BytheancientlawofFrance,aswellasbythatofmostotherpartsofEurope,thelabourofthecountrypeoplewasunderthedirectionofalocalorprovincialmagistracy,whichhadnoimmediatedependencyupontheking’scouncil。Butbythepresentpracticeboththelabourofthepeople,andwhateverotherfundthekingmaychoosetoassignforthereparationofthehighroadsinanyparticularprovinceorgenerality,areentirelyunderthemanagementoftheintendant;anofficerwhoisappointedandremovedbytheking’scouncil,andwhoreceiveshisordersfromit,andisinconstantcorrespondencewithit。Intheprogressofdespotismtheauthorityoftheexecutivepowergraduallyabsorbsthatofeveryotherpowerinthestate,andassumestoitselfthemanagementofeverybranchofrevenuewhichisdestinedforanypublicpurpose。InFrance,however,thegreatpost—roads,theroadswhichmakethecommunicationbetweentheprincipaltownsofthekingdom,areingeneralkeptingoodorder,andinsomeprovincesareevenagooddealsuperiortothegreaterpartoftheturnpikeroadsofEngland。Butwhatwecallthecross—roads,thatis,thefargreaterpartoftheroadsinthecountry,areentirelyneglected,andareinmanyplacesabsolutelyimpassableforanyheavycarriage。Insomeplacesitisevendangeroustotravelonhorseback,andmulesaretheonlyconveyanceswhichcansafelybetrusted。Theproudministerofanostentatiouscourtmayfrequentlytakepleasureinexecutingaworkofsplendourandmagnificence,suchasagreathighway,whichisfrequentlyseenbytheprincipalnobility,whoseapplausesnotonlyflatterhisvanity,butevencontributetosupporthisinterestatcourt。Buttoexecuteagreatnumberoflittleworks,inwhichnothingthatcanbedonecanmakeanygreatappearance,orexcitethesmallestdegreeofadmirationinanytraveller,andwhich,inshort,havenothingtorecommendthembuttheirextremeutility,isabusinesswhichappearsineveryrespecttoomeanandpaltrytomerittheattentionofsogreatamagistrate。Undersuchanadministration,therefore,suchworksarealmostalwaysentirelyneglected。
InChina,andinseveralothergovernmentsofAsia,theexecutivepowerchargesitselfbothwiththereparationofthehighroadsandwiththemaintenanceofthenavigablecanals。Intheinstructionswhicharegiventothegovernorofeachprovince,thoseobjects,itissaid,areconstantlyrecommendedtohim,andthejudgmentwhichthecourtformsofhisconductisverymuchregulatedbytheattentionwhichheappearstohavepaidtothispartofhisinstructions。Thisbranchofpublicpoliceaccordinglyissaidtobeverymuchattendedtoinallthosecountries,butparticularlyinChina,wherethehighroads,andstillmorethenavigablecanals,itispretended,exceedverymucheverythingofthesamekindwhichisknowninEurope。Theaccountsofthoseworks,however,whichhavebeentransmittedtoEurope,havegenerallybeendrawnupbyweakandwonderingtravellers;frequentlybystupidandlyingmissionaries。Iftheyhadbeenexaminedbymoreintelligenteyes,andiftheaccountsofthemhadbeenreportedbymorefaithfulwitnesses,theywouldnot,perhaps,appeartobesowonderful。TheaccountwhichBerniergivesofsomeworksofthiskindinIndostanfallsverymuchshortofwhathadbeenreportedofthembyothertravellers,moredisposedtothemarvellousthanhewas。Itmaytoo,perhaps,beinthosecountries,asinFrance,wherethegreatroads,thegreatcommunicationswhicharelikelytobethesubjectsofconversationatthecourtandinthecapital,areattendedto,andalltherestneglected。InChina,besides,inIndostan,andinseveralothergovernmentsofAsia,therevenueofthesovereignarisesalmostaltogetherfromalandtaxorlandrent,whichrisesorfallswiththeriseandfalloftheannualproduceoftheland。Thegreatinterestofthesovereign,therefore,hisrevenue,isinsuchcountriesnecessarilyandimmediatelyconnectedwiththecultivationoftheland,withthegreatnessofitsproduce,andwiththevalueofitsproduce。Butinordertorenderthatproducebothasgreatandasvaluableaspossible,itisnecessarytoprocuretoitasextensiveamarketaspossible,andconsequentlytoestablishthefreest,theeasiest,andtheleastexpensivecommunicationbetweenallthedifferentpartsofthecountry;whichcanbedoneonlybymeansofthebestroadsandthebestnavigablecanals。Buttherevenueofthesovereigndoesnot,inanypartofEurope,arisechieflyfromalandtaxorlandrent。InallthegreatkingdomsofEurope,perhaps,thegreaterpartofitmayultimatelydependupontheproduceoftheland:butthatdependencyisneithersoimmediate,norsoevident。InEurope,therefore,thesovereigndoesnotfeelhimselfsodirectlycalledupontopromotetheincrease,bothinquantityandvalue,oftheproduceoftheland,or,bymaintaininggoodroadsandcanals,toprovidethemostextensivemarketforthatproduce。Thoughitshouldbetrue,therefore,whatIapprehendisnotalittledoubtful,thatinsomepartsofAsiathisdepartmentofthepublicpoliceisveryproperlymanagedbytheexecutivepower,thereisnottheleastprobabilitythat,duringthepresentstateofthings,itcouldbetolerablymanagedbythatpowerinanypartofEurope。
Eventhosepublicworkswhichareofsuchanaturethattheycannotaffordanyrevenueformaintainingthemselves,butofwhichtheconveniencyisnearlyconfinedtosomeparticularplaceordistrict,arealwaysbettermaintainedbyalocalorprovincialrevenue,underthemanagementofalocalorprovincialadministration,thanbythegeneralrevenueofthestate,ofwhichtheexecutivepowermustalwayshavethemanagement。WerethestreetsofLondontobelightedandpavedattheexpenseofthetreasury,isthereanyprobabilitythattheywouldbesowelllightedandpavedastheyareatpresent,orevenatsosmallanexpense?Theexpense,besides,insteadofbeingraisedbyalocaltaxupontheinhabitantsofeachparticularstreet,parish,ordistrictinLondon,would,inthiscase,bedefrayedoutofthegeneralrevenueofthestate,andwouldconsequentlyberaisedbyataxuponalltheinhabitantsofthekingdom,ofwhomthegreaterpartderivenosortofbenefitfromthelightingandpavingofthestreetsofLondon。
Theabuseswhichsometimescreepintothelocalandprovincialadministrationofalocalandprovincialrevenue,howenormoussoevertheymayappear,areinreality,however,almostalwaysverytriflingincomparisonofthosewhichcommonlytakeplaceintheadministrationandexpenditureoftherevenueofagreatempire。Theyare,besides,muchmoreeasilycorrected。
UnderthelocalorprovincialadministrationofthejusticesofthepeaceinGreatBritain,thesixdays’labourwhichthecountrypeopleareobligedtogivetothereparationofthehighwaysisnotalwaysperhapsveryjudiciouslyapplied,butitisscarceeverexactedwithanycircumstancesofcrueltyoroppression。InFrance,undertheadministrationoftheintendants,theapplicationisnotalwaysmorejudicious,andtheexactionisfrequentlythemostcruelandoppressive。SuchCorvees,astheyarecalled,makeoneoftheprincipalinstrumentsoftyrannybywhichthoseofficerschastiseanyparishorcommunautewhichhashadthemisfortunetofallundertheirdispleasure。
OfthePublicWorksandInstitutionswhicharenecessaryforfacilitatingparticularBranchesofCommerce。
Theobjectofthepublicworksandinstitutionsabovementionedistofacilitatecommerceingeneral。Butinordertofacilitatesomeparticularbranchesofit,particularinstitutionsarenecessary,whichagainrequireaparticularandextraordinaryexpense。
Someparticularbranchesofcommerce,whicharecarriedonwithbarbarousanduncivilisednations,requireextraordinaryprotection。Anordinarystoreorcounting—housecouldgivelittlesecuritytothegoodsofthemerchantswhotradetothewesterncoastofAfrica。Todefendthemfromthebarbarousnatives,itisnecessarythattheplacewheretheyaredepositedshouldbe,insomemeasure,fortified。ThedisordersinthegovernmentofIndostanhavebeensupposedtorenderalikeprecautionnecessaryevenamongthatmildandgentlepeople;anditwasunderpretenceofsecuringtheirpersonsandpropertyfromviolencethatboththeEnglishandFrenchEastIndiaCompanieswereallowedtoerectthefirstfortswhichtheypossessedinthatcountry。Amongothernations,whosevigorousgovernmentwillsuffernostrangerstopossessanyfortifiedplacewithintheirterritory,itmaybenecessarytomaintainsomeambassador,minister,orcounsel,whomaybothdecide,accordingtotheirowncustoms,thedifferencesarisingamonghisowncountrymen,and,intheirdisputeswiththenatives,may,bymeansofhispubliccharacter,interferewithmoreauthority,andaffordthemamorepowerfulprotection,thantheycouldexpectfromanyprivateman。Theinterestsofcommercehavefrequentlymadeitnecessarytomaintainministersinforeigncountrieswherethepurposes,eitherofwaroralliance,wouldnothaverequiredany。ThecommerceoftheTurkeyCompanyfirstoccasionedtheestablishmentofanordinaryambassadoratConstantinople。ThefirstEnglishembassiestoRussiaarosealtogetherfromcommercialinterests。TheconstantinterferencewhichthoseinterestsnecessarilyoccasionedbetweenthesubjectsofthedifferentstatesofEurope,hasprobablyintroducedthecustomofkeeping,inallneighbouringcountries,ambassadorsorministersconstantlyresidenteveninthetimeofpeace。Thiscustom,unknowntoancienttimes,seemsnottobeolderthantheendofthefifteenthorbeginningofthesixteenthcentury;thatis,thanthetimewhencommercefirstbegantoextenditselftothegreaterpartofthenationsofEurope,andwhentheyfirstbegantoattendtoitsinterests。
Itseemsnotunreasonablethattheextraordinaryexpensewhichtheprotectionofanyparticularbranchofcommercemayoccasionshouldbedefrayedbyamoderatetaxuponthatparticularbranch;byamoderatefine,forexample,tobepaidbythetraderswhentheyfirstenterintoit,or,whatismoreequal,byaparticulardutyofsomuchpercentuponthegoodswhichtheyeitherimportinto,orexportoutof,theparticularcountrieswithwhichitiscarriedon。Theprotectionoftradeingeneral,frompiratesandfreebooters,issaidtohavegivenoccasiontothefirstinstitutionofthedutiesofcustoms。But,ifitwasthoughtreasonabletolayageneraltaxupontrade,inordertodefraytheexpenseofprotectingtradeingeneral,itshouldseemequallyreasonabletolayaparticulartaxuponaparticularbranchoftrade,inordertodefraytheextraordinaryexpenseofprotectingthatbranch。
Theprotectionoftradeingeneralhasalwaysbeenconsideredasessentialtothedefenceofthecommonwealth,and,uponthataccount,anecessarypartofthedutyoftheexecutivepower。Thecollectionandapplicationofthegeneraldutiesofcustoms,therefore,havealwaysbeenlefttothatpower。Buttheprotectionofanyparticularbranchoftradeisapartofthegeneralprotectionoftrade;apart,therefore,ofthedutyofthatpower;andifnationsalwaysactedconsistently,theparticulardutiesleviedforthepurposesofsuchparticularprotectionshouldalwayshavebeenleftequallytoitsdisposal。
Butinthisrespect,aswellasinmanyothers,nationshavenotalwaysactedconsistently;andinthegreaterpartofthecommercialstatesofEurope,particularcompaniesofmerchantshavehadtheaddresstopersuadethelegislaturetoentrusttothemtheperformanceofthispartofthedutyofthesovereign,togetherwithallthepowerswhicharenecessarilyconnectedwithit。
Thesecompanies,thoughtheymay,perhaps,havebeenusefulforthefirstintroductionofsomebranchesofcommerce,bymaking,attheirownexpense,anexperimentwhichthestatemightnotthinkitprudenttomake,haveinthelongrunproved,universally,eitherburdensomeoruseless,andhaveeithermismanagedorconfinedthetrade。
Whenthosecompaniesdonottradeuponajointstock,butareobligedtoadmitanyperson,properlyqualified,uponpayingacertainfine,andagreeingtosubmittotheregulationsofthecompany,eachmembertradinguponhisownstock,andathisownrisk,theyarecalledregulatedcompanies。Whentheytradeuponajointstock,eachmembersharinginthecommonprofitorlossinproportiontohisshareinthisstock,theyarecalledjointstockcompanies。Suchcompanies,whetherregulatedorjointstock,sometimeshave,andsometimeshavenot,exclusiveprivileges。
Regulatedcompaniesresemble,ineveryrespect,thecorporationsoftradessocommoninthecitiesandtownsofallthedifferentcountriesofEurope,andareasortofenlargedmonopoliesofthesamekind。Asnoinhabitantofatowncanexerciseanincorporatedtradewithoutfirstobtaininghisfreedominthecorporation,soinmostcasesnosubjectofthestatecanlawfullycarryonanybranchofforeigntrade,forwhicharegulatedcompanyisestablished,withoutfirstbecomingamemberofthatcompany。Themonopolyismoreorlessstrictaccordingasthetermsofadmissionaremoreorlessdifficult;
andaccordingasthedirectorsofthecompanyhavemoreorlessauthority,orhaveitmoreorlessintheirpowertomanageinsuchamannerastoconfinethegreaterpartofthetradetothemselvesandtheirparticularfriends。Inthemostancientregulatedcompaniestheprivilegesofapprenticeshipwerethesameasinothercorporations,andentitledthepersonwhohadservedhistimetoamemberofthecompanytobecomehimselfamember,eitherwithoutpayinganyfine,oruponpayingamuchsmalleronethanwhatwasexactedofotherpeople。Theusualcorporationspirit,whereverthelawdoesnotrestrainit,prevailsinallregulatedcompanies。Whentheyhavebeenallowedtoactaccordingtotheirnaturalgenius,theyhavealways,inordertoconfinethecompetitiontoassmallanumberofpersonsaspossible,endeavouredtosubjectthetradetomanyburdensomeregulations。Whenthelawhasrestrainedthemfromdoingthis,theyhavebecomealtogetheruselessandinsignificant。
TheregulatedcompaniesforforeigncommercewhichatpresentsubsistinGreatBritainaretheancientmerchantadventurers’company,nowcommonlycalledtheHamburgCompany,theRussiaCompany,theEastlandCompany,theTurkeyCompany,andtheAfricanCompany。
ThetermsofadmissionintotheHamburgCompanyarenowsaidtobequiteeasy,andthedirectorseitherhaveitnottheirpowertosubjectthetradetoanyburdensomerestraintorregulations,or,atleast,havenotoflateexercisedthatpower。
Ithasnotalwaysbeenso。Aboutthemiddleofthelastcentury,thefineforadmissionwasfifty,andatonetimeonehundredpounds,andtheconductofthecompanywassaidtobeextremelyoppressive。In1643,in1645,andin1661,theclothiersandfreetradersoftheWestofEnglandcomplainedofthemtoParliamentasofmonopolistswhoconfinedthetradeandoppressedthemanufacturesofthecountry。ThoughthosecomplaintsproducedanActofParliament,theyhadprobablyintimidatedthecompanysofarastoobligethemtoreformtheirconduct。Sincethattime,atleast,therehasbeennocomplaintsagainstthem。Bythe10thand11thofWilliamIII,c。6,thefineforadmissionintotheRussiaCompanywasreducedtofivepounds;andbythe25thofCharlesII,c。7,thatforadmissionintotheEastlandCompanytofortyshillings,while,atthesametime,Sweden,Denmark,andNorway,allthecountriesonthenorthsideoftheBaltic,wereexemptedfromtheirexclusivecharter。TheconductofthosecompanieshadprobablygivenoccasiontothosetwoActsofParliament。Beforethattime,SirJosiahChildhadrepresentedboththeseandtheHamburgCompanyasextremelyoppressive,andimputedtotheirbadmanagementthelowstateofthetradewhichweatthattimecarriedontothecountriescomprehendedwithintheirrespectivecharters。Butthoughsuchcompaniesmaynot,inthepresenttimes,beveryoppressive,theyarecertainlyaltogetheruseless。Tobemerelyuseless,indeed,isperhapsthehighesteulogywhichcaneverjustlybebestoweduponaregulatedcompany;andallthethreecompaniesabovementionedseem,intheirpresentstate,todeservethiseulogy。
ThefineforadmissionintotheTurkeyCompanywasformerlytwenty—fivepoundsforallpersonsundertwenty—sixyearsofage,andfiftypoundsforallpersonsabovethatage。Nobodybutmeremerchantscouldbeadmitted;arestrictionwhichexcludedallshopkeepersandretailers。Byabye—law,noBritishmanufacturescouldbeexportedtoTurkeybutinthegeneralshipsofthecompany;andasthoseshipssailedalwaysfromtheportofLondon,thisrestrictionconfinedthetradetothatexpensiveport,andthetraderstothosewholivedinLondonandinitsneighbourhood。Byanotherbye—law,nopersonlivingwithintwentymilesofLondon,andnotfreeofthecity,couldbeadmittedamember;anotherrestrictionwhich,joinedtotheforegoing,necessarilyexcludedallbutthefreemenofLondon。Asthetimefortheloadingandsailingofthosegeneralshipsdependedaltogetheruponthedirectors,theycouldeasilyfillthemwiththeirowngoodsandthoseoftheirparticularfriends,totheexclusionofothers,who,theymightpretend,hadmadetheirproposalstoolate。Inthisstateofthings,therefore,thiscompanywasineveryrespectastrictandoppressivemonopoly。
Thoseabusesgaveoccasiontotheactofthe26thofGeorgeII,c。18,reducingthefineforadmissiontotwentypoundsforallpersons,withoutanydistinctionofages,oranyrestriction,eithertomeremerchants,ortothefreemenofLondon;andgrantingtoallsuchpersonsthelibertyofexporting,fromalltheportsofGreatBritaintoanyportinTurkey,allBritishgoodsofwhichtheexportationwasnotprohibited;andofimportingfromthenceallTurkishgoodsofwhichtheimportationwasnotprohibited,uponpayingboththegeneraldutiesofcustoms,andtheparticulardutiesassessedfordefrayingthenecessaryexpensesofthecompany;andsubmitting,atthesametime,tothelawfulauthorityoftheBritishambassadorandconsulsresidentinTurkey,andtothebyelawsofthecompanydulyenacted。Topreventanyoppressionbythosebye—laws,itwasbythesameactordained,thatifanysevenmembersofthecompanyconceivedthemselvesaggrievedbyanybye—lawwhichshouldbeenactedafterthepassingofthisact,theymightappealtotheBoardofTradeandPlantations(totheauthorityofwhichacommitteeofthePrivyCouncilhasnowsucceeded),providedsuchappealwasbroughtwithintwelvemonthsafterthebye—lawwasenacted;andthatifanysevenmembersconceivedthemselvesaggrievedbyanybye—lawwhichhadbeenenactedbeforethepassingofthisact,theymightbringalikeappeal,provideditwaswithintwelvemonthsafterthedayonwhichthisactwastotakeplace。Theexperienceofoneyear,however,maynotalwaysbesufficienttodiscovertoallthemembersofagreatcompany,thepernicioustendencyofaparticularbye—law;andifseveralofthemshouldafterwardsdiscoverit,neithertheBoardofTrade,northecommitteeofcouncil,canaffordthemanyredress。Theobject,besides,ofthegreaterpartofthebye—lawsofallregulatedcompanies,aswellasofallothercorporations,isnotsomuchtooppressthosewhoarealreadymembers,astodiscourageothersfrombecomingso;whichmaybedone,notonlybyahighfine,butbymanyothercontrivances。Theconstantviewofsuchcompaniesisalwaystoraisetherateoftheirownprofitashighastheycan;tokeepthemarket,bothforthegoodswhichtheyexport,andforthosewhichtheyimport,asmuchunderstockedastheycan:whichcanbedoneonlybyrestrainingthecompetition,orbydiscouragingnewadventurersfromenteringintothetrade。Afineevenoftwentypounds,besides,thoughitmaynotperhapsbesufficienttodiscourageanymanfromenteringintotheTurkeytradewithanintentiontocontinueinit,maybeenoughtodiscourageaspeculativemerchantfromhazardingasingleadventureinit。Inalltrades,theregularestablishedtraders,eventhoughnotincorporated,naturallycombinetoraiseprofits,whicharenowaysolikelytobekept,atalltimes,downtotheirproperlevel,asbytheoccasionalcompetitionofspeculativeadventure。TheTurkeytrade,thoughinsomemeasurelaidopenbythisActofParliament,isstillconsideredbymanypeopleasveryfarfrombeingaltogetherfree。TheTurkeyCompanycontributetomaintainanambassadorandtwoorthreeconsuls,who,likeotherpublicministers,oughttobemaintainedaltogetherbythestate,andthetradelaidopentoallhisMajesty’ssubjects。Thedifferenttaxesleviedbythecompany,forthisandothercorporationpurposes,mightaffordavenuemuchmorethansufficienttoenablethestatetomaintainsuchministers。
Regulatedcompanies,itwasobservedbySirJosiahChild,thoughtheyhadfrequentlysupportedpublicministers,hadnevermaintainedanyfortsorgarrisonsinthecountriestowhichtheytraded;whereasjointstockcompaniesfrequentlyhad。Andinrealitytheformerseemtobemuchmoreunfitforthissortofservicethanthelatter。First,thedirectorsofaregulatedcompanyhavenoparticularinterestintheprosperityofthegeneraltradeofthecompanyforthesakeofwhichsuchfortsandgarrisonsaremaintained。Thedecayofthatgeneraltrademayevenfrequentlycontributetotheadvantageoftheirownprivatetrade;asbydiminishingthenumberoftheircompetitorsitmayenablethembothtobuycheaper,andtoselldearer。Thedirectorsofajointstockcompany,onthecontrary,havingonlytheirshareintheprofitswhicharemadeuponthecommonstockcommittedtotheirmanagement,havenoprivatetradeoftheirownofwhichtheinterestcanbeseparatedfromthatofthegeneraltradeofthecompany。Theirprivateinterestisconnectedwiththeprosperityofthegeneraltradeofthecompany,andwiththemaintenanceofthefortsandgarrisonswhicharenecessaryforitsdefence。Theyaremorelikely,therefore,tohavethatcontinualandcarefulattentionwhichthatmaintenancenecessarilyrequires。Secondly,thedirectorsofajointstockcompanyhavealwaysthemanagementofalargecapital,thejointstockofthecompany,apartofwhichtheymayfrequentlyemploy,withpropriety,inbuilding,repairing,andmaintainingsuchnecessaryfortsandgarrisons。Butthedirectorsofaregulatedcompany,havingthemanagementofnocommoncapital,havenootherfundtoemployinthiswaybutthecasualrevenuearisingfromtheadmissionfines,andfromthecorporationdutiesimposeduponthetradeofthecompany。Thoughtheyhadthesameinterest,therefore,toattendtothemaintenanceofsuchfortsandgarrisons,theycanseldomhavethesameabilitytorenderthatattentioneffectual。Themaintenanceofapublicministerrequiringscarceanyattention,andbutamoderateandlimitedexpense,isabusinessmuchmoresuitablebothtothetemperandabilitiesofaregulatedcompany。
LongafterthetimeofSirJosiahChild,however,in1750,aregulatedcompanywasestablished,thepresentcompanyofmerchantstradingtoAfrica,whichwasexpresslychargedatfirstwiththemaintenanceofalltheBritishfortsandgarrisonsthatliebetweenCapeBlancandtheCapeofGoodHope,andafterwardswiththatofthoseonlywhichliebetweenCapeRougeandtheCapeofGoodHope。Theactwhichestablishesthiscompany(the23rdofGeorgeII,c。3)seemstohavehadtwodistinctobjectsinview;
first,torestraineffectuallytheoppressiveandmonopolizingspiritwhichisnaturaltothedirectorsofaregulatedcompany;
andsecondly,toforcethem,asmuchaspossible,togiveanattention,whichisnotnaturaltothem,towardsthemaintenanceoffortsandgarrisons。
Forthefirstofthesepurposesthefineforadmissionislimitedtofortyshillings。Thecompanyisprohibitedfromtradingintheircorporatecapacity,oruponajointstock;fromborrowingmoneyuponcommonseal,orfromlayinganyrestraintsuponthetradewhichmaybecarriedonfreelyfromallplaces,andbyallpersonsbeingBritishsubjects,andpayingthefine。
ThegovernmentisinacommitteeofninepersonswhomeetatLondon,butwhoarechosenannuallybythefreemenofthecompanyatLondon,Bristol,andLiverpool;threefromeachplace。Nocommittee—mancanbecontinuedinofficeformorethanthreeyearstogether。Anycommittee—manmightberemovedbytheBoardofTradeandPlantations,nowbyacommitteecouncil,afterbeingheardinhisowndefence。ThecommitteeareforbidtoexportnegroesfromAfrica,ortoimportanyAfricangoodsintoGreatBritain。Butastheyarechargedwiththemaintenanceoffortsandgarrisons,theymay,forthatpurpose,exportfromGreatBritaintoAfricagoodsandstoresofdifferentkinds。Outofthemonieswhichtheyshallreceivefromthecompany,theyareallowedasumnotexceedingeighthundredpoundsforthesalariesoftheirclerksandagentsatLondon,Bristol,andLiverpool,thehouserentoftheirofficeatLondon,andallotherexpensesofmanagement,commission,andagencyinEngland。Whatremainsofthissum,afterdefrayingthesedifferentexpenses,theymaydivideamongthemselves,ascompensationfortheirtrouble,inwhatmannertheythinkproper。Bythisconstitution,itmighthavebeenexpectedthatthespiritofmonopolywouldhavebeeneffectuallyrestrained,andthefirstofthesepurposessufficientlyanswered。Itwouldseem,however,thatithadnot。
Thoughbythe4thofGeorgeIII,c。20,thefortofSenegal,withallitsdependencies,hadbeenvestedinthecompanyofmerchantstradingtoAfrica,yetintheyearfollowing(bythe5thofGeorgeIII,c。44)notonlySenegalanditsdependencies,butthewholecoastfromtheportofSallee,insouthBarbary,toCapeRouge,wasexemptedfromthejurisdictionofthatcompany,wasvestedinthecrown,andthetradetoitdeclaredfreetoallhisMajesty’ssubjects。Thecompanyhadbeensuspectedofrestrainingthetrade,andofestablishingsomesortofimpropermonopoly。Itisnot,however,veryeasytoconceivehow,undertheregulationsofthe23rdofGeorgeII,theycoulddoso。IntheprinteddebatesoftheHouseofCommons,notalwaysthemostauthenticrecordsoftruth,Iobserve,however,thattheyhavebeenaccusedofthis。Themembersofthecommitteeofnine,beingallmerchants,andthegovernorsandfactors,intheirdifferentfortsandsettlements,beingalldependentuponthem,itisnotunlikelythatthelattermighthavegivenpeculiarattentiontotheconsignmentsandcommissionsoftheformerwhichwouldestablisharealmonopoly。
Forthesecondofthese,purposes,themaintenanceofthefortsandgarrisons,anannualsumhasbeenallottedtothembyParliament,generallyaboutL13,000。Fortheproperapplicationofthissum,thecommitteeisobligedtoaccountannuallytotheCursitorBaronofExchequer;whichaccountisafterwardstobelaidbeforeParliament。ButParliament,whichgivessolittleattentiontotheapplicationofmillions,isnotlikelytogivemuchtothatofL13,000ayear;andtheCursitorBaronofExchequer,fromhisprofessionandeducation,isnotlikelytobeprofoundlyskilledintheproperexpenseoffortsandgarrisons。
ThecaptainsofhisMajesty’snavy,indeed,oranyothercommissionedofficersappointedbytheBoardofAdmiralty,mayinquireintotheconditionofthefortsandgarrisons,andreporttheirobservationstothatboard。Butthatboardseemstohavenodirectjurisdictionoverthecommittee,noranyauthoritytocorrectthosewhoseconductitmaythusinquireinto;andthecaptainsofhisMajesty’snavy,besides,arenotsupposedtobealwaysdeeplylearnedinthescienceoffortification。Removalfromanofficewhichcanbeenjoyedonlyforthetermofthreeyears,andofwhichthelawfulemoluments,evenduringthatterm,aresoverysmall,seemstobetheutmostpunishmenttowhichanycommittee—manisliableforanyfault,exceptdirectmalversation,orembezzlement,eitherofthepublicmoney,orofthatofthecompany;andthefearofthatpunishmentcanneverbeamotiveofsufficientweighttoforceacontinualandcarefulattentiontoabusinesstowhichhehasnootherinteresttoattend。ThecommitteeareaccusedofhavingsentoutbricksandstonesfromEnglandforthereparationofCapeCoastCastleonthecoastofGuinea,abusinessforwhichParliamenthadseveraltimesgrantedanextraordinarysumofmoney。Thesebricksandstonestoo,whichhadthusbeensentuponsolongavoyage,weresaidtohavebeenofsobadaqualitythatitwasnecessarytorebuildfromthefoundationthewallswhichhadbeenrepairedwiththem。ThefortsandgarrisonswhichlienorthofCapeRougearenotonlymaintainedattheexpenseofthestate,butareundertheimmediategovernmentoftheexecutivepower;andwhythosewhichliesouthofthatCape,andwhichare,inpartatleast,maintainedattheexpenseofthestate,shouldbeunderadifferentgovernment,itseemsnotveryeasyeventoimagineagoodreason。TheprotectionoftheMediterraneantradewastheoriginalpurposeofpretenceofthegarrisonsofGibraltarandMinorca,andthemaintenanceandgovernmentofthosegarrisonshasalwaysbeen,veryproperly,committed,nottotheTurkeyCompany,buttotheexecutivepower。Intheextentofitsdominionconsists,inagreatmeasure,theprideanddignityofthatpower;anditisnotverylikelytofailinattentiontowhatisnecessaryforthedefenceofthatdominion。ThegarrisonsatGibraltarandMinorca,accordingly,haveneverbeenneglected;
thoughMinorcahasbeentwicetaken,andisnowprobablylostforever,thatdisasterwasneverevenimputedtoanyneglectintheexecutivepower。Iwouldnot,however,beunderstoodtoinsinuatethateitherofthoseexpensivegarrisonswasever,eveninthesmallestdegree,necessaryforthepurposeforwhichtheywereoriginallydismemberedfromtheSpanishmonarchy。Thatdismemberment,perhaps,neverservedanyotherrealpurposethantoalienatefromEnglandhernaturalallytheKingofSpain,andtounitethetwoprincipalbranchesofthehouseofBourboninamuchstricterandmorepermanentalliancethanthetiesofbloodcouldeverhaveunitedthem。
Jointstockcompanies,establishedbyRoyalCharterorbyActofParliament,differinseveralrespects,notonlyfromregulatedcompanies,butfromprivatecopartneries。
First,inaprivatecopartnery,nopartner,withouttheconsentofthecompany,cantransferhissharetoanotherperson,orintroduceanewmemberintothecompany。Eachmember,however,may,uponproperwarning,withdrawfromthecopartnery,anddemandpaymentfromthemofhisshareofthecommonstock。Inajointstockcompany,onthecontrary,nomembercandemandpaymentofhissharefromthecompany;buteachmembercan,withouttheirconsent,transferhissharetoanotherperson,andtherebyintroduceanewmember。Thevalueofashareinajointstockisalwaysthepricewhichitwillbringinthemarket;andthismaybeeithergreaterorless,inanyproportion,thanthesumwhichitsownerstandscreditedforinthestockofthecompany。
Secondly,inaprivatecopartnery,eachpartnerisboundforthedebtscontractedbythecompanytothewholeextentofhisfortune。Inajointstockcompany,onthecontrary,eachpartnerisboundonlytotheextentofhisshare。
Thetradeofajointstockcompanyisalwaysmanagedbyacourtofdirectors。Thiscourt,indeed,isfrequentlysubject,inmanyrespects,tothecontrolofageneralcourtofproprietors。
Butthegreaterpartofthoseproprietorsseldompretendtounderstandanythingofthebusinessofthecompany,andwhenthespiritoffactionhappensnottoprevailamongthem,givethemselvesnotroubleaboutit,butreceivecontentedlysuchhalf—yearlyoryearlydividendasthedirectorsthinkpropertomaketothem。Thistotalexemptionfromtroubleandfromrisk,beyondalimitedsum,encouragesmanypeopletobecomeadventurersinjointstockcompanies,whowould,uponnoaccount,hazardtheirfortunesinanyprivatecopartnery。Suchcompanies,therefore,commonlydrawtothemselvesmuchgreaterstocksthananyprivatecopartnerycanboastof。ThetradingstockoftheSouthSeaCompany,atonetime,amountedtoupwardsofthirty—threemillionseighthundredthousandpounds。ThedividedcapitaloftheBankofEnglandamounts,atpresent,totenmillionssevenhundredandeightythousandpounds。Thedirectorsofsuchcompanies,however,beingthemanagersratherofotherpeople’smoneythanoftheirown,itcannotwellbeexpectedthattheyshouldwatchoveritwiththesameanxiousvigilancewithwhichthepartnersinaprivatecopartneryfrequentlywatchovertheirown。Likethestewardsofarichman,theyareapttoconsiderattentiontosmallmattersasnotfortheirmaster’shonour,andveryeasilygivethemselvesadispensationfromhavingit。Negligenceandprofusion,therefore,mustalwaysprevail,moreorless,inthemanagementoftheaffairsofsuchacompany。Itisuponthisaccountthatjointstockcompaniesforforeigntradehaveseldombeenabletomaintainthecompetitionagainstprivateadventurers。Theyhave,accordingly,veryseldomsucceededwithoutanexclusiveprivilege,andfrequentlyhavenotsucceededwithone。Withoutanexclusiveprivilegetheyhavecommonlymismanagedthetrade。Withanexclusiveprivilegetheyhavebothmismanagedandconfinedit。
TheRoyalAfricanCompany,thepredecessorsofthepresentAfricanCompany,hadanexclusiveprivilegebycharter,butasthatcharterhadnotbeenconfirmedbyActofParliament,thetrade,inconsequenceoftheDeclarationofRights,was,soonaftertherevolution,laidopentoallhisMajesty’ssubjects。
TheHudson’sBayCompanyare,astotheirlegalrights,inthesamesituationastheRoyalAfricanCompany。TheirexclusivecharterhasnotbeenconfirmedbyActofParliament。TheSouthSeaCompany,aslongastheycontinuedtobeatradingcompany,hadanexclusiveprivilegeconfirmedbyActofParliament;ashavelikewisethepresentUnitedCompanyofMerchantstradingtotheEastIndies。
TheRoyalAfricanCompanysoonfoundthattheycouldnotmaintainthecompetitionagainstprivateadventurers,whom,notwithstandingtheDeclarationofRights,theycontinuedforsometimetocallinterlopers,andtopersecuteassuch。In1698,however,theprivateadventurersweresubjectedtoadutyoftenpercentuponalmostallthedifferentbranchesoftheirtrade,tobeemployedbythecompanyinthemaintenanceoftheirfortsandgarrisonsBut,notwithstandingthisheavytax,thecompanywerestillunabletomaintainthecompetition。Theirstockandcreditgraduallydeclined。In1712,theirdebtshadbecomesogreatthataparticularActofParliamentwasthoughtnecessary,bothfortheirsecurityandforthatoftheircreditors。Itwasenactedthattheresolutionoftwo—thirdsofthesecreditorsinnumberandvalueshouldbindtherest,bothwithregardtothetimewhichshouldbeallowedtothecompanyforthepaymentoftheirdebts,andwithregardtoanyotheragreementwhichitmightbethoughtpropertomakewiththemconcerningthosedebts。
In1730,theiraffairswereinsogreatdisorderthattheywerealtogetherincapableofmaintainingtheirfortsandgarrisons,thesolepurposeandpretextoftheirinstitution。Fromthatyear,tilltheirfinaldissolution,theParliamentjudgeditnecessarytoallowtheannualsumoftenthousandpoundsforthatpurpose。In1732,afterhavingbeenformanyyearslosersbythetradeofcarryingnegroestotheWestIndies,theyatlastresolvedtogiveitupaltogether;toselltotheprivatetraderstoAmericathenegroeswhichtheypurchaseduponthecoast;andtoemploytheirservantsinatradetotheinlandpartsofAfricaforgolddust,elephants’teeth,dyeingdrugs,etc。Buttheirsuccessinthismoreconfinedtradewasnotgreaterthanintheirformerextensiveone。Theiraffairscontinuedtogograduallytodecline,tillatlast,beingineveryrespectabankruptcompany,theyweredissolvedbyActofParliament,andtheirfortsandgarrisonsvestedinthepresentregulatedcompanyofmerchantstradingtoAfrica。BeforetheerectionoftheRoyalAfricanCompany,therehadbeenthreeotherjointstockcompaniessuccessivelyestablished,oneafteranother,fortheAfricantrade。Theywereallequallyunsuccessful。Theyall,however,hadexclusivecharters,which,thoughnotconfirmedbyActofParliament,wereinthosedayssupposedtoconveyarealexclusiveprivilege。