Underthewill，takengenerally，maybeincludedthevolitionalactofchoice，andalsothemereactofwish，insofarasreasonmaydeterminethefacultyofdesireinitsactivity。Theactofchoicethatcanbedeterminedbypurereasonconstitutestheactoffree—will。Thatactwhichisdeterminableonlybyinclinationasasensuousimpulseorstimuluswouldbeirrationalbrutechoice（arbitriumbrutum）。Thehumanactofchoice，however，ashuman，isinfactaffectedbysuchimpulsesorstimuli，butisnotdeterminedbythem;anditis，therefore，notpureinitselfwhentakenapartfromtheacquiredhabitofdeterminationbyreason。Butitmaybedeterminedtoactionbythepurewill。Thefreedomoftheactofvolitionalchoiceisitsindependenceofbeingdeterminedbysensuousimpulsesorstimuli。Thisformsthenegativeconceptionofthefree—will。Thepositiveconceptionoffreedomisgivenbythefactthatthewillisthecapabilityofpurereasontobepracticalofitself。Butthisisnotpossibleotherwisethanbythemaximofeveryactionbeingsubjectedtotheconditionofbeingpracticableasauniversallaw。Appliedaspurereasontotheactofchoice，andconsideredapartfromitsobjects，itmayberegardedasthefacultyofprinciples;and，inthisconnection，itisthesourceofpracticalprinciples。Henceitistobeviewedasalaw—givingfaculty。Butasthematerialuponwhichtoconstructalawisnotfurnishedtoit，itcanonlymaketheformoftheformofthemaximoftheactofwill，insofarasitisavailableasauniversallaw，thesupremelawanddeterminingprincipleofthewill。Andasthemaxims，orrulesofhumanactionderivedfromsubjectivecauses，donotofthemselvesnecessarilyagreewiththosethatareobjectiveanduniversal，reasoncanonlyprescribethissupremelawasanabsoluteimperativeofprohibitionorcommand。
Thelawsoffreedom，asdistinguishedfromthelawsofnature，aremorallaws。Sofarastheyreferonlytoexternalactionsandtheirlawfulness，theyarecalledjuridical;butiftheyalsorequirethat，aslaws，theyshallthemselvesbethedeterminingprinciplesofouractions，theyareethical。Theagreementofanactionwithjuridicallawsisitslegality;theagreementofanactionwithethicallawsisitsmorality。Thefreedomtowhichtheformerlawsrefer，canonlybefreedominexternalpractice;butthefreedomtowhichthelatterlawsreferisfreedomintheinternalaswellastheexternalexerciseoftheactivityofthewillinsofarasitisdeterminedbylawsofreason。So，intheoreticalphilosophy，itissaidthatonlytheobjectsoftheexternalsensesareinspace，butalltheobjectsbothofinternalandexternalsenseareintime;
becausetherepresentationsofboth，asbeingrepresentations，sofarbelongalltotheinternalsense。Inlikemanner，whetherfreedomisviewedinreferencetotheexternalortheinternalactionofthewill，itslaws，aspurepracticallawsofreasonforthefreeactivityofthewillgenerally，mustatthesametimebeinnerprinciplesforitsdetermination，althoughtheymaynotalwaysbeconsideredinthisrelation。
II。THEIDEAANDNECESSITYOFAMETAPHYSICOFMORALS。
IthasbeenshowninTheMetaphysicalPrinciplesoftheScienceofNaturethattheremustbeprinciplesaprioriforthenaturalsciencethathastodealwiththeobjectsoftheexternalsenses。