perhapsnotaboveathirdorafourthofthecapitalwhichatpresentcarriesonthisgreatround—abouttrademighthavebeensufficienttocarryonallthosesmalldirectones,mighthavekeptinconstantemploymentanequalquantityofBritishindustry,andhaveequallysupportedtheannualproduceofthelandandlabourofGreatBritain。Allthepurposesofthistradebeing,inthismanner,answeredbyamuchsmallercapital,therewouldhavebeenalargesparecapitaltoapplytootherpurposes:toimprovethelands,toincreasethemanufactures,andtoextendthecommerceofGreatBritain;tocomeintocompetitionatleastwiththeotherBritishcapitalsemployedinallthosedifferentways,toreducetherateofprofitinthemall,andtherebytogivetoGreatBritain,inallofthem,asuperiorityoverothercountriesstillgreaterthanwhatsheatpresentenjoys。
Themonopolyofthecolonytrade,too,hasforcedsomepartofthecapitalofGreatBritainfromallforeigntradeofconsumptiontoacarryingtrade;andconsequently,fromsupportingmoreorlesstheindustryofGreatBritain,tobeemployedaltogetherinsupportingpartlythatofthecoloniesandpartlythatofsomeothercountries。
Thegoods,forexample,whichareannuallypurchasedwiththegreatsurplusofeighty—twothousandhogsheadsoftobaccoannuallyre—exportedfromGreatBritainarenotallconsumedinGreatBritain。Partofthem,linenfromGermanyandHolland,forexample,isreturnedtothecoloniesfortheirparticularconsumption。ButthatpartofthecapitalofGreatBritainwhichbuysthetobaccowithwhichthislinenisafterwardsboughtisnecessarilywithdrawnfromsupportingtheindustryofGreatBritain,tobeemployedaltogetherinsupporting,partlythatofthecolonies,andpartlythatoftheparticularcountrieswhopayforthistobaccowiththeproduceoftheirownindustry。
Themonopolyofthecolonytradebesides,byforcingtowardsitamuchgreaterproportionofthecapitalofGreatBritainthanwhatwouldnaturallyhavegonetoit,seemstohavebrokenaltogetherthatnaturalbalancewhichwouldotherwisehavetakenplaceamongallthedifferentbranchesofBritishindustry。TheindustryofGreatBritain,insteadofbeingaccommodatedtoagreatnumberofsmallmarkets,hasbeenprincipallysuitedtoonegreatmarket。Hercommerce,insteadofrunninginagreatnumberofsmallchannels,hasbeentaughttorunprincipallyinonegreatchannel。Butthewholesystemofherindustryandcommercehastherebybeenrenderedlesssecure,thewholestateofherbodypoliticlesshealthfulthanitotherwisewouldhavebeen。
Inherpresentcondition,GreatBritainresemblesoneofthoseunwholesomebodiesinwhichsomeofthevitalpartsareovergrown,andwhich,uponthataccount,areliabletomanydangerousdisordersscarceincidenttothoseinwhichallthepartsaremoreproperlyproportioned。Asmallstopinthatgreatblood—vessel,whichhasbeenartificiallyswelledbeyonditsnaturaldimensions,andthroughwhichanunnaturalproportionoftheindustryandcommerceofthecountryhasbeenforcedtocirculate,isverylikelytobringonthemostdangerousdisordersuponthewholebodypolitic。Theexpectationofarupturewiththecolonies,accordingly,hasstruckthepeopleofGreatBritainwithmoreterrorthantheyeverfeltforaSpanisharmada,oraFrenchinvasion。
Itwasthisterror,whetherwellorillgrounded,whichrenderedtherepealoftheStampAct,amongthemerchantsatleast,apopularmeasure。Inthetotalexclusionfromthecolonymarket,wasittolastonlyforafewyears,thegreaterpartofourmerchantsusedtofancythattheyforesawanentirestoptotheirtrade;thegreaterpartofourmastermanufacturers,theentireruinoftheirbusiness;andthegreaterpartofourworkmen,anendoftheiremployment。Arupturewithanyofourneighboursuponthecontinent,thoughlikely,too,tooccasionsomestoporinterruptionintheemploymentsofsomeofallthesedifferentordersofpeople,isforeseen,however,withoutanysuchgeneralemotion。Theblood,ofwhichthecirculationisstoppedinsomeofthesmallervessels,easilydisgorgesitselfintothegreaterwithoutoccasioninganydangerousdisorder;
but,whenitisstoppedinanyofthegreatervessels,convulsions,apoplexy,ordeath,aretheimmediateandunavoidableconsequences。Ifbutoneofthoseovergrownmanufactures,which,bymeanseitherofbountiesorofthemonopolyofthehomeandcolonymarkets,havebeenartificiallyraiseduptoanunnaturalheight,findssomesmallstoporinterruptioninitsemployment,itfrequentlyoccasionsamutinyanddisorderalarmingtogovernment,andembarrassingeventothedeliberationsofthelegislature。Howgreat,therefore,wouldbethedisorderandconfusion,itwasthought,whichmustnecessarilybeoccasionedbyasuddenandentirestopintheemploymentofsogreataproportionofourprincipalmanufacturers。
SomemoderateandgradualrelaxationofthelawswhichgivetoGreatBritaintheexclusivetradetothecolonies,tillitisrenderedinagreatmeasurefree,seemstobetheonlyexpedientwhichcan,inallfuturetimes,deliverherfromthisdanger,whichcanenableherorevenforcehertowithdrawsomepartofhercapitalfromthisovergrownemployment,andtoturnit,thoughwithlessprofit,towardsotheremployments;andwhich,bygraduallydiminishingonebranchofherindustryandgraduallyincreasingalltherest,canbydegreesrestoreallthedifferentbranchesofittothatnatural,healthful,andproperproportionwhichperfectlibertynecessarilyestablishes,andwhichperfectlibertycanalonepreserve。Toopenthecolonytradeallatoncetoallnationsmightnotonlyoccasionsometransitoryinconveniency,butagreatpermanentlosstothegreaterpartofthosewhoseindustryorcapitalisatpresentengagedinit。Thesuddenlossoftheemploymentevenoftheshipswhichimporttheeighty—twothousandhogsheadsoftobacco,whichareoverandabovetheconsumptionofGreatBritain,mightalonebefeltverysensibly。Sucharetheunfortunateeffectsofalltheregulationsofthemercantilesystem!Theynotonlyintroduceverydangerousdisordersintothestateofthebodypolitic,butdisorderswhichitisoftendifficulttoremedy,withoutoccasioningforatimeatleast,stillgreaterdisorders。Inwhatmanner,therefore,thecolonytradeoughtgraduallytobeopened;whataretherestraintswhichoughtfirst,andwhatarethosewhichoughtlasttobetakenaway;orinwhatmannerthenaturalsystemofperfectlibertyandjusticeoughtgraduallytoberestored,wemustleavetothewisdomoffuturestatesmenandlegislatorstodetermine。
Fivedifferentevents,unforeseenandunthoughtof,haveveryfortunatelyconcurredtohinderGreatBritainfromfeeling,sosensiblyasitwasgenerallyexpectedshewould,thetotalexclusionwhichhasnowtakenplaceformorethanayear(fromthefirstofDecember,1774)fromaveryimportantbranchofthecolonytrade,thatofthetwelveassociatedprovincesofNorthAmerica。First,thosecolonies,inpreparingthemselvesfortheirnon—importationagreement,drainedGreatBritaincompletelyofallthecommoditieswhichwerefitfortheirmarket;secondly,theextraordinarydemandoftheSpanishFlotahas,thisyear,drainedGermanyandtheNorthofmanycommodities,lineninparticular,whichusedtocomeintocompetition,evenintheBritishmarket,withthemanufacturesofGreatBritain;thirdly,thepeacebetweenRussiaandTurkeyhasoccasionedanextraordinarydemandfromtheTurkeymarket,which,duringthedistressofthecountry,andwhileaRussianfleetwascruisingintheArchipelago,hadbeenverypoorlysupplied;fourthly,thedemandoftheNorthofEuropeforthemanufacturesofGreatBritainhasbeenincreasingfromyeartoyearforsometimepast;
andfifthly,thelatepartitionandconsequentialpacificationofPoland,byopeningthemarketofthatgreatcountry,havethisyearaddedanextraordinarydemandfromthencetotheincreasingdemandoftheNorth。Theseeventsareall,exceptthefourth,intheirnaturetransitoryandaccidental,andtheexclusionfromsoimportantabranchofthecolonytrade,ifunfortunatelyitshouldcontinuemuchlonger,maystilloccasionsomedegreeofdistress。Thisdistress,however,asitwillcomeongradually,willbefeltmuchlessseverelythanifithadcomeonallatonce;and,inthemeantime,theindustryandcapitalofthecountrymayfindanewemploymentanddirection,soastopreventthisdistressfromeverrisingtoanyconsiderableheight。
Themonopolyofthecolonytrade,therefore,sofarasithasturnedtowardsthattradeagreaterproportionofthecapitalofGreatBritainthanwhatwouldotherwisehavegonetoit,hasinallcasesturnedit,fromaforeigntradeofconsumptionwithaneighbouringintoonewithamoredistantcountry;inmanycases,fromadirectforeigntradeofconsumptionintoaround—aboutone;andinsomecases,fromallforeigntradeofconsumptionintoacarryingtrade。Ithasinallcases,therefore,turneditfromadirectioninwhichitwouldhavemaintainedagreaterquantityofproductivelabourintooneinwhichitcanmaintainamuchsmallerquantity。Bysuiting,besides,tooneparticularmarketonlysogreatapartoftheindustryandcommerceofGreatBritain,ithasrenderedthewholestateofthatindustryandcommercemoreprecariousandlesssecurethaniftheirproducehadbeenaccommodatedtoagreatervarietyofmarkets。
Wemustcarefullydistinguishbetweentheeffectsofthecolonytradeandthoseofthemonopolyofthattrade。Theformerarealwaysandnecessarilybeneficial;thelatteralwaysandnecessarilyhurtful。Buttheformeraresobeneficialthatthecolonytrade,thoughsubjecttoamonopoly,andnotwithstandingthehurtfuleffectsofthatmonopoly,isstilluponthewholebeneficial,andgreatlybeneficial;thoughagooddeallesssothanitotherwisewouldbe。
Theeffectofthecolonytradeinitsnaturalandfreestateistoopenagreat,thoughdistant,marketforsuchpartsoftheproduceofBritishindustryasmayexceedthedemandofthemarketsnearerhome,ofthoseofEurope,andofthecountrieswhichlieroundtheMediterraneanSea。Initsnaturalandfreestate,thecolonytrade,withoutdrawingfromthosemarketsanypartoftheproducewhichhadeverbeensenttothem,encouragesGreatBritaintoincreasethesurpluscontinuallybycontinuallypresentingnewequivalentstobeexchangedforit。Initsnaturalandfreestate,thecolonytradetendstoincreasethequantityofproductivelabourinGreatBritain,butwithoutalteringinanyrespectthedirectionofthatwhichhadbeenemployedtherebefore。Inthenaturalandfreestateofthecolonytrade,thecompetitionofallothernationswouldhindertherateofprofitfromrisingabovethecommonleveleitherinthenewmarketorinthenewemployment。Thenewmarket,withoutdrawinganythingfromtheoldone,wouldcreate,ifonemaysayso,anewproduceforitsownsupply;andthatnewproducewouldconstituteanewcapitalforcarryingonthenewemployment,whichinthesamemannerwoulddrawnothingfromtheoldone。
Themonopolyofthecolonytrade,onthecontrary,byexcludingthecompetitionofothernations,andtherebyraisingtherateofprofitbothinthenewmarketandinthenewemployment,drawsproducefromtheoldmarketandcapitalfromtheoldemployment。Toaugmentourshareofthecolonytradebeyondwhatitotherwisewouldbeistheavowedpurposeofthemonopoly。Ifourshareofthattradeweretobenogreaterwiththanitwouldhavebeenwithoutthemonopoly,therecouldhavebeennoreasonforestablishingthemonopoly。Butwhateverforcesintoabranchoftradeofwhichthereturnsareslowerandmoredistantthanthoseofthegreaterpartofothertrades,agreaterproportionofthecapitalofanycountrythanwhatofitsownaccordwouldgotothatbranch,necessarilyrendersthewholequantityofproductivelabourannuallymaintainedthere,thewholeannualproduceofthelandandlabourofthatcountry,lessthantheyotherwisewouldbe。Itkeepsdowntherevenueoftheinhabitantsofthatcountrybelowwhatitwouldnaturallyriseto,andtherebydiminishestheirpowerofaccumulation。Itnotonlyhinders,atalltimes,theircapitalfrommaintainingsogreataquantityofproductivelabourasitwouldotherwisemaintain,butithindersitfromincreasingsofastasitwouldotherwiseincrease,andconsequentlyfrommaintainingastillgreaterquantityofproductivelabour。
Thenaturalgoodeffectsofthecolonytrade,however,morethancounterbalancetoGreatBritainthebadeffectsofthemonopoly,sothat,monopolyandalltogether,thattrade,evenasitcarriedonatpresent,isnotonlyadvantageous,butgreatlyadvantageous。Thenewmarketandthenewemploymentwhichareopenedbythecolonytradeareofmuchgreaterextentthanthatportionoftheoldmarketandoftheoldemploymentwhichislostbythemonopoly。Thenewproduceandthenewcapitalwhichhasbeencreated,ifonemaysayso,bythecolonytrade,maintaininGreatBritainagreaterquantityofproductivelabourthanwhatcanhavebeenthrownoutofemploymentbytherevulsionofcapitalfromothertradesofwhichthereturnsaremorefrequent。
Ifthecolonytrade,however,evenasitiscarriedonatpresent,isadvantageoustoGreatBritain,itisnotbymeansofthemonopoly,butinspiteofthemonopoly。
ItisratherforthemanufacturedthanfortherudeproduceofEuropethatthecolonytradeopensanewmarket。Agricultureistheproperbusinessofallnewcolonies;abusinesswhichthecheapnessoflandrendersmoreadvantageousthananyother。Theyabound,therefore,intherudeproduceofland,andinsteadofimportingitfromothercountries,theyhavegenerallyalargesurplustoexport。Innewcolonies,agricultureeitherdrawshandsfromallotheremployments,orkeepsthemfromgoingtoanyotheremployment。Therearefewhandstospareforthenecessary,andnonefortheornamentalmanufactures。Thegreaterpartofthemanufacturesofbothkindstheyfinditcheapertopurchaseofothercountriesthantomakeforthemselves。ItischieflybyencouragingthemanufacturesofEuropethatthecolonytradeindirectlyencouragesitsagriculture。ThemanufacturesofEurope,towhomthattradegivesemployment,constituteanewmarketfortheproduceoftheland;andthemostadvantageousofallmarkets,thehomemarketforthecornandcattle,forthebreadandbutcher’smeatofEurope,isthusgreatlyextendedbymeansofthetradetoAmerica。
Butthatthemonopolyofthetradeofpopulousandthrivingcoloniesisnotalonesufficienttoestablish,oreventomaintainmanufacturesinanycountry,theexamplesofSpainandPortugalsufficientlydemonstrate。SpainandPortugalweremanufacturingcountriesbeforetheyhadanyconsiderablecolonies。Sincetheyhadtherichestandmostfertileintheworld,theyhavebothceasedtobeso。
InSpainandPortugalthebadeffectsofthemonopoly,aggravatedbyothercauses,haveperhapsnearlyoverbalancedthenaturalgoodeffectsofthecolonytrade。Thesecausesseemtobeothermonopoliesofdifferentkinds;thedegradationofthevalueofgoldandsilverbelowwhatitisinmostothercountries;theexclusionfromforeignmarketsbyimpropertaxesuponexportation,andthenarrowingofthehomemarket,bystillmoreimpropertaxesuponthetransportationofgoodsfromonepartofthecountrytoanother;butaboveall,thatirregularandpartialadministrationofjustice,whichoftenprotectstherichandpowerfuldebtorfromthepursuitofhisinjuredcreditor,andwhichmakestheindustriouspartofthenationafraidtopreparegoodsfortheconsumptionofthosehaughtyandgreatmentowhomtheydarenotrefusetoselluponcredit,andfromtheyarealtogetheruncertainofrepayment。
InEngland,onthecontrary,thenaturalgoodeffectsofthecolonytrade,assistedbyothercauses,haveinagreatmeasureconqueredthebadeffectsofthemonopoly。Thesecausesseemtobe:thegenerallibertyoftrade,which,notwithstandingsomerestraints,isatleastequal,perhapssuperior,towhatitisinanyothercountry;thelibertyofexporting,dutyfree,almostallsortsofgoodswhicharetheproduceofdomesticindustrytoalmostanyforeigncountry;andwhatperhapsisofstillgreaterimportance,theunboundedlibertyoftransportingthemfromanyonepartofourowncountrytoanyotherwithoutbeingobligedtogiveanyaccounttoanypublicoffice,withoutbeingliabletoquestionorexaminationofanykind;butaboveall,thatequalandimpartialadministrationofjusticewhichrenderstherightsofthemeanestBritishsubjectrespectabletothegreatest,andwhich,bysecuringtoeverymanthefruitsofhisownindustry,givesthegreatestandmosteffectualencouragementtoeverysortofindustry。
IfthemanufacturesofGreatBritain,however,havebeenadvanced,astheycertainlyhave,bythecolonytrade,ithasnotbeenbymeansofthemonopolyofthattradebutinspiteofthemonopoly。Theeffectofthemonopolyhasbeen,nottoaugmentthequantity,buttoalterthequalityandshapeofapartofthemanufacturesofGreatBritain,andtoaccommodatetoamarket,fromwhichthereturnsareslowanddistant,whatwouldotherwisehavebeenaccommodatedtoonefromwhichthereturnsarefrequentandnear。ItseffecthasconsequentlybeentoturnapartofthecapitalofGreatBritainfromanemploymentinwhichitwouldhavemaintainedagreaterquantityofmanufacturingindustrytooneinwhichitmaintainsamuchsmaller,andtherebytodiminish,insteadofincreasing,thewholequantityofmanufacturingindustrymaintainedinGreatBritain。
Themonopolyofthecolonytrade,therefore,likealltheothermeanandmalignantexpedientsofthemercantilesystem,depressestheindustryofallothercountries,butchieflythatofthecolonies,withoutintheleastincreasing,butonthecontrarydiminishingthatofthecountryinwhosefavouritisestablished。
Themonopolyhindersthecapitalofthatcountry,whatevermayatanyparticulartimebetheextentofthatcapital,frommaintainingsogreataquantityofproductivelabourasitwouldotherwisemaintain,andfromaffordingsogreatarevenuetotheindustriousinhabitantsasitwouldotherwiseafford。Butascapitalcanbeincreasedonlybysavingsfromrevenue,themonopoly,byhinderingitfromaffordingsogreatarevenueasitwouldotherwiseafford,necessarilyhindersitfromincreasingsofastasitwouldotherwiseincrease,andconsequentlyfrommaintainingastillgreaterquantityofproductivelabour,andaffordingastillgreaterrevenuetotheindustriousinhabitantsofthatcountry。Onegreatoriginalsourceofrevenue,therefore,thewagesoflabour,themonopolymustnecessarilyhaverenderedatalltimeslessabundantthanitotherwisewouldhavebeen。
Byraisingtherateofmercantileprofit,themonopolydiscouragestheimprovementofland。Theprofitofimprovementdependsuponthedifferencebetweenwhatthelandactuallyproduces,andwhat,bytheapplicationofacertaincapital,itcanbemadetoproduce。Ifthisdifferenceaffordsagreaterprofitthanwhatcanbedrawnfromanequalcapitalinanymercantileemployment,theimprovementoflandwilldrawcapitalfromallmercantileemployments。Iftheprofitisless,mercantileemploymentswilldrawcapitalfromtheimprovementofland。Whatever,therefore,raisestherateofmercantileprofit,eitherlessensthesuperiorityorincreasestheinferiorityoftheprofitofimprovement;andintheonecasehinderscapitalfromgoingtoimprovement,andintheotherdrawscapitalfromit。Butbydiscouragingimprovement,themonopolynecessarilyretardsthenaturalincreaseofanothergreatoriginalsourceofrevenue,therentofland。Byraisingtherateofprofit,too,themonopolynecessarilykeepsupthemarketrateofinteresthigherthanitotherwisewouldbe。Butthepriceoflandinproportiontotherentwhichitaffords,thenumberofyearspurchasewhichiscommonlypaidforit,necessarilyfallsastherateofinterestrises,andrisesastherateofinterestfalls。
Themonopoly,therefore,hurtstheinterestofthelandlordtwodifferentways,byretardingthenaturalincrease,first,ofhisrent,andsecondly,ofthepricewhichhewouldgetforhislandinproportiontotherentwhichitaffords。
Themonopolyindeedraisestherateofmercantileprofit,andtherebyaugmentssomewhatthegainofourmerchants。Butasitobstructsthenaturalincreaseofcapital,ittendsrathertodiminishthantoincreasethesumtotaloftherevenuewhichtheinhabitantsofthecountryderivefromtheprofitsofstock;asmallprofituponagreatcapitalgenerallyaffordingagreaterrevenuethanagreatprofituponasmallone。Themonopolyraisestherateofprofit,butithindersthesumofprofitfromrisingsohighasitotherwisewoulddo。
Alltheoriginalsourcesofrevenue,thewagesoflabour,therentofland,andtheprofitsofstock,themonopolyrendersmuchlessabundantthantheyotherwisewouldbe。Topromotethelittleinterestofonelittleorderofmeninonecountry,ithurtstheinterestofallotherordersofmeninthatcountry,andofallmeninallothercountries。
Itissolelybyraisingtheordinaryrateofprofitthatthemonopolyeitherhasprovedorcouldproveadvantageoustoanyoneparticularorderofmen。Butbesidesallthebadeffectstothecountryingeneral,whichhavealreadybeenmentionedasnecessarilyresultingfromahighrateofprofit,thereisonemorefatal,perhaps,thanalltheseputtogether,butwhich,ifwemayjudgefromexperience,isinseparablyconnectedwithit。
Thehighrateofprofitseemseverywheretodestroythatparsimonywhichinothercircumstancesisnaturaltothecharacterofthemerchant。Whenprofitsarehighthatsobervirtueseemstobesuperfluousandexpensiveluxurytosuitbettertheaffluenceofhissituation。Buttheownersofthegreatmercantilecapitalsarenecessarilytheleadersandconductorsofthewholeindustryofeverynation,andtheirexamplehasamuchgreaterinfluenceuponthemannersofthewholeindustriouspartofitthanthatofanyotherorderofmen。
Ifhisemployerisattentiveandparsimonious,theworkmanisverylikelytobesotoo;butifthemasterisdissoluteanddisorderly,theservantwhoshapeshisworkaccordingtothepatternwhichhismasterprescribestohimwillshapehislifetooaccordingtotheexamplewhichhesetshim。Accumulationisthuspreventedinthehandsofallthosewhoarenaturallythemostdisposedtoaccumulate,andthefundsdestinedforthemaintenanceofproductivelabourreceivenoaugmentationfromtherevenueofthosewhooughtnaturallytoaugmentthemthemost。
Thecapitalofthecountry,insteadofincreasing,graduallydwindlesaway,andthequantityofproductivelabourmaintainedinitgrowseverydaylessandless。HavetheexorbitantprofitsofthemerchantsofCadizandLisbonaugmentedthecapitalofSpainandPortugal?Havetheyalleviatedthepoverty,havetheypromotedtheindustryofthosetwobeggarlycountries?Suchhasbeenthetoneofmercantileexpenseinthosetwotradingcitiesthatthoseexorbitantprofits,farfromaugmentingthegeneralcapitalofthecountry,seemscarcetohavebeensufficienttokeepupthecapitalsuponwhichtheyweremade。Foreigncapitalsareeverydayintrudingthemselves,ifImaysayso,moreandmoreintothetradeofCadizandLisbon。ItistoexpelthoseforeigncapitalsfromatradewhichtheirowngrowseverydaymoreandmoreinsufficientforcarryingonthattheSpaniardsandPortugueseendeavoureverydaytostraightenmoreandmorethegallingbandsoftheirabsurdmonopoly。ComparethemercantilemannersofCadizandLisbonwiththoseofAmsterdam,andyouwillbesensiblehowdifferentlytheconductandcharacterofmerchantsareaffectedbythehighandbythelowprofitsofstock。ThemerchantsofLondon,indeed,havenotyetgenerallybecomesuchmagnificentlordsasthoseofCadizandLisbon,butneitheraretheyingeneralsuchattentiveandparsimoniousburghersasthoseofAmsterdam。Theyaresupposed,however,manyofthem,tobeagooddealricherthanthegreaterpartoftheformer,andnotquitesorichasmanyofthelatter。Buttherateoftheirprofitiscommonlymuchlowerthanthatoftheformer,andagooddealhigherthanthatofthelatter。Lightcome,lightgo,saystheproverb;andtheordinarytoneofexpenseseemseverywheretoberegulated,notsomuchaccordingtotherealabilityofspending,astothesupposedfacilityofgettingmoneytospend。
Itisthusthatthesingleadvantagewhichthemonopolyprocurestoasingleorderofmenisinmanydifferentwayshurtfultothegeneralinterestofthecountry。
Tofoundagreatempireforthesolepurposeofraisingupapeopleofcustomersmayatfirstsightappearaprojectfitonlyforanationofshopkeepers。Itis,however,aprojectaltogetherunfitforanationofshopkeepers;butextremelyfitforanationwhosegovernmentisinfluencedbyshopkeepers。Suchstatesmen,andsuchstatesmenonly,arecapableoffancyingthattheywillfindsomeadvantageinemployingthebloodandtreasureoftheirfellow—citizenstofoundandmaintainsuchanempire。Saytoashopkeeper,\"Buymeagoodestate,andIshallalwaysbuymyclothesatyourshop,eventhoughIshouldpaysomewhatdearerthanwhatIcanhavethemforatothershops\";andyouwillnotfindhimveryforwardtoembraceyourproposal。Butshouldanyotherpersonbuyyousuchanestate,theshopkeeperwouldbemuchobligedtoyourbenefactorifhewouldenjoinyoutobuyallyourclothesathisshop。Englandpurchasedforsomeofhersubjects,whofoundthemselvesuneasyathome,agreatestateinadistantcountry。Theprice,indeed,wasverysmall,andinsteadofthirtyyears’purchase,theordinarypriceoflandinthepresenttimes,itamountedtolittlemorethantheexpenseofthedifferentequipmentswhichmadethefirstdiscovery,reconnoitredthecoast,andtookafictitiouspossessionofthecountry。Thelandwasgoodandofgreatextent,andthecultivatorshavingplentyofgoodgroundtoworkupon,andbeingforsometimeatlibertytoselltheirproducewheretheypleased,becameinthecourseoflittlemorethanthirtyorfortyyears(between1620and1660)sonumerousandthrivingapeoplethattheshopkeepersandothertradersofEnglandwishedtosecuretothemselvesthemonopolyoftheircustom。Withoutpretending,therefore,thattheyhadpaidanypart,eitheroftheoriginalpurchase—money,orofthesubsequentexpenseofimprovement,theypetitionedtheParliamentthatthecultivatorsofAmericamightforthefuturebeconfinedtotheirshop;first,forbuyingallthegoodswhichtheywantedfromEurope;and,secondly,forsellingallsuchpartsoftheirownproduceasthosetradersmightfinditconvenienttobuy。Fortheydidnotfinditconvenienttobuyeverypartofit。SomepartsofitimportedintoEnglandmighthaveinterferedwithsomeofthetradeswhichtheythemselvescarriedonathome。Thoseparticularpartsofit,therefore,theywerewillingthatthecolonistsshouldsellwheretheycould—thefartheroffthebetter;anduponthataccountpurposedthattheirmarketshouldbeconfinedtothecountriessouthofCapeFinisterre。AclauseinthefamousActofNavigationestablishedthistrulyshopkeeperproposalintoalaw。
Themaintenanceofthismonopolyhashithertobeentheprincipal,ormoreproperlyperhapsthesoleendandpurposeofthedominionwhichGreatBritainassumesoverhercolonies。Intheexclusivetrade,itissupposed,consiststhegreatadvantageofprovinces,whichhaveneveryetaffordedeitherrevenueormilitaryforceforthesupportofthecivilgovernment,orthedefenceofthemothercountry。Themonopolyistheprincipalbadgeoftheirdependency,anditisthesolefruitwhichhashithertobeengatheredfromthatdependency。WhateverexpenseGreatBritainhashithertolaidoutinmaintainingthisdependencyhasreallybeenlaidoutinordertosupportthismonopoly。Theexpenseoftheordinarypeaceestablishmentofthecoloniesamounted,beforethecommencementofthepresentdisturbances,tothepayoftwentyregimentsoffoot;totheexpenseoftheartillery,stores,andextraordinaryprovisionswithwhichitwasnecessarytosupplythem;andtotheexpenseofaveryconsiderablenavalforcewhichwasconstantlykeptup,inordertoguard,fromthesmugglingvesselsofothernations,theimmensecoastofNorthAmerica,andthatofourWestIndianislands。ThewholeexpenseofthispeaceestablishmentwasachargeupontherevenueofGreatBritain,andwas,atthesametime,thesmallestpartofwhatthedominionofthecolonieshascostthemothercountry。Ifwewouldknowtheamountofthewhole,wemustaddtotheannualexpenseofthispeaceestablishmenttheinterestofthesumswhich,inconsequenceofherconsideringhercoloniesasprovincessubjecttoherdominion,GreatBritainhasupondifferentoccasionslaidoutupontheirdefence。Wemustaddtoit,inparticular,thewholeexpenseofthelatewar,andagreatpartofthatofthewarwhichprecededit。Thelatewarwasaltogetheracolonyquarrel,andthewholeexpenseofit,inwhateverpartoftheworlditmayhavebeenlaidout,whetherinGermanyortheEastIndies,oughtjustlytobestatedtotheaccountofthecolonies。Itamountedtomorethanninetymillionssterling,includingnotonlythenewdebtwhichwascontracted,butthetwoshillingsinthepoundadditionallandtax,andthesumswhichwereeveryyearborrowedfromthesinkingfund。TheSpanishwar,whichbeganin1739,wasprincipallyacolonyquarrel。ItsprincipalobjectwastopreventthesearchofthecolonyshipswhichcarriedonacontrabandtradewiththeSpanishMain。Thiswholeexpenseis,inreality,abountywhichhasbeengiveninordertosupportamonopoly。Thepretendedpurposeofitwastoencouragethemanufactures,andtoincreasethecommerceofGreatBritain。Butitsrealeffecthasbeentoraisetherateofmercantileprofit,andtoenableourmerchantstoturnintoabranchoftrade,ofwhichthereturnsaremoreslowanddistantthanthoseofthegreaterpartofothertrades,agreaterproportionoftheircapitalthantheyotherwisewouldhavedone;twoeventswhich,ifabountycouldhaveprevented,itmightperhapshavebeenverywellworthwhiletogivesuchabounty。
Underthepresentsystemofmanagement,therefore,GreatBritainderivesnothingbutlossfromthedominionwhichsheassumesoverhercolonies。
ToproposethatGreatBritainshouldvoluntarilygiveupallauthorityoverhercolonies,andleavethemtoelecttheirownmagistrates,toenacttheirownlaws,andtomakepeaceandwarastheymightthinkproper,wouldbetoproposesuchameasureasneverwas,andneverwillbeadopted,byanynationintheworld。
Nonationevervoluntarilygaveupthedominionofanyprovince,howtroublesomesoeveritmightbetogovernit,andhowsmallsoevertherevenuewhichitaffordedmightbeinproportiontotheexpensewhichitoccasioned。Suchsacrifices,thoughtheymightfrequentlybeagreeabletotheinterest,arealwaysmortifyingtotheprideofeverynation,andwhatisperhapsofstillgreaterconsequence,theyarealwayscontrarytotheprivateinterestofthegoverningpartofit,whowouldtherebybedeprivedofthedisposalofmanyplacesoftrustandprofit,ofmanyopportunitiesofacquiringwealthanddistinction,whichthepossessionofthemostturbulent,and,tothegreatbodyofthepeople,themostunprofitableprovinceseldomfailstoafford。
Themostvisionaryenthusiastwouldscarcebecapableofproposingsuchameasurewithanyserioushopesatleastofitseverbeingadopted。Ifitwasadopted,however,GreatBritainwouldnotonlybeimmediatelyfreedfromthewholeannualexpenseofthepeaceestablishmentofthecolonies,butmightsettlewiththemsuchatreatyofcommerceaswouldeffectuallysecuretoherafreetrade,moreadvantageoustothegreatbodyofthepeople,thoughlesssotothemerchants,thanthemonopolywhichsheatpresentenjoys。Bythuspartinggoodfriends,thenaturalaffectionofthecoloniestothemothercountrywhich,perhaps,ourlatedissensionshavewellnighextinguished,wouldquicklyrevive。Itmightdisposethemnotonlytorespect,forwholecenturiestogether,thattreatyofcommercewhichtheyhadconcludedwithusatparting,buttofavourusinwaraswellasintrade,and,insteadofturbulentandfactioussubjects,tobecomeourmostfaithful,affectionate,andgenerousallies;andthesamesortofparentalaffectionontheoneside,andfilialrespectontheother,mightrevivebetweenGreatBritainandhercolonies,whichusedtosubsistbetweenthoseofancientGreeceandthemothercityfromwhichtheydescended。
Inordertorenderanyprovinceadvantageoustotheempiretowhichitbelongs,itoughttoafford,intimeofpeace,arevenuetothepublicsufficientnotonlyfordefrayingthewholeexpenseofitsownpeaceestablishment,butforcontributingitsproportiontothesupportofthegeneralgovernmentoftheempire。Everyprovincenecessarilycontributes,moreorless,toincreasetheexpenseofthatgeneralgovernment。Ifanyparticularprovince,therefore,doesnotcontributeitssharetowardsdefrayingthisexpense,anunequalburdenmustbethrownuponsomeotherpartoftheempire。Theextraordinaryrevenue,too,whicheveryprovinceaffordstothepublicintimeofwar,ought,fromparityofreason,tobearthesameproportiontotheextraordinaryrevenueofthewholeempirewhichitsordinaryrevenuedoesintimeofpeace。ThatneithertheordinarynorextraordinaryrevenuewhichGreatBritainderivesfromhercolonies,bearsthisproportiontothewholerevenueoftheBritishempire,willreadilybeallowed。
Themonopoly,ithasbeensupposed,indeed,byincreasingtheprivaterevenueofthepeopleofGreatBritain,andtherebyenablingthemtopaygreatertaxes,compensatesthedeficiencyofthepublicrevenueofthecolonies。Butthismonopoly,Ihaveendeavouredtoshow,thoughaverygrievoustaxuponthecolonies,andthoughitmayincreasetherevenueofaparticularorderofmeninGreatBritain,diminishesinsteadofincreasingthatofthegreatbodyofthepeople;andconsequentlydiminishesinsteadofincreasingtheabilityofthegreatbodyofthepeopletopaytaxes。Themen,too,whoserevenuethemonopolyincreases,constituteaparticularorder,whichitisbothabsolutelyimpossibletotaxbeyondtheproportionofotherorders,andextremelyimpoliticeventoattempttotaxbeyondthatproportion,asIshallendeavourtoshowinthefollowingbook。Noparticularresource,therefore,canbedrawnfromthisparticularorder。
Thecoloniesmaybetaxedeitherbytheirownassemblies,orbytheParliamentofGreatBritain。
Thatthecolonyassembliescaneverbesomanagedastolevyupontheirconstituentsapublicrevenuesufficientnotonlytomaintainatalltimestheirowncivilandmilitaryestablishment,buttopaytheirproperproportionoftheexpenseofthegeneralgovernmentoftheBritishempireseemsnotveryprobable。ItwasalongtimebeforeeventheParliamentofEngland,thoughplacedimmediatelyundertheeyeofthesovereign,couldbebroughtundersuchasystemofmanagement,orcouldberenderedsufficientlyliberalintheirgrantsforsupportingthecivilandmilitaryestablishmentsevenoftheirowncountry。ItwasonlybydistributingamongtheparticularMembersofParliamentagreatparteitheroftheoffices,orofthedisposaloftheofficesarisingfromthiscivilandmilitaryestablishment,thatsuchasystemofmanagementcouldbeestablishedevenwithregardtotheParliamentofEngland。Butthedistanceofthecolonyassembliesfromtheeyeofthesovereign,theirnumber,theirdispersedsituation,andtheirvariousconstitutions,wouldrenderitverydifficulttomanagetheminthesamemanner,eventhoughthesovereignhadthesamemeansofdoingit;andthosemeansarewanting。Itwouldbeabsolutelyimpossibletodistributeamongalltheleadingmembersofallthecolonyassembliessuchashare,eitheroftheofficesorofthedisposaloftheofficesarisingfromthegeneralgovernmentoftheBritishempire,astodisposethemtogiveuptheirpopularityathome,andtotaxtheirconstituentsforthesupportofthatgeneralgovernment,ofwhichalmostthewholeemolumentsweretobedividedamongpeoplewhowerestrangerstothem。Theunavoidableignoranceofadministration,besides,concerningtherelativeimportanceofthedifferentmembersofthosedifferentassemblies,theoffenceswhichmustfrequentlybegiven,theblunderswhichmustconstantlybecommittedinattemptingtomanagetheminthismanner,seemstorendersuchasystemofmanagementaltogetherimpracticablewithregardtothem。