\"Theapprobationwithwhichweviewatender，delicate，andhumanesentiment，isquitedifferentfromthatwithwhichwearestruckbyonethatappearsgreat，daring，andmagnanimous。Ourapprobationofbothmay，upondifferentoccasions，beperfectandentire；butwearesoftenedbytheoneandweareelevatedbytheother，andthereisnosortofresemblancebetweentheemotionswhichtheyexciteinus。And，inthesameway，ourhorrorforcrueltyhasnoresemblancetoourcontemptformeannessofspirit。
ByhisowntheoryAdamSmiththinksthatthisdifferenceinthecharacterofapprobationismoreeasilyexplained。Itisbecausetheemotionsofthepersonwhomweapproveofaredifferentwhentheyarehumaneanddelicatefromwhattheyarewhentheyaregreatanddaring，andbecauseourapprobationarisesfromsympathywiththesedifferentemotions，thatourfeelingofapprobationwithregardtotheonesentimentissodifferentfromwhatitiswithregardtotheother。
Moreover，notonlyarethedifferentpassionsandaffectionsofthehumanmindapprovedordisapprovedasmorallygoodorevil，buttheapprobationordisapprobationitselfismarkedwiththesamemoralattributes。Themoralsensetheorycannotaccountforthisfact；andtheonlyexplanationpossibleis，that，inthisinstanceatleast，thecoincidenceoroppositionofsentimentsbetweenthepersonjudgingandthepersonjudgedconstitutesmoralapprobationorthecontrary。Whentheapprobationwithwhichourneighbourregardstheconductofanotherpersoncoincideswithourown，weapproveofhisapprobationasinsomemeasuremorallygood；andso，onthecontrary，whenhissentimentsdifferfromourown，wedisapproveofthemasmorallywrong。
Ifapeculiarsentiment，distinctfromeveryother，werereallythesourceoftheprincipleofapprobation，itisstrangethatsuchasentiment\"shouldhithertohavebeensolittletakennoticeofasnottohavegotanameinanylanguage。Theword`moralsense\'isofverylateformation，andcannotyetbeconsideredasmakingpartoftheEnglishtongue……Theword`conscience\'doesnotimmediatelydenoteanymoralfacultybywhichweapproveordisapprove。Consciencesupposes，indeed，theexistenceofsomesuchfaculty，andproperlysignifiesourconsciousnessofhavingactedagreeablytoitsdirections。Whenlove，hatred，joy，sorrow，gratitude，resentment，withsomanyotherpassionswhichareallsupposedtobethesubjectsofthisprinciple，havemadethemselvesconsiderableenoughtogetthemtitlestoknowthemby，isitnotsurprisingthatthesovereignofthemallshouldhithertohavebeensolittleheededthatafewphilosophersexceptednobodyhasyetthoughtitworthwhiletobestowanameuponit？\"
Inoppositionthentothetheorywhichderivesmoralapprobationfromapeculiarsentiment，AdamSmithreducesithimselftofoursources，insomerespectsdifferentfromoneanother。\"First，wesympathizewiththemotivesoftheagent；secondly，weenterintothegratitudeofthosewhoreceivethebenefitofhisactions；thirdly，weobservethathisconducthasbeenagreeabletothegeneralrulesbywhichthosetwosympathiesgenerallyact；andlastofall，whenweconsidersuchactionsasmakingapartofasystemofbehaviourwhichtendstopromotethehappinesseitheroftheindividualorofthesociety，theyappeartoderiveabeautyfromthisutilitynotunlikethatwhichweascribetoanywell-contrivedmachine。\"
CHAPTERXIV。REVIEWOFTHEPRINCIPALCRITICISMSOFADAMSMITH\'S
THEORY。
Theresultoftheprecedingchapter，inwhichtherelationofAdamSmith\'stheorytootherethicaltheorieshasbeendefined，isthatitisatheoryinwhichallthatistrueinthe\"selfish\"systemofHobbesorMandeville，inthe\"benevolent\"systemofHutcheson，orinthe\"utilitarian\"systemofHume，isadoptedandmadeuseof，toformasystemquitedistinctfromanyoneofthem。Itseekstobridgeovertheirdifferences，byavoidingtheone-sidednessoftheirseveralprinciples，andtakingawiderviewofthefactsofhumannature。Itistherefore，properlyspeaking，anEclectictheory，ifbyeclecticismbeunderstood，notamerecommixtureofdifferentsystems，butadiscriminateselectionoftheelementsoftruthtobefoundinthemseverally。
TheethicalwriterswhomostinfluencedAdamSmithwereundoubtedlyHumeandHutcheson，inthewayofagreementanddifferencethathasbeenalreadyindicated。DugaldStewarthasalsodrawnattentiontohisobligationstoButler。8ItwouldbeinterestingtoknowwhetherheeverreadHartley\'sObservationsonMan，aworkwhich，publishedin1749thatis，sometenyearsbeforehisownwouldhavemateriallyassistedhisargument。ForAdamSmith\'saccountofthegrowthofconscienceofasenseofduty，isinrealitycloselyconnectedwiththetheorywhichexplainsitsoriginbytheworkingofthelawsofassociation。
Fromourexperienceoftheconstantassociationbetweentheactsofothersandpleasurableorpainfulfeelingsofourown，accordingaswesympathizeornotwiththem，comesthedesireofourselvescausinginotherssimilarpleasurable，andavoidingsimilarpainful，emotionsorinotherwords，thatdesireofpraiseandaversiontoblamewhich，refinedandpurifiedbyreferencetoanimaginaryandidealspectatorofourconduct，growstobeaconscientiousanddisinterestedloveofvirtueanddetestationofvice。Therulesofmoralconduct，formedastheyarebygeneralizationfromparticularjudgmentsofthesympatheticinstinct，orfromanumberofparticularassociationsofpleasurableandpainfulfeelingswithparticularacts，arethemselvesdirectlyassociatedwiththatloveofpraiseorpraise-worthinesswhichoriginatesinourlongingforthesamesympathyfromothermenwithregardtoourselvesthatweknowtobepleasurableintheconverserelation。Theword\"association\"isneveronceusedbyAdamSmith，butitisimpliedateverystepofhistheory，andformsreallyasfundamentalafeatureinhisreasoningasitdoesinthatofthephilosopherwhowasthefirsttoinvestigateitslawsintheirapplicationtothefactsofmorality。
Thisis，perhaps，internalevidenceenoughthatAdamSmithneversawHartley\'swork。9
Butthewriterwho，perhaps，asmuchasanyothercontributedtotheformationofAdamSmith\'sideas，seemstohavebeenPope，whoinhisEveryonMananticipatedmanyoftheleadingthoughtsintheTheoryofMoralSentiments。Thepointsofresemblancebetweenthepoetandthephilosopherarefrequentandobvious。Thereisinboththesameconstantappealtonature，andtothewisdomdisplayedinherlaws；thesamereferencetoself-loveasthebasisofthesocialvirtuesandbenevolence；thesameidentificationofvirtuewithhappiness；andthesamedepreciationofgreatnessandambitionasconducivetohumanfelicity。
AdamSmith\'ssimpletheoryofhappiness，forinstance，readslikeacommentaryonthetextsuppliedbyPopeinthelines，\"Reason\'swholepleasure，allthejoysofsense，LieinthreewordsHealth，Peace，andCompetence。\"
Saidinprose，thesameteachingisconveyedbythephilosopher:\"Whatcanbeaddedtothehappinessofthemanwhoisinhealth，whoisoutofdebt，andhasaclearconscience？\"
Or，totakeanotherinstance。AdamSmith\'saccountoftheorderinwhichindividualsarerecommendedbynaturetoourcareispreciselythesameasthatgivenbyPope。Saystheformer:\"Everymanisfirstandprincipallyrecommendedtohisowncare，\"and，afterhimself，hisfriends，hiscountry，ormankindbecomebydegreestheobjectofhissympathiesSosaidPopebeforehim\"Godlovesfromwholetoparts:buthumansoulMustrisefromindividualtothewhole。
Self-lovebutservesthevirtuousmindtowake，Asthesmallpebblestirsthepeacefullake；
Thecentremoved，acirclestraightsucceedsAnotherstill，andstillanotherspreads；
Friend，parent，neighbour，firstitwillembrace；
Hiscountrynext；andnextallhumanrace。\"
Toturnnowfromthetheoryitselftothecriticismsuponit:itmayperhapsbesaid，thatiftheimportanceofanethicaltheoryinthehistoryofmoralphilosophymaybemeasuredbytheamountofcriticismexpendeduponit，AdamSmith\'sTheoryofMoralSentimentsmusttakeitsplaceimmediatelyafterHume\'sEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals。
TheshorterobservationsonitbyLordKamesandSirJamesMackintoshbearwitnesstothegreatinterestthatattachedtoit，nolessthanthelongercriticismsofDr。Brown，DugaldStewart，orJouffroy，theFrenchmoralphilosopher。Thevariousobjectionsraisedbythesewriters，allofwhomhaveapproacheditwiththatimpartialacutenesssocharacteristicofphilosophersinregardtotheoriesnottheirown，willbestservetoillustratewhathavebeenconsideredtheweakpointsinthegeneraltheoryproposedbyAdamSmith。Butinfollowingthemaincurrentofsuchcriticism，itisonlyfairthatweshouldtryinsomemeasuretoholdthescalesbetweenthecriticsandtheirauthor，andtoweighthevalueoftheargumentsthathavebeenactuallyadvancedontheonesideandthatseemcapableofbeingadvancedontheother。
Firstofall，itissaidthattheresolutionofallmoralapprobationintosympathyreallymakesmoralitydependentonthementalconstitutionofeachindividual，andsosetsupavariablestandard，atthemercyofpersonalinfluencesandlocalcustom。AdamSmithsaysexpresslyindeed，thatthereisnoothermeasureofmoralconductthanthesympatheticapprobationofeachindividual。\"Everyfacultyinonemanisthemeasurebywhichhejudgesofthelikefacultyiuanother；\"andashejudgesofothermen\'spowerofsightorhearingbyreferencetohisown，sohejudgesoftheirlove，resentment，orothermoralstates，byreferencetohisownconsciousnessofthoseseveralaffections。
Isnotthistodestroythefixedcharacterofmorality，andtodepriveitasProtagoras，theGreeksophist，depriveditlongagoinhissimilarteachingthatmanwasthemeasureofallthingsofitsmostennoblingqualities，itseternityandimmutability？Isitnottoreducetherulesofmoralitytothelevelmerelyoftherulesofetiquette？Isitnottomakeourstandardofconductdependentmerelyontheideasandpassionsofthosewehappentolivewith？DoesitnotjustifyBrown\'schiefobjectiontothesystemofsympathy，thatitfixesmorality\"onabasisnotsufficientlyfirm\"？
AdamSmith\'sanswertothismighthavebeen，thattheconsiderationofthebasisofmoralitylaybeyondthescopeofhisinquiry，andthat，ifheexplainedtheprincipleofmoralapprobationbythelawsofsympathyheappealedto，thefactscommandedacceptance，whatevertheconsequencesmightbe。Hewouldhavereassertedconfidently，thatnocaseofapprobationoccurredwithoutatacitreferencetothesympathyoftheapprover；andthatthefeelingofapprobationorthecontraryalwaysvariedexactlywiththedegreeofsympathyorantipathyfeltfortheagent。Therefore，ifasamatteroffacteverycaseofsuchapprobationimpliedareferencetothefeelingsoftheindividualpersonapproving，thenthosefeelingswerethesourceofmoraljudgment，howevervariableorrelativemoralitymightthusbemadetoappear。
Hewouldalsohavedeniedthattheconsequenceofhistheorydidreallyinanywayweakenthebasisofmorality，ordepriveitofitsobligatorypoweroverourconduct。Theassertionofsuchaconsequencehasbeenperhapsthemostpersistentobjectionraisedagainsthissystem。SirJamesMackintosh，forinstance，makesthecriticism，that\"thesympathieshavenothingmoreofanimperativecharacterthananyotheremotions。Theyattractorrepel，likeotherfeelings，accordingtotheirintensity。If，then，thesympathiescontinueinmaturemindstoconstitutethewholeofconscience，itbecomesutterlyimpossibletoexplainthecharacterofcommandandsupremacy，whichisattestedbytheunanimousvoiceofmankindto
belongtothatfaculty，andtoformitsessentialdistinction。\"10Butas，ofallAdamSmith\'scritics，Jouffroyhasbeentheonewhohasurgedthisargumentwiththegreatestforce，itwillbebesttofollowhisreasoning，beforeconsideringtheforceoftheobjection。
Accordingtohim，nomoremoralauthoritycanattachtotheinstinctofsympathythancanattachtoanyotherinstinctofournature。Thedesireofsympathy，beingsimplyaninstinct，canhavenoclaimtoprevailovertheimpulsesofourotherinstincts，whenevertheyhappentocomeintoconflict，thansuchasisfoundedonitspossiblegreaterstrength。Forinstance，theinstinctofself-loveoftencomesintoconflictwith，andoftenprevailsover，theinstinctofsympathy，themotiveofself-interestwell-understoodbeingthussuperiortooursympatheticimpulsesbothinfactandbyright。Ifthenthereisasuperiorityintheinstinctofsympathyaboveallourotherinstincts，itmustcomefromajudgmentofreason，decisiveofitstitle；butsincesuchdecisionofreasonimpliesareferencetosomeruleotherandhigherthaninstinct，ourmotiveinpreferringtheinspirationsofinstinctivesympathytoallotherimpulsesmustbederivedfromthishighermotive，or，inotherwords，fromreasonandnotfrominstinct。
Hence，sincethesympatheticinstinctbearsnosignsofanauthoritysuperiortothatofotherinstincts，thereisnorealauthorityinthemotivewhich，accordingtoAdamSmith，impelsustorightconduct。Insteadofprovingthattheinstinctofsympathyisthetruemoralmotive，AdamSmithdescribestrulyandbeautifullythecharacteristicsofthismoralmotive，andthengratuitouslyattributesthemtotheinstinctofsympathy。Buthefailstoapplytorulesofconductfoundeduponsuchaninstinct，thatwhichisthespecialcharacteristicofthemoralmotive，namely，thatitaloneisobligatoryalonepresentsus，asanendtobepursued，anendwhichoughttobepursued，asdistinctfromotherendssuggestedbyothermotives，whichmaybepursuedornotasweplease。\"Amongallpossiblemotives，themoralmotivealoneappearstousasonethatoughttogovernourconduct。\"
JouffroyappliesthesamereasoningtoAdamSmith\'sexplanationofourmoralideas，those，forexample，ofRightandDuty。Forifthemotiveofsympathybearswithitnoauthority，itisevidentthatitcannotexplainideasbothofwhichimplyandinvolveamotiveofobligation。
Ifdutyisobediencetorulesofconductthathavebeenproducedbysympathy，andtheserulesareonlygeneralizationsofparticularjudgmentsofinstinctivesympathy，itisplainthattheauthorityoftheserulescanbenogreaterthanthatofthejudgmentswhichoriginallygaverisetothem。Ifitisequallyadutytoobeytheinstinctastoobeytherulesitgivesriseto，itissuperfluoustoexplaindutyasasenseoftheauthorityoftheserules，seeingthatitisalreadyinvolvedintheprocessoftheirformation。
Andifagainitcanneverbeadutytoobeytheinstinct，becauseneitheritsdirectionnorthedesireofsympathywhichimpelsustofollowitcaneverbeobligatory，itcannonethemorebeadutytoobeytheruleswhicharefoundedupontheinstinct。Theauthorityofthemoralrulesorprinciplesofconductstandsorfallswiththeauthorityoftheinstinct；forifthelattercanenforceobligationtoacertaindegree，itcanenforceitinalldegrees；andifitcannotenforceittothisdegree，thenitcannotinany。ItisthereforeJouffroy\'sconclusion，that\"thereisnot，inthesystemofSmith，anysuchthingasamorallaw；anditisincompetenttoexplainourideasofduty，ofright，andofallothersuchideasasimplythefactofobligation。\"11
Thequestionthenis，Howfarissuchcriticismwell-founded？Howfarisitrelevanttothesubject-matterofAdamSmith\'streatise？
AdamSmithmighthaverepliedtoJouffroy\'sobjectionsbyaskingwhether，puttingasidethequestionofthesoundnessofhistheoryoftheoriginofmoralapprobation，anytheorythataccountedfortheapprobationdidnotipsofactoaccountfortheobligation。Hemighthavesaidthat，ifheshowedwhyonecourseofconductwasregardedasgoodandanotherasbad，heimplicitlyshowedwhyonecoursewasfelttoberightandtheothertobewrongwhyitwasfelt，thatonecourseoughttobefollowedandtheothercourseoughttobeavoided。Forthefeelingofauthorityandobligationisinvolvedinthefactofapprobation。AsithasbeenwellputbyBrown，\"Theveryconceptionsoftherectitude，theobligation，theapprovablenessofcertainactionsareinvolvedinthefeelingoftheapprobationitself。
Itisimpossibleforustohavethefeeling，andnottohavethese……
Toknowthatweshouldfeelourselvesunworthyofself-esteem，andobjectsratherofself-abhorrence，ifwedidnotactinacertainmanner，istofeelthemoralobligationtoactinacertainmanner，asitistofeelthemoralrectitudeoftheactionitself。Wearesoconstitutedthatitisimpossibleforus，incertaincircumstances，nottohavethisfeeling；
andhavingthefeeling，wemusthavethenotionsofvirtue，obligation，merit。\"12
Moreover，AdamSmithexpresslypointedoutthatthedifferencebetweenmoralapprobationandapprobationofallotherkindslayintheimpossibilityofourbeingasindifferentaboutconductasaboutotherthings，becauseconduct，eitherdirectlyorbyourimagination，affectedourselves；sothattheadditionalstrengththusconferredonthefeelingofmoralapprobationwasquitesufficienttoaccountforthatfeelingoftheimperativeandobligatoryforcewhichinculcatesobediencetomoralrules。Ifthereisnoauthorityinaninstinctperse，itmayneverthelessbesoconstitutedandmaysooperatethatthestrictestsenseofdutymayultimatelygrowfromitanduponit。Theobligationisnonethelessrealbecauseitcanbeaccountedfor；noraretheclaimsofdutyanythelesssubstantialbecausetheyarecapableofbeingtracedtosohumbleabeginningasaninstinctivedesireforthesympathyofourfellows。
Itmaythereforebesaid，onbehalfofAdamSmith，thatitisnottoweakenthebasisofmorality，northeauthorityofconscience，totraceeitherofthemtotheirsourcesinsentimentsofsympathy，originallyinfluencedbypleasureandpain。Theobligatorynatureofmoralrulesremainsafact，whichnotheoryoftheirorigincanalterormodify；justasbenevolentaffectionsremainfactsofourmoralbeing，irrespectiveoftheirpossiblesuperstructureoninstinctsofself-interest。Ifcon-scienceisexplicableasakindofgeneralizationorsummaryofmoralsympathies，formedbytheobservationofthedistributionofpraiseorblameinanumberofparticularinstancesandbypersonalexperienceofmanyyears，itsinfluenceneedbenonethelessgreatnoritscontrolanythelessauthoritativethanifitwereprovedtodemonstrationtobeaprimaryprincipleofourmoralconsciousness。
ItisalsonecessarytorememberthatAdamSmithcarefullyrestrictedthefeelingofobligationtotheonesinglevirtueofjustice，andthroughouthistreatiseavoidedgenerallytheuseofwordswhich，like\"right\"and\"wrong，\"seemtosuggesttheideaofobligation。Bytheuseofthewords\"proper\"and\"improper，\"or\"meritorious，\"asappliedtosentimentsandconduct，heseemstohavewishedtoconveytheideathathedidregardmoralityasrelativetotime，place，andcircumstance，astoacertainextentduetocustomandconvention，andnotasabsolute，eternal，orimmutable。
Properlyspeaking，justice，ortheabstinencefrominjurytoothers，was，heheld，theonlyvirtuewhich，asmenhadarighttoexactitfromus，itwasourdutytopractisetowardsthem。Theconsciousnessthatforcemightbeemployedtomakeusactaccordingtotherulesofjustice，butnotaccordingtotherulesofanyothervirtues，suchasfriendship，charity，orgenerosity，wasthesourceofthestricterobligationfeltbyusinreferencetothevirtueofjustice。\"Wefeelourselves，\"hesaid，\"tobeinapeculiarmannertied，bound，andobligedtotheobservationofjustice，\"whilstthepracticeoftheothervirtues\"seemstobeleftinsomemeasuretoourownchoice。\"\"Inthepracticeoftheothervirtues，ourconductshouldratherbedirectedbyacertainkindofpropriety，byacertaintasteforaparticulartenorofconduct，thanbyanyregardtoapreciseruleormaxim；\"butitisotherwisewithregardtojustice，alltherulesofwhichareprecise，definite，andcertain，andaloneadmitofnoexception。