\"Theapprobationwithwhichweviewatender,delicate,andhumanesentiment,isquitedifferentfromthatwithwhichwearestruckbyonethatappearsgreat,daring,andmagnanimous。Ourapprobationofbothmay,upondifferentoccasions,beperfectandentire;butwearesoftenedbytheoneandweareelevatedbytheother,andthereisnosortofresemblancebetweentheemotionswhichtheyexciteinus。And,inthesameway,ourhorrorforcrueltyhasnoresemblancetoourcontemptformeannessofspirit。
ByhisowntheoryAdamSmiththinksthatthisdifferenceinthecharacterofapprobationismoreeasilyexplained。Itisbecausetheemotionsofthepersonwhomweapproveofaredifferentwhentheyarehumaneanddelicatefromwhattheyarewhentheyaregreatanddaring,andbecauseourapprobationarisesfromsympathywiththesedifferentemotions,thatourfeelingofapprobationwithregardtotheonesentimentissodifferentfromwhatitiswithregardtotheother。
Moreover,notonlyarethedifferentpassionsandaffectionsofthehumanmindapprovedordisapprovedasmorallygoodorevil,buttheapprobationordisapprobationitselfismarkedwiththesamemoralattributes。Themoralsensetheorycannotaccountforthisfact;andtheonlyexplanationpossibleis,that,inthisinstanceatleast,thecoincidenceoroppositionofsentimentsbetweenthepersonjudgingandthepersonjudgedconstitutesmoralapprobationorthecontrary。Whentheapprobationwithwhichourneighbourregardstheconductofanotherpersoncoincideswithourown,weapproveofhisapprobationasinsomemeasuremorallygood;andso,onthecontrary,whenhissentimentsdifferfromourown,wedisapproveofthemasmorallywrong。
Ifapeculiarsentiment,distinctfromeveryother,werereallythesourceoftheprincipleofapprobation,itisstrangethatsuchasentiment\"shouldhithertohavebeensolittletakennoticeofasnottohavegotanameinanylanguage。Theword`moralsense\'isofverylateformation,andcannotyetbeconsideredasmakingpartoftheEnglishtongue……Theword`conscience\'doesnotimmediatelydenoteanymoralfacultybywhichweapproveordisapprove。Consciencesupposes,indeed,theexistenceofsomesuchfaculty,andproperlysignifiesourconsciousnessofhavingactedagreeablytoitsdirections。Whenlove,hatred,joy,sorrow,gratitude,resentment,withsomanyotherpassionswhichareallsupposedtobethesubjectsofthisprinciple,havemadethemselvesconsiderableenoughtogetthemtitlestoknowthemby,isitnotsurprisingthatthesovereignofthemallshouldhithertohavebeensolittleheededthatafewphilosophersexceptednobodyhasyetthoughtitworthwhiletobestowanameuponit?\"
Inoppositionthentothetheorywhichderivesmoralapprobationfromapeculiarsentiment,AdamSmithreducesithimselftofoursources,insomerespectsdifferentfromoneanother。\"First,wesympathizewiththemotivesoftheagent;secondly,weenterintothegratitudeofthosewhoreceivethebenefitofhisactions;thirdly,weobservethathisconducthasbeenagreeabletothegeneralrulesbywhichthosetwosympathiesgenerallyact;andlastofall,whenweconsidersuchactionsasmakingapartofasystemofbehaviourwhichtendstopromotethehappinesseitheroftheindividualorofthesociety,theyappeartoderiveabeautyfromthisutilitynotunlikethatwhichweascribetoanywell-contrivedmachine。\"
CHAPTERXIV。REVIEWOFTHEPRINCIPALCRITICISMSOFADAMSMITH\'S
THEORY。
Theresultoftheprecedingchapter,inwhichtherelationofAdamSmith\'stheorytootherethicaltheorieshasbeendefined,isthatitisatheoryinwhichallthatistrueinthe\"selfish\"systemofHobbesorMandeville,inthe\"benevolent\"systemofHutcheson,orinthe\"utilitarian\"systemofHume,isadoptedandmadeuseof,toformasystemquitedistinctfromanyoneofthem。Itseekstobridgeovertheirdifferences,byavoidingtheone-sidednessoftheirseveralprinciples,andtakingawiderviewofthefactsofhumannature。Itistherefore,properlyspeaking,anEclectictheory,ifbyeclecticismbeunderstood,notamerecommixtureofdifferentsystems,butadiscriminateselectionoftheelementsoftruthtobefoundinthemseverally。
TheethicalwriterswhomostinfluencedAdamSmithwereundoubtedlyHumeandHutcheson,inthewayofagreementanddifferencethathasbeenalreadyindicated。DugaldStewarthasalsodrawnattentiontohisobligationstoButler。8ItwouldbeinterestingtoknowwhetherheeverreadHartley\'sObservationsonMan,aworkwhich,publishedin1749thatis,sometenyearsbeforehisownwouldhavemateriallyassistedhisargument。ForAdamSmith\'saccountofthegrowthofconscienceofasenseofduty,isinrealitycloselyconnectedwiththetheorywhichexplainsitsoriginbytheworkingofthelawsofassociation。
Fromourexperienceoftheconstantassociationbetweentheactsofothersandpleasurableorpainfulfeelingsofourown,accordingaswesympathizeornotwiththem,comesthedesireofourselvescausinginotherssimilarpleasurable,andavoidingsimilarpainful,emotionsorinotherwords,thatdesireofpraiseandaversiontoblamewhich,refinedandpurifiedbyreferencetoanimaginaryandidealspectatorofourconduct,growstobeaconscientiousanddisinterestedloveofvirtueanddetestationofvice。Therulesofmoralconduct,formedastheyarebygeneralizationfromparticularjudgmentsofthesympatheticinstinct,orfromanumberofparticularassociationsofpleasurableandpainfulfeelingswithparticularacts,arethemselvesdirectlyassociatedwiththatloveofpraiseorpraise-worthinesswhichoriginatesinourlongingforthesamesympathyfromothermenwithregardtoourselvesthatweknowtobepleasurableintheconverserelation。Theword\"association\"isneveronceusedbyAdamSmith,butitisimpliedateverystepofhistheory,andformsreallyasfundamentalafeatureinhisreasoningasitdoesinthatofthephilosopherwhowasthefirsttoinvestigateitslawsintheirapplicationtothefactsofmorality。
Thisis,perhaps,internalevidenceenoughthatAdamSmithneversawHartley\'swork。9
Butthewriterwho,perhaps,asmuchasanyothercontributedtotheformationofAdamSmith\'sideas,seemstohavebeenPope,whoinhisEveryonMananticipatedmanyoftheleadingthoughtsintheTheoryofMoralSentiments。Thepointsofresemblancebetweenthepoetandthephilosopherarefrequentandobvious。Thereisinboththesameconstantappealtonature,andtothewisdomdisplayedinherlaws;thesamereferencetoself-loveasthebasisofthesocialvirtuesandbenevolence;thesameidentificationofvirtuewithhappiness;andthesamedepreciationofgreatnessandambitionasconducivetohumanfelicity。
AdamSmith\'ssimpletheoryofhappiness,forinstance,readslikeacommentaryonthetextsuppliedbyPopeinthelines,\"Reason\'swholepleasure,allthejoysofsense,LieinthreewordsHealth,Peace,andCompetence。\"
Saidinprose,thesameteachingisconveyedbythephilosopher:\"Whatcanbeaddedtothehappinessofthemanwhoisinhealth,whoisoutofdebt,andhasaclearconscience?\"
Or,totakeanotherinstance。AdamSmith\'saccountoftheorderinwhichindividualsarerecommendedbynaturetoourcareispreciselythesameasthatgivenbyPope。Saystheformer:\"Everymanisfirstandprincipallyrecommendedtohisowncare,\"and,afterhimself,hisfriends,hiscountry,ormankindbecomebydegreestheobjectofhissympathiesSosaidPopebeforehim\"Godlovesfromwholetoparts:buthumansoulMustrisefromindividualtothewhole。
Self-lovebutservesthevirtuousmindtowake,Asthesmallpebblestirsthepeacefullake;
Thecentremoved,acirclestraightsucceedsAnotherstill,andstillanotherspreads;
Friend,parent,neighbour,firstitwillembrace;
Hiscountrynext;andnextallhumanrace。\"
Toturnnowfromthetheoryitselftothecriticismsuponit:itmayperhapsbesaid,thatiftheimportanceofanethicaltheoryinthehistoryofmoralphilosophymaybemeasuredbytheamountofcriticismexpendeduponit,AdamSmith\'sTheoryofMoralSentimentsmusttakeitsplaceimmediatelyafterHume\'sEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals。
TheshorterobservationsonitbyLordKamesandSirJamesMackintoshbearwitnesstothegreatinterestthatattachedtoit,nolessthanthelongercriticismsofDr。Brown,DugaldStewart,orJouffroy,theFrenchmoralphilosopher。Thevariousobjectionsraisedbythesewriters,allofwhomhaveapproacheditwiththatimpartialacutenesssocharacteristicofphilosophersinregardtotheoriesnottheirown,willbestservetoillustratewhathavebeenconsideredtheweakpointsinthegeneraltheoryproposedbyAdamSmith。Butinfollowingthemaincurrentofsuchcriticism,itisonlyfairthatweshouldtryinsomemeasuretoholdthescalesbetweenthecriticsandtheirauthor,andtoweighthevalueoftheargumentsthathavebeenactuallyadvancedontheonesideandthatseemcapableofbeingadvancedontheother。
Firstofall,itissaidthattheresolutionofallmoralapprobationintosympathyreallymakesmoralitydependentonthementalconstitutionofeachindividual,andsosetsupavariablestandard,atthemercyofpersonalinfluencesandlocalcustom。AdamSmithsaysexpresslyindeed,thatthereisnoothermeasureofmoralconductthanthesympatheticapprobationofeachindividual。\"Everyfacultyinonemanisthemeasurebywhichhejudgesofthelikefacultyiuanother;\"andashejudgesofothermen\'spowerofsightorhearingbyreferencetohisown,sohejudgesoftheirlove,resentment,orothermoralstates,byreferencetohisownconsciousnessofthoseseveralaffections。
Isnotthistodestroythefixedcharacterofmorality,andtodepriveitasProtagoras,theGreeksophist,depriveditlongagoinhissimilarteachingthatmanwasthemeasureofallthingsofitsmostennoblingqualities,itseternityandimmutability?Isitnottoreducetherulesofmoralitytothelevelmerelyoftherulesofetiquette?Isitnottomakeourstandardofconductdependentmerelyontheideasandpassionsofthosewehappentolivewith?DoesitnotjustifyBrown\'schiefobjectiontothesystemofsympathy,thatitfixesmorality\"onabasisnotsufficientlyfirm\"?
AdamSmith\'sanswertothismighthavebeen,thattheconsiderationofthebasisofmoralitylaybeyondthescopeofhisinquiry,andthat,ifheexplainedtheprincipleofmoralapprobationbythelawsofsympathyheappealedto,thefactscommandedacceptance,whatevertheconsequencesmightbe。Hewouldhavereassertedconfidently,thatnocaseofapprobationoccurredwithoutatacitreferencetothesympathyoftheapprover;andthatthefeelingofapprobationorthecontraryalwaysvariedexactlywiththedegreeofsympathyorantipathyfeltfortheagent。Therefore,ifasamatteroffacteverycaseofsuchapprobationimpliedareferencetothefeelingsoftheindividualpersonapproving,thenthosefeelingswerethesourceofmoraljudgment,howevervariableorrelativemoralitymightthusbemadetoappear。
Hewouldalsohavedeniedthattheconsequenceofhistheorydidreallyinanywayweakenthebasisofmorality,ordepriveitofitsobligatorypoweroverourconduct。Theassertionofsuchaconsequencehasbeenperhapsthemostpersistentobjectionraisedagainsthissystem。SirJamesMackintosh,forinstance,makesthecriticism,that\"thesympathieshavenothingmoreofanimperativecharacterthananyotheremotions。Theyattractorrepel,likeotherfeelings,accordingtotheirintensity。If,then,thesympathiescontinueinmaturemindstoconstitutethewholeofconscience,itbecomesutterlyimpossibletoexplainthecharacterofcommandandsupremacy,whichisattestedbytheunanimousvoiceofmankindto
belongtothatfaculty,andtoformitsessentialdistinction。\"10Butas,ofallAdamSmith\'scritics,Jouffroyhasbeentheonewhohasurgedthisargumentwiththegreatestforce,itwillbebesttofollowhisreasoning,beforeconsideringtheforceoftheobjection。
Accordingtohim,nomoremoralauthoritycanattachtotheinstinctofsympathythancanattachtoanyotherinstinctofournature。Thedesireofsympathy,beingsimplyaninstinct,canhavenoclaimtoprevailovertheimpulsesofourotherinstincts,whenevertheyhappentocomeintoconflict,thansuchasisfoundedonitspossiblegreaterstrength。Forinstance,theinstinctofself-loveoftencomesintoconflictwith,andoftenprevailsover,theinstinctofsympathy,themotiveofself-interestwell-understoodbeingthussuperiortooursympatheticimpulsesbothinfactandbyright。Ifthenthereisasuperiorityintheinstinctofsympathyaboveallourotherinstincts,itmustcomefromajudgmentofreason,decisiveofitstitle;butsincesuchdecisionofreasonimpliesareferencetosomeruleotherandhigherthaninstinct,ourmotiveinpreferringtheinspirationsofinstinctivesympathytoallotherimpulsesmustbederivedfromthishighermotive,or,inotherwords,fromreasonandnotfrominstinct。
Hence,sincethesympatheticinstinctbearsnosignsofanauthoritysuperiortothatofotherinstincts,thereisnorealauthorityinthemotivewhich,accordingtoAdamSmith,impelsustorightconduct。Insteadofprovingthattheinstinctofsympathyisthetruemoralmotive,AdamSmithdescribestrulyandbeautifullythecharacteristicsofthismoralmotive,andthengratuitouslyattributesthemtotheinstinctofsympathy。Buthefailstoapplytorulesofconductfoundeduponsuchaninstinct,thatwhichisthespecialcharacteristicofthemoralmotive,namely,thatitaloneisobligatoryalonepresentsus,asanendtobepursued,anendwhichoughttobepursued,asdistinctfromotherendssuggestedbyothermotives,whichmaybepursuedornotasweplease。\"Amongallpossiblemotives,themoralmotivealoneappearstousasonethatoughttogovernourconduct。\"
JouffroyappliesthesamereasoningtoAdamSmith\'sexplanationofourmoralideas,those,forexample,ofRightandDuty。Forifthemotiveofsympathybearswithitnoauthority,itisevidentthatitcannotexplainideasbothofwhichimplyandinvolveamotiveofobligation。
Ifdutyisobediencetorulesofconductthathavebeenproducedbysympathy,andtheserulesareonlygeneralizationsofparticularjudgmentsofinstinctivesympathy,itisplainthattheauthorityoftheserulescanbenogreaterthanthatofthejudgmentswhichoriginallygaverisetothem。Ifitisequallyadutytoobeytheinstinctastoobeytherulesitgivesriseto,itissuperfluoustoexplaindutyasasenseoftheauthorityoftheserules,seeingthatitisalreadyinvolvedintheprocessoftheirformation。
Andifagainitcanneverbeadutytoobeytheinstinct,becauseneitheritsdirectionnorthedesireofsympathywhichimpelsustofollowitcaneverbeobligatory,itcannonethemorebeadutytoobeytheruleswhicharefoundedupontheinstinct。Theauthorityofthemoralrulesorprinciplesofconductstandsorfallswiththeauthorityoftheinstinct;forifthelattercanenforceobligationtoacertaindegree,itcanenforceitinalldegrees;andifitcannotenforceittothisdegree,thenitcannotinany。ItisthereforeJouffroy\'sconclusion,that\"thereisnot,inthesystemofSmith,anysuchthingasamorallaw;anditisincompetenttoexplainourideasofduty,ofright,andofallothersuchideasasimplythefactofobligation。\"11
Thequestionthenis,Howfarissuchcriticismwell-founded?Howfarisitrelevanttothesubject-matterofAdamSmith\'streatise?
AdamSmithmighthaverepliedtoJouffroy\'sobjectionsbyaskingwhether,puttingasidethequestionofthesoundnessofhistheoryoftheoriginofmoralapprobation,anytheorythataccountedfortheapprobationdidnotipsofactoaccountfortheobligation。Hemighthavesaidthat,ifheshowedwhyonecourseofconductwasregardedasgoodandanotherasbad,heimplicitlyshowedwhyonecoursewasfelttoberightandtheothertobewrongwhyitwasfelt,thatonecourseoughttobefollowedandtheothercourseoughttobeavoided。Forthefeelingofauthorityandobligationisinvolvedinthefactofapprobation。AsithasbeenwellputbyBrown,\"Theveryconceptionsoftherectitude,theobligation,theapprovablenessofcertainactionsareinvolvedinthefeelingoftheapprobationitself。
Itisimpossibleforustohavethefeeling,andnottohavethese……
Toknowthatweshouldfeelourselvesunworthyofself-esteem,andobjectsratherofself-abhorrence,ifwedidnotactinacertainmanner,istofeelthemoralobligationtoactinacertainmanner,asitistofeelthemoralrectitudeoftheactionitself。Wearesoconstitutedthatitisimpossibleforus,incertaincircumstances,nottohavethisfeeling;
andhavingthefeeling,wemusthavethenotionsofvirtue,obligation,merit。\"12
Moreover,AdamSmithexpresslypointedoutthatthedifferencebetweenmoralapprobationandapprobationofallotherkindslayintheimpossibilityofourbeingasindifferentaboutconductasaboutotherthings,becauseconduct,eitherdirectlyorbyourimagination,affectedourselves;sothattheadditionalstrengththusconferredonthefeelingofmoralapprobationwasquitesufficienttoaccountforthatfeelingoftheimperativeandobligatoryforcewhichinculcatesobediencetomoralrules。Ifthereisnoauthorityinaninstinctperse,itmayneverthelessbesoconstitutedandmaysooperatethatthestrictestsenseofdutymayultimatelygrowfromitanduponit。Theobligationisnonethelessrealbecauseitcanbeaccountedfor;noraretheclaimsofdutyanythelesssubstantialbecausetheyarecapableofbeingtracedtosohumbleabeginningasaninstinctivedesireforthesympathyofourfellows。
Itmaythereforebesaid,onbehalfofAdamSmith,thatitisnottoweakenthebasisofmorality,northeauthorityofconscience,totraceeitherofthemtotheirsourcesinsentimentsofsympathy,originallyinfluencedbypleasureandpain。Theobligatorynatureofmoralrulesremainsafact,whichnotheoryoftheirorigincanalterormodify;justasbenevolentaffectionsremainfactsofourmoralbeing,irrespectiveoftheirpossiblesuperstructureoninstinctsofself-interest。Ifcon-scienceisexplicableasakindofgeneralizationorsummaryofmoralsympathies,formedbytheobservationofthedistributionofpraiseorblameinanumberofparticularinstancesandbypersonalexperienceofmanyyears,itsinfluenceneedbenonethelessgreatnoritscontrolanythelessauthoritativethanifitwereprovedtodemonstrationtobeaprimaryprincipleofourmoralconsciousness。
ItisalsonecessarytorememberthatAdamSmithcarefullyrestrictedthefeelingofobligationtotheonesinglevirtueofjustice,andthroughouthistreatiseavoidedgenerallytheuseofwordswhich,like\"right\"and\"wrong,\"seemtosuggesttheideaofobligation。Bytheuseofthewords\"proper\"and\"improper,\"or\"meritorious,\"asappliedtosentimentsandconduct,heseemstohavewishedtoconveytheideathathedidregardmoralityasrelativetotime,place,andcircumstance,astoacertainextentduetocustomandconvention,andnotasabsolute,eternal,orimmutable。
Properlyspeaking,justice,ortheabstinencefrominjurytoothers,was,heheld,theonlyvirtuewhich,asmenhadarighttoexactitfromus,itwasourdutytopractisetowardsthem。Theconsciousnessthatforcemightbeemployedtomakeusactaccordingtotherulesofjustice,butnotaccordingtotherulesofanyothervirtues,suchasfriendship,charity,orgenerosity,wasthesourceofthestricterobligationfeltbyusinreferencetothevirtueofjustice。\"Wefeelourselves,\"hesaid,\"tobeinapeculiarmannertied,bound,andobligedtotheobservationofjustice,\"whilstthepracticeoftheothervirtues\"seemstobeleftinsomemeasuretoourownchoice。\"\"Inthepracticeoftheothervirtues,ourconductshouldratherbedirectedbyacertainkindofpropriety,byacertaintasteforaparticulartenorofconduct,thanbyanyregardtoapreciseruleormaxim;\"butitisotherwisewithregardtojustice,alltherulesofwhichareprecise,definite,andcertain,andaloneadmitofnoexception。