AdamSmithalsodiffersfromHumenolessinhistheoryofthecauseofthebeautywhichresultsfromaperceptionofutilitythaninhistheoryoftheplaceassignabletoutilityintheprincipleofmoralapprobation。
AccordingtoHume，theutilityofanyobjectisasourceofpleasurefromitssuggestionoftheconveniencyitisintendedtopromote，fromitsfitnesstoproducetheendintendedbyit。AdamSmithmaintains，ratherbywayofsupplementthanofcontradiction，thatthefitnessofathingtoproduceitsend，orthehappyadjustmentofmeanstotheattainmentofanyconvenienceorpleasureisoftenmoreregardedthantheendorconvenienceitself，andhegivesseveralinstancestoillustratetheoperationofthisprinciple。
Forinstance，amancomingintohisroomandfindingallthechairsinthemiddle，willperhapsbeangrywithhisservantandtakethetroubletoplacethemallwiththeirbackstothewall，forthesakeofthegreaterconvenienceofhavingthefloorfreeanddisengaged。Butitismorethearrangementthantheconveniencewhichhereallycaresfor，sincetoattaintheconvenienceheputshimselftomoretroublethanhecouldhavesufferedfromthewantofit，seeingthatnothingwaseasierforhimthantohavesatdownatonceononeofthechairs，whichisprobablyallhedoeswhenhislabourisover。
Thesameprincipleappliestothepursuitofriches，undercircumstanceswhichimplymuchmoretroubleandvexationthanthepossessionofthemcaneverobviate。Thepoorman\'sson，cursedwithambition，whoadmirestheconvenienceofapalacetolivein，ofhorsestocarryhim，andofservantstowaitonhim，sacrificesarealtranquillityforacertainartificialandelegantreposehemayneverreach，tofindatlastthat\"wealthandgreatnessaremeretrinketsoffrivolousutility，nomoreadaptedforprocuringeaseofbodyortranquillityofmind，thanthetweezer-casesoftheloveroftoys。\"Indeed，thereisnootherrealdifferencebetweenthemthanthattheconveniencesof。theonearesomewhatmoreobservablethanthoseoftheother。Thepalaces，gardens，orequipageofthegreatareobjectsofwhichtheconveniencystrikeseveryone；theirutilityisobvious；andwereadilyenjoybysympathythesatisfactiontheyarefittedtoafford。
Buttheconveniencyofatoothpickorofanail-cutter，beinglessobvious，itislesseasytoenterintothesatisfactionoftheirpossessor。Theyarelessreasonableobjectsofvanitythanwealthandgreat-ness，andlesseffectuallygratifyman\'sloveofdistinction。Toamanwhohadtolivealoneonadesolateisland，itmightbeamatterofdoubt，\"whetherapalace，oracollectionofsuchsmallconveniencesasarecommonlycontainedinatweezer-case，wouldcontributemosttohishappinessandenjoyment。\"
Thefactthattherichandthegreataresomuchtheobjectofadmirationisduenotsomuchtoanysuperioreaseorpleasuretheyaresupposedtoenjoy，astothenumberlessartificialandelegantcontrivancestheypossessforpromotingsucheaseandpleasure。Thespectatordoesnotimagine\"thattheyarereallyhappierthanotherpeople，butheimaginesthattheypossessmoremeansofhappiness。Anditistheingeniousandartfuladjustmentofthosemeanstotheendforwhichtheywereintended，thatistheprincipalsourceofhisadmiration。\"
Again，thesoleuseandendofallconstitutionsofgovernmentistopromotethehappinessofthosewholiveunderthem。Butfromthisloveofartandcontrivance，weoftencometovaluethemeansmorethantheend，andtobeeagertopromotethehappinessofourfellows，lessfromanysympathywiththeirsufferingsorenjoymentthanfromawishtoperfectandimproveabeautifulsystem。Menofthegreatestpublicspirithaveoftenbeenmenofthesmallesthumanity，likePetertheGreat；andifapublic-spiritedmanencouragesthemendingofroads，itisnotcommonlyfromafellow-feelingwithcarriersandwaggonerssomuchasfromaregardtothegeneralbeautyoforder。
Thisadmitshoweverofapracticalapplication，forifyouwishtoimplantpublicvirtueinamandevoidofit，youwilltellhiminvainofthesuperioradvantagesofawell-governedstate，ofthebetterhomes，thebetterclothing，orthebetterfood。Butifyoudescribethegreatsystemofgovernmentwhichprocurestheseadvantages，explainingtheconnexionsandsubordinationsoftheirseveralparts，andtheirgeneralsubserviencytothehappinessoftheirsociety；ifyoushowthepossibilityofintroducingsuchasystemintohisowncountry，orofremovingtheobstructionstoit，andsettingthewheelsofthemachineofgovernmenttomovewithmoreharmonyandsmoothness，youwillscarcefailtoraiseinhimthedesiretohelptoremovetheobstructions，andtoputinmotionsobeautifulandorderlyamachine。Itislesstheresultsofapoliticalsystemthatcanmovehimthanthecontemplationofaningeniousadjustmentofmeanstoends。
CHAPTERXIII。THERELATIONOFADAMSMITH\'STHEORYTOOTHERSYSTEMS
OFMORALITY。
ThelongestandperhapsthemostinterestingdivisionofAdamSmith\'streatiseisthatinwhichhereviewstherelationofhisowntheorytothatofothersystemsofmoralphilosophy。Forlikeallwritersonthesamedifficultsubject，hefindsbutaverypartialattainmentoftruthinanysystemoutsidehisown，andclaimsforthelatteracomprehensivesurveyofallthephenomena，whichhispredecessorshadonlygraspedsinglyandindetail。Everysystemofmorality，everytheoryoftheoriginofourmoralsentiments，hasbeenderived，hethinks，fromsomeoneorotheroftheprinciplesexpoundedbyhimself。And\"astheyarealloftheminthisrespectfoundeduponnaturalprinciples，theyarealloftheminsomemeasureintheright。Butasmanyofthemarederivedfromapartialandimperfectviewofnature，therearemanyofthemtooinsomerespectsinthewrong。\"
I。Thuswithregard，first，tothenatureofVirtue，allthedifferenttheories，whetherinancientorinmoderntimes，may，AdamSmiththinks，bereducedtothree，accordingastheymakeittoconsistinPropriety，Prudence，orBenevolence:orinotherwords，accordingastheyplaceitinthepropergovernmentanddirectionofallouraffectionsequally，whetherselfishorsocial；inthejudiciouspursuitofourownprivateinterestandhappinessbytherightdirectionoftheselfishaffectionsalone；orinthedisinterestedpursuitofthehappinessofothersunderthesoledirectionofthebenevolentaffections。
AdamSmith\'sowntheorydifferedfromallthese，inthatittookaccountofallthesethreedifferentaspectsofvirtuetogether，andgavenoexclusivepreferencetoanyoneofthem。WithPlato，Aristotle，andtheStoics，whomadevirtuetoconsistinproprietyofconduct，orinthesuitablenessofthemotiveofactiontotheobjectwhichexcitesit，orwithsuchmodernsystemsasthoseofLordShaftesburyorClarke，whodefinedvirtueasmaintainingaproperbalanceoftheaffectionsandpassions，orasactingaccordingtotherelationsortothetruthofthings，hesofaragreedastoregardsuchproprietyasconstitutingoneelementinourapprobationofvirtue；
buthemaintainedthatthispropriety，thoughanessentialingredientineveryvirtuousaction，wasnotalwaystheonlyone。Proprietycommandedapprobation，andimproprietydisapprobation，buttherewereotherqualitieswhichcommandedahigherdegreeofesteemorblame，andseemedtocallforrewardorpunishmentrespectively。Suchwerebeneficentorviciousactions，inwhichsomethingwasrecognizedbesidesmereproprietyorimpropriety，andraisedfeelingsstrongerthanthoseofmereapprovalordislike，andthatwastheirtendencytoproducegoodorbadresults。Moreover，noneofthesystemswhichplacedvirtueinaproprietyofaffectiongaveanymeasurebywhichthatproprietymightbeascer-tained，norcouldsuchameasurebefoundanywherebutinthesympatheticfeelingsoftheimpartialandwell-informedspectator。
Plato，Aristotle，andtheStoics，onlyregarded，intheiraccountofvirtue，thatpartofitwhichconsistsinproprietyofconduct。AccordingtoPlato，thesoulwascomposedofthreedifferentfacultiesreason，passion，andappetite；andthathigherformofjusticewhichconstitutesperfectvirtuewasnothingmorethanthatstateofmindinwhicheveryfacultyconfineditselftoitspropersphere，withoutencroachinguponthatofanyother，andperformeditsofficewithpreciselythatdegreeofstrengthwhichbelongedtoit。Inotherwords，thisjustice，thelastandgreatestofthecardinalvirtues，andthatwhichcomprehendedalltheothers，meantthatexactandperfectproprietyofconduct，thenatureofwhichhasbeenalreadydiscussed。NearlythesameaccountofvirtuewasgivenbyAristotle，whodefineditasthehabitofmoderationinaccordancewithrightreason；
bywhichhemeantarightaffectionofmindtowardsparticularobjects，asinbeingneithertoomuchnortoolittleaffectedbyobjectsoffear。
AndtheStoicssofarcoincidedwithPlatoandAristotleastoplaceperfectvirtue，orrectitudeofconduct，inaproperchoiceorrejectionofdifferentobjectsandcircumstancesaccordingastheywerebynaturerenderedmoreorlesstheobjectsofourdesireoraversion。Inthisproprietyofthemindtowardsexternalthingsconsistedthelifeaccordingtonature，orinotherwords，thevirtuousconductoflife。
Nolessincompletethansystemswhichplacedvirtueinproprietyalonewerethosesystemswhichplaceditinprudence，orinaprudentialregardformerepersonalwelfare。SuchwerethesystemsoftheCyrenaicsandEpicureansinancienttimes，andofwriterslikeHobbesandMandevilleinmoderntimes。
AccordingtoEpicurus，thegoodnessorbadnessofanythingwasultimatelyreferabletoitstendencytoproducebodilypleasureorpain。Thuspowerandrichesweredesirableasgoodthings，fromtheirtendencytoprocurepleasure，whilsttheevilofthecontraryconditionslayintheircloseconnexionwithpain。Honourandreputationwereofvalue，becausetheesteemofotherswasofsomuchimportancetoprocureuspleasureandtodefendusfrompain。Andinthesamewaytheseveralvirtueswerenotdesirablesimplyforthemselves，butonlybyreasonoftheirintimateconnexionwithourgreatestwell-being，easeofbodyandtranquillityofmind。Thustemperancewasnothingbutprudencewithregardtopleasure，thesacrificeofapresentenjoymenttoobtainagreateroneortoavoidagreaterpain。Couragewasnothingbutprudencewithregardtodangerorlabour，notgoodinitself，butonlyasrepellentofsomegreaterevil。Andjusticetoowasnothingbutprudencewithregardtoourneighbours，ameanscalculatedtoprocuretheiresteem，andtoavoidthefearthatwouldflowfromtheirresentment。
AdamSmith\'sfirstreplytothistheoryis，thatwhatevermaybethetendencyoftheseveralvirtuesorvices，thesentimentswhichtheyexciteinothersaretheobjectsofamuchmorepassionatedesireoraversionthanalltheirothercon-sequences；thattobe-amiableandtheproperobjectofesteemisofmorevaluetousthanalltheeaseandsecuritywhichloveoresteemcanprocureus:andthattobeodious，ortheproperobjectofcontempt，orindignationismoredreadfulthanallwecansufferinourbodyfromhatred，contempt，orindignation；andthatthereforeourdesireoftheonecharacterandouraversiontotheothercannotarisefromregardtotheeffectswhicheitherofthemislikelytoproduceonthebody。
Secondly，thereisoneaspectofnaturefromwhichtheEpicureansystemderivesitsplausibility。\"BythewisecontrivanceoftheAuthorofnature，virtueisuponallordinaryoccasions，evenwithregardtothislife，realwisdom，andthesurestandreadiestmeansofobtainingbothsafetyandadvantage。\"Thesuccessorfailureofourundertakingsmustverymuchdependonthegoodorbadopinionentertainedofus，andonthegeneraldispositionofotherstoassistoropposeus。Hencethetendencyofvirtuetopromoteourinterestandofvicetoobstructit，undoubtedlystampsanadditionalbeautyandproprietyupontheone，andafreshdeformityandimproprietyupontheother。Andthustemperance，magnanimity，justiceandbeneficence，cometobeapprovedof，notonlyundertheirpropercharacters，butundertheadditionalcharacterofthemostrealprudenceandthehighestwisdom；
whilstthecontraryvicescometobedisapprovedof；notonlyundertheirpropercharacters，butundertheadditionalcharacterofthemostshort-sightedfollyandweakness。Sothattheconducivenessofvirtuetohappinessisonlysecondary，andsotospeakaccidentaltoitscharacter；itisnotitsfirstrecommendationtoourpursuitofit。
Butifthetheorieswhichresolvedvirtueintoproprietyorprudencewerethusone-sided，theremainingtheorythatbestrepresentedbyHutchesonwasnolessso，whichmadevirtuetoconsistsolelyinbenevolence，orinadisinterestedregardtothegoodofothersorthepublicgenerally。SofarindeeddidHutchesoncarrythistheory，thatheevenrejectedasaselfishmotivetovirtuousactionthepleasureofself-approbation，\"thecomfortableapplauseofourownconsciences，\"holdingthatitdiminishedthemeritofanybenevolentaction。Theprincipleofself-lovecouldneverbevirtuousinanydegree，anditwasmerelyinnocent，notgood，whenitledamantoactfromareasonableregardtohisownhappiness。
Severalreasonsseem，indeed，atfirstsight，tojustifytheidentificationofvirtuewithbenevolence。Itisthemostagreeableofalltheaffections。
Itisrecommendedtousbyadoublesympathy，andwefeelittobetheproperobjectofgratitudeandreward。Evenitsweaknessoritsexcessisnotverydisagreeabletous，asistheexcessofeveryotherpassion。
Andasitthrowsapeculiarcharmovereveryactionwhichproceedsfromit，sothewantofitaddsapeculiardeformitytoactionsindicativeofdisregardtothehappinessofothers。Oursensetooofthemeritofanyactionisjustsofarincreasedordiminishedaccordingaswefindthatbenevolencewasorwasnotthemotiveoftheaction。If，forinstance，anactsupposedtoproceedfromgratitudeisfoundtoproceedfromthehopeofsomefreshfavour，allitsmeritisgone；andsoifanactionattributedtoaselfishmotiveisfoundtohavebeenduetoabenevolentone，oursenseofitsmeritisallthemoreenhanced。Andlastly，inalldisputesconcerningtherectitudeofconduct，thepublicgood，orthetendencyofactionstopromotethegeneralwelfare，hasalwaysbeenthestandardofreference，thatbeingaccountedmorallygoodwhichtendstopromotehappiness，andthatbadorwrongwhichtendstothecontraryresult。
ThesereasonsledHutchesontotheconclusion，thatanactwasmeritoriousinproportiontothebenevolenceevidencedbyit；hencethatthevirtueofanactionwasproportionedtotheextentofhappinessittendedtopromote，sothattheleastvirtuousaffectionwasthatwhichaimednofurtherthanatthehappinessofanindividual，asason，abrother，orafriend，whilstthemostvirtuouswasonewhichembracedasitsobjectthehappinessofallintelligentbeings。Theperfectionofvirtueconsistedthereforeindirectingallouractionstopromotethegreatestpossiblegood，andinsubjectingallinferioraffectionstothedesireofthegeneralhappinessofmankind。
ThefirstdefectwhichAdamSmithfindsinthistheoryofhisformerteacheris，thatitfailstoexplainsufficientlyourapprobationoftheinferiorvirtuesofprudence，temperance，constancy，andfirmness。Justasothertheorieserredinregardingsolelytheproprietyorimproprietyofconduct，andindisregardingitsgoodorbadtendency，sothissystemerredbydisregardingaltogetherthesuitablenessofaffectionstotheirexcitingcause，andattendingonlytheirbeneficientorhurtfuleffects。
Inthesecondplace，aselfishmotiveisnotalwaysabadone。Self-lovemayoftenbeavirtuousmotivetoaction。Everymanisbynaturefirstandprincipallyrecommendedtohisowncare；andbecauseheisfittertotakecareofhimselfthanofanyotherperson，itisright。thatheshoulddoso。Regardtoourownprivatehappinessandinterestmayconstituteverylaudablemotivesofaction。Thehabitsofeconomy，industry，discretion，attention，andapplicationofthought，thoughcultivatedfromself-interestedmotives，areneverthelesspraiseworthyqualities，anddeservetheesteemandapprobationofeverybody。Ontheotherhand，carelessnessandwantofeconomyareuniversallydisapprovedof，notasproceedingfromawantofbenevolence，butfromawantofaproperattentiontotheobjectsofself-interest。
Andastothestandardofrightandwrongbeingfrequentlythetendencyofconducttothewelfareordisorderofsociety，itdoesnotfollowthataregardtosocietyshouldbethesolevirtuousmotiveofaction，butonlythatinanycompetitionitoughttocastthebalanceagainstallothermotives。
Itwas，again，ageneraldefectofeachofthethreetheorieswhichdefinedvirtueaspropriety，prudence，orbenevolence，thattheytendedtogiveabiastothemindtosomeprinciplesofactionbeyondtheproportionthatisduetothem。Thustheancientsystems，whichplacedvirtueinpropriety，insistedlittleonthesoftandgentlevirtues，ratherregardingthemasweaknessestobeexpungedfromthebreast，whiletheylaidchiefstressonthegravervirtuesofself-command，fortitude，andcourage。Andthebenevolentsystem，whileencouragingthemildervirtuesinthehighestdegree，wentsofarastodenythenameofvirtuetothemorerespectablequalitiesofthemind，callingthemmerely\"moralabilities，\"unworthyoftheapprobationbestowedonrealvirtue。Neverthelessthegeneraltendencyofeachofthesesystemswastoencouragethebestandmostlaudablehabitsofthemind，anditwerewellforsocietyifmankindregulatedtheirconductbythepreceptsofanyoneofthem。
Thisgeneralgoodtendencyofthesethreetheoriesleadsourauthortoclassifybyitself，andtotreatinadistinctchapter，asystemwhich，hesays，destroysaltogetherthedistinctionbetweenvirtueandvice，andofwhichthetendencyconsequentlyiswhollypernicious，andthatisthesystem，whichhedesignatesastheLicentiousSystem，expoundedbyMandevilleintheFableoftheBees。
AdamSmithconsidersthatthissystem，\"whichoncemadesomuchnoiseintheworldcouldneverhaveimposeduponsogreatanumberofpersons，norhaveoccasionedsogeneralalarmamongthosewhoarethefriendsofbetterprinciples，haditnotinsomerespectsbordereduponthetruth。\"
Mandevillesfamousdefinitionofthemoralvirtuesas\"thepoliticaloffspringwhichflatterybegotuponpride，\"wasbasedontheassumptionthatmoralitywasnotnaturaltoman，butwastheinventionofwisemen，who，bygivingthetitleofnobletopersonscapableofself-denialandofpreferringthepublicinteresttotheirown，wonmankindgenerally，throughthissubtleflattery，towhattheychosetodenominatevirtue。
Hencewhatevermendidfromasenseofpropriety，orfromaregardtowhatwaspraiseworthy，theyreallydidfromaloveofpraise，fromprideorvanity。Thisloveofpraisewasoneofthestrongestofmansselfishaffections，andthefoundationoftheloveofhonour。Inconductapparentlythemostdisinterested，thisselfishmotivewaspresent。Ifamansacrificedhisowninteresttothatofhisfellows，heknewthathisconductwouldbeagreeabletotheirself-love，andthattheywouldnotfailtoexpresstheirsatisfactionbybestowingonhimselfthemostextravagantpraises。Thepleasurehewouldderivefromthissourcecounterbalancedtheinterestheabandonedtoprocureit。Henceallpublicspirit，orpreferenceofpublictoprivateinterestwasamerecheatandimpositiononmankind。
Thefallacyofthissystemlies，accordingtoAdamSmith，inasophisticaluseofthewordvanityinitsapplicationtoaremoteaffinitythatprevailsbetweentworeallyverydifferentthings。Todesirepraiseforqualitieswhicharenotpraise-worthyinanydegree，orforqualitiespraiseworthyinthemselvesbutunpossessedbytheindividualconcerned，isvanityproper；
butthisfrivolousdesireforpraiseatanypriceisverydifferentfromthedesireofrenderingour-selvestheproperobjectsofhonourandesteem，orofacquiringhonourandesteembyreallydeservingthem。Theaffinitybetweentheseverydifferentdesires，ofwhichMandevillemadesomuchuse，layinthefactthatvanityaswellastheloveoftruegloryaimsatacquiringesteemandapprobation；butthedifferenceconsistsinthis，thatthedesireoftheoneisunjustandridiculous，whilethatoftheotherisjustandreasonable。
Thereisalsoanaffinitybetweentheloveofvirtueandtheloveoftrueglory，whichgivesacertainspeciousnesstoMandeville\'stheory。
Forthereisacloseconnexionbetweenthedesireofbecomingwhatishonourableandestimable，whichistheloveofvirtue，andthedesireofactualhonourandesteem，whichistheloveoftrueglory。Theybothhaveandhereinliestheirsuperficialresemblancetovanitysomereferencetothesentimentsofothers。Evenintheloveofvirtuethereisstillsomereference，ifnottowhatis，yettowhatinreasonandproprietyoughttobe，theopinionofothers。Themanofthegreatestmagnanimity，whodesiresvirtueforitsownsake，andismostindifferentabouttheactualopinionsofmankind，isstilldelightedwiththethoughtsofwhatthoseopinionsoughttobe，andwiththeconsciousnessthatthoughhemayneitherbehonourednorapplauded，heisyettheproperobjectofhonourandapplause。
AnotherfeatureofMandeville\'ssystemwastodenytheexistenceofanyself-denialordisinterestednessinhumanvirtueofanykind。Thuswherevertemperancefellshortofthemostasceticabstinence，hetreateditasgrossluxury；andallourpretensionstoself-denialwerebased，notontheconquest，butontheconcealedindulgence，ofourpassions。
Herethefallacylayinrepresentingeverypassionaswhollyvicious，whichissoinanydegreeandinanydirection。Therearesomeofourpassionswhichhavenoothernamesthanthosewhichmarkthedisagreeableandoffensivedegree，theybeingmoreapttoattractnoticeinthisdegreethaninanyother。Itisnotthereforetodemolishtherealityofsuchavirtueastemperance，toshowthatthesameindulgenceofpleasurewhichwhenunrestrainedisregardedasblameable，isalsopresentwhenthepassionisrestrained。
Thevirtueinsuchcasesconsists，notinanentireinsensibilitytotheobjectsofpassion，butintherestraintofournaturaldesireofthem。
Thesamefallacyunderliesthefamousparadoxthat\"privatevicesarepublicbenefits，\"andthatitisnotthegood，buttheevilqualitiesofmen，whichleadtogreatness。Byusingthewordluxury，asitwasusedinthefashionableasceticismofhistime，asineveryrespectevil，itwaseasyforMandevilletoshowthatfromthisevilalltradeandwealthandprosperityflowed，andthatwithoutitnosocietycouldflourish。\"If；\"
AdamSmithreplies，\"theloveofmagnificence，atastefortheelegantartsandimprovementsofhumanlife；forwhateverisagreeableindress，furniture，orequipage；forarchitecture，statuary，painting，andmusic，istoberegardedasluxury，sensuality，andostentation，eveninthosewhosesituationallows，withoutanyinconvenieney，theindulgenceofthosepassions，itiscertainthatluxury，sensuality，andostentationarepublicbenefits。\"Ifeverythingistobereprobatedasluxurywhichexceedswhatisabsolutelynecessaryforthesupportofhumannature，\"thereisviceevenintheuseofacleanshirt，orofaconvenienthabitation。\'Hencethewholepointoftheparadoxrestsonalooseantunscientificuseofthewordluxury。
II。Toturnnowtotheothergreatquestionofethics，tothenatureofmoralapprobation，anditssourceinthemind。
Asthedifferenttheoriesofthenatureofvirtuemayallbereducedtothree，soallthedifferenttheoriesconcerningtheoriginofmoralapprobationmaybereducedtoasimilarnumber。Self-love，reason，andsentiment，arethethreedifferentsourceswhichhavebeenassignedfortheprincipleofmoralapprobation。Accordingtosome，weapproveordisapproveofourownactionsandofthoseofothersfromself-loveonly，orfromsomeviewoftheirtendencytoourownhappinessordisadvantage；accordingtoothers，wedistinguishwhatisfitorunfit，bothinactionsandaffections，byreason，orthesamefacultybywhichwedistinguishtruthfromfalsehood；
andaccordingtoyetathirdschool，thedistinctionisaltogethertheeffectofimmediatesentimentandfeeling，arisingfromthepleasureordisgustwithwhichcertainactionsoraffectionsinspireus。
AccordingtoAdamSmith，therewasagainsometruthineachofthesetheories，buttheyeachfellshortofthatcompletenessofexplanationwhichwasthemeritofhisownpeculiarsystem。
Theself-lovetheory，bestexpoundedbyHobbesandMandeville，reducedtheprincipleofapprobationtoaremoteperceptionofthetendencyofconductuponpersonalwell-being；andthemeritofvirtueordemeritofviceconsistedintheirrespectivelyservingtosupportordisturbsociety，thepreservationofwhichwassonecessarytothesecurityofindividualexistence。
Tothisourauthorobjects，thatthisperceptionofthegoodeffectsofvirtueenhancesindeedourappreciationofit，butthatitdoesnotcauseit。Whentheinnumerableadvantagesofacultivatedandsociallifeoverasavageandsolitaryonearedescribed，andthenecessityofvirtuepointedoutforthemaintenanceoftheone，andthetendencyofvicetoreproducetheother，thereaderischarmedwiththenoveltyoftheobservation；
\"heseesplainlyanewbeautyinvirtueandanewdeformityinvice，whichhehadnevertakennoticeofbefore；andiscommonlysodelightedwiththediscovery，thatheseldomtakestimetoreflectthatthispoliticalview，havingneveroccurredtohiminhislifebefore，cannotpossiblybethegroundofthatapprobationanddisapprobationwithwhichhehasalwaysbeenaccustomedtoconsiderthosedifferentqualities。\"
Intheapplicationoftheself-lovetheorytoourpraiseorblameofactionsorconductinpasttimeasofthevirtueofCatoorofthevillanyofCatilinetherewasonlyanimaginary，notanactual，referencetoself；
andinpraisingorblaminginsuchcaseswethoughtofwhatmighthavehappenedtous，hadwelivedinthosetimes，orofwhatmightstillhappentousifinourowntimeswemetwithsuchcharacters。Theideawhichtheauthorsofthistheory\"weregropingabout，butwhichtheywereneverabletounfolddistinctly，wasthatindirectsympathywhichwefeelwiththegratitudeorresentmentofthosewhoreceivedthebenefitorsufferedthedamageresultingfromsuchoppositecharacters。\"
Istheprincipleofsympathythenaselfishprinciple？Issympathywiththesorroworindignationofanotheranemotionfoundedonself-love，becauseitarisesfrombringingthecaseofanotherhometooneself；andthenconceivingofone\'sownfeelingsinthesamesituation？
Theanswertothisquestionisimportant，andisbestgiverinAdamSmith\'sownwords，ashehimselfadmitsthatthewholeaccountofhumannaturewhichdeducesallsentimentsandaffectionsfromself-love，seemstohavearisen\"fromsomeconfusedmisapprehensionofthesystemofsympathy。\"
Hisanswer，whichisasfollows，willperhapsnotbethoughtcompletelysatisfactory:\"Thoughsympathyisveryproperlysaidtoarisefromanimaginarychangeofsituationswiththepersonprincipallyconcerned，yetthisimaginarychangeisnotsupposedtohappentomeinmyownpersonandcharacter，butinthatofthepersonwithwhomIsympathize。WhenI
condolewithyouforthelossofyouronlyson，inordertoenterintoyourgriefIdonotconsiderwhatI，apersonofsuchacharacterandprofession，shouldsufferifIhadason，andifthatsonwasunfortunatelytodie；
butIconsiderwhatIshouldsufferifIwasreallyyou；andInotonlychangecircumstanceswithyou，butIchangepersonsandcharacters。Mygrief；therefore，isentirelyuponyouraccount，andnotintheleastuponmyown。Itisnot，therefore，intheleastselfish。Howcanthatberegardedasaselfishpassion，whichdoesnotariseevenfromtheimaginationofanythingthathasbefallen，orthatrelatestomyself；inmyownproperpersonorcharacter，butisentirelyoccupiedaboutwhatrelatestoyou？\"
Yetifareferencetoselfbethefundamentalfactofsympathy，itwouldseemthatthisisequivalenttomakingareferencetoselfthefoundationofallmoralsentiment；asinHobbes\'explanationofpity，thatitisgriefforthecalamityofanother，arisingfromtheimaginationofthelikecalamitybefallingoneself。AnditisremarkablethatthesamepassageofPolybiuswhichhasbeenthoughttobeananticipationofthetheoryofsympathy，shouldhavealsobeenquotedbyflume，asshowingthatPolybiusreferredalloursentimentsofvirtuetoaselfishorigin。
Nexttothetheorywhichfoundedmoralapprobationinself-love，comesthatwhichfoundeditinreason。ThistheoryoriginatedintheoppositiontothedoctrineofHobbes，whomadethelawsofthecivilmagistratethesoleultimatestandardsofjustandunjust，ofrightandwrongimplyingtheconsequence，thattherewasnonaturaldistinctionbetweenrightandwrong，butthattheywerethearbitrarycreationsoflaw。Cudworthtaught，that，antecedenttoalllaworpositiveinstitution，therewasafacultyofthemindwhichdistinguishedmoralqualitiesinactionsandaffections，andthatthisfacultywasreason；thesamefacultythatdistinguishedtruthfromfalsehood，thusalsodistinguishingrightfromwrong。Itbecamethereforethepopulardoctrine，whenthecontroversywithHobbeswasatitsheight，thattheessenceofvirtueandvicedidnotconsistintheconformityornonconformityofactionswiththelawofasuperior，butintheirconformityornonconformitywithreason；andreasonthuscametobeconsideredastheoriginalsourceofallmoralapprobation。
InthistheoryalsoAdamSmithrecognizessomeelementsoftruth。\"Thatvirtueconsistsinconformitytoreasonistrueinsomerespects；andthisfacultymayveryjustlybeconsideredas，insomesense，thesourceandprincipleofmoralapprobationanddisapprobation，andofallsolidjudgmentsconcerningrightandwrong。\"Inductiontooisoneoftheoperationsofreason，anditisbyinductionandexperiencethatthegeneralrulesofmoralityareformed。Theyareestablishedinductively，fromtheobservationinanumberofparticularcasesofwhatispleasingordispleasingtoourmoralfaculties。Soitisbyreasonthatwediscoverthosegeneralrulesofjusticebywhichweoughttoregulateouractions；andbythesamefacultyweformthosemoreindeterminateideasofwhatisprudent，decent，generous，ornoble，accordingtowhichweendeavourtomodelourconduct。Andasitisbythesegeneralrules，soformedbyaninductionofreason，thatwemostregulateourmoraljudgments，whichwouldbeveryvariableiftheydependedmerelyuponfeelingandsentiment，virtuemaysofarbesaidtoconsistinconformitytoreason，andsofarmayreasonbeconsideredasthesourceofmoralapprobation。
Thisadmission，however，isaverydifferentthingfromthesuppositionthatourfirstperceptionsofrightandwrongcanbederivedfromreason。
Thesefirstperceptions，uponwhichfromanumberofparticularcasesthegeneralrulesofmoralityarefounded，mustbetheobjectofanimmediatesouseandfeeling，notofreason。\"Itisbyfindinginavastvarietyofinstancesthatonetenorofconductconstantlypleasesinacertainmanner，andthatanotherasconstantlydispleasesthemind，thatweformthegeneralrulesofmorality。Butreasoncannotrenderanyparticularobjecteitheragreeableordisagreeabletothemindforitsownsake。Reasonmayshowthatthisobjectisthemeansofobtainingsomeotherwhichisnaturallyeitherpleasingordispleasing，andinthismannermayrenderiteitheragreeableordisagreeableforthesakeofsomethingelse；butnothingcanbeagreeableordisagreeableforitsownsake，whichisnotrenderedsuchbyimmediatesenseandfeeling。Ifvirtue，therefore，ineveryparticularinstance，necessarilypleasesforitsownsake，andifviceascertainlydispleasesthemind，itcannotbereason，butimmediatesenseandfeelingwhichinthismannerreconcilesustotheoneandalienatesusfromtheother。\"
Thereremainedthereforethetheorieswhichmadesentimentorfeelingtheoriginalsourceofmoralapprobation；andthebestexpositionofthistheorywasthatgivenbyHutchesoninhisdoctrineoftheMoralSense。
Iftheprincipleofapprobationwasfoundedneitheronself-lovenoronreason，theremustbesomefacultyofapeculiarkind，withwhichthehumanmindwasendowedtoproducetheeffectinquestion。Suchafacultywasthemoralsenseaparticularpowerofperceptionexertedbythemindattheviewofcertainactionsandaffections，bywhichthosethataffectedthemindagreeablywereimmediatelystampedwiththecharactersofright，laudable，andvirtuous，whilethosethataffecteditotherwisewereimmediatelystampedwiththecharactersofwrong，blameable，andvicious。
Thismoralsensewassomewhatanalagoustoourexternalsenses；forasexternalbodies，byaffectingoursensesinacertainway，seemedtopossessthedifferentqualitiesofsound，taste，smell，orcolour，sothevariousaffectionsofthemind，bytouchingthemoralsenseinacertainway，appearedtopossessthedifferentqualitiesofrightorwrong，ofvirtueorofvice。Themoralsensetoowasareflexinternalsense，asdistinctfromadirectinternalsense；thatistosay，astheperceptionofbeautywasareflexsensepresupposingthedirectsensewhichperceivedobjectsandcolours，sotheperceptionofthebeautyordeformityofpassionsandaffectionswasareflexsensepresupposingtheperceptionbyadirectinternalsenseoftheseveralpassionsandaffectionsthemselves。Otherreflexsensesofthesamekindwere，apublicsense，bywhichwesympathizewiththehappinessormiseryofourfellows；asenseofshameandhonour；
andasenseofridicule。
Oneconsequenceofthisanalogybetweenthemoralsenseandtheexternalsenses，andaconsequencedrawnbyHutchesonhimself，wasthatourmoralfacultiesthemselvescouldnotbecalledvirtuousorvicious，morallygoodormorallyevil；forthequalitiesofanyobjectofsensecannotbeappliedtothesenseitself。Anobjectmayhavethequalityofblackorwhite，butthesenseofseeingisnotblacknorwhite；andinthesameway，thoughanactionorsentimentmayappeargoodorbad，thequalitiesofgoodnessorbadnesscannotattachtothemoralfacultywhichperceivessuchqualitiesinnature。
AdamSmithobjectstothis，thatwedorecognizesome-thingmorallygoodincorrectmoralsentiments，andthatwedoconsideramanworthyofmoralapprobationwhosepraiseandblamearealwaysaccuratelysuitedtothevalueorworthlessnessofconduct。Ifwesawaman\"shoutingwithadmirationandapplauseatabarbarousandunmeritedexecution，whichsomeinsolenttyranthadordered，\"weshouldbesurelyjustifiedincallingsuchbehaviourvicious，andmorallyevilinthehighestdegree，thoughitexpressednothingbutadepravedstateofthemoralfaculties。Thereisnoperversionofsentimentoraffectionweshouldbemoreaversetoenterinto，orrejectwithgreaterdisapprobation，thanoneofthiskind；
andsofarfromregardingsuchastateofmindasmerelystrange，andnotatallviciousorevil，weshouldratherregardit\"astheverylastandmostdreadfulstageofmoraldepravity。\"
Norarethedifficultieslessifwefoundtheprincipleofmoralapprobation，notuponanysenseanalogoustotheexternalsenses，butuponsomepeculiarsentiment，intendedforsuchapurpose；ifwesay，forinstance，thatasresentmentmaybecalledasenseofinjuries，orgratitudeasenseofbenefits，soapprobationanddisapprobation，asfeelingsoremotionswhichariseinthemindontheviewofdifferentactionsandcharacters，maybecalledasenseofrightandwrong，oramoralsense。
Forifapprobationanddisapprobationwere，likegratitudeorresentment，anemotionofaparticularkind，distinctfromeveryother，whatevervariationseitherofthemmightundergoweshouldexpectthemtoretainclearlymarkedanddistinguishablegeneralfeatures；justasinallthevariationsoftheemotionofanger，itiseasytodistinguishthesamegeneralfeatures。
Withregardtoapprobationitisotherwise，fortherearenocommonfeaturesrunningthroughallmanifestationsofmoralapproval，orthecontrary。