andintheexplanationwhichhehimselfelaborated,hethoughtthatsomepartorotherofhissystemembracedandcoincidedwithwhateverwastrueinthedifferenttheoriesofhispredecessors。
CHAPTERII。THEPHENOMENAOFSYMPATHY。
Thephenomenaofsympathyorfellow-feelingshow,accordingtoAdamSmith,thatitisoneoftheoriginalpassionsofhumannature。Weseeitintheimmediatetransfusionofanemotionfromonemantoanother,whichisantecedenttoanyknowledgeonourpartofthecausesofanotherman\'sgrieforjoy。Itisaprimaryfactorofourconstitutionashumanbeings,asisshownintheinstinctivewithdrawalofourlimbsfromthestrokeweseeaimedatanother。Itisindeedsomethingalmostphysical,asweseeinthetendencyofamobtotwisttheirbodiessimultaneouslywiththemovementsofarope-dancer,orinthetendencyofsomepeopleonbeholdingsoreeyestofeelasorenessintheirown。
Sympathyoriginatesintheimagination,whichalonecanmakeusenterintothesensationsofothers。Ourownsenses,forinstance,cannevertellusanythingofthesufferingsofamanontherack。Itisonlybyimaginingourselvesinhisposition,bychangingplaceswithhiminfancy,bythinkingwhatourownsensationswouldbeinthesameplight,thatwecometofeelwhatheendures,andtoshudderatthemerethoughtoftheagoniesbefeels。Butananalogousemotionspringsup,whatevermaybethenatureofthepassion,inthepersonprincipallyaffectedbyit;andwhetheritbejoyorgrief,gratitudeorresentment,thatanotherfeels,weequallyenterasitwereintohisbody,andinsomedegreebecomethesamepersonwithhim。Theemotionofaspectatoralwayscorrespondstowhat,bybringingthecaseofanotherhometohimself,heimaginesshouldbethatother\'ssentiments。
Butalthoughsympathyisthusaninstantaneousemotion,andtheexpressionofgrieforjoyinthelooksorgesturesofanotheraffectuswithsomedegreeofasimilaremotion,fromtheirsuggestionofageneralideaofhisbadorgoodfortune,therearesomepassionswithwhoseexpressionnosympathyarisestilltheirexcitingcauseisknown。Suchapassionisanger,forinstance。Whenwewitnessthesignsofangerinamanwemorereadilysympathizewiththefearorresentmentofthoseendangeredbyitthanwiththeprovokedmanhimself。Thegeneralideaofprovocationexcitesnosympathywithhisanger,forwecannotmakehispassionourowntillweknowthecauseofhisprovocation。Evenoursympathywithjoyorgriefisveryimperfect,tillweknowthecauseofit:infact,sympathyarisesnotsomuchfromtheviewofanypassionasfromthatofthesituationwhichexcitesit。Henceitisthatweoftenfeelforanotherwhathecannotfeelhim-self,
thatpassionarisinginourownbreastfromthemereimaginationwhicheventherealityfailstoarouseinhis。Wesometimes,forinstance,blushfortherudenessofanotherwhoisinsensibleofanyfaulthimself,becausewefeelhowashamedweshouldhavefelthadhisconductandsituationbeenours。Oursorrow,again,foranidiotisnoreflectionofanysentimentofhis,wholaughsandsings,andisunconsciousofhismisery;norisoursympathywiththedeadduetoanyotherconsiderationthantheconceptionofourselvesasdeprivedofalltheblessingsoflifeandyetconsciousofourdeprivation。Tothechangeproduceduponthemwejoinourownconsciousnessofthatchange,ourownsenseofthelossofthesunlightofhumanaffections,andhumanmemory,andthensympathizewiththeirsituationbysovividlyimaginingitourown。
Butwhatevermaybethecauseofsympathy,thereisnodoubtofthepleasurewhichtheconsciousnessofaconcordoffeelingproduces,andofthepainwhicharisesfromasenseofitsabsence。Somehaveaccountedforthisbytheprincipleofself-love,bysayingthattheconsciousnessofourownweaknessandourneedoftheassistanceofothersmakesustorejoiceintheirsympathyasanearnestoftheirassistance,andtogrieveintheirindifferenceasasignoftheiropposition。Butboththepleasureandpainarefeltsoinstantaneously,anduponsuchfrivolousoccasions,thatitisimpossibletoexplainthemasarefinementofself-love。Forinstance,wearemortifiedifnobodylaughsatourjests,andarepleasediftheydo;notfromanyconsiderationofself-interest,butfromaninstinctiveneedandlongingaftersympathy。
Neithercanthefact,thatthecorrespondenceofthesentimentsofotherswithourownisacauseofpleasure,andthewantofitacauseofpain,beaccountedforentirelybytheadditionalzestwhichthejoyofotherscommunicatestoourown,orbythedisappointmentwhichtheabsenceofitcauses。Thesympathyofotherswithourownjoymay,indeed,enliventhatjoy,andsogiveuspleasure;buttheirsympathywithourgriefcouldgiveusnopleasure,ifitsimplyenlivenedourgrief。Sympathy,however,whilstitenlivensjoy,alleviatesgrief,andsogivespleasureneithercase,bythemerefactofthecoincidenceofmutualfeeling。
Thesympathyofothersbeingmorenecessaryforusingriefthaninjoy,wearemoredesiroustocommunicatetoothersourdisagreeablepassionsthanouragreeableones。\"Theagreeablepassionsofloveandjoycansatisfyandsupporttheheartwithoutanyauxiliarypleasure。Thebitterandpainfulemotionsofgriefandresentmentmorestronglyrequirethehealingconsolationofsympathy。\"Hencewearelessanxiousthatourfriendsshouldadoptourfriendshipsthanthattheyshouldenterintoourresentments,anditmakesusmuchmoreangryiftheydonotenterintoourresentmentsthaniftheydonotenterintoourgratitude。
Butsympathyispleasurable,andtheabsenceofitdistressing,notonlytothepersonsympathizedwith,buttothepersonsympathizing。Weareourselvespleasedifwecansympathizewithanother\'ssuccessoraffliction,anditpainsusifwecannot。Theconsciousnessofaninabilitytosympathizewithhisdistress,ifwethinkhisgriefexcessive,givesusevenmorepainthanthesympatheticsorrowwhichthemostcompleteaccordancewithhimcouldmakeusfeel。
SucharethephysicalandinstinctivefactsofsympathyuponwhichAdamSmithfoundshistheoryoftheoriginofmoralapprobationandourmoralideas。Beforeproceedingwiththisdevelopmentofhistheory,itisworthnoticingagainitsclosecorrespondencewiththatofHume,wholikewisetracedmoralsentimentstoabasisofphysicalsympathy。\"Whereverwego,\"
saysHume,\"whateverwereflectonorconverseabout,everythingstillpresentsuswiththeviewofhumanhappinessormisery,andexcitesinourbreastasympatheticmovementofpleasureoruneasiness。\"Censureorapplauseare,then,theresultoftheinfluenceofsympathyuponoursentiments。
Ifthenaturaleffectsofmisery,suchastearsandcriesandgroans,neverfailtoinspireuswithcompassionanduneasiness,\"canwebesupposedaltogetherinsensibleorindifferenttowardsitscauses,whenamaliciousortreacherouscharacterandbehaviourarepresentedtous?\"
CHAPTERIII。MORALAPPROBATION,ANDTHEFEELINGOFPROPRIETY。
Havinganalyzedthefactsofsympathy,andshownthatthecorrespondenceofthesentimentsofotherswithourownisadirectcauseofpleasuretous,andthewantofitacauseofpain,AdamSmithproceedstoshowthattheamountofpleasureorpainfeltbyonemanintheconductorfeelingsofanotheristhemeasureofhisapprobationorthecontrary。Thesentimentsofanyonearejustandproper,orthereverse,accordingastheycoincideornotwiththesentimentsofsomeoneelsewhoobservesthem。Hisapprobationvarieswiththedegreeinwhichhecansympathizewiththem,andperfectconcordofsentimentmeansperfectapprobation。
JustasamanwhoadmiresthesamepoemorpicturethatIdo,orlaughsatthesamejoke,allowsthejusticeofmyadmirationormirth,sohe,whoentersintomyresentment,andbybringingmyinjurieshometohimselfsharesmyfeelings,cannotbuttherebyapproveofthemasjustandproper。
Accordingashissympatheticindignationfailstocorrespondtomine,accordingashiscompassionfallsshortofmygrief,according,inshort,tothedegreeofdisproportionhemayperceivebetweenmysentimentsandhis,doeshefeelstrongerorweakerdisapprovalofmyfeelings。
Moralapprobationadmitsofthesameexplanationasintellectualapprobation。
Forjustastoapproveordisapproveoftheopinionsofothersisnothingmorethantoobservetheiragreementordisagreementwithourown,sotoapproveordisapproveoftheirfeelingsandpassionsissimplytomarkasimilaragreementordisagreementexistingbetweenourownandtheirs。
Consequentlythesentimentsofeachindividualarethestandardandmeasureofthecorrectnessofanother\'s,anditishardlypossibleforustojudgeofanother\'sfeelingsbyanyothercanonthanthecorrespondentaffectioninourselves。Theonlymeasurebywhichonemancanjudgeofthefacultyofanotherisbyhisownfacultyofthelikekind。Aswejudgeofanother\'seyesight,hearing,orreason,bycomparisonwithourowneyesight,hearing,orreason,sowecanonlyjudgeofanother\'sloveorresentmentbyourownloveorourownresentment。If,uponbringingthecaseofanotherhometoourselves,wefindthatthesentimentswhichitproducesinhimcoincideandtallywithourown,wenecessarilyap-proveofhisasproportionedandsuitabletotheirobjects,whileifotherwise,wenecessarilydisapproveofthemasextravagantandoutofproportion。
Since,then,onepointofviewineverymoraljudgmentisthe\"suitableness\"
whichanyaffectionoftheheartbearstothecauseorobjectwhichexcitesit,theproprietyorimproprietyoftheaction,whichresultsfromsuchaffection,dependsentirelyontheconcordordissonanceoftheaffectionwiththatfeltsympatheticallybyaspectator。HencethatpartofmoralapprobationwhichconsistsinthesenseoftheProprietyofasentimenttoitscausesay,ofangertoitsprovocation,arisessimplyfromtheperceptionofacoincidencebetweenthesentimentofthepersonprimarilyaffectedbyitandthatofthespectatorwho,byforceofimagination,putshimselfintheother\'splace。
Letustake,forinstance,asaconcretecase,theexhibitionoffortitudeundergreatdistress。Whatisthesourceofourapprobationofit?Itistheperfectcoincidenceofanother\'sfirmnesswithourowninsensibilitytohismisfortunes。Byhismakingnodemandonusforthathigherdegreeofsensibilitywhichwefindtoourregretthatwedonotpossess,heeffectsamostperfectcorrespondencebetweenhissentimentsandours,whichcausesustorecognizetheperfectproprietyof\'hisconduct。Theadditionalelementwhichraisesourfeelingofmereapprobationintooneofadmiration,isthewonderandsurprisewefeelatwitnessingadegreeofself-commandfarabovethatusuallymetwithamongmankind。
Thereare,however,severalfactswhichmodifyoursenseoftheproprietyorimproprietyofanotherperson\'ssentimentsbytheirconcordordisagreementwithourown,andwhichitisimportanttonotice。
Firstofall,itisonlywhentheobjectswhichexciteanysentimentbearsomedirectrelationtothepersonprimarilyaffectedbythesentimentortoourselvesassympatheticallyaffectedbyit,thatanymoraljudgmentofhissentimentarisesonourpart。Forinstance,\"thebeautyofaplain,thegreat-nessofamountain,theornamentsofabuilding,theexpressionofapicture,thecompositionofadiscourse,theconductofathirdperson……allthegeneralsubjectsofscienceandtaste,arewhatweandourcompanionsregardashavingnopeculiarrelationtoeitherofus。\"Thereisnooccasionforsympathy,orforanimaginarychangeofsituations,inordertoproduce,withregardtosuchthings,themostperfectharmonyofsentimentsandaffections。Wherethereissuchharmony,weascribetoamangoodtasteorjudgment,butrecognizenodegreeofmoralpropriety。
Butitisotherwisewithanythingwhichmorecloselyaffectsus。Amisfortuneorinjurytoanotherisnotregardedbyhimandbyusfromthesamepointofviewasapoemorpictureare,fortheformercannotbutmorecloselyaffecthim。Henceacorrespondenceoffeelingismuchmoredifficultandmuchmoreimportantwithregardtomatterswhichnearlyconcernhim,thanwithregardtomatterswhichconcernneitherhimnorus,andarereallyindifferenttoouractualinterests。Wecaneasilybearwithdifferenceofopinioninmattersofspeculationortaste;butweceasetobebearabletooneanother,ifhehasnofellow-feelingformymisfortunesormygriefs;
orifhefeelseithernoindignationatmyinjuriesornonethatbearsanyproportiontomyresentmentofthem。
Thiscorrespondenceoffeeling,then,beingatthesametimesodifficultofattainmentandyetsopleasurablewhenattained,twooperationscomeintoplay:theeffortonourpart,asspectators,toenterintothesentimentsandpassionsofthepersonprincipallyconcerned,andtheeffortonhispartalsotobringhissentimentsintounisonwithours。Whilstwestrivetoassume,inimagination,hissituation,hestrivestoassumeours,andtobringdownhisemotionstothatdegreewithwhichweasspectatorscansympathize。Consciousasheisthatoursympathymustnaturallyfallshortoftheviolenceofhisown,andlongingashedoesforthatreliefwhichhecanonlyderivefromacompletesympathyoffeeling,heseekstoobtainamoreentireconcordbyloweringhispassiontothatpitchwhichheissensiblethatwecanassume。Doeshefeelresentmentorjealousy,hewillstrivetotoneitdowntothepointatwhichwecanenterintoit。Andbythusbeingledtoimaginehowhehimselfwouldbeaffected,wereheonlyaspectatorofhisownsituation,heisbroughttoabatetheviolenceofhisoriginalpassion。Sothatinasortofmeeting-pointofsympathyliesthepointofperfectpropriety,ashasbeenshowninthecaseoftheproprietyoffortitude。
Onthistwofoldtendencyofourmoralnaturetwodifferentsetsofvirtuesarebased。Onourefforttosympathizewiththepassionsandfeelingsofothersarefoundedthegentlervirtuesofcondescension,toleration,andhumanity;whilstthesternervirtuesofself-denialandself-commandarefoundedonourefforttoattuneourpassionstothatpitchofwhichotherscanapprove。Inaunionofthesetwokindsofvirtuesinfeelingmuchforothersandlittleforourselves,inrestrainingourselfishandindulgingourbenevolentaffectionsconsiststhehighestperfectionofwhichhumannatureiscapable。
Buthowdowepassfromaperceptionoftheproprietyofthesegoodqualitiestoaperceptionoftheirvirtue,forproprietyandvirtuemeandifferentthings?Theansweris,thatproprietyofsentimentwhich,whendisplayedintheusualdegree,meetswithourapprobationmerely,callsforouradmirationandbecomesvirtuouswhenitsurprisesusbyanunusualmanifestationofit。Admirationis\"approbation,heightenedbywonderandsurprise。\"\"Virtueisexcellence,somethinguncommonlygreatandbeautiful,whichrisesfarabovewhatisvulgarandordinary。\"Thereisnovirtueintheordinarydisplayofthemoralqualities,justasintheordinarydegreeoftheintellectualqualitiestherearenoabilities。
Forsensibilitytobeaccountedhumanityitmustexceedwhatispossessedbythe\"rudevulgarofmankind;\"and,inlikemanner,forself-commandtoamounttothevirtueoffortitude,itmustbemuchmorethantheweakestofmortalsiscapableofexerting。
Thereare,infact,twodifferentstandardsbywhichweoftenmeasurethedegreeofpraiseorblameduetoanyaction,oneconsistingintheideaofcompleteproprietyorperfection,incomparisonwithwhichallhumanactionmusteverappearblameable,andtheotherconsistinginthatapproachtosuchperfectionofwhichthemajorityofmenarecapable。Justinthesamewayasaworkofartmayappearverybeautifulwhenjudgedbythestandardofordinaryperfection,andappearfulloffaultswhenjudgedbythestandardofabsoluteperfection,soamoralactionorsentimentmayfrequentlydeserveapplausethatfallsshortofanidealvirtue。
Ithavingthusbeenshownthattheproprietyofanysentimentliesinameeting-pointbetweentwodifferentsympathies,orinasortofcompromisebetweentwodifferentaspectsof\'thesamepassion,itisevidentthatsuchproprietymustlieinacertainmediocrityormeanstatebetweentwoextremes,orinjustthatamountofpassionintowhichanimpartialspectatorcanenter。Thatgrieforresentment,forexample,isproperwhicherrsneitheronthesideofexcessorofdefect,whichisneithertoomuchnortoolittle。Theimpartialspectator,beingunableeithertoenterintoanexcessofresentmentortosympathizewithitsdeficiency,blamestheoneextremebycallingit\"fury,\"andtheotherbycallingit\"wantofspirit。\"
OnthispointitisnoticeablethatAdamSmith\'stheoryofProprietyagrees,ashesayshimself,\"prettyexactly\"withAristotle\'sdefinitionofVirtue,asconsistinginameanorbetweentwoextremesofexcessordefect。Forin-stance,courage,accordingtoAristotle,liesinthemeanstatebetweentheoppositevicesofcowardiceandrashness。Frugalityisasimilaravoidanceofbothavariceandprodigality,andmagnanimityconsistsinavoidingtheextremesofeitherarroganceorpusillanimity。AndasalsocoincidentineveryrespectwithhisowntheoryofPropriety,AdamSmithclaimsPlato\'saccountofvirtuegivenintheRepublic,whereitisshowntoconsistinthatstateofmindinwhicheveryfacultyconfinesitselftoitsproperspherewithoutencroachingonthatofanyother,andperformsitsproperofficewithexactlythatdegreeofstrengthwhichbynaturebelongstoit。
Butitisobviousthatthemeanstateorpointofproprietymustbedifferentindifferentpassions,lyingnearertotheexcessinsomeandnearertothedefectinothers。Anditwillbefoundthatthedecencyorindecencyofgivingexpressiontoourpassionsvariesexactlyinproportiontothegeneraldispositionofmankindtosympathizewiththem。
Toillustratetheapplicationofthisprinciple,AdamSmithdividesallhumanpassionsintofivedifferentclasses。ThesearethePassionswhichtaketheiroriginfromthebody,thosewhichtaketheiroriginfromaparticularturnoftheimagination,theunsocialPassions,thesocialPassions,andtheselfishPassions。AndwhateverdoubtsmaybefeltastothetruthofAdamSmith\'sgeneraltheoryoftheoriginofmoralapprobation,thereisnodoubtoftheinterestwhichattachestohisaccountoftheinfluenceofoursympathiesinconditioningthenatureofourmoralsentiments。
1。Tobeginwiththepassionswhichhavetheiroriginfromthebody。Thebodilypassions,suchashungerandthirst,beingpurelypersonal,failtoexciteanygeneralsympathy,andinproportiontotheimpossibilityofsuchsympathyistheimproprietyorindecencyofanystrongexpressionofthem。Therealoriginofourdisliketosuchpassionswhenwewitnesstheminothers,therealreasonwhyanystrongexpressionsofthemaresodisagreeable,isnotthefactthatsuchpassionsarethosewhichweshareincommonwiththebrutesforwealsosharewiththemnaturalaffectionandgratitude,butsimplythefactthatwecannotenterintothem,thattheyareinsufficienttocommandoursympathies。
Withthepassionswhicharisefromtheimaginationitisotherwisethanwithpassionswhichoriginatefromthebody。Forinstance,adisappointmentinloveorambitioncallsforthmoresympathythanthegreatestbodilyevil,forourimaginationlendsitselfmorereadilytosympathizewiththemisfortunesaffectingtheimaginationsofothers,thanispossibleinthecaseofthesufferingsoftheirbodies。Ourimaginationmouldsitselfmoreeasilyupontheimaginationofanotherthanourbodilyframecanbeaffectedbywhataffectshis。Thuswecanreadilysympathizewithamanwhohaslosthisfortune,forheonlysuffersinhisimagination,notinhisbody;andwecanfancy,justashedoes,thelossofdignity,theneglectofhisfriends,thecontemptfromhisenemies,thedependence,want,andmiserywhichhehimselfforeseesinstoreforhim。Thelossofalegisamorerealcalamitythanthelossofamistress;butwhilstitwouldberidiculoustofoundatragedyontheformerloss,thelattermisfortunehasgivenrisetomanyafineplay。Merepainnevercallsforthanylivelysympathy,andforthatreasontherewerenogreaterbreachesofdecorumcommittedintheplaysoftheGreeks,thanintheattempttoexcitecompassionbytherepresentationofphysicalagonies,asinthecriesofPhiloctetes,5orthetorturesofHippolytusandHercules。Itisonthislittlesympathywhichwefeelwithbodilypainthatisfoundedtheproprietyofconstancyandpatienceinitsendurance。