Astotheauthorityofourmoralfaculties,ofourperception,howsoeverderived,ofdifferentqualitiesinconduct,itis,inAdamSmith\'ssystem,anultimatefact,asindisputableastheauthorityofotherfacultiesovertheirrespectiveobjects;forexample,astheauthorityoftheeyeaboutbeautyofcolour,orasthatoftheearaboutharmonyofsounds。\"Ourmoralfaculties,ournaturalsenseofmeritandpropriety,\"approveordisapproveofactionsinstantaneously,andthisapprovalorjudgmentistheirpeculiarfunction。Theyjudgeoftheotherfacultiesandprinciplesofournature;
howfar,forexample,loveorresentmentoughteithertobeindulgedorrestrained,andwhenthevarioussensesoughttobegratified。Hencetheycannotbesaidtobeonalevelwithourothernaturalfacultiesandappetites,andendowedwithnomorerighttorestrainthelatterthanthelatteraretorestrainthem。Therecanbenomoreappealfromthemabouttheirobjectsthanthereisfromtheeye,ortheear,orthetastewithregardtotheobjectsoftheirseveraljurisdictions。Accordingasanythingisagreeableornottothem,isitfit,right,andproper,orunfit,wrong,andimproper。
\"Thesentimentswhichtheyapproveofaregracefulandbecoming;thecontrary,ungracefulandunbecoming。Theverywords,right,wrong,fit,proper,graceful,orbecoming,meanonlywhatpleasesordispleasesthosefaculties。\"
Hencethequestionoftheauthorityofourmoralfacultiesisasfutileasthequestionoftheauthorityofthespecialsensesovertheirseveralobjects。For\"theycarryalongwiththemthemostevidentbadgesofthisauthority,whichdenotethattheyweresetupwithinustobethesupremearbiterofallouractions,tosuperintendalloursenses,passions,andappetites,andtojudgehowfareitherofthemwaseithertobeindulgedorrestrained。\"Thatistosay,itisimpossibleforourmoralfacultiestoapproveofonecourseofconductandtodisapproveofanother,andatthesametimetofeelthatthereisnoauthorityinthesentimentwhichpassesjudgmenteitherway。
PerhapsthepartofAdamSmith\'stheorywhichhasgivenleastsatisfactionishisaccountoftheethicalstandard,ormeasureofmoralactions。This,itwillberemembered,isnoneotherthanthesympatheticemotionoftheimpartialspectatorwhichseemsagaintoresolveitselfintothevoiceofpublicopinion。Itwillbeofinteresttofollowsomeofthecriticismthathasbeendevotedtothispoint,mostofwhichturnsonthemeaningofthewordimpartial。
Ifimpartialitymeans,arguesJouffroy,asaloneitcanmeanimpartialityofjudgment,theimpartialityofaspectatormustbetheimpartialityofhisreason,whichrisessuperiortothesuggestionsofhisinstinctsorpassions;butifso,amoraljudgmentnolongerarisesfromamereinstinctofsympathy,butfromanoperationofreason。Ifinstinctisadoptedasourruleofmoralconduct,theremustbesomehigherrulebywhichwemakechoiceofsomeimpulsesagainsttheinfluenceofothers;andtheimpartialityrequisiteinsympathyisitselfarecognitionoftheinsufficiencyofinstinctivefeelingstosupplymoralrules。
Itmaybesaid,inreplytothis,thatbyimpartialityAdamSmithmeantneitheranimpartialityofreasonnorofinstinct,butsimplytheindifferenceorcoolnessofamindthatfeelsnotthefullstrengthoftheoriginalpassion,whichitshares,andwhichitsharesinadueandjustdegreepreciselybecauseitfeelsitnotdirectlybutbyreflection。IftheresentmentofA。canonlyfairlybeestimatedbythepowerofB。tosympathizewithit,thelatterisonlyimpartialinsofarashisfeelingofresentmentisreflectedandnotoriginal。HisfeelingofapprobationordisapprobationofA\'sresentmentneedbenonethelessafeeling,nonethelessinstinctiveandemotional,becauseheisexemptfromthevividnessofthepassionasitaffectshisfriend。Itissimplythatexemption,AdamSmithwouldsay,whichenableshimtojudge;andwhetherhisjudgmentisforthatreasontobeconsideredfinalandrightornot,itis,asamatteroffact,theonlywayinwhichamoraljudgmentispossibleatall。
ThenextobjectionofJouffroy,thatthesympathyofanimpartialspectatoraffordsonlyvariablerulesofmorality,AdamSmithwouldhavemetbytheanswer,thattherulesofmoralityaretoacertainextentvariable,anddependentoncustom。Jouffroysupposeshimselfplacedasanentirestrangerinthepresenceofaquantityofpersonsofdifferentages,sexes,andprofessions,andthenasks,howshouldhejudgeoftheproprietyofanyemotiononhispartbyreferencetotheverydifferentsympathieswhichsuchanemotionwouldarouse。Livelysensibilitieswouldpartakeofhisemotionsvividly,coldonesbutfeebly。Thesympathiesofthemenwouldbedifferentfromthoseofthewomen,thoseoftheyoungfromthoseoftheold,thoseofthemerchantfromthoseofthesoldier,andsoforth。
Tothisitmightfairlybereplied,thatasamatteroffactthereareveryfewemotionswithwhichdifferentpeopledonotsympathizeinverydifferentdegrees,andofwhichaccordinglytheydonotentertainverydifferentfeelingsofmoralapprobationorthereverse。Eachman\'ssympathyisinfacthisonlymeasureoftheproprietyofothermen\'ssentiments,andforthatreasonitisthatthereisscarcelyanysinglemoralactionofwhichanytwomenadoptthesamemoralsentiment。Thatmoralityisrelativeandnotabsolute,AdamSmithnowheredenies。Nevertheless,hewouldsay,thereissufficientuniformityinthelawsofsympathy,directedandcontrolledastheyarebycustom,tomaketheruleofgeneralsympathyoroftheabstractspectatorasufficientlypermanentstandardofconduct。
Itismoreoverafact,whichnoonehasexplainedbetterthanAdamSmith,inhisaccountofthegrowthineveryindividualofthevirtueofself-command,thatthoughourmoralestimateofourownconductbeginsbyreferencetothesympathyofparticularindividuals,ourparents,schoolfellows,orothers,weyetendbyjudgingourselves,notbyreferencetoanyoneinparticularsomuchasfromanabstractideaofgeneralapprobationorthecontrary,derivedfromourexperienceofparticularjudgmentsinthecourseofourlife。Thisisallthatismeantby\"theabstractspectator,\"referencetowhomissimplythesameasreferencetothesupposedverdictofpublicopinion。Ifwehavedoneanythingwrong,toldalie,forexample,theself-condemnationwepassonourselvesisthecondemnationofpublicopinion,withwhichweidentifyourselvesbylongforceofhabit;andhadweneverheardaliecondemned,norknownitpunished,weshouldfeelnoself-condemnationwhateverintellingone。Wecondemnit,notbyreference,asJouffroyputsit,tothefeelingsofJohnorPeter,butbyreferencetothefeelingsofthegeneralworld,whichweknowtobemadeupofpeoplelikeJohnandPeter。Thereisnothinginconsistentthereforeinthenotionofanabstractspectator,\"whohasneithertheprejudicesoftheonenortheweaknessesoftheother,andwhoseescorrectlyandsoundlypreciselybecauseheisabstract。\"Theidentificationofthisabstractspectatorwithconscience,issofarfrombeing,asJouffroysaysitis,adeparturefrom,andanabandonmentoftheruleofsympathy,thatitisitslogicalandmostsatisfactorydevelopment。Thereisnoreasontorepeattheprocessbywhichtheperceptionofparticularapprovingsympathiespassesintoidentificationwiththehighestrulesofmoralityandthemostsacreddictatesofreligion。Byreferencetohisownexperience,everyreadermayeasilytestforhimselfthetruthorfalsityofAdamSmith\'sargumentuponthissubject。
Itissaidwithtruth,thattomakethejudgmentofanimpartialorabstractspectatorthestandardofmoralityistomakenosecurityagainstfallibilityofjudgment;andthatsuchajudgmentisonlyefficaciouswherethereistolerableunanimity,butthatitfailsinthefaceofpossibledifferencesofopinion。Butthisobjectionisequallytrueofanyethicalstandardeveryetpropoundedintheworld,whetherself-interest,thegreatestpossiblehappiness,thewillofthesovereign,thefitnessofthings,oranyotherprincipleissuggestedastheultimatetestofrectitudeofconduct。Thispartofthetheorymayclaim,therefore,notonlytobeasgoodasanyothertheory,buttobeinstrictkeepingwiththevastamountofvariablemoralsentimentwhichactuallyexistsintheworld。
InfurtherdisproofofAdamSmith\'stheory,Jouffroyappealstoconsciousness。
Wearenotconscious,hesays,injudgingoftheactsofothers,thatwemeasurethembyreferencetoourabilitytosympathizewiththem。Sofararewefromdoingthis,thatweconsideritourfirstdutytostifleouremotionsofsympathyorantipathy,inordertoarriveatanimpartialjudgment。
Asregardsourownemotions,also,thereisnosuchrecoursetothesympathiesofothers;andevenwhenthereis,weoftenpreferourownjudgmentafteralltothatwhichweknowtobethejudgmentofothers。Consciousnessthereforeatteststhefalsityofthetheorythatweseekinourownsensibilitythejudgmentswepassuponothers,orthatweseekintheopinionsofotherstheprincipleofestimationforourownsentimentsandconduct。
Thetruthofthefactstatedinthisobjectionmayevidentlybeconceded,andyetthevalidityofthemaintheorybeleftuntouched。Thelatterisatheorymainlyoftheoriginofmoralfeelings,andoftheirgrowth;andemotionsofsympathywhichoriginallygiverisetomoralfeelingsmaywelldisappearandbeabsentwhenlonghabithasoncefixedtheminthemind。
Itisquiteconceivable,forinstance,thatifweoriginallyderivedourmoralnotionsofourownconductfromconstantobservationoftheconductofothers,wemightyetcometojudgeourselvesbyastandardapparentlyunconnectedwithanyreferencetootherpeople,andyetreallymadeupofanumberofforgottenjudgmentspassedbyusuponthem。Childrenarealwaystaughttojudgethem-selvesbyappealstothesentimentsoftheirparentsorotherrelationsabouttheirconduct;andthoughthestandardofmorality,thusexternalatfirst,mayintimecometobeinternal,andeventobemorepotentthanwhenitwasexternal,itnonethemorefollowsthatrecoursetosuchsympathynevertookplacebecauseitceasestotakeplaceortobenoticedwhenthemoralsentimentsarefullyformed。Inlearningtoreadandwrite,anexactlyanalogousprocessmaybetraced。Theletterswhichsopainfullyaffectedourconsciousnessatfirst,whenwehadtomakeconstantreferencetothealphabet,ceaseatlasttoaffectitatall;yettheprocessofspellingreallygoesoninthemindineverywordwereadorwrite,howeverunconsciouswemaybeofitsoperation。Habitandexperience,saysAdamSmith,teachussoeasilyandsoreadilytoviewourowninterestsandthoseofothersfromthestandpointofathirdperson,that\"wearescarcesensible\"ofsuchaprocessatall。
Thenagain,thequestionhasbeenraised,Isittruethatsympathywithanagentorwiththeobjectofhisactionisanecessaryantecedenttoallmoralapprobationorthecontrary?
Itisobjected,forinstance,byBrown,thatsympathyisnotaperpetualaccompanimentofourobservationofalltheactionsthattakeplaceinlife,andthatmanycasesoccurinwhichwefeelapprovalordisapproval,inwhichconsequentlymoralestimatesaremade,andyetwithoutanyprecedingsympathyorantipathy。\"Inthenumberofpettyaffairswhicharehourlybeforeoureyes,whatsympathyisfelt,\"heasks,\"eitherwiththosewhoareactivelyorwiththosewhoarepassivelyconcerned,whentheagenthimselfperformshislittleofficeswithemotionsasslightasthosewhichtheobjectsofhisactionsreciprocallyfeel?Yetinthesecasesweareascapableofjudging,andapproveordisapprovenotwiththesamelivelinessofemotionindeed,butwithasaccurateestimationofmeritordemeritaswhenweconsiderthemostheroicsacrificeswhichthevirtuouscanmake,orthemostatrociouscrimesofwhichthesordidandthecruelcanbeguilty。\"
Theremustbethesamesympathyinthecaseofthehumblestactionwedenominaterightasinthatofthemostgloriousaction;yetsuchactionsoftenexcitenosympathywhatever。Unlessthereforethecommontransactionsoflifearetobeexcludedaltogetherfrommorality,fromthefieldofrightandwrong,itisimpossibletoascribesuchmoralqualitiestothem,ifsympathyisthesourceofourapprovalofthem。
Tothisobjection,foundedonthenon-universalityofsympathy,andonitsnotbeingcoextensivewithfeelingsofmoralapprobation,AdamSmithmighthavereplied,thattherewasnoaction,howsoeverhumble,denominatedright,inwhichtherewasnotorhadnotbeentostartwithareferencetosentimentsofsympathy。Itisimpossibletoconceiveanycaseinthemosttrivialdepartmentoflifeinwhichapprobationonthegroundofgoodnessmaynotbeexplainedbyreferencetosuchfeelings。Brownhimselflaysindeedlessstressonthisargumentthanonanotherwhichhas,itmustbeconfessed,muchgreaterforce。
Thatis,thatthetheoryofsympathyassumesasalreadyexistingthosemoralfeelingswhichitprofessestoexplain。If,hesays,nomoralsentimentsprecededafeelingofsym-pathy,thelattercouldnomoreproducethemthanamirror,withoutpre-existenceandpre-suppositionoflight,couldreflectthebeautifulcoloursofalandscape。
Ifwehadnoprincipleofmoralapprobationprevioustosympathy,themostperfectsympathyoraccordanceofpassionswouldprovenothingmorethanamereagreementoffeeling;norshouldwebeawareofanythingmorethaninanycaseofcoincidenceoffeelingwithregardtomereobjectsoftaste,suchasapictureoranairofmusic。Itisnotbecausewesympathizewiththesentimentsofanagentthatweaccountthemmoral,butitisbecausehismoralsentimentsagreewithourownthatwesympathizewiththem。Themoralityistherebeforethesympathy。Ifweregardsentimentswhichdifferfromourown,notmerelyasunlikeourown,butasmorallyimproperandwrong,wemustfirsthaveconceivedourowntobemorallyproperandright,bywhichwemeasurethoseofothers。Withoutthispreviousbeliefinthemoralproprietyofourownsentiments,wecouldneverjudgeoftheproprietyorimproprietyofothers,norregardthemasmorallyunsuitabletothecircumstancesoutofwhichtheyarose。Hencethesympathyfromwhichwearesaidtoderiveournotionsofproprietyorthecontraryassumesindependentlyofsympathytheveryfeelingsitissaidtooccasion。
AsimilarcriticismBrownalsoappliestothatsympathywiththegratitudeofpersonswhohavereceivedbenefitsorinjurieswhichissaidtobethesourceoffeelingsofmeritanddemerit。Ifitistruethatoursenseofthemeritofanagentisduetooursympathywiththegratitudeofthosehehasbenefitedifthesympathyonlytransfusesintoourownbreaststhegratitudeorresentmentofpersonssoaffected,itisevidentthatourreflectedgratitudeorresentmentcanonlygiverisetothesamesenseofmeritordemeritthathasbeenalreadyinvolvedintheprimaryanddirectgratitudeorresentment。\"Ifourreflexgratitudeandresentmentinvolvenotionsofmeritanddemerit,theoriginalgratitudeandresentmentwhichwefeelbyreflexionmustinlikemannerhaveinvolvedthem……Butiftheactualgratitudeorresentmentofthosewhohaveprofitedorsufferedimplynofeelingsofmeritordemerit,wemaybecertain,atleast,thatinwhateversourcewearetostrivetodiscoverthosefeelings,itisnotinthemerereflexionofafaintergratitudeorresentmentthatwecanhopetofindthem……Thefeelingswithwhichwesympathizearethemselvesmoralfeelingsorsentiments;oriftheyarenotmoralfeelings,thereflexionofthemfromathousandbreastscannotaltertheirnature。\"
Unlessthereforewealreadypossessedmoralfeelingsofourown,themostexactsympathyoffeelingscoulddonomorethantellusofthesimilarityofourownfeelingstothoseofsomeotherperson,whichtheymightequallydowhethertheywereviciousorvirtuous;andinthesameway,themostcompletedissonanceoffeelingcouldsupplyuswithnomorethanaconsciousnessofthedissimilarityofouremotions。Asacoincidenceoftastewithregardtoaworkofartpre-supposesinanytwomindssimilarlyaffectedbyitanindependentsusceptibilityofemotions,distinguishingwhatisbeautifulfromwhatisugly,irrespectivelyofothersbeingpresenttosharethem;
soacoincidenceoffeelingwithregardtoanymoralactionpre-supposesanindependentcapacityinthetwomindssimilarlyaffectedbythemofdistinguishingwhatisrightfromwhatiswrong,acapacitywhicheachwouldhavesingly,irrespectivelyofallreferencetothefeelingsoftheother。Thereissomethingmorethatwerecognizeinourmoralsentimentsthanthemerecoincidenceoffeelingrecognizedinanagreementoftasteoropinion。Wefeelthatapersonhasactednotmerelyasweshouldhavedone,andthathismotiveshavebeensimilartothoseweshouldhavefelt,butthatliehasactedrightlyandproperly。
ItisperhapsbesttostateBrown\'scriticisminhisownwords:\"Allwhichispeculiartothesympathyis,thatinsteadofonemindonlyaffectedwithcertainfeelings,therearetwomindsaffectedwithcertainfeelings,andarecognitionofthesimilarityofthesefeelings;asimilaritywhichfarfrombeingconfinedtoourmoralemotions,mayoccurasreadilyandasfrequentlyineveryotherfeelingofwhichthemindissusceptible。
Whatproducesthemoralnotionsthere-foremustevidentlybesomethingmorethanarecognitionofsimilarityoffeelingwhichisthuscommontofeelingsofeveryclass。Theremustbeanindependentcapacityofmoralemotion,inconsequenceofwhichwejudgethosesentimentsofconducttoberightwhichcoincidewithsentimentsofconductpreviouslyrecognizedasrightorthesentimentsofotherstobeimproper,becausetheyarenotinunisonwiththosewhichwepreviouslyrecognizedasproper。Sympathythenmaybethediffuserofmoralsentiments,asofvariousotherfeelings;
butifnomoralsentimentsexistpreviouslytooursympathy,oursympathyitselfcannotgiverisetothem。
ThesameinconsistencyBrowndetectsinAdamSmith\'stheoryofmoralsentimentsrelatingtoourownconduct,accordingtowhichitwouldbeimpossibleforustodistinguishwithoutreferencetothefeelingsofarealorimaginaryspectatoranydifferenceofproprietyorimpropriety,meritordemerit,inourownactionsorcharacter。Ifanimpartialspectatorcanthusdiscovermeritordemeritinusbymakingourcasehisownandassumingourfeelings,thosefeelingswhichhethusmakeshisownmustsurelyspeaktoustothesamepurpose,andwithevengreatereffectthantheyspeaktohim。Innocasethencansympathygiveanyadditionalknowledge:
itcanonlygiveawiderdiffusiontofeelingswhichalreadyexist。
Itistherefore,accordingtoBrown,aserroneousinethicstoascribemoralfeelingstosympathy,orthementalreflectionbywhichfeelingsarediffused,asitwouldbe,inatheoryofthesourceoflight,toascribelightitselftothereflectionwhichinvolvesitsexistence。\"Amirrorpresentstousafaintercopyofexternalthings;butitisacopywhichitpresents。Weareinlikemannertoeachothermirrorsthatreflectfrombreasttobreast,joy,sorrow,indignation,andallthevividemotionsofwhichtheindividualmindissusceptible;butthough,asmirrors,wemutuallygiveandreceiveemotions,theseemotionsmusthavebeenfeltbeforetheycouldbecommunicated。\"
TheobjectioncontainedinthisanalogyofthemirrorisperhapsmorefataltothetruthofAdamSmith\'stheorythananyother。Ifapassionarisesineveryoneanalogousto,thoughweakerthan,theoriginalpassionofthepersonprimarilyaffectedbyit;if,forinstance,bythisforceoffellow-feelingweenterintoorapproveofanotherperson\'sresentmentorgratitude;itseemsclearthattheoriginalgratitudeorresentmentmustitselfinvolve,irrespectiveofallsympathy,thosefeelingsofmoralapprobation,orthecontrary,whichitisassertedcanonlyarisebysympathy。
ItisimpossibletostatethisobjectionmoreclearlythaninthewordsalreadyquotedfromBrown。Butwhenthelatterinsistsontheirregularnatureofsympathyasthebasisofmoralityonitstendencytovaryeveninthesameindividualmanytimesintheday,sothatwhatwasvirtuousinthemorningmightseemviciousatnoon,itisimpossibletorecognizethejusticeofthecriticism。AdamSmithmightfairlyhavereplied,thattheeducationalforcesoflife,whicharecomprisedinordinarycircumstancesandsurroundings,andwhichconditionallsympathy,weresufficientlyuniformincharactertoensuretolerableuniformityintheresult,andtogivetoournotionsofmoralityallthatappearanceofcertaintyandsamenesswhichundoubtedlybelongstothem。
AdamSmithseemshimselftohaveanticipatedoneofthedifficultiesraisedinBrown\'scriticism,namely,therelationofmoralapprobationtotheapprobationofanotherperson\'stasteoropinions。Whyshouldthefeelingofapprobationbeofadifferentkindwhenwesympathizewithaperson\'ssentimentsoractionsthanwhenwesympathizewithhisintellectualjudgments?Thefeelingofsympathybeingthesameineithercase,whyshouldthefeelingofresultantapprobationbedifferent?
NoonecouldstatemoreclearlythandoesAdamSmiththeanalogythereisbetweencoincidenceofmoralsentimentandcoincidenceofintellectualopinion;norisanythingmoredefiniteinhistheorythanthatapprovalofthemoralsentimentsofothers,likeapprovaloftheiropinions,meansnothingmorethantheiragreementwithourown。Thefollowingarehiswords:
\"Toapproveofanotherman\'sopinionsistoadoptthoseopinions,andtoadoptthemistoapproveofthem。Ifthesameargumentswhichconvinceyouconvincemelikewise,Inecessarilyapproveofyourconviction;andiftheydonot,Inecessarilydisapproveofit;neithercanIpossiblyconceivethatIshoulddotheonewithouttheother。Toapproveordisapprove,therefore,oftheopinionsisacknowledgedbyeverybodytomeannomorethantoobservetheiragreementordisagreementwithourown。Butthisisequallythecasewithregardtoourapprobationordisapprobationofthesentimentsorpassionsofothers。\"
Whence,then,comesthestrongerfeelingofapprobationinthecaseofagreementofsentimentsthaninthatofagreementofopinion?Whydoweesteemamanwhosemoralsentimentsseemtoaccordwithourown,whilstwedonotnecessarilyesteemhimsimplyfortheaccordanceofhisopinionswithourown?Whyintheonecasedoweascribetohimthequalityofrightnessorrectitude,andintheotheronlythequalitiesofgoodtasteorgoodjudgment?ToquoteBrownoncemore:\"Ifmereaccordanceofemotionimplythefeelingofmoralexcellenceofanysort,weshouldcertainlyfeelamoralregardforallwhosetastecoincideswithours;yet,howevergratifyingthesympathyinsuchacasemaybe,wedonotfeel,inconsequenceofthissympathy,anymoralityinthetastewhichismostexactlyaccordantwithourown。\"
AdamSmith\'sansweris,thatmattersofintellectualagreementtouchusmuchlessnearlythancircumstancesofbehaviourwhichaffectourselvesorthepersonwejudgeof;thatwelookatsuchthingsasthesizeofamountainortheexpressionofapicturefromthesamepointofview,andthereforethatweagreeordisagreewithoutthatimaginarychangeofsituationwhichisthefoundationofmoralsympathy。Thestrongerfeelingofapprobationintheonecasethanintheotherarisesfromthepersonalelement,whichinfluencesourjudgmentofanotherperson\'sconduct,andwhichisabsentinourjudgmentofhisopinionsaboutthings。ItwillbebestagaintoletAdamSmithspeakforhimself。
\"Though,\"hesays,\"youdespisethatpicture,orthatpoem,oreventhatsystemofphilosophywhichIadmire,thereislittledangerofourquarrellinguponthataccount。Neitherofuscanreasonablybemuchinterestedaboutthem。Theyoughtallofthemtobemattersofgreatindifferencetousboth;sothat,thoughouropinionsmaybeopposite,ouraffectionsmaystillbeverynearlythesame。ButitisquiteotherwisewithregardtothoseobjectsbywhicheitheryouorIareparticularlyaffected。Thoughyourjudgmentsinmattersofspeculation,thoughyoursentimentsinmattersoftaste,arequiteoppositetomine,Icaneasilyoverlookthisopposition;
and,ifIhaveanydegreeoftemper,Imaystillfindsomeentertainmentinyourconversation,evenuponthoseverysubjects。Butifyouhaveeithernofellow-feelingforthemisfortunesIhavemetwith,ornonewhichbearsanyproportiontothegriefwhichdistractsme;orifyouhaveeithernoindignationattheinjuriesIhavesuffered,ornonethatbearsanyproportiontotheresentmentwhichtransportsme,wecannolongerconverseuponthesesubjects。Webecomeintolerabletooneanother。Icanneithersupportyourcompany,noryoumine。Youareconfoundedatmyviolenceandpassion,andIamenragedatyourcoldinsensibilityandwantoffeeling。\"
Accordingly,weonlyregardthesentimentswhichweshareasmoral,orthecontrary,whentheyaffectanotherpersonorourselvesinapeculiarmanner;whentheybearnorelationtoeitherofus,nomoralproprietyisrecognizedinamereagreementoffeeling。Itisobviousthatthisexplanation,towhichBrownpaysnoattentionwhatever,issatisfactorytoacertainpoint。Aplain,oramountain,orapicture,aremattersaboutwhichitisintelligiblethatagreementordifferenceshouldgiverisetoverydifferentfeelingsfromthoseproducedbyacaseofdishonesty,excessiveanger,oruntruthfulness。Beingobjectssodifferentintheirnature,itisonlynaturalthattheyshouldgiverisetoverydifferentsentiments。Independentlyofallsympathy,admirationofapictureoramountainisaverydifferentthingfromadmirationofagenerousactionoradisplayofcourage。Thelanguageofallmenhasobservedthedifference,andtheadmirationintheonecaseiswithperfectreasoncalledmoral,todistinguishitfromtheadmirationwhicharisesintheother。ButwhenAdamSmithclasses\"theconductofathirdperson\"amongthingswhich,likethebeautyofaplainorthesizeofamountain,neednoimaginarychangeofsituationonthepartofobserverstobeapprovedofbythem,heinadvertentlydesertshisownprinciple,which,ifthisweretrue,wouldfailtoaccountfortheapprobationofactionsdonelongago,intimesorplacesunrelatedtotheapprover。
But,evenifAdamSmith\'sexplanationwithregardtothedifferenceofapprobationfeltwhereconductisconcernedfromthatfeltinmattersoftasteoropinionbeacceptedassatisfactory,itisstrangethatheshouldnothaveseenthedifficultyofaccountingbyhistheoryfortheabsenceofanythinglikemoralapprobationinanumberofcaseswheresympathynonethelessstronglyimpelsustoshareandenterintotheemotionsofanotherperson。Forinstance,ifweseeamaninimminentdangerofhislifepursuedbyabullorseemingtofallfromatightropethoughwemayfullysympathizewithhisrealorpretendedfear,inneithercasedoweforthatreasonmorallyapproveofit。Inthesameway,wemaysympathizewithorenterintoanyotheremotionhemanifestshislove,hishope,orhisjoywithoutanythemoreapprovingthemorpassinganyjudgmentonthemwhatever。Sympathyhasbeenwelldefinedas\"aspeciesofinvoluntaryimitationofthedisplaysoffeelingenactedinourpresence,whichisfollowedbytheriseofthefeelingsthemselves。\"13Thuswebecomeaffectedwithwhateverthementalstatemaybethatismanifestedbytheexpressedfeelingsofanotherperson;butunlesshisemotionalreadycontainstheelementofmoralapprobation,orthecontrary,asinacaseofgratitudeorresentment,themerefactofsympathywillnomoregiverisetoitthanwillsympathywithanotherperson\'sfeargiverisetoanymoralapprovalofit。Itisevident,therefore,thatsympathydoesnotnecessarilyinvolveapprobation,andthatitonlyinvolvesmoralapprobationwherethesentimentssharedbysympathybelongtotheclassofemotionsdenominatedmoral。
What,then,istherealrelationbetweensympathyandapprobation?andtowhatextentisthefact,ofsympathyanexplanationofthefactofapprobation?
ItisdifficulttoreadAdamSmith\'saccountoftheidentificationofsympathyandapprobation,withoutfeelingthatthroughouthisargumentthereisanunconsciousplayuponwords,andthatanequivocaluseoftheword\"sympathy\"lendsallitsspeciousnesstothetheoryheexpounds。Thefirstmeaningofthewordsympathyisfellow-feeling,ortheparticipationofanotherperson\'semotion,inwhichsensewemaybesaidtosympathizewithanotherperson\'shopeorfear;thesecondmeaningcontainstheideaofapprovalorpraise,inwhichsensewemaybesaidtosympathizewithanotherperson\'sgratitudeorresentment。AdamSmithbeginsbyusingthewordsympathyinitsfirstandprimarysense,asmeaningparticipationinanotherperson\'sfeelings,andthenproceedstouseitinitssecondaryandlesspropersense,inwhichtheideaofapprobationisinvolved。Butthesympathyintheonecaseistotallydifferentfromthesympathyintheother。Intheonecaseamerestateoffeelingisintended,intheotherajudgmentofreason。Toshareanotherperson\'sfeelingbelongsonlytooursensibility;toapproveofitasproper,good,andright,impliestheexerciseofourintelligence。Toemploytheword\"sympathy\"initslatteruseasitissometimesemployedinpopularparlanceissimplytoemployitasasynonymfor\"approbation;\"sothatsympathy,insteadofbeingreallythesourceofapprobation,isonlyanotherwordforthatapprobationitself。Tosaythatweapproveofanotherperson\'ssentimentswhenwesympathizewiththemis,therefore,nothingmorethansayingthatweapproveofthemwhenweapproveofthemapurelytautologicalproposition。
ItcannotthereforebesaidthatAdamSmith\'sattempttotracethefeelingofmoralapprobationtoemotionsofsympathyisaltogethersuccessful,incontestableasisthetruthofhisappli-cationofittomanyofthephenomenaoflifeandconduct。Yetalthoughsympathyisnottheonlyfactorinmoralapprobation,itisonethatentersverywidelyintothegrowthofourmoralperceptions。Itplays,forinstance,animportantpartinevolvinginusthatsenseofrightandwrongwhichisgenerallyknownasConscienceortheMoralFaculty。Itisoneoftheelements,justasself-loveisanother,inthatever-formingchainofassociationwhichgoestodistinguishonesetofactionsasgoodfromanothersetofactionsasbad。Ourobservationinothersofthesameoutwardsymptomswhichweknowinourowncasetoattendjoyorgrief,pleasureorpain,leadsusbythemereforceoftheremembranceofourownpleasuresandpains,andindependentlyofanycontrolofourwill,toenterintothoseofotherpeople,andtopromoteasmuchaswecantheoneandpreventtheother。
Sympathyaccordinglyisthesourceofalldisinterestedmotivesinaction,ofourreadinesstogiveuppleasuresandincurpainsforthesakeofothers;
andAdamSmithwassofarright,thatheestablished,byreferencetothisforceofoursympatheticemotions,therealityofadisinterestedelementasthefoundationofourbenevolentaffections。Inthesameway,self-loveisthesourceofalltheprudentialsideofmorality;andtothegeneralformationofourmoralsentiments,allourotheremotions,suchasanger,fear,love,contributetogetherwithsympathy,inlesserperhapsbutconsiderabledegree。Noneofthemtakensinglywouldsufficetoaccountformoralapprobation。
Althoughanyactionthathurtsanotherpersonmaysoaffectournaturalsympathyastogiverisetothefeelingofdisapprobationinvolvedinsympatheticresentment,andalthoughanactionthatisinjurioustoourselvesmayalsoberegardedwithsimilarfeelingsofdislike,theconstantpressureofauthority,exercisedasitisbydomesticeducation,bygovernment,bylaw,andbypunishment,mustfirstbebroughttobearonsuchactionsbeforethefeelingofmoraldisapprobationcanarisewithregardtothem。Theassociationofthepainofpunishmentwithcertainactions,andtheassociationoftheabsenceofsuchpainanegativepleasurewithcertainothers,enforcesthenaturaldictatesofoursympatheticorselfishemotions,andimpressesonthemthecharacterofmorality,ofobligation,andofduty。
Theassociationissocloseandconstant,thatincourseoftimethefeelingoftheapprobationordisapprobationofcertainactionsbecomesperfectlyindependentofthevariousmeans,necessaryatfirsttoenforceortopreventthem;justasinmanyothercasesourlikesanddislikesbecomefreeoftheassociationswhichfirstpermanentlyfixedthem。
Inthiswaythefeelingofmoralapprobationisseentobetheproductoftimeandslowgrowthofcircumstance,aphenomenontowhichbothreasonandsentimentcontributeinequalsharesinaccordancewiththelawsthatconditiontheirdevelopment。Moralapprobationisnomoregiveninstantaneouslybysympathythanitisgiveninstantaneouslybyamoralsense。Sympathyismerelyoneoftheconditionsunderwhichitisevolved,oneofthefeelingswhichassistinitsformation。Itisindeedthefeelingonwhich,morethanonanyother,themoralagenciesexistingintheworldbuildupandconfirmthenotionsofrightandwrong;butitdoesofitselfnothingmorethantranslatefeelingsfromonemindtoanother,andunlessthereisapre-existentmoralelementinthefeelingsotranslated,theactualpassagewillnotgiverisetoit。Sympathyenablesoneman\'sfear,resentment,orgratitudetobecomeanotherman\'sfear,resentment,orgratitude;butthefeelingofmoralapprobationwhichattendsemotionssodiffused,arisesfromreferencetoideasotherwisederivedthanfromapurelyinvoluntarysympathyfromreference,thatis,toastandardsetupbycustomandopinion。
Achildtoldforthefirsttimeofamurdermightsofarenterbysympathyintotheresentmentofthevictimastofeelindignationpromptinghimtovengeance;buthisideaofthemurderitselfasawrongandwickedacthisideaofitasadeedmorallyworsethantheslaughterofasheepbyabutcher,wouldonlyariseastheresultofthevariousforcesofeducation,availingthemselvesoftheoriginallawofsympathy,bywhichanactdisagreeabletoourselvesseemsdisagreeableinitsapplicationtoothers。Andwhatistrueinthiscase,theextremeformofmoraldisapprobation,isnolesstrueinalltheminorcases,inwhichapprobationorthecontraryisfelt。
ThefeelingofmoralapprobationisthereforemuchmorecomplexthanitisinAdamSmith\'stheory。Aboveallthingsitisoneandindivisible,anditisimpossibletodistinguishourmoraljudgmentsofourselvesfromourjudgmentsofothers。Thereisanobviousinconsistencyinsayingthatwecanonlyjudgeofotherpeople\'ssentimentsandactionsbyreferencetoourownpowertosympathizewiththem,andyetthatwecanonlyjudgeofourownbyreferencetothesamepowerinthem。Themoralstandardcannotprimarilyexistinourselves,andyet,atthesametime,beonlyderivablefromwithout。Ifbythehypothesismoralfeelingsrelatingtoourselvesonlyexistbypriorreferencetothefeelingsofothers,howcanweatthesametimeformanymoraljudgmentofthefeelingsofothersbyreferencetoanyfeelingsofourown?
Butalthoughthetwosidesofmoralfeelingarethusreallyindistinguishable,thefeelingofself-approbationorthecontrarymayindeedbesomuchstrongerthanourfeelingofapprovalordisapprovalofothersastojustifytheapplicationtoitofsuchtermsasConscience,Shame,Remorse。Thedifferenceoffeeling,however,isonlyoneofdegree,andineithercase,whetherourownconductorthatofothersisunderreview,themoralfeelingthatarisesisduetotheforceofeducationandopinionactinguponthevariousemotionsofournature。Forinstance,aMohammedanwomanseenwithoutaveilwouldhavethesamefeelingofremorseorofmoraldisapprobationwithregardtoherselfthatshewouldhavewithregardtoanyotherwomanwhomshemightseeinthesamecondition,thoughofcourseinalessstrongdegree。Ineithercaseherfeelingwouldbearesultofallthecomplexsurroundingsofherlife,whichismeantbyeducationinitsbroadestsense。
Sympathyitselfwouldbeinsufficienttoexplainthefeeling,thoughitmighthelptoexplainhowitwasdeveloped。Allthatsympathycoulddowouldbetoextendthedreadofpunishmentassociatedbythewomanherselfwithabreachofthelaw,toallwomenwhomightoffendinasimilarway;
theoriginalfeelingoftimeimmoralityofexposurebeingaccountableforinnootherwaythanbyitsassociationwithpunishment,ordainedbycivilorreligiouslaw,orbysocialcustom,andenforcedbythedisciplineofearlyhomelife。Itisobviousthatthesameexplanationappliestoallcasesinwhichmoraldisapprobationisfelt,andconverselytoallcasesinwhichthesentimentofmoralapprobationarises。