclearandpreciseprinciplescommandinguniversalacceptance。Thequestion，whetherwecandothisornot，seemedtomeone，whichshouldnotbedecidedaprioriwithoutafairtrial:anditispartlyinordertopreparematerialsforthistrialthatthesurveyintheprecedingeightchaptershasbeenconducted。Ihaveendeavouredtoascertainimpartially，bymerereflectiononourcommonmoraldiscourse，whatarethegeneralprinciplesormaxims，accordingtowhichdifferentkindsofconductarejudgedtoberightandreasonableindifferentdepartmentsoflife。Iwishittobeparticularlyobserved，thatIhaveinnocaseintroducedmyownviews，insofarasIamconsciousoftheirbeingatallpeculiartomyself:mysoleobjecthasbeentomakeexplicittheimpliedpremisesofourcommonmoralreasoning。
Inowwishtosubjecttheresultsofthissurveytoafinalexamination，inordertodecidewhetherthesegeneralformulæ；possessthecharacteristicsbywhichself-evidenttruthsaredistinguishedfrommereopinions。