Thedistinctionofbirth，beingsubsequenttotheinequalityoffortune，canhavenoplaceinnationsofhunters，amongwhomallmen，beingequalinfortune，mustlikewisebeverynearlyequalinbirth。Thesonofawiseandbravemanmay，indeed，evenamongthem，besomewhatmorerespectedthanamanofequalmeritwhohasthemisfortunetobethesonofafooloracoward。Thedifference，however，willnotbeverygreat;andthereneverwas，Ibelieve，agreatfamilyintheworldwhoseillustrationwasentirelyderivedfromtheinheritanceofwisdomandvirtue。
Thedistinctionofbirthnotonlymay，butalwaysdoestakeplaceamongnationsofshepherds。Suchnationsarealwaysstrangerstoeverysortofluxury，andgreatwealthcanscarceeverbedissipatedamongthembyimprovidentprofusion。Therearenonationsaccordinglywhoaboundmoreinfamiliesreveredandhonouredonaccountoftheirdescentfromalongraceofgreatandillustriousancestors，becausetherearenonationsamongwhomwealthislikelytocontinuelongerinthesamefamilies。
Birthandfortuneareevidentlythetwocircumstanceswhichprincipallysetonemanaboveanother。Theyarethetwogreatsourcesofpersonaldistinction，andarethereforetheprincipalcauseswhichnaturallyestablishauthorityandsubordinationamongmen。Amongnationsofshepherdsboththosecausesoperatewiththeirfullforce。Thegreatshepherdorherdsman，respectedonaccountofhisgreatwealth，andofthegreatnumberofthosewhodependuponhimforsubsistence，andreveredonaccountofthenoblenessofhisbirth，andoftheimmemorialantiquityofhisillustriousfamily，hasanaturalauthorityoveralltheinferiorshepherdsorherdsmenofhishordeorclan。Hecancommandtheunitedforceofagreaternumberofpeoplethananyofthem。Hismilitarypowerisgreaterthanthatofanyofthem。
Intimeofwartheyareallofthemnaturallydisposedtomusterthemselvesunderhisbanner，ratherthanunderthatofanyotherperson，andhisbirthandfortunethusnaturallyprocuretohimsomesortofexecutivepower。Bycommanding，too，theunitedforceofagreaternumberofpeoplethananyofthem，heisbestabletocompelanyoneofthemwhomayhaveinjuredanothertocompensatethewrong。Heistheperson，therefore，towhomallthosewhoaretooweaktodefendthemselvesnaturallylookupforprotection。Itistohimthattheynaturallycomplainoftheinjurieswhichtheyimaginehavebeendonetothem，andhisinterpositioninsuchcasesismoreeasilysubmittedto，evenbythepersoncomplainedof，thanthatofanyotherpersonwouldbe。
Hisbirthandfortunethusnaturallyprocurehimsomesortofjudicialauthority。
Itisintheageofshepherds，inthesecondperiodofsociety，thattheinequalityoffortunefirstbeginstotakeplace，andintroducesamongmenadegreeofauthorityandsubordinationwhichcouldnotpossiblyexistbefore。Ittherebyintroducessomedegreeofthatcivilgovernmentwhichisindispensablynecessaryforitsownpreservation:anditseemstodothisnaturally，andevenindependentoftheconsiderationofthatnecessity。Theconsiderationofthatnecessitycomesnodoubtafterwardstocontributeverymuchtomaintainandsecurethatauthorityandsubordination。Therich，inparticular，arenecessarilyinterestedtosupportthatorderofthingswhichcanalonesecuretheminthepossessionoftheirownadvantages。Menofinferiorwealthcombinetodefendthoseofsuperiorwealthinthepossessionoftheirproperty，inorderthatmenofsuperiorwealthmaycombinetodefendtheminthepossessionoftheirs。
Alltheinferiorshepherdsandherdsmenfeelthatthesecurityoftheirownherdsandflocksdependsuponthesecurityofthoseofthegreatshepherdorherdsman;thatthemaintenanceoftheirlesserauthoritydependsuponthatofhisgreaterauthority，andthatupontheirsubordinationtohimdependshispowerofkeepingtheirinferiorsinsubordinationtothem。Theyconstituteasortoflittlenobility，whofeelthemselvesinterestedtodefendthepropertyandtosupporttheauthorityoftheirownlittlesovereigninorderthathemaybeabletodefendtheirpropertyandtosupporttheirauthority。Civilgovernment，sofarasitisinstitutedforthesecurityofproperty，isinrealityinstitutedforthedefenceoftherichagainstthepoor，orofthosewhohavesomepropertyagainstthosewhohavenoneatall。
Thejudicialauthorityofsuchasovereign，however，farfrombeingacauseofexpense，wasforalongtimeasourceofrevenuetohim。Thepersonswhoappliedtohimforjusticewerealwayswillingtopayforit，andapresentneverfailedtoaccompanyapetition。Aftertheauthorityofthesovereign，too，wasthoroughlyestablished，thepersonfoundguilty，overandabovethesatisfactionwhichhewasobligedtomaketotheparty，waslikewiseforcedtopayanamercementtothesovereign。Hehadgiventrouble，hehaddisturbed，hehadbrokethepeaceofhislordtheking，andforthoseoffencesanamercementwasthoughtdue。IntheTartargovernmentsofAsia，inthegovernmentsofEuropewhichwerefoundedbytheGermanandScythiannationswhooverturnedtheRomanempire，theadministrationofjusticewasaconsiderablesourceofrevenue，bothtothesovereignandtoallthelesserchiefsorlordswhoexercisedunderhimanyparticularjurisdiction，eitheroversomeparticulartribeorclan，oroversomeparticularterritoryordistrict。Originallyboththesovereignandtheinferiorchiefsusedtoexercisethisjurisdictionintheirownpersons。Afterwardstheyuniversallyfounditconvenienttodelegateittosomesubstitute，bailiff，orjudge。Thissubstitute，however，wasstillobligedtoaccounttohisprincipalorconstituentfortheprofitsofthejurisdiction。WhoeverreadstheinstructionswhichweregiventothejudgesofthecircuitinthetimeofHenryIIwillseeclearlythatthosejudgeswereasortofitinerantfactors，sentroundthecountryforthepurposeoflevyingcertainbranchesoftheking’srevenue。Inthosedaystheadministrationofjusticenotonlyaffordedacertainrevenuetothesovereign，buttoprocurethisrevenueseemstohavebeenoneoftheprincipaladvantageswhichheproposedtoobtainbytheadministrationofjustice。
Thisschemeofmakingtheadministrationofjusticesubservienttothepurposesofrevenuecouldscarcefailtobeproductiveofseveralverygrossabuses。Thepersonwhoappliedforjusticewithalargepresentinhishandwaslikelytogetsomethingmorethanjustice;whilehewhoappliedforitwithasmallonewaslikelytogetsomethingless。Justice，too，mightfrequentlybedelayedinorderthatthispresentmightberepeated。Theamercement，besides，ofthepersoncomplainedof，mightfrequentlysuggestaverystrongreasonforfindinghiminthewrong，evenwhenhehadnotreallybeenso。ThatsuchabuseswerefarfrombeinguncommontheancienthistoryofeverycountryinEuropebearswitness。
Whenthesovereignorchiefexercisedhisjudicialauthorityinhisownperson，howmuchsoeverhemightabuseit，itmusthavebeenscarcepossibletogetanyredress，becausetherecouldseldombeanybodypowerfulenoughtocallhimtoaccount。Whenheexerciseditbyabailiff，indeed，redressmightsometimesbehad。Ifitwasforhisownbenefitonlythatthebailiffhadbeenguiltyofanyactofinjustice，thesovereignhimselfmightnotalwaysbeunwillingtopunishhim，ortoobligehimtorepairthewrong。Butifitwasforthebenefitofhissovereign，ifitwasinordertomakecourttothepersonwhoappointedhimandwhomightpreferhim，thathehadcommittedanyactofoppression，redresswoulduponmostoccasionsbeasimpossibleasifthesovereignhadcommittedithimself。Inallbarbarousgovernments，accordingly，inallthoseancientgovernmentsofEuropeinparticularwhichwerefoundedupontheruinsoftheRomanempire，theadministrationofjusticeappearsforalongtimetohavebeenextremelycorrupt，farfrombeingquiteequalandimpartialevenunderthebestmonarchs，andaltogetherprofligateundertheworst。
Amongnationsofshepherds，wherethesovereignorchiefisonlythegreatestshepherdorherdsmanofthehordeorclan，heismaintainedinthesamemannerasanyofhisvassalsorsubjects，bytheincreaseofhisownherdsorflocks。Amongthosenationsofhusbandmenwhoarebutjustcomeoutoftheshepherdstate，andwhoarenotmuchadvancedbeyondthatstate，suchastheGreektribesappeartohavebeenaboutthetimeoftheTrojanwar，andourGermanandScythianancestorswhentheyfirstsettledupontheruinsofthewesternempire，thesovereignorchiefis，inthesamemanner，onlythegreatestlandlordofthecountry，andismaintained，inthesamemannerasanyotherlandlord，byarevenuederivedfromhisownprivateestate，orfromwhat，inmodernEurope，wascalledthedemesneofthecrown。
Hissubjects，uponordinaryoccasions，contributednothingtohissupport，exceptwhen，inordertoprotectthemfromtheoppressionofsomeoftheirfellow—subjects，theystandinneedofhisauthority。Thepresentswhichtheymakehimuponsuchoccasionsconstitutethewholeordinaryrevenue，thewholeoftheemolumentswhich，exceptperhapsuponsomeveryextraordinaryemergencies，hederivesfromhisdominionoverthem。WhenAgamemnon，inHomer，offerstoAchillesforhisfriendshipthesovereigntyofsevenGreekcities，thesoleadvantagewhichhementionsaslikelytobederivedfromitwasthatthepeoplewouldhonourhimwithpresents。Aslongassuchpresents，aslongastheemolumentsofjustice，orwhatmaybecalledthefeesofcourt，constitutedinthismannerthewholeordinaryrevenuewhichthesovereignderivedfromhissovereignty，itcouldnotwellbeexpected，itcouldnotevendecentlybeproposed，thatheshouldgivethemupaltogether。Itmight，anditfrequentlywasproposed，thatheshouldregulateandascertainthem。Butaftertheyhadbeensoregulatedandascertained，howtohinderapersonwhowasall—powerfulfromextendingthembeyondthoseregulationswasstillverydifficult，nottosayimpossible。
Duringthecontinuanceofthisstateofthings，therefore，thecorruptionofjustice，naturallyresultingfromthearbitraryanduncertainnatureofthosepresents，scarceadmittedofanyeffectualremedy。
Butwhenfromdifferentcauses，chieflyfromthecontinuallyincreasingexpensesofdefendingthenationagainsttheinvasionofothernations，theprivateestateofthesovereignhadbecomealtogetherinsufficientfordefrayingtheexpenseofthesovereignty，andwhenithadbecomenecessarythatthepeopleshould，fortheirownsecurity，contributetowardsthisexpensebytaxesofdifferentkinds，itseemstohavebeenverycommonlystipulatedthatnopresentfortheadministrationofjusticeshould，underanypretence，beacceptedeitherbythesovereign，orbyhisbailiffsandsubstitutes，thejudges。Thosepresents，itseemstohavebeensupposed，couldmoreeasilybeabolishedaltogetherthaneffectuallyregulatedandascertained。Fixedsalarieswereappointedtothejudges，whichweresupposedtocompensatetothemthelossofwhatevermighthavebeentheirshareoftheancientemolumentsofjustice，asthetaxesmorethancompensatedtothesovereignthelossofhis。Justicewasthensaidtobeadministeredgratis。
Justice，however，neverwasinrealityadministeredgratisinanycountry。Lawyersandattorneys，atleast，mustalwaysbepaidbytheparties;and，iftheywerenot，theywouldperformtheirdutystillworsethantheyactuallyperformit。Thefeesannuallypaidtolawyersandattorneysamount，ineverycourt，toamuchgreatersumthanthesalariesofthejudges。Thecircumstanceofthosesalariesbeingpaidbythecrowncannowheremuchdiminishthenecessaryexpenseofalaw—suit。Butitwasnotsomuchtodiminishtheexpense，astopreventthecorruptionofjustice，thatthejudgeswereprohibitedfromreceivinganypresentorfeefromtheparties。
Theofficeofjudgeisinitselfsoveryhonourablethatmenarewillingtoacceptofit，thoughaccompaniedwithverysmallemoluments。Theinferiorofficeofjusticeofpeace，thoughattendedwithagooddealoftrouble，andinmostcaseswithnoemolumentsatall，isanobjectofambitiontothegreaterpartofourcountrygentlemen。Thesalariesofallthedifferentjudges，highandlow，togetherwiththewholeexpenseoftheadministrationandexecutionofjustice，evenwhereitisnotmanagedwithverygoodeconomy，makes，inanycivilisedcountry，butaveryinconsiderablepartofthewholeexpenseofgovernment。
Thewholeexpenseofjustice，too，mighteasilybedefrayedbythefeesofcourt;and，withoutexposingtheadministrationofjusticetoanyrealhazardofcorruption，thepublicrevenuemightthusbedischargedfromacertain，though，perhaps，butasmallincumbrance。Itisdifficulttoregulatethefeesofcourteffectuallywhereapersonsopowerfulasthesovereignistoshareinthem，andtoderiveanyconsiderablepartofhisrevenuefromthem。Itisveryeasywherethejudgeistheprincipalpersonwhocanreapanybenefitfromthem。Thelawcanveryeasilyobligethejudgetorespecttheregulation，thoughitmightnotalwaysbeabletomakethesovereignrespectit。Wherethefeesofcourtarepreciselyregulatedandascertained，wheretheyarepaidallatonce，atacertainperiodofeveryprocess，intothehandsofacashierorreceiver，tobebyhimdistributedincertainknownproportionsamongthedifferentjudgesaftertheprocessisdecided，andnottillitisdecided，thereseemstobenomoredangerofcorruptionthanwheresuchfeesareprohibitedaltogether。Thosefees，withoutoccasioninganyconsiderableincreaseintheexpenseofalawsuit，mightberenderedfullysufficientfordefrayingthewholeexpenseofjustice。Bynotbeingpaidtothejudgestilltheprocesswasdetermined，theymightbesomeincitementtothediligenceofthecourtinexamininganddecidingit。Incourtswhichconsistedofaconsiderablenumberofjudges，byproportioningtheshareofeachjudgetothenumberofhoursanddayswhichhehademployedinexaminingtheprocess，eitherinthecourtorinacommitteebyorderofthecourt，thosefeesmightgivesomeencouragementtothediligenceofeachparticularjudge。Publicservicesareneverbetterperformedthanwhentheirrewardcomesonlyinconsequenceoftheirbeingperformed，andisproportionedtothediligenceemployedinperformingthem。InthedifferentparliamentsofFrance，thefeesofcourt（calledepicesandvacations）
constitutethefargreaterpartoftheemolumentsofthejudges。
Afteralldeductionsaremade，thenetsalarypaidbythecrowntoacounsellororjudgeintheParliamentofToulouse，inrankanddignitythesecondparliamentofthekingdom，amountsonlytoahundredandfiftylivres，aboutsixpoundselevenshillingssterlingayear。Aboutsevenyearsagothatsumwasinthesameplacetheordinaryyearlywagesofacommonfootman。Thedistributionofthoseepices，too，isaccordingtothediligenceofthejudges。Adiligentjudgegainsacomfortable，thoughmoderate，revenuebyhisoffice:anidleonegetslittlemorethanhissalary。ThoseParliamentsareperhaps，inmanyrespects，notveryconvenientcourtsofjustice;buttheyhaveneverbeenaccused，theyseemnevereventohavebeensuspected，ofcorruption。
ThefeesofcourtseemoriginallytohavebeentheprincipalsupportofthedifferentcourtsofjusticeinEngland。Eachcourtendeavouredtodrawtoitselfasmuchbusinessasitcould，andwas，uponthataccount，willingtotakecognisanceofmanysuitswhichwerenotoriginallyintendedtofallunderitsjurisdiction。TheCourtofKing’sBench，institutedforthetrialofcriminalcausesonly，tookcognisanceofcivilsuits;theplaintiffpretendingthatthedefendant，innotdoinghimjustice，hadbeenguiltyofsometrespassormisdemeanour。TheCourtofExchequer，institutedforthelevyingoftheking’srevenue，andforenforcingthepaymentofsuchdebtsonlyaswereduetotheking，tookcognisanceofallothercontractdebts;theplaintiffallegingthathecouldnotpaythekingbecausethedefendantwouldnotpayhim。Inconsequenceofsuchfictionsitcame，inmanycases，todependaltogetheruponthepartiesbeforewhatcourttheywouldchoosetohavetheircausetried;andeachcourtendeavoured，bysuperiordispatchandimpartiality，todrawtoitselfasmanycausesasitcould。ThepresentadmirableconstitutionofthecourtsofjusticeinEnglandwas，perhaps，originallyinagreatmeasureformedbythisemulationwhichancientlytookplacebetweentheirrespectivejudges;eachjudgeendeavouringtogive，inhisowncourt，thespeediestandmosteffectualremedywhichthelawwouldadmitforeverysortofinjustice。Originallythecourtsoflawgavedamagesonlyforbreachofcontract。TheCourtofChancery，asacourtofconscience，firsttookuponittoenforcethespecificperformanceofagreements。Whenthebreachofcontractconsistedinthenon—paymentofmoney，thedamagesustainedcouldbecompensatedinnootherwaythanbyorderingpayment，whichwasequivalenttoaspecificperformanceoftheagreement。Insuchcases，therefore，theremedyofthecourtsoflawwassufficient。
Itwasnotsoinothers。Whenthetenantsuedhislordforhavingunjustlyoutedhimofhislease，thedamageswhichherecoveredwerebynomeansequivalenttothepossessionoftheland。Suchcauses，therefore，forsometime，wentalltotheCourtofChancery，tothenosmalllossofthecourtsoflaw。ItwastodrawbacksuchcausestothemselvesthatthecourtsoflawaresaidtohaveinventedtheartificialandfictitiousWritofEjectment，themosteffectualremedyforanunjustouterordispossessionofland。
Astamp—dutyuponthelawproceedingsofeachparticularcourt，tobeleviedbythatcourt，andappliedtowardsthemaintenanceofthejudgesandotherofficersbelongingtoit，might，inthesamemanner，affordrevenuesufficientfordefrayingtheexpenseoftheadministrationofjustice，withoutbringinganyburdenuponthegeneralrevenueofthesociety。Thejudgesindeedmight，inthiscase，beunderthetemptationofmultiplyingunnecessarilytheproceedingsuponeverycause，inordertoincrease，asmuchaspossible，theproduceofsuchastamp—duty。IthasbeenthecustominmodernEuropetoregulate，uponmostoccasions，thepaymentoftheattorneysandclerksofcourtaccordingtothenumberofpageswhichtheyhadoccasiontowrite;thecourt，however，requiringthateachpageshouldcontainsomanylines，andeachlinesomanywords。Inordertoincreasetheirpayment，theattorneysandclerkshavecontrivedtomultiplywordsbeyondallnecessity，tothecorruptionofthelawlanguageof，Ibelieve，everycourtofjusticeinEurope。A
liketemptationmightperhapsoccasionalikecorruptionintheformoflawproceedings。
Butwhethertheadministrationofjusticebesocontrivedastodefrayitsownexpense，orwhetherthejudgesbemaintainedbyfixedsalariespaidtothemfromsomeotherfund，itdoesnotseemnecessarythatthepersonorpersonsentrustedwiththeexecutivepowershouldbechargedwiththemanagementofthatfund，orwiththepaymentofthosesalaries。Thatfundmightarisefromtherentoflandedestates，themanagementofeachestatebeingentrustedtotheparticularcourtwhichwastobemaintainedbyit。Thatfundmightariseevenfromtheinterestofasumofmoney，thelendingoutofwhichmight，inthesamemanner，beentrustedtothecourtwhichwastobemaintainedbyit。Apart，thoughindeedbutasmallpart，ofthesalaryofthejudgesoftheCourtofSessioninScotlandarisesfromtheinterestofasumofmoney。Thenecessaryinstabilityofsuchafundseems，however，torenderitanimproperoneforthemaintenanceofaninstitutionwhichoughttolastforever。
Theseparationofthejudicialfromtheexecutivepowerseemsoriginallytohavearisenfromtheincreasingbusinessofthesociety，inconsequenceofitsincreasingimprovement。Theadministrationofjusticebecamesolaboriousandsocomplicatedadutyastorequiretheundividedattentionofthepersonstowhomitwasentrusted。Thepersonentrustedwiththeexecutivepowernothavingleisuretoattendtothedecisionofprivatecauseshimself，adeputywasappointedtodecidetheminhisstead。IntheprogressoftheRomangreatness，theconsulwastoomuchoccupiedwiththepoliticalaffairsofthestatetoattendtotheadministrationofjustice。Apraetor，therefore，wasappointedtoadministeritinhisstead。IntheprogressoftheEuropeanmonarchieswhichwerefoundedupontheruinsoftheRomanempire，thesovereignsandthegreatlordscameuniversallytoconsidertheadministrationofjusticeasanofficebothtoolaboriousandtooignobleforthemtoexecuteintheirownpersons。Theyuniversally，therefore，dischargedthemselvesofitbyappointingadeputy，bailiff，orjudge。
Whenthejudicialisunitedtotheexecutivepower，itisscarcepossiblethatjusticeshouldnotfrequentlybesacrificedtowhatisvulgarlycalledpolities。Thepersonsentrustedwiththegreatinterestsofthestatemay，evenwithoutanycorruptviews，sometimesimagineitnecessarytosacrificetothoseintereststherightsofaprivateman。Butupontheimpartialadministrationofjusticedependsthelibertyofeveryindividual，thesensewhichhehasofhisownsecurity。Inordertomakeeveryindividualfeelhimselfperfectlysecureinthepossessionofeveryrightwhichbelongstohim，itisnotonlynecessarythatthejudicialshouldbeseparatedfromtheexecutivepower，butthatitshouldberenderedasmuchaspossibleindependentofthatpower。Thejudgeshouldnotbeliabletoberemovedfromhisofficeaccordingtothecapriceofthatpower。Theregularthegood—willorevenuponthegoodeconomypaymentofhissalaryshouldnotdependuponofthatpower。
PART3
OftheExpenseofPublicWorksandPublicInstitutionsTHEthirdandlastdutyofthesovereignorcommonwealthisthatoferectingandmaintainingthosepublicinstitutionsandthosepublicworks，which，thoughtheymaybeinthehighestdegreeadvantageoustoagreatsociety，are，however，ofsuchanaturethattheprofitcouldneverrepaytheexpensetoanyindividualorsmallnumberofindividuals，andwhichitthereforecannotbeexpectedthatanyindividualorsmallnumberofindividualsshoulderectormaintain。Theperformanceofthisdutyrequires，too，verydifferentdegreesofexpenseinthedifferentperiodsofsociety。
Afterthepublicinstitutionsandpublicworksnecessaryforthedefenceofthesociety，andfortheadministrationofjustice，bothofwhichhavealreadybeenmentioned，theotherworksandinstitutionsofthiskindarechieflythoseforfacilitatingthecommerceofthesociety，andthoseforpromotingtheinstructionofthepeople。Theinstitutionsforinstructionareoftwokinds:thosefortheeducationofyouth，andthosefortheinstructionofpeopleofallages。Theconsiderationofthemannerinwhichtheexpenseofthosedifferentsortsofpublic，worksandinstitutionsmaybemostproperlydefrayedwilldividethisthirdpartofthepresentchapterintothreedifferentarticles。
ARTICLE1
OfthePublicWorksandInstitutionsforfacilitatingtheCommerceoftheSocietyAnd，first，ofthosewhicharenecessaryforfacilitatingCommerceingeneral。
Thattheerectionandmaintenanceofthepublicworkswhichfacilitatethecommerceofanycountry，suchasgoodroads，bridges，navigablecanals，harbours，etc。，mustrequireverydifferentdegreesofexpenseinthedifferentperiodsofsocietyisevidentwithoutanyproof。Theexpenseofmakingandmaintainingthepublicroadsofanycountrymustevidentlyincreasewiththeannualproduceofthelandandlabourofthatcountry，orwiththequantityandweightofthegoodswhichitbecomesnecessarytofetchandcarryuponthoseroads。Thestrengthofabridgemustbesuitedtothenumberandweightofthecarriageswhicharelikelytopassoverit。Thedepthandthesupplyofwaterforanavigablecanalmustbeproportionedtothenumberandtonnageofthelighterswhicharelikelytocarrygoodsuponit;theextentofaharbourtothenumberoftheshippingwhicharelikelytotakeshelterinit。
Itdoesnotseemnecessarythattheexpenseofthosepublicworksshouldbedefrayedfromthatpublicrevenue，asitiscommonlycalled，ofwhichthecollectionandapplicationisinmostcountriesassignedtotheexecutivepower。Thegreaterpartofsuchpublicworksmayeasilybesomanagedastoaffordaparticularrevenuesufficientfordefrayingtheirownexpense，withoutbringinganyburdenuponthegeneralrevenueofthesociety。
Ahighway，abridge，anavigablecanal，forexample，mayinmostcasesbebothmadeandmaintainedbyasmalltolluponthecarriageswhichmakeuseofthem:aharbour，byamoderateport—dutyuponthetonnageoftheshippingwhichloadorunloadinit。Thecoinage，anotherinstitutionforfacilitatingcommerce，inmanycountries，notonlydefraysitsownexpense，butaffordsasmallrevenueorseignoragetothesovereign。Thepost—office，anotherinstitutionforthesamepurpose，overandabovedefrayingitsownexpense，affordsinalmostallcountriesaveryconsiderablerevenuetothesovereign。
Whenthecarriageswhichpassoverahighwayorabridge，andthelighterswhichsailuponanavigablecanal，paytollinproportiontotheirweightortheirtonnage，theypayforthemaintenanceofthosepublicworksexactlyinproportiontothewearandtearwhichtheyoccasionofthem。Itseemsscarcepossibletoinventamoreequitablewayofmaintainingsuchworks。Thistaxortolltoo，thoughitisadvancedbythecarrier，isfinallypaidbytheconsumer，towhomitmustalwaysbechargedinthepriceofthegoods。Astheexpenseofcarriage，however，isverymuchreducedbymeansofsuchpublicworks，thegoods，notwithstandingthetollcomecheapertotheconsumerthanthe;couldotherwisehavedone;theirpricenotbeingsomuchraisedbythetollasitisloweredbythecheapnessofthecarriage。Thepersonwhofinallypaysthistax，therefore，gainsbytheapplicationmorethanhelosesbythepaymentofit。Hispaymentisexactlyinproportiontohisgain。Itisinrealitynomorethanapartofthatgainwhichheisobligedtogiveupinordertogettherest。Itseemsimpossibletoimagineamoreequitablemethodofraisingatax。
Whenthetolluponcarriagesofluxuryuponcoaches，post—chaises，etc。，ismadesomewhathigherinproportiontotheirweightthanuponcarriagesofnecessaryuse，suchascarts，waggons，etc。，theindolenceandvanityoftherichismadetocontributeinaveryeasymannertothereliefofthepoor，byrenderingcheaperthetransportationofheavygoodstoallthedifferentpartsofthecountry。
Whenhighroads，bridges，canals，etc。，areinthismannermadeandsupportedbythecommercewhichiscarriedonbymeansofthem，theycanbemadeonlywherethatcommercerequiresthem，andconsequentlywhereitispropertomakethem。Theirexpensestoo，theirgrandeurandmagnificence，mustbesuitedtowhatthatcommercecanaffordtopay。Theymustbemadeconsequentlyasitispropertomakethem。Amagnificenthighroadcannotbemadethroughadesertcountrywherethereislittleornocommerce，ormerelybecauseithappenstoleadtothecountryvillaoftheintendantoftheprovince，ortothatofsomegreatlordtowhomtheintendantfindsitconvenienttomakehiscourt。Agreatbridgecannotbethrownoverariverataplacewherenobodypasses，ormerelytoembellishtheviewfromthewindowsofaneighbouringpalace:thingswhichsometimeshappenincountrieswhereworksofthiskindarecarriedonbyanyotherrevenuethanthatwhichtheythemselvesarecapableofaffording。
InseveraldifferentpartsofEuropethetonorlock—dutyuponacanalisthepropertyofprivatepersons，whoseprivateinterestobligesthemtokeepupthecanal。Ifitisnotkeptintolerableorder，thenavigationnecessarilyceasesaltogether，andalongwithitthewholeprofitwhichtheycanmakebythetolls。Ifthosetollswereputunderthemanagementofcommissioners，whohadthemselvesnointerestinthem，theymightbelessattentivetothemaintenanceoftheworkswhichproducedthem。ThecanalofLanguedoccosttheKingofFranceandtheprovinceupwardsofthirteenmillionsoflivres，which（attwenty—eightlivresthemarkofsilver，thevalueofFrenchmoneyintheendofthelastcentury）amountedtoupwardsofninehundredthousandpoundssterling。Whenthatgreatworkwasfinished，themostlikelymethod，itwasfound，ofkeepingitinconstantrepairwastomakeapresentofthetollstoRiquettheengineer，whoplannedandconductedthework。Thosetollsconstituteatpresentaverylargeestatetothedifferentbranchesofthefamilyofthatgentleman，whohave，therefore，agreatinteresttokeeptheworkinconstantrepair。Buthadthosetollsbeenputunderthemanagementofcommissioners，whohadnosuchinterest，theymightperhapshavebeendissipatedinornamentalandunnecessaryexpenses，whilethemostessentialpartsoftheworkwereallowedtogotoruin。
Thetollsforthemaintenanceofahighroadcannotwithanysafetybemadethepropertyofprivatepersons。Ahighroad，thoughentirelyneglected，doesnotbecomealtogetherimpassable，thoughacanaldoes。Theproprietorsofthetollsuponahighroad，therefore，mightneglectaltogethertherepairoftheroad，andyetcontinuetolevyverynearlythesametolls。Itisproper，therefore，thatthetollsforthemaintenanceofsuchaworkshouldbeputunderthemanagementofcommissionersortrustees。
InGreatBritain，theabuseswhichthetrusteeshavecommittedinthemanagementofthosetollshaveinmanycasesbeenveryjustlycomplainedof。Atmanyturnpikes，ithasbeensaid，themoneyleviedismorethandoubleofwhatisnecessaryforexecuting，inthecompletestmanner，theworkwhichisoftenexecutedinveryslovenlymanner，andsometimesnotexecutedatall。Thesystemofrepairingthehighroadsbytollsofthiskind，itmustbeobserved，isnotofverylongstanding。Weshouldnotwonder，therefore，ifithasnotyetbeenbroughttothatdegreeofperfectionofwhichitseemscapable。Ifmeanandimproperpersonsarefrequentlyappointedtrustees，andifpropercourtsofinspectionandaccounthavenotyetbeenestablishedforcontrollingtheirconduct，andforreducingthetollstowhatisbarelysufficientforexecutingtheworktobedonebythem，therecencyoftheinstitutionbothaccountsandapologizesforthosedefects，ofwhich，bythewisdomofParliament，thegreaterpartmayinduetimebegraduallyremedied。
ThemoneyleviedatthedifferentturnpikesinGreatBritainissupposedtoexceedsomuchwhatisnecessaryforrepairingtheroads，thatthesavings，which，withpropereconomy，mightbemadefromit，havebeenconsidered，evenbysomeministers，asaverygreatresourcewhichmightatsometimeoranotherbeappliedtotheexigenciesofthestate。Government，ithasbeensaid，bytakingthemanagementoftheturnpikesintoitsownhands，andbyemployingthesoldiers，whowouldworkforaverysmalladditiontotheirpay，couldkeeptheroadsingoodorderatamuchlessexpensethanitcanbedonebytrustees，whohavenootherworkmentoemploybutsuchasderivetheirwholesubsistencefromtheirwages。Agreatrevenue，halfamillionperhaps，*ithasbeenpretended，mightinthismannerbegainedwithoutlayinganynewburdenuponthepeople;andtheturnpikeroadsmightbemadetocontributetothegeneralexpenseofthestate，inthesamemannerasthepostofficedoesatpresent。
*Sincepublishingthetwofirsteditionsofthisbook，IhavegotgoodreasonstobelievethatalltheturnpiketollsleviedinGreatBritaindonotproduceanetrevenuethatamountstohalfamillion;asumwhich，underthemanagementofGovernment，wouldnotbesufficienttokeepinrepairfiveoftheprincipalroadsinthekingdom。
ThataconsiderablerevenuemightbegainedinthismannerI
havenodoubt，thoughprobablynotnearsomuchastheprojectorsofthisplanhavesupposed。Theplanitself，however，seemsliabletoseveralveryimportantobjections。
First，ifthetollswhichareleviedattheturnpikesshouldeverbeconsideredasoneoftheresourcesforsupplyingtheexigenciesofthestate，theywouldcertainlybeaugmentedasthoseexigenciesweresupposedtorequire。AccordingtothepolicyofGreatBritain，therefore，theywouldprobablybeaugmentedveryfast。Thefacilitywithwhichagreatrevenuecouldbedrawnfromthemwouldprobablyencourageadministrationtorecurveryfrequentlytothisresource。Thoughitmay，perhaps，bemorethandoubtfulwhetherhalfamillioncouldbyanyeconomybesavedoutofthepresenttolls，itcanscarcebedoubtedbutthatamillionmightbesavedoutofthemiftheyweredoubled:andperhapstwomillionsiftheyweretripled。*
Thisgreatrevenue，too，mightbeleviedwithouttheappointmentofasinglenewofficertocollectandreceiveit。Buttheturnpiketollsbeingcontinuallyaugmentedinthismanner，insteadoffacilitatingtheinlandcommerceofthecountryasatpresent，wouldsoonbecomeaverygreatincumbranceuponit。Theexpenseoftransportingallheavygoodsfromonepartofthecountrytoanotherwouldsoonbesomuchincreased，themarketforallsuchgoods，consequently，wouldsoonbesomuchnarrowed，thattheirproductionwouldbeinagreatmeasurediscouraged，andthemostimportantbranchesofthedomesticindustryofthecountryannihilatedaltogether。*Ihavenowgoodreasonstobelievethatalltheseconjecturalsumsarebymuchtoolarge。
Secondly，ataxuponcarriagesinproportiontotheirweight，thoughaveryequaltaxwhenappliedtothesolepurposeofrepairingtheroads，isaveryunequalonewhenappliedtoanyotherpurpose，ortosupplythecommonexigenciesofthestate。
Whenitisappliedtothesolepurposeabovementioned，eachcarriageissupposedtopayexactlyforthewearandtearwhichthatcarriageoccasionsoftheroads。Butwhenitisappliedtoanyotherpurpose，eachcarriageissupposedtopayformorethanthatwearandtear，andcontributestothesupplyofsomeotherexigencyofthestate。Butastheturnpiketollraisesthepriceofgoodsinproportiontotheirweight，andnottotheirvalue，itischieflypaidbytheconsumersofcoarseandbulky，notbythoseofpreciousandlight，commodities。Whateverexigencyofthestatethereforethistaxmightbeintendedtosupply，thatexigencywouldbechieflysuppliedattheexpenseofthepoor，nottherich;attheexpenseofthosewhoareleastabletosupplyit，notofthosewhoaremostable。
Thirdly，ifgovernmentshouldatanytimeneglectthereparationofthehighroads，itwouldbestillmoredifficultthanitisatpresenttocompeltheproperapplicationofanypartoftheturnpiketolls。Alargerevenuemightthusbelevieduponthepeoplewithoutanypartofitbeingappliedtotheonlypurposetowhicharevenueleviedinthismanneroughtevertobeapplied。Ifthemeannessandpovertyofthetrusteesofturnpikeroadsrenderitsometimesdifficultatpresenttoobligethemtorepairtheirwrong，theirwealthandgreatnesswouldrenderittentimesmoresointhecasewhichisheresupposed。
InFrance，thefundsdestinedforthereparationofhighroadsareundertheimmediatedirectionoftheexecutivepower。
Thosefundsconsistpartlyinacertainnumberofdays’labourwhichthecountrypeopleareinmostpartsofEuropeobligedtogivetothereparationofthehighways，andpartlyinsuchaportionofthegeneralrevenueofthestateasthekingchoosestosparefromhisotherexpenses。