AdamSmithalsodiffersfromHumenolessinhistheoryofthecauseofthebeautywhichresultsfromaperceptionofutilitythaninhistheoryoftheplaceassignabletoutilityintheprincipleofmoralapprobation。
AccordingtoHume,theutilityofanyobjectisasourceofpleasurefromitssuggestionoftheconveniencyitisintendedtopromote,fromitsfitnesstoproducetheendintendedbyit。AdamSmithmaintains,ratherbywayofsupplementthanofcontradiction,thatthefitnessofathingtoproduceitsend,orthehappyadjustmentofmeanstotheattainmentofanyconvenienceorpleasureisoftenmoreregardedthantheendorconvenienceitself,andhegivesseveralinstancestoillustratetheoperationofthisprinciple。
Forinstance,amancomingintohisroomandfindingallthechairsinthemiddle,willperhapsbeangrywithhisservantandtakethetroubletoplacethemallwiththeirbackstothewall,forthesakeofthegreaterconvenienceofhavingthefloorfreeanddisengaged。Butitismorethearrangementthantheconveniencewhichhereallycaresfor,sincetoattaintheconvenienceheputshimselftomoretroublethanhecouldhavesufferedfromthewantofit,seeingthatnothingwaseasierforhimthantohavesatdownatonceononeofthechairs,whichisprobablyallhedoeswhenhislabourisover。
Thesameprincipleappliestothepursuitofriches,undercircumstanceswhichimplymuchmoretroubleandvexationthanthepossessionofthemcaneverobviate。Thepoorman\'sson,cursedwithambition,whoadmirestheconvenienceofapalacetolivein,ofhorsestocarryhim,andofservantstowaitonhim,sacrificesarealtranquillityforacertainartificialandelegantreposehemayneverreach,tofindatlastthat\"wealthandgreatnessaremeretrinketsoffrivolousutility,nomoreadaptedforprocuringeaseofbodyortranquillityofmind,thanthetweezer-casesoftheloveroftoys。\"Indeed,thereisnootherrealdifferencebetweenthemthanthattheconveniencesof。theonearesomewhatmoreobservablethanthoseoftheother。Thepalaces,gardens,orequipageofthegreatareobjectsofwhichtheconveniencystrikeseveryone;theirutilityisobvious;andwereadilyenjoybysympathythesatisfactiontheyarefittedtoafford。
Buttheconveniencyofatoothpickorofanail-cutter,beinglessobvious,itislesseasytoenterintothesatisfactionoftheirpossessor。Theyarelessreasonableobjectsofvanitythanwealthandgreat-ness,andlesseffectuallygratifyman\'sloveofdistinction。Toamanwhohadtolivealoneonadesolateisland,itmightbeamatterofdoubt,\"whetherapalace,oracollectionofsuchsmallconveniencesasarecommonlycontainedinatweezer-case,wouldcontributemosttohishappinessandenjoyment。\"
Thefactthattherichandthegreataresomuchtheobjectofadmirationisduenotsomuchtoanysuperioreaseorpleasuretheyaresupposedtoenjoy,astothenumberlessartificialandelegantcontrivancestheypossessforpromotingsucheaseandpleasure。Thespectatordoesnotimagine\"thattheyarereallyhappierthanotherpeople,butheimaginesthattheypossessmoremeansofhappiness。Anditistheingeniousandartfuladjustmentofthosemeanstotheendforwhichtheywereintended,thatistheprincipalsourceofhisadmiration。\"
Again,thesoleuseandendofallconstitutionsofgovernmentistopromotethehappinessofthosewholiveunderthem。Butfromthisloveofartandcontrivance,weoftencometovaluethemeansmorethantheend,andtobeeagertopromotethehappinessofourfellows,lessfromanysympathywiththeirsufferingsorenjoymentthanfromawishtoperfectandimproveabeautifulsystem。Menofthegreatestpublicspirithaveoftenbeenmenofthesmallesthumanity,likePetertheGreat;andifapublic-spiritedmanencouragesthemendingofroads,itisnotcommonlyfromafellow-feelingwithcarriersandwaggonerssomuchasfromaregardtothegeneralbeautyoforder。
Thisadmitshoweverofapracticalapplication,forifyouwishtoimplantpublicvirtueinamandevoidofit,youwilltellhiminvainofthesuperioradvantagesofawell-governedstate,ofthebetterhomes,thebetterclothing,orthebetterfood。Butifyoudescribethegreatsystemofgovernmentwhichprocurestheseadvantages,explainingtheconnexionsandsubordinationsoftheirseveralparts,andtheirgeneralsubserviencytothehappinessoftheirsociety;ifyoushowthepossibilityofintroducingsuchasystemintohisowncountry,orofremovingtheobstructionstoit,andsettingthewheelsofthemachineofgovernmenttomovewithmoreharmonyandsmoothness,youwillscarcefailtoraiseinhimthedesiretohelptoremovetheobstructions,andtoputinmotionsobeautifulandorderlyamachine。Itislesstheresultsofapoliticalsystemthatcanmovehimthanthecontemplationofaningeniousadjustmentofmeanstoends。
CHAPTERXIII。THERELATIONOFADAMSMITH\'STHEORYTOOTHERSYSTEMS
OFMORALITY。
ThelongestandperhapsthemostinterestingdivisionofAdamSmith\'streatiseisthatinwhichhereviewstherelationofhisowntheorytothatofothersystemsofmoralphilosophy。Forlikeallwritersonthesamedifficultsubject,hefindsbutaverypartialattainmentoftruthinanysystemoutsidehisown,andclaimsforthelatteracomprehensivesurveyofallthephenomena,whichhispredecessorshadonlygraspedsinglyandindetail。Everysystemofmorality,everytheoryoftheoriginofourmoralsentiments,hasbeenderived,hethinks,fromsomeoneorotheroftheprinciplesexpoundedbyhimself。And\"astheyarealloftheminthisrespectfoundeduponnaturalprinciples,theyarealloftheminsomemeasureintheright。Butasmanyofthemarederivedfromapartialandimperfectviewofnature,therearemanyofthemtooinsomerespectsinthewrong。\"
I。Thuswithregard,first,tothenatureofVirtue,allthedifferenttheories,whetherinancientorinmoderntimes,may,AdamSmiththinks,bereducedtothree,accordingastheymakeittoconsistinPropriety,Prudence,orBenevolence:orinotherwords,accordingastheyplaceitinthepropergovernmentanddirectionofallouraffectionsequally,whetherselfishorsocial;inthejudiciouspursuitofourownprivateinterestandhappinessbytherightdirectionoftheselfishaffectionsalone;orinthedisinterestedpursuitofthehappinessofothersunderthesoledirectionofthebenevolentaffections。
AdamSmith\'sowntheorydifferedfromallthese,inthatittookaccountofallthesethreedifferentaspectsofvirtuetogether,andgavenoexclusivepreferencetoanyoneofthem。WithPlato,Aristotle,andtheStoics,whomadevirtuetoconsistinproprietyofconduct,orinthesuitablenessofthemotiveofactiontotheobjectwhichexcitesit,orwithsuchmodernsystemsasthoseofLordShaftesburyorClarke,whodefinedvirtueasmaintainingaproperbalanceoftheaffectionsandpassions,orasactingaccordingtotherelationsortothetruthofthings,hesofaragreedastoregardsuchproprietyasconstitutingoneelementinourapprobationofvirtue;
buthemaintainedthatthispropriety,thoughanessentialingredientineveryvirtuousaction,wasnotalwaystheonlyone。Proprietycommandedapprobation,andimproprietydisapprobation,buttherewereotherqualitieswhichcommandedahigherdegreeofesteemorblame,andseemedtocallforrewardorpunishmentrespectively。Suchwerebeneficentorviciousactions,inwhichsomethingwasrecognizedbesidesmereproprietyorimpropriety,andraisedfeelingsstrongerthanthoseofmereapprovalordislike,andthatwastheirtendencytoproducegoodorbadresults。Moreover,noneofthesystemswhichplacedvirtueinaproprietyofaffectiongaveanymeasurebywhichthatproprietymightbeascer-tained,norcouldsuchameasurebefoundanywherebutinthesympatheticfeelingsoftheimpartialandwell-informedspectator。
Plato,Aristotle,andtheStoics,onlyregarded,intheiraccountofvirtue,thatpartofitwhichconsistsinproprietyofconduct。AccordingtoPlato,thesoulwascomposedofthreedifferentfacultiesreason,passion,andappetite;andthathigherformofjusticewhichconstitutesperfectvirtuewasnothingmorethanthatstateofmindinwhicheveryfacultyconfineditselftoitspropersphere,withoutencroachinguponthatofanyother,andperformeditsofficewithpreciselythatdegreeofstrengthwhichbelongedtoit。Inotherwords,thisjustice,thelastandgreatestofthecardinalvirtues,andthatwhichcomprehendedalltheothers,meantthatexactandperfectproprietyofconduct,thenatureofwhichhasbeenalreadydiscussed。NearlythesameaccountofvirtuewasgivenbyAristotle,whodefineditasthehabitofmoderationinaccordancewithrightreason;
bywhichhemeantarightaffectionofmindtowardsparticularobjects,asinbeingneithertoomuchnortoolittleaffectedbyobjectsoffear。
AndtheStoicssofarcoincidedwithPlatoandAristotleastoplaceperfectvirtue,orrectitudeofconduct,inaproperchoiceorrejectionofdifferentobjectsandcircumstancesaccordingastheywerebynaturerenderedmoreorlesstheobjectsofourdesireoraversion。Inthisproprietyofthemindtowardsexternalthingsconsistedthelifeaccordingtonature,orinotherwords,thevirtuousconductoflife。
Nolessincompletethansystemswhichplacedvirtueinproprietyalonewerethosesystemswhichplaceditinprudence,orinaprudentialregardformerepersonalwelfare。SuchwerethesystemsoftheCyrenaicsandEpicureansinancienttimes,andofwriterslikeHobbesandMandevilleinmoderntimes。
AccordingtoEpicurus,thegoodnessorbadnessofanythingwasultimatelyreferabletoitstendencytoproducebodilypleasureorpain。Thuspowerandrichesweredesirableasgoodthings,fromtheirtendencytoprocurepleasure,whilsttheevilofthecontraryconditionslayintheircloseconnexionwithpain。Honourandreputationwereofvalue,becausetheesteemofotherswasofsomuchimportancetoprocureuspleasureandtodefendusfrompain。Andinthesamewaytheseveralvirtueswerenotdesirablesimplyforthemselves,butonlybyreasonoftheirintimateconnexionwithourgreatestwell-being,easeofbodyandtranquillityofmind。Thustemperancewasnothingbutprudencewithregardtopleasure,thesacrificeofapresentenjoymenttoobtainagreateroneortoavoidagreaterpain。Couragewasnothingbutprudencewithregardtodangerorlabour,notgoodinitself,butonlyasrepellentofsomegreaterevil。Andjusticetoowasnothingbutprudencewithregardtoourneighbours,ameanscalculatedtoprocuretheiresteem,andtoavoidthefearthatwouldflowfromtheirresentment。
AdamSmith\'sfirstreplytothistheoryis,thatwhatevermaybethetendencyoftheseveralvirtuesorvices,thesentimentswhichtheyexciteinothersaretheobjectsofamuchmorepassionatedesireoraversionthanalltheirothercon-sequences;thattobe-amiableandtheproperobjectofesteemisofmorevaluetousthanalltheeaseandsecuritywhichloveoresteemcanprocureus:andthattobeodious,ortheproperobjectofcontempt,orindignationismoredreadfulthanallwecansufferinourbodyfromhatred,contempt,orindignation;andthatthereforeourdesireoftheonecharacterandouraversiontotheothercannotarisefromregardtotheeffectswhicheitherofthemislikelytoproduceonthebody。
Secondly,thereisoneaspectofnaturefromwhichtheEpicureansystemderivesitsplausibility。\"BythewisecontrivanceoftheAuthorofnature,virtueisuponallordinaryoccasions,evenwithregardtothislife,realwisdom,andthesurestandreadiestmeansofobtainingbothsafetyandadvantage。\"Thesuccessorfailureofourundertakingsmustverymuchdependonthegoodorbadopinionentertainedofus,andonthegeneraldispositionofotherstoassistoropposeus。Hencethetendencyofvirtuetopromoteourinterestandofvicetoobstructit,undoubtedlystampsanadditionalbeautyandproprietyupontheone,andafreshdeformityandimproprietyupontheother。Andthustemperance,magnanimity,justiceandbeneficence,cometobeapprovedof,notonlyundertheirpropercharacters,butundertheadditionalcharacterofthemostrealprudenceandthehighestwisdom;
whilstthecontraryvicescometobedisapprovedof;notonlyundertheirpropercharacters,butundertheadditionalcharacterofthemostshort-sightedfollyandweakness。Sothattheconducivenessofvirtuetohappinessisonlysecondary,andsotospeakaccidentaltoitscharacter;itisnotitsfirstrecommendationtoourpursuitofit。
Butifthetheorieswhichresolvedvirtueintoproprietyorprudencewerethusone-sided,theremainingtheorythatbestrepresentedbyHutchesonwasnolessso,whichmadevirtuetoconsistsolelyinbenevolence,orinadisinterestedregardtothegoodofothersorthepublicgenerally。SofarindeeddidHutchesoncarrythistheory,thatheevenrejectedasaselfishmotivetovirtuousactionthepleasureofself-approbation,\"thecomfortableapplauseofourownconsciences,\"holdingthatitdiminishedthemeritofanybenevolentaction。Theprincipleofself-lovecouldneverbevirtuousinanydegree,anditwasmerelyinnocent,notgood,whenitledamantoactfromareasonableregardtohisownhappiness。
Severalreasonsseem,indeed,atfirstsight,tojustifytheidentificationofvirtuewithbenevolence。Itisthemostagreeableofalltheaffections。
Itisrecommendedtousbyadoublesympathy,andwefeelittobetheproperobjectofgratitudeandreward。Evenitsweaknessoritsexcessisnotverydisagreeabletous,asistheexcessofeveryotherpassion。
Andasitthrowsapeculiarcharmovereveryactionwhichproceedsfromit,sothewantofitaddsapeculiardeformitytoactionsindicativeofdisregardtothehappinessofothers。Oursensetooofthemeritofanyactionisjustsofarincreasedordiminishedaccordingaswefindthatbenevolencewasorwasnotthemotiveoftheaction。If,forinstance,anactsupposedtoproceedfromgratitudeisfoundtoproceedfromthehopeofsomefreshfavour,allitsmeritisgone;andsoifanactionattributedtoaselfishmotiveisfoundtohavebeenduetoabenevolentone,oursenseofitsmeritisallthemoreenhanced。Andlastly,inalldisputesconcerningtherectitudeofconduct,thepublicgood,orthetendencyofactionstopromotethegeneralwelfare,hasalwaysbeenthestandardofreference,thatbeingaccountedmorallygoodwhichtendstopromotehappiness,andthatbadorwrongwhichtendstothecontraryresult。
ThesereasonsledHutchesontotheconclusion,thatanactwasmeritoriousinproportiontothebenevolenceevidencedbyit;hencethatthevirtueofanactionwasproportionedtotheextentofhappinessittendedtopromote,sothattheleastvirtuousaffectionwasthatwhichaimednofurtherthanatthehappinessofanindividual,asason,abrother,orafriend,whilstthemostvirtuouswasonewhichembracedasitsobjectthehappinessofallintelligentbeings。Theperfectionofvirtueconsistedthereforeindirectingallouractionstopromotethegreatestpossiblegood,andinsubjectingallinferioraffectionstothedesireofthegeneralhappinessofmankind。
ThefirstdefectwhichAdamSmithfindsinthistheoryofhisformerteacheris,thatitfailstoexplainsufficientlyourapprobationoftheinferiorvirtuesofprudence,temperance,constancy,andfirmness。Justasothertheorieserredinregardingsolelytheproprietyorimproprietyofconduct,andindisregardingitsgoodorbadtendency,sothissystemerredbydisregardingaltogetherthesuitablenessofaffectionstotheirexcitingcause,andattendingonlytheirbeneficientorhurtfuleffects。
Inthesecondplace,aselfishmotiveisnotalwaysabadone。Self-lovemayoftenbeavirtuousmotivetoaction。Everymanisbynaturefirstandprincipallyrecommendedtohisowncare;andbecauseheisfittertotakecareofhimselfthanofanyotherperson,itisright。thatheshoulddoso。Regardtoourownprivatehappinessandinterestmayconstituteverylaudablemotivesofaction。Thehabitsofeconomy,industry,discretion,attention,andapplicationofthought,thoughcultivatedfromself-interestedmotives,areneverthelesspraiseworthyqualities,anddeservetheesteemandapprobationofeverybody。Ontheotherhand,carelessnessandwantofeconomyareuniversallydisapprovedof,notasproceedingfromawantofbenevolence,butfromawantofaproperattentiontotheobjectsofself-interest。
Andastothestandardofrightandwrongbeingfrequentlythetendencyofconducttothewelfareordisorderofsociety,itdoesnotfollowthataregardtosocietyshouldbethesolevirtuousmotiveofaction,butonlythatinanycompetitionitoughttocastthebalanceagainstallothermotives。
Itwas,again,ageneraldefectofeachofthethreetheorieswhichdefinedvirtueaspropriety,prudence,orbenevolence,thattheytendedtogiveabiastothemindtosomeprinciplesofactionbeyondtheproportionthatisduetothem。Thustheancientsystems,whichplacedvirtueinpropriety,insistedlittleonthesoftandgentlevirtues,ratherregardingthemasweaknessestobeexpungedfromthebreast,whiletheylaidchiefstressonthegravervirtuesofself-command,fortitude,andcourage。Andthebenevolentsystem,whileencouragingthemildervirtuesinthehighestdegree,wentsofarastodenythenameofvirtuetothemorerespectablequalitiesofthemind,callingthemmerely\"moralabilities,\"unworthyoftheapprobationbestowedonrealvirtue。Neverthelessthegeneraltendencyofeachofthesesystemswastoencouragethebestandmostlaudablehabitsofthemind,anditwerewellforsocietyifmankindregulatedtheirconductbythepreceptsofanyoneofthem。
Thisgeneralgoodtendencyofthesethreetheoriesleadsourauthortoclassifybyitself,andtotreatinadistinctchapter,asystemwhich,hesays,destroysaltogetherthedistinctionbetweenvirtueandvice,andofwhichthetendencyconsequentlyiswhollypernicious,andthatisthesystem,whichhedesignatesastheLicentiousSystem,expoundedbyMandevilleintheFableoftheBees。
AdamSmithconsidersthatthissystem,\"whichoncemadesomuchnoiseintheworldcouldneverhaveimposeduponsogreatanumberofpersons,norhaveoccasionedsogeneralalarmamongthosewhoarethefriendsofbetterprinciples,haditnotinsomerespectsbordereduponthetruth。\"
Mandevillesfamousdefinitionofthemoralvirtuesas\"thepoliticaloffspringwhichflatterybegotuponpride,\"wasbasedontheassumptionthatmoralitywasnotnaturaltoman,butwastheinventionofwisemen,who,bygivingthetitleofnobletopersonscapableofself-denialandofpreferringthepublicinteresttotheirown,wonmankindgenerally,throughthissubtleflattery,towhattheychosetodenominatevirtue。
Hencewhatevermendidfromasenseofpropriety,orfromaregardtowhatwaspraiseworthy,theyreallydidfromaloveofpraise,fromprideorvanity。Thisloveofpraisewasoneofthestrongestofmansselfishaffections,andthefoundationoftheloveofhonour。Inconductapparentlythemostdisinterested,thisselfishmotivewaspresent。Ifamansacrificedhisowninteresttothatofhisfellows,heknewthathisconductwouldbeagreeabletotheirself-love,andthattheywouldnotfailtoexpresstheirsatisfactionbybestowingonhimselfthemostextravagantpraises。Thepleasurehewouldderivefromthissourcecounterbalancedtheinterestheabandonedtoprocureit。Henceallpublicspirit,orpreferenceofpublictoprivateinterestwasamerecheatandimpositiononmankind。
Thefallacyofthissystemlies,accordingtoAdamSmith,inasophisticaluseofthewordvanityinitsapplicationtoaremoteaffinitythatprevailsbetweentworeallyverydifferentthings。Todesirepraiseforqualitieswhicharenotpraise-worthyinanydegree,orforqualitiespraiseworthyinthemselvesbutunpossessedbytheindividualconcerned,isvanityproper;
butthisfrivolousdesireforpraiseatanypriceisverydifferentfromthedesireofrenderingour-selvestheproperobjectsofhonourandesteem,orofacquiringhonourandesteembyreallydeservingthem。Theaffinitybetweentheseverydifferentdesires,ofwhichMandevillemadesomuchuse,layinthefactthatvanityaswellastheloveoftruegloryaimsatacquiringesteemandapprobation;butthedifferenceconsistsinthis,thatthedesireoftheoneisunjustandridiculous,whilethatoftheotherisjustandreasonable。
Thereisalsoanaffinitybetweentheloveofvirtueandtheloveoftrueglory,whichgivesacertainspeciousnesstoMandeville\'stheory。
Forthereisacloseconnexionbetweenthedesireofbecomingwhatishonourableandestimable,whichistheloveofvirtue,andthedesireofactualhonourandesteem,whichistheloveoftrueglory。Theybothhaveandhereinliestheirsuperficialresemblancetovanitysomereferencetothesentimentsofothers。Evenintheloveofvirtuethereisstillsomereference,ifnottowhatis,yettowhatinreasonandproprietyoughttobe,theopinionofothers。Themanofthegreatestmagnanimity,whodesiresvirtueforitsownsake,andismostindifferentabouttheactualopinionsofmankind,isstilldelightedwiththethoughtsofwhatthoseopinionsoughttobe,andwiththeconsciousnessthatthoughhemayneitherbehonourednorapplauded,heisyettheproperobjectofhonourandapplause。
AnotherfeatureofMandeville\'ssystemwastodenytheexistenceofanyself-denialordisinterestednessinhumanvirtueofanykind。Thuswherevertemperancefellshortofthemostasceticabstinence,hetreateditasgrossluxury;andallourpretensionstoself-denialwerebased,notontheconquest,butontheconcealedindulgence,ofourpassions。
Herethefallacylayinrepresentingeverypassionaswhollyvicious,whichissoinanydegreeandinanydirection。Therearesomeofourpassionswhichhavenoothernamesthanthosewhichmarkthedisagreeableandoffensivedegree,theybeingmoreapttoattractnoticeinthisdegreethaninanyother。Itisnotthereforetodemolishtherealityofsuchavirtueastemperance,toshowthatthesameindulgenceofpleasurewhichwhenunrestrainedisregardedasblameable,isalsopresentwhenthepassionisrestrained。
Thevirtueinsuchcasesconsists,notinanentireinsensibilitytotheobjectsofpassion,butintherestraintofournaturaldesireofthem。
Thesamefallacyunderliesthefamousparadoxthat\"privatevicesarepublicbenefits,\"andthatitisnotthegood,buttheevilqualitiesofmen,whichleadtogreatness。Byusingthewordluxury,asitwasusedinthefashionableasceticismofhistime,asineveryrespectevil,itwaseasyforMandevilletoshowthatfromthisevilalltradeandwealthandprosperityflowed,andthatwithoutitnosocietycouldflourish。\"If;\"
AdamSmithreplies,\"theloveofmagnificence,atastefortheelegantartsandimprovementsofhumanlife;forwhateverisagreeableindress,furniture,orequipage;forarchitecture,statuary,painting,andmusic,istoberegardedasluxury,sensuality,andostentation,eveninthosewhosesituationallows,withoutanyinconvenieney,theindulgenceofthosepassions,itiscertainthatluxury,sensuality,andostentationarepublicbenefits。\"Ifeverythingistobereprobatedasluxurywhichexceedswhatisabsolutelynecessaryforthesupportofhumannature,\"thereisviceevenintheuseofacleanshirt,orofaconvenienthabitation。\'Hencethewholepointoftheparadoxrestsonalooseantunscientificuseofthewordluxury。
II。Toturnnowtotheothergreatquestionofethics,tothenatureofmoralapprobation,anditssourceinthemind。
Asthedifferenttheoriesofthenatureofvirtuemayallbereducedtothree,soallthedifferenttheoriesconcerningtheoriginofmoralapprobationmaybereducedtoasimilarnumber。Self-love,reason,andsentiment,arethethreedifferentsourceswhichhavebeenassignedfortheprincipleofmoralapprobation。Accordingtosome,weapproveordisapproveofourownactionsandofthoseofothersfromself-loveonly,orfromsomeviewoftheirtendencytoourownhappinessordisadvantage;accordingtoothers,wedistinguishwhatisfitorunfit,bothinactionsandaffections,byreason,orthesamefacultybywhichwedistinguishtruthfromfalsehood;
andaccordingtoyetathirdschool,thedistinctionisaltogethertheeffectofimmediatesentimentandfeeling,arisingfromthepleasureordisgustwithwhichcertainactionsoraffectionsinspireus。
AccordingtoAdamSmith,therewasagainsometruthineachofthesetheories,buttheyeachfellshortofthatcompletenessofexplanationwhichwasthemeritofhisownpeculiarsystem。
Theself-lovetheory,bestexpoundedbyHobbesandMandeville,reducedtheprincipleofapprobationtoaremoteperceptionofthetendencyofconductuponpersonalwell-being;andthemeritofvirtueordemeritofviceconsistedintheirrespectivelyservingtosupportordisturbsociety,thepreservationofwhichwassonecessarytothesecurityofindividualexistence。
Tothisourauthorobjects,thatthisperceptionofthegoodeffectsofvirtueenhancesindeedourappreciationofit,butthatitdoesnotcauseit。Whentheinnumerableadvantagesofacultivatedandsociallifeoverasavageandsolitaryonearedescribed,andthenecessityofvirtuepointedoutforthemaintenanceoftheone,andthetendencyofvicetoreproducetheother,thereaderischarmedwiththenoveltyoftheobservation;
\"heseesplainlyanewbeautyinvirtueandanewdeformityinvice,whichhehadnevertakennoticeofbefore;andiscommonlysodelightedwiththediscovery,thatheseldomtakestimetoreflectthatthispoliticalview,havingneveroccurredtohiminhislifebefore,cannotpossiblybethegroundofthatapprobationanddisapprobationwithwhichhehasalwaysbeenaccustomedtoconsiderthosedifferentqualities。\"
Intheapplicationoftheself-lovetheorytoourpraiseorblameofactionsorconductinpasttimeasofthevirtueofCatoorofthevillanyofCatilinetherewasonlyanimaginary,notanactual,referencetoself;
andinpraisingorblaminginsuchcaseswethoughtofwhatmighthavehappenedtous,hadwelivedinthosetimes,orofwhatmightstillhappentousifinourowntimeswemetwithsuchcharacters。Theideawhichtheauthorsofthistheory\"weregropingabout,butwhichtheywereneverabletounfolddistinctly,wasthatindirectsympathywhichwefeelwiththegratitudeorresentmentofthosewhoreceivedthebenefitorsufferedthedamageresultingfromsuchoppositecharacters。\"
Istheprincipleofsympathythenaselfishprinciple?Issympathywiththesorroworindignationofanotheranemotionfoundedonself-love,becauseitarisesfrombringingthecaseofanotherhometooneself;andthenconceivingofone\'sownfeelingsinthesamesituation?
Theanswertothisquestionisimportant,andisbestgiverinAdamSmith\'sownwords,ashehimselfadmitsthatthewholeaccountofhumannaturewhichdeducesallsentimentsandaffectionsfromself-love,seemstohavearisen\"fromsomeconfusedmisapprehensionofthesystemofsympathy。\"
Hisanswer,whichisasfollows,willperhapsnotbethoughtcompletelysatisfactory:\"Thoughsympathyisveryproperlysaidtoarisefromanimaginarychangeofsituationswiththepersonprincipallyconcerned,yetthisimaginarychangeisnotsupposedtohappentomeinmyownpersonandcharacter,butinthatofthepersonwithwhomIsympathize。WhenI
condolewithyouforthelossofyouronlyson,inordertoenterintoyourgriefIdonotconsiderwhatI,apersonofsuchacharacterandprofession,shouldsufferifIhadason,andifthatsonwasunfortunatelytodie;
butIconsiderwhatIshouldsufferifIwasreallyyou;andInotonlychangecircumstanceswithyou,butIchangepersonsandcharacters。Mygrief;therefore,isentirelyuponyouraccount,andnotintheleastuponmyown。Itisnot,therefore,intheleastselfish。Howcanthatberegardedasaselfishpassion,whichdoesnotariseevenfromtheimaginationofanythingthathasbefallen,orthatrelatestomyself;inmyownproperpersonorcharacter,butisentirelyoccupiedaboutwhatrelatestoyou?\"
Yetifareferencetoselfbethefundamentalfactofsympathy,itwouldseemthatthisisequivalenttomakingareferencetoselfthefoundationofallmoralsentiment;asinHobbes\'explanationofpity,thatitisgriefforthecalamityofanother,arisingfromtheimaginationofthelikecalamitybefallingoneself。AnditisremarkablethatthesamepassageofPolybiuswhichhasbeenthoughttobeananticipationofthetheoryofsympathy,shouldhavealsobeenquotedbyflume,asshowingthatPolybiusreferredalloursentimentsofvirtuetoaselfishorigin。
Nexttothetheorywhichfoundedmoralapprobationinself-love,comesthatwhichfoundeditinreason。ThistheoryoriginatedintheoppositiontothedoctrineofHobbes,whomadethelawsofthecivilmagistratethesoleultimatestandardsofjustandunjust,ofrightandwrongimplyingtheconsequence,thattherewasnonaturaldistinctionbetweenrightandwrong,butthattheywerethearbitrarycreationsoflaw。Cudworthtaught,that,antecedenttoalllaworpositiveinstitution,therewasafacultyofthemindwhichdistinguishedmoralqualitiesinactionsandaffections,andthatthisfacultywasreason;thesamefacultythatdistinguishedtruthfromfalsehood,thusalsodistinguishingrightfromwrong。Itbecamethereforethepopulardoctrine,whenthecontroversywithHobbeswasatitsheight,thattheessenceofvirtueandvicedidnotconsistintheconformityornonconformityofactionswiththelawofasuperior,butintheirconformityornonconformitywithreason;andreasonthuscametobeconsideredastheoriginalsourceofallmoralapprobation。
InthistheoryalsoAdamSmithrecognizessomeelementsoftruth。\"Thatvirtueconsistsinconformitytoreasonistrueinsomerespects;andthisfacultymayveryjustlybeconsideredas,insomesense,thesourceandprincipleofmoralapprobationanddisapprobation,andofallsolidjudgmentsconcerningrightandwrong。\"Inductiontooisoneoftheoperationsofreason,anditisbyinductionandexperiencethatthegeneralrulesofmoralityareformed。Theyareestablishedinductively,fromtheobservationinanumberofparticularcasesofwhatispleasingordispleasingtoourmoralfaculties。Soitisbyreasonthatwediscoverthosegeneralrulesofjusticebywhichweoughttoregulateouractions;andbythesamefacultyweformthosemoreindeterminateideasofwhatisprudent,decent,generous,ornoble,accordingtowhichweendeavourtomodelourconduct。Andasitisbythesegeneralrules,soformedbyaninductionofreason,thatwemostregulateourmoraljudgments,whichwouldbeveryvariableiftheydependedmerelyuponfeelingandsentiment,virtuemaysofarbesaidtoconsistinconformitytoreason,andsofarmayreasonbeconsideredasthesourceofmoralapprobation。
Thisadmission,however,isaverydifferentthingfromthesuppositionthatourfirstperceptionsofrightandwrongcanbederivedfromreason。
Thesefirstperceptions,uponwhichfromanumberofparticularcasesthegeneralrulesofmoralityarefounded,mustbetheobjectofanimmediatesouseandfeeling,notofreason。\"Itisbyfindinginavastvarietyofinstancesthatonetenorofconductconstantlypleasesinacertainmanner,andthatanotherasconstantlydispleasesthemind,thatweformthegeneralrulesofmorality。Butreasoncannotrenderanyparticularobjecteitheragreeableordisagreeabletothemindforitsownsake。Reasonmayshowthatthisobjectisthemeansofobtainingsomeotherwhichisnaturallyeitherpleasingordispleasing,andinthismannermayrenderiteitheragreeableordisagreeableforthesakeofsomethingelse;butnothingcanbeagreeableordisagreeableforitsownsake,whichisnotrenderedsuchbyimmediatesenseandfeeling。Ifvirtue,therefore,ineveryparticularinstance,necessarilypleasesforitsownsake,andifviceascertainlydispleasesthemind,itcannotbereason,butimmediatesenseandfeelingwhichinthismannerreconcilesustotheoneandalienatesusfromtheother。\"
Thereremainedthereforethetheorieswhichmadesentimentorfeelingtheoriginalsourceofmoralapprobation;andthebestexpositionofthistheorywasthatgivenbyHutchesoninhisdoctrineoftheMoralSense。
Iftheprincipleofapprobationwasfoundedneitheronself-lovenoronreason,theremustbesomefacultyofapeculiarkind,withwhichthehumanmindwasendowedtoproducetheeffectinquestion。Suchafacultywasthemoralsenseaparticularpowerofperceptionexertedbythemindattheviewofcertainactionsandaffections,bywhichthosethataffectedthemindagreeablywereimmediatelystampedwiththecharactersofright,laudable,andvirtuous,whilethosethataffecteditotherwisewereimmediatelystampedwiththecharactersofwrong,blameable,andvicious。
Thismoralsensewassomewhatanalagoustoourexternalsenses;forasexternalbodies,byaffectingoursensesinacertainway,seemedtopossessthedifferentqualitiesofsound,taste,smell,orcolour,sothevariousaffectionsofthemind,bytouchingthemoralsenseinacertainway,appearedtopossessthedifferentqualitiesofrightorwrong,ofvirtueorofvice。Themoralsensetoowasareflexinternalsense,asdistinctfromadirectinternalsense;thatistosay,astheperceptionofbeautywasareflexsensepresupposingthedirectsensewhichperceivedobjectsandcolours,sotheperceptionofthebeautyordeformityofpassionsandaffectionswasareflexsensepresupposingtheperceptionbyadirectinternalsenseoftheseveralpassionsandaffectionsthemselves。Otherreflexsensesofthesamekindwere,apublicsense,bywhichwesympathizewiththehappinessormiseryofourfellows;asenseofshameandhonour;
andasenseofridicule。
Oneconsequenceofthisanalogybetweenthemoralsenseandtheexternalsenses,andaconsequencedrawnbyHutchesonhimself,wasthatourmoralfacultiesthemselvescouldnotbecalledvirtuousorvicious,morallygoodormorallyevil;forthequalitiesofanyobjectofsensecannotbeappliedtothesenseitself。Anobjectmayhavethequalityofblackorwhite,butthesenseofseeingisnotblacknorwhite;andinthesameway,thoughanactionorsentimentmayappeargoodorbad,thequalitiesofgoodnessorbadnesscannotattachtothemoralfacultywhichperceivessuchqualitiesinnature。
AdamSmithobjectstothis,thatwedorecognizesome-thingmorallygoodincorrectmoralsentiments,andthatwedoconsideramanworthyofmoralapprobationwhosepraiseandblamearealwaysaccuratelysuitedtothevalueorworthlessnessofconduct。Ifwesawaman\"shoutingwithadmirationandapplauseatabarbarousandunmeritedexecution,whichsomeinsolenttyranthadordered,\"weshouldbesurelyjustifiedincallingsuchbehaviourvicious,andmorallyevilinthehighestdegree,thoughitexpressednothingbutadepravedstateofthemoralfaculties。Thereisnoperversionofsentimentoraffectionweshouldbemoreaversetoenterinto,orrejectwithgreaterdisapprobation,thanoneofthiskind;
andsofarfromregardingsuchastateofmindasmerelystrange,andnotatallviciousorevil,weshouldratherregardit\"astheverylastandmostdreadfulstageofmoraldepravity。\"
Norarethedifficultieslessifwefoundtheprincipleofmoralapprobation,notuponanysenseanalogoustotheexternalsenses,butuponsomepeculiarsentiment,intendedforsuchapurpose;ifwesay,forinstance,thatasresentmentmaybecalledasenseofinjuries,orgratitudeasenseofbenefits,soapprobationanddisapprobation,asfeelingsoremotionswhichariseinthemindontheviewofdifferentactionsandcharacters,maybecalledasenseofrightandwrong,oramoralsense。
Forifapprobationanddisapprobationwere,likegratitudeorresentment,anemotionofaparticularkind,distinctfromeveryother,whatevervariationseitherofthemmightundergoweshouldexpectthemtoretainclearlymarkedanddistinguishablegeneralfeatures;justasinallthevariationsoftheemotionofanger,itiseasytodistinguishthesamegeneralfeatures。
Withregardtoapprobationitisotherwise,fortherearenocommonfeaturesrunningthroughallmanifestationsofmoralapproval,orthecontrary。