andintheexplanationwhichhehimselfelaborated，hethoughtthatsomepartorotherofhissystemembracedandcoincidedwithwhateverwastrueinthedifferenttheoriesofhispredecessors。
CHAPTERII。THEPHENOMENAOFSYMPATHY。
Thephenomenaofsympathyorfellow-feelingshow，accordingtoAdamSmith，thatitisoneoftheoriginalpassionsofhumannature。Weseeitintheimmediatetransfusionofanemotionfromonemantoanother，whichisantecedenttoanyknowledgeonourpartofthecausesofanotherman\'sgrieforjoy。Itisaprimaryfactorofourconstitutionashumanbeings，asisshownintheinstinctivewithdrawalofourlimbsfromthestrokeweseeaimedatanother。Itisindeedsomethingalmostphysical，asweseeinthetendencyofamobtotwisttheirbodiessimultaneouslywiththemovementsofarope-dancer，orinthetendencyofsomepeopleonbeholdingsoreeyestofeelasorenessintheirown。
Sympathyoriginatesintheimagination，whichalonecanmakeusenterintothesensationsofothers。Ourownsenses，forinstance，cannevertellusanythingofthesufferingsofamanontherack。Itisonlybyimaginingourselvesinhisposition，bychangingplaceswithhiminfancy，bythinkingwhatourownsensationswouldbeinthesameplight，thatwecometofeelwhatheendures，andtoshudderatthemerethoughtoftheagoniesbefeels。Butananalogousemotionspringsup，whatevermaybethenatureofthepassion，inthepersonprincipallyaffectedbyit；andwhetheritbejoyorgrief，gratitudeorresentment，thatanotherfeels，weequallyenterasitwereintohisbody，andinsomedegreebecomethesamepersonwithhim。Theemotionofaspectatoralwayscorrespondstowhat，bybringingthecaseofanotherhometohimself，heimaginesshouldbethatother\'ssentiments。
Butalthoughsympathyisthusaninstantaneousemotion，andtheexpressionofgrieforjoyinthelooksorgesturesofanotheraffectuswithsomedegreeofasimilaremotion，fromtheirsuggestionofageneralideaofhisbadorgoodfortune，therearesomepassionswithwhoseexpressionnosympathyarisestilltheirexcitingcauseisknown。Suchapassionisanger，forinstance。Whenwewitnessthesignsofangerinamanwemorereadilysympathizewiththefearorresentmentofthoseendangeredbyitthanwiththeprovokedmanhimself。Thegeneralideaofprovocationexcitesnosympathywithhisanger，forwecannotmakehispassionourowntillweknowthecauseofhisprovocation。Evenoursympathywithjoyorgriefisveryimperfect，tillweknowthecauseofit:infact，sympathyarisesnotsomuchfromtheviewofanypassionasfromthatofthesituationwhichexcitesit。Henceitisthatweoftenfeelforanotherwhathecannotfeelhim-self，
thatpassionarisinginourownbreastfromthemereimaginationwhicheventherealityfailstoarouseinhis。Wesometimes，forinstance，blushfortherudenessofanotherwhoisinsensibleofanyfaulthimself，becausewefeelhowashamedweshouldhavefelthadhisconductandsituationbeenours。Oursorrow，again，foranidiotisnoreflectionofanysentimentofhis，wholaughsandsings，andisunconsciousofhismisery；norisoursympathywiththedeadduetoanyotherconsiderationthantheconceptionofourselvesasdeprivedofalltheblessingsoflifeandyetconsciousofourdeprivation。Tothechangeproduceduponthemwejoinourownconsciousnessofthatchange，ourownsenseofthelossofthesunlightofhumanaffections，andhumanmemory，andthensympathizewiththeirsituationbysovividlyimaginingitourown。
Butwhatevermaybethecauseofsympathy，thereisnodoubtofthepleasurewhichtheconsciousnessofaconcordoffeelingproduces，andofthepainwhicharisesfromasenseofitsabsence。Somehaveaccountedforthisbytheprincipleofself-love，bysayingthattheconsciousnessofourownweaknessandourneedoftheassistanceofothersmakesustorejoiceintheirsympathyasanearnestoftheirassistance，andtogrieveintheirindifferenceasasignoftheiropposition。Butboththepleasureandpainarefeltsoinstantaneously，anduponsuchfrivolousoccasions，thatitisimpossibletoexplainthemasarefinementofself-love。Forinstance，wearemortifiedifnobodylaughsatourjests，andarepleasediftheydo；notfromanyconsiderationofself-interest，butfromaninstinctiveneedandlongingaftersympathy。
Neithercanthefact，thatthecorrespondenceofthesentimentsofotherswithourownisacauseofpleasure，andthewantofitacauseofpain，beaccountedforentirelybytheadditionalzestwhichthejoyofotherscommunicatestoourown，orbythedisappointmentwhichtheabsenceofitcauses。Thesympathyofotherswithourownjoymay，indeed，enliventhatjoy，andsogiveuspleasure；buttheirsympathywithourgriefcouldgiveusnopleasure，ifitsimplyenlivenedourgrief。Sympathy，however，whilstitenlivensjoy，alleviatesgrief，andsogivespleasureneithercase，bythemerefactofthecoincidenceofmutualfeeling。
Thesympathyofothersbeingmorenecessaryforusingriefthaninjoy，wearemoredesiroustocommunicatetoothersourdisagreeablepassionsthanouragreeableones。\"Theagreeablepassionsofloveandjoycansatisfyandsupporttheheartwithoutanyauxiliarypleasure。Thebitterandpainfulemotionsofgriefandresentmentmorestronglyrequirethehealingconsolationofsympathy。\"Hencewearelessanxiousthatourfriendsshouldadoptourfriendshipsthanthattheyshouldenterintoourresentments，anditmakesusmuchmoreangryiftheydonotenterintoourresentmentsthaniftheydonotenterintoourgratitude。
Butsympathyispleasurable，andtheabsenceofitdistressing，notonlytothepersonsympathizedwith，buttothepersonsympathizing。Weareourselvespleasedifwecansympathizewithanother\'ssuccessoraffliction，anditpainsusifwecannot。Theconsciousnessofaninabilitytosympathizewithhisdistress，ifwethinkhisgriefexcessive，givesusevenmorepainthanthesympatheticsorrowwhichthemostcompleteaccordancewithhimcouldmakeusfeel。
SucharethephysicalandinstinctivefactsofsympathyuponwhichAdamSmithfoundshistheoryoftheoriginofmoralapprobationandourmoralideas。Beforeproceedingwiththisdevelopmentofhistheory，itisworthnoticingagainitsclosecorrespondencewiththatofHume，wholikewisetracedmoralsentimentstoabasisofphysicalsympathy。\"Whereverwego，\"
saysHume，\"whateverwereflectonorconverseabout，everythingstillpresentsuswiththeviewofhumanhappinessormisery，andexcitesinourbreastasympatheticmovementofpleasureoruneasiness。\"Censureorapplauseare，then，theresultoftheinfluenceofsympathyuponoursentiments。
Ifthenaturaleffectsofmisery，suchastearsandcriesandgroans，neverfailtoinspireuswithcompassionanduneasiness，\"canwebesupposedaltogetherinsensibleorindifferenttowardsitscauses，whenamaliciousortreacherouscharacterandbehaviourarepresentedtous？\"
CHAPTERIII。MORALAPPROBATION，ANDTHEFEELINGOFPROPRIETY。
Havinganalyzedthefactsofsympathy，andshownthatthecorrespondenceofthesentimentsofotherswithourownisadirectcauseofpleasuretous，andthewantofitacauseofpain，AdamSmithproceedstoshowthattheamountofpleasureorpainfeltbyonemanintheconductorfeelingsofanotheristhemeasureofhisapprobationorthecontrary。Thesentimentsofanyonearejustandproper，orthereverse，accordingastheycoincideornotwiththesentimentsofsomeoneelsewhoobservesthem。Hisapprobationvarieswiththedegreeinwhichhecansympathizewiththem，andperfectconcordofsentimentmeansperfectapprobation。
JustasamanwhoadmiresthesamepoemorpicturethatIdo，orlaughsatthesamejoke，allowsthejusticeofmyadmirationormirth，sohe，whoentersintomyresentment，andbybringingmyinjurieshometohimselfsharesmyfeelings，cannotbuttherebyapproveofthemasjustandproper。
Accordingashissympatheticindignationfailstocorrespondtomine，accordingashiscompassionfallsshortofmygrief，according，inshort，tothedegreeofdisproportionhemayperceivebetweenmysentimentsandhis，doeshefeelstrongerorweakerdisapprovalofmyfeelings。
Moralapprobationadmitsofthesameexplanationasintellectualapprobation。
Forjustastoapproveordisapproveoftheopinionsofothersisnothingmorethantoobservetheiragreementordisagreementwithourown，sotoapproveordisapproveoftheirfeelingsandpassionsissimplytomarkasimilaragreementordisagreementexistingbetweenourownandtheirs。
Consequentlythesentimentsofeachindividualarethestandardandmeasureofthecorrectnessofanother\'s，anditishardlypossibleforustojudgeofanother\'sfeelingsbyanyothercanonthanthecorrespondentaffectioninourselves。Theonlymeasurebywhichonemancanjudgeofthefacultyofanotherisbyhisownfacultyofthelikekind。Aswejudgeofanother\'seyesight，hearing，orreason，bycomparisonwithourowneyesight，hearing，orreason，sowecanonlyjudgeofanother\'sloveorresentmentbyourownloveorourownresentment。If，uponbringingthecaseofanotherhometoourselves，wefindthatthesentimentswhichitproducesinhimcoincideandtallywithourown，wenecessarilyap-proveofhisasproportionedandsuitabletotheirobjects，whileifotherwise，wenecessarilydisapproveofthemasextravagantandoutofproportion。
Since，then，onepointofviewineverymoraljudgmentisthe\"suitableness\"
whichanyaffectionoftheheartbearstothecauseorobjectwhichexcitesit，theproprietyorimproprietyoftheaction，whichresultsfromsuchaffection，dependsentirelyontheconcordordissonanceoftheaffectionwiththatfeltsympatheticallybyaspectator。HencethatpartofmoralapprobationwhichconsistsinthesenseoftheProprietyofasentimenttoitscausesay，ofangertoitsprovocation，arisessimplyfromtheperceptionofacoincidencebetweenthesentimentofthepersonprimarilyaffectedbyitandthatofthespectatorwho，byforceofimagination，putshimselfintheother\'splace。
Letustake，forinstance，asaconcretecase，theexhibitionoffortitudeundergreatdistress。Whatisthesourceofourapprobationofit？Itistheperfectcoincidenceofanother\'sfirmnesswithourowninsensibilitytohismisfortunes。Byhismakingnodemandonusforthathigherdegreeofsensibilitywhichwefindtoourregretthatwedonotpossess，heeffectsamostperfectcorrespondencebetweenhissentimentsandours，whichcausesustorecognizetheperfectproprietyof\'hisconduct。Theadditionalelementwhichraisesourfeelingofmereapprobationintooneofadmiration，isthewonderandsurprisewefeelatwitnessingadegreeofself-commandfarabovethatusuallymetwithamongmankind。
Thereare，however，severalfactswhichmodifyoursenseoftheproprietyorimproprietyofanotherperson\'ssentimentsbytheirconcordordisagreementwithourown，andwhichitisimportanttonotice。
Firstofall，itisonlywhentheobjectswhichexciteanysentimentbearsomedirectrelationtothepersonprimarilyaffectedbythesentimentortoourselvesassympatheticallyaffectedbyit，thatanymoraljudgmentofhissentimentarisesonourpart。Forinstance，\"thebeautyofaplain，thegreat-nessofamountain，theornamentsofabuilding，theexpressionofapicture，thecompositionofadiscourse，theconductofathirdperson……allthegeneralsubjectsofscienceandtaste，arewhatweandourcompanionsregardashavingnopeculiarrelationtoeitherofus。\"Thereisnooccasionforsympathy，orforanimaginarychangeofsituations，inordertoproduce，withregardtosuchthings，themostperfectharmonyofsentimentsandaffections。Wherethereissuchharmony，weascribetoamangoodtasteorjudgment，butrecognizenodegreeofmoralpropriety。
Butitisotherwisewithanythingwhichmorecloselyaffectsus。Amisfortuneorinjurytoanotherisnotregardedbyhimandbyusfromthesamepointofviewasapoemorpictureare，fortheformercannotbutmorecloselyaffecthim。Henceacorrespondenceoffeelingismuchmoredifficultandmuchmoreimportantwithregardtomatterswhichnearlyconcernhim，thanwithregardtomatterswhichconcernneitherhimnorus，andarereallyindifferenttoouractualinterests。Wecaneasilybearwithdifferenceofopinioninmattersofspeculationortaste；butweceasetobebearabletooneanother，ifhehasnofellow-feelingformymisfortunesormygriefs；
orifhefeelseithernoindignationatmyinjuriesornonethatbearsanyproportiontomyresentmentofthem。
Thiscorrespondenceoffeeling，then，beingatthesametimesodifficultofattainmentandyetsopleasurablewhenattained，twooperationscomeintoplay:theeffortonourpart，asspectators，toenterintothesentimentsandpassionsofthepersonprincipallyconcerned，andtheeffortonhispartalsotobringhissentimentsintounisonwithours。Whilstwestrivetoassume，inimagination，hissituation，hestrivestoassumeours，andtobringdownhisemotionstothatdegreewithwhichweasspectatorscansympathize。Consciousasheisthatoursympathymustnaturallyfallshortoftheviolenceofhisown，andlongingashedoesforthatreliefwhichhecanonlyderivefromacompletesympathyoffeeling，heseekstoobtainamoreentireconcordbyloweringhispassiontothatpitchwhichheissensiblethatwecanassume。Doeshefeelresentmentorjealousy，hewillstrivetotoneitdowntothepointatwhichwecanenterintoit。Andbythusbeingledtoimaginehowhehimselfwouldbeaffected，wereheonlyaspectatorofhisownsituation，heisbroughttoabatetheviolenceofhisoriginalpassion。Sothatinasortofmeeting-pointofsympathyliesthepointofperfectpropriety，ashasbeenshowninthecaseoftheproprietyoffortitude。
Onthistwofoldtendencyofourmoralnaturetwodifferentsetsofvirtuesarebased。Onourefforttosympathizewiththepassionsandfeelingsofothersarefoundedthegentlervirtuesofcondescension，toleration，andhumanity；whilstthesternervirtuesofself-denialandself-commandarefoundedonourefforttoattuneourpassionstothatpitchofwhichotherscanapprove。Inaunionofthesetwokindsofvirtuesinfeelingmuchforothersandlittleforourselves，inrestrainingourselfishandindulgingourbenevolentaffectionsconsiststhehighestperfectionofwhichhumannatureiscapable。
Buthowdowepassfromaperceptionoftheproprietyofthesegoodqualitiestoaperceptionoftheirvirtue，forproprietyandvirtuemeandifferentthings？Theansweris，thatproprietyofsentimentwhich，whendisplayedintheusualdegree，meetswithourapprobationmerely，callsforouradmirationandbecomesvirtuouswhenitsurprisesusbyanunusualmanifestationofit。Admirationis\"approbation，heightenedbywonderandsurprise。\"\"Virtueisexcellence，somethinguncommonlygreatandbeautiful，whichrisesfarabovewhatisvulgarandordinary。\"Thereisnovirtueintheordinarydisplayofthemoralqualities，justasintheordinarydegreeoftheintellectualqualitiestherearenoabilities。
Forsensibilitytobeaccountedhumanityitmustexceedwhatispossessedbythe\"rudevulgarofmankind；\"and，inlikemanner，forself-commandtoamounttothevirtueoffortitude，itmustbemuchmorethantheweakestofmortalsiscapableofexerting。
Thereare，infact，twodifferentstandardsbywhichweoftenmeasurethedegreeofpraiseorblameduetoanyaction，oneconsistingintheideaofcompleteproprietyorperfection，incomparisonwithwhichallhumanactionmusteverappearblameable，andtheotherconsistinginthatapproachtosuchperfectionofwhichthemajorityofmenarecapable。Justinthesamewayasaworkofartmayappearverybeautifulwhenjudgedbythestandardofordinaryperfection，andappearfulloffaultswhenjudgedbythestandardofabsoluteperfection，soamoralactionorsentimentmayfrequentlydeserveapplausethatfallsshortofanidealvirtue。
Ithavingthusbeenshownthattheproprietyofanysentimentliesinameeting-pointbetweentwodifferentsympathies，orinasortofcompromisebetweentwodifferentaspectsof\'thesamepassion，itisevidentthatsuchproprietymustlieinacertainmediocrityormeanstatebetweentwoextremes，orinjustthatamountofpassionintowhichanimpartialspectatorcanenter。Thatgrieforresentment，forexample，isproperwhicherrsneitheronthesideofexcessorofdefect，whichisneithertoomuchnortoolittle。Theimpartialspectator，beingunableeithertoenterintoanexcessofresentmentortosympathizewithitsdeficiency，blamestheoneextremebycallingit\"fury，\"andtheotherbycallingit\"wantofspirit。\"
OnthispointitisnoticeablethatAdamSmith\'stheoryofProprietyagrees，ashesayshimself，\"prettyexactly\"withAristotle\'sdefinitionofVirtue，asconsistinginameanorbetweentwoextremesofexcessordefect。Forin-stance，courage，accordingtoAristotle，liesinthemeanstatebetweentheoppositevicesofcowardiceandrashness。Frugalityisasimilaravoidanceofbothavariceandprodigality，andmagnanimityconsistsinavoidingtheextremesofeitherarroganceorpusillanimity。AndasalsocoincidentineveryrespectwithhisowntheoryofPropriety，AdamSmithclaimsPlato\'saccountofvirtuegivenintheRepublic，whereitisshowntoconsistinthatstateofmindinwhicheveryfacultyconfinesitselftoitsproperspherewithoutencroachingonthatofanyother，andperformsitsproperofficewithexactlythatdegreeofstrengthwhichbynaturebelongstoit。
Butitisobviousthatthemeanstateorpointofproprietymustbedifferentindifferentpassions，lyingnearertotheexcessinsomeandnearertothedefectinothers。Anditwillbefoundthatthedecencyorindecencyofgivingexpressiontoourpassionsvariesexactlyinproportiontothegeneraldispositionofmankindtosympathizewiththem。
Toillustratetheapplicationofthisprinciple，AdamSmithdividesallhumanpassionsintofivedifferentclasses。ThesearethePassionswhichtaketheiroriginfromthebody，thosewhichtaketheiroriginfromaparticularturnoftheimagination，theunsocialPassions，thesocialPassions，andtheselfishPassions。AndwhateverdoubtsmaybefeltastothetruthofAdamSmith\'sgeneraltheoryoftheoriginofmoralapprobation，thereisnodoubtoftheinterestwhichattachestohisaccountoftheinfluenceofoursympathiesinconditioningthenatureofourmoralsentiments。
1。Tobeginwiththepassionswhichhavetheiroriginfromthebody。Thebodilypassions，suchashungerandthirst，beingpurelypersonal，failtoexciteanygeneralsympathy，andinproportiontotheimpossibilityofsuchsympathyistheimproprietyorindecencyofanystrongexpressionofthem。Therealoriginofourdisliketosuchpassionswhenwewitnesstheminothers，therealreasonwhyanystrongexpressionsofthemaresodisagreeable，isnotthefactthatsuchpassionsarethosewhichweshareincommonwiththebrutesforwealsosharewiththemnaturalaffectionandgratitude，butsimplythefactthatwecannotenterintothem，thattheyareinsufficienttocommandoursympathies。
Withthepassionswhicharisefromtheimaginationitisotherwisethanwithpassionswhichoriginatefromthebody。Forinstance，adisappointmentinloveorambitioncallsforthmoresympathythanthegreatestbodilyevil，forourimaginationlendsitselfmorereadilytosympathizewiththemisfortunesaffectingtheimaginationsofothers，thanispossibleinthecaseofthesufferingsoftheirbodies。Ourimaginationmouldsitselfmoreeasilyupontheimaginationofanotherthanourbodilyframecanbeaffectedbywhataffectshis。Thuswecanreadilysympathizewithamanwhohaslosthisfortune，forheonlysuffersinhisimagination，notinhisbody；andwecanfancy，justashedoes，thelossofdignity，theneglectofhisfriends，thecontemptfromhisenemies，thedependence，want，andmiserywhichhehimselfforeseesinstoreforhim。Thelossofalegisamorerealcalamitythanthelossofamistress；butwhilstitwouldberidiculoustofoundatragedyontheformerloss，thelattermisfortunehasgivenrisetomanyafineplay。Merepainnevercallsforthanylivelysympathy，andforthatreasontherewerenogreaterbreachesofdecorumcommittedintheplaysoftheGreeks，thanintheattempttoexcitecompassionbytherepresentationofphysicalagonies，asinthecriesofPhiloctetes，5orthetorturesofHippolytusandHercules。Itisonthislittlesympathywhichwefeelwithbodilypainthatisfoundedtheproprietyofconstancyandpatienceinitsendurance。