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  Thecensors,andbeforethemtheconsuls,modelled[45]andcreated,asitwere,everyfiveyearsthebodyofthepeople;theyexercisedthelegislationontheverypartthatwaspossessedofthelegislativepower。\"TiberiusGracchus,\"saysCicero,\"causedthefreedmentobeadmittedintothetribes,notbytheforceofhiseloquence,butbyaword,byagesture;whichhadhenoteffected,therepublic,whosedroopingheadweareatpresentscarcelyabletouphold,wouldnotevenexist。\"

  Ontheotherhand,thesenatehadthepowerofrescuing,asitwere,therepublicoutofthehandsofthepeople,bycreatingadictator,beforewhomthesovereignbowedhishead,andthemostpopularlawsweresilent。[46]

  17。OftheexecutivePowerinthesameRepublic。Jealousasthepeoplewereoftheirlegislativepower,theyhadnogreatuneasinessabouttheexecutive。Thistheyleftalmostentirelytothesenateandtotheconsuls,reservingscarcelyanythingmoretothemselvesthantherightofchoosingthemagistrates,andofconfirmingtheactsofthesenateandofthegenerals。

  Rome,whosepassionwastocommand,whoseambitionwastoconquer,whosecommencementandprogresswereonecontinuedusurpation,hadconstantlyaffairsofthegreatestweightuponherhands;herenemieswereeverconspiringagainsther,orsheagainstherenemies。

  Asshewasobligedtobehaveontheonehandwithheroiccourage,andontheotherwithconsummateprudence,itwasrequisite,ofcourse,thatthemanagementofaffairsshouldbecommittedtothesenate。Thusthepeopledisputedeverybranchofthelegislativepowerwiththesenate,becausetheywerejealousoftheirliberty;buttheyhadnodisputesabouttheexecutive,becausetheywereanimatedwiththeloveofglory。

  Sogreatwasthesharethesenatetookintheexecutivepower,that,asPolybius[47]informsus,foreignnationsimaginedthatRomewasanaristocracy。Thesenatedisposedofthepublicmoney,andfarmedouttherevenue;theywerearbitersoftheaffairsoftheirallies;theydeterminedwarorpeace,anddirectedinthisrespecttheconsuls;theyfixedthenumberoftheRomanandofthealliedtroops,disposedoftheprovincesandarmiestotheconsulsorpr?tors,andupontheexpirationoftheyearofcommandhadthepowerofappointingsuccessors;theydecreedtriumphs,receivedandsentembassies:theynominated,rewarded,punished,andwerejudgesofkings,declaredthemalliesoftheRomanpeople,orstrippedthemofthattitle。

  Theconsulsleviedthetroopswhichtheyweretocarryintothefield;

  hadthecommandoftheforcesbyseaandbyland;disposedoftheforcesoftheallies;wereinvestedwiththewholepoweroftherepublicintheprovinces;gavepeacetothevanquishednations,imposedconditionsonthem,orreferredthemtothesenate。

  Intheearliesttimes,whenthepeoplehadsomeshareintheaffairsrelatingtowarorpeace,theyexercisedrathertheirlegislativethantheirexecutivepower。Theyscarcelydidanythingelsebutconfirmtheactsofthekings,andaftertheirexpulsionthoseoftheconsulsorsenate。Sofarweretheyfrombeingthearbitersofwarthatwehaveinstancesofitshavingbeenoftendeclared,notwithstandingtheoppositionofthetribunes。Butgrowingwantonintheirprosperity,theyincreasedtheirexecutivepower。Thus[48]theycreatedthemilitarytribunes,thenominationofwhomtillthenhadbelongedtothegenerals;

  andsometimebeforethefirstPunicwar,theydecreedthatonlytheirownbodyshouldhavetherightofdeclaringwar。[49]

  18。OfthejudiciaryPowerintheRomanGovernment。Thejudiciarypowerwasgiventothepeople,tothesenate,tothemagistrates,andtoparticularjudges。Wemustseeinwhatmanneritwasdistributed;

  beginningwiththeircivilaffairs。

  Theconsulshadthejudiciarypower[50]aftertheexpulsionofthekings,asthepr?torswerejudgesaftertheconsuls。ServiusTulliushaddivestedhimselfofthepowerofdeterminingcivilcauses,whichwasnotresumedbytheconsuls,exceptinsome[51]veryrarecases,forthatreasoncalledextraordinary。[52]Theyweresatisfiedwithnamingthejudges,andestablishingtheseveraltribunals。ByadiscourseofAppiusClaudius,inDionysiusHalicarnassus,[53]itappearsthatasearlyasthe259thyearofRomethiswaslookeduponasasettledcustomamongtheRomans;anditisnottracingitveryhightoreferittoServiusTullius。

  Everyyearthepr?tormadealist[54]ofsuchashechosefortheofficeofjudgesduringhismagistracy。Asufficientnumberwaspitcheduponforeachcause;acustomverynearlythesameasthatnowpractisedinEngland。Andwhatwasextremelyfavourabletoliberty[55]wasthepr?tor’sfixingthejudgeswiththeconsent[56]oftheparties。ThegreatnumberofexceptionsthatcanbemadeinEnglandamountsprettynearlytothisverycustom。

  Thejudgesdecidedonlythequestionsrelatingtomatteroffact;[57]

  forexample,whetherasumofmoneyhadbeenpaidornot,whetheranacthadbeencommittedornot。Butastoquestionsoflaw,[58]astheserequiredacertaincapacity,theywerealwayscarriedbeforethetribunalofthecentumvirs。[59]

  Thekingsreservedtothemselvesthejudgmentofcriminalaffairs,andinthisweresucceededbytheconsuls。ItwasinconsequenceofthisauthoritythatBrutusputhischildrenandallthosewhowereconcernedintheTarquinianconspiracytodeath。Thiswasanexorbitantpower。Theconsulsalreadyinvestedwiththemilitarycommandextendedtheexerciseofiteventocivilaffairs;andtheirprocedures,beingstrippedofallformsofjustice,wereratherexertionsofviolencethanlegaljudgments。

  ThisgaverisetotheValerianlaw,bywhichitwasmadelawfultoappealtothepeoplefromeverydecisionoftheconsulsthatendangeredthelifeofacitizen。TheconsulshadnolongerthepowerofpronouncingsentenceincapitalcasesagainstaRomancitizen,withouttheconsentofthepeople。[60]

  WeseeinthefirstconspiracyfortherestorationoftheTarquinsthatthecriminalsweretriedbyBrutustheconsul;inthesecondthesenateandcomitiawereassembledtotrythem。[61]

  Thelawsdistinguishedbythenameofsacredallowedtheplebeianstheprivilegeofchoosingtribunes;whencewasformedabodywhosepretensionsatfirstwereimmense。Itishardtodeterminewhichwasgreater,theinsolenceoftheplebeiansindemanding,orthecondescensionofthesenateingranting。TheValerianlawallowedappealstothepeople,thatis,tothepeoplecomposedofsenators,patricians,andplebeians。Theplebeiansmadealawthatappealsshouldbebroughtbeforetheirownbody。Aquestionwassoonafterstarted,whethertheplebeianshadarighttotryapatrician;thiswasthesubjectofadisputetowhichtheimpeachmentofCoriolanusgaverise,andwhichendedwiththataffair。WhenCoriolanuswasaccusedbythetribunesbeforethepeople,heinsisted,contrarytothespiritoftheValerianlaw,thatashewasapatrician,nonebuttheconsulshadthepowertotryhim;ontheotherhand,theplebeians,alsocontrarytothespiritofthatsamelaw,pretendedthatnonebuttheirbodywereempoweredtobehisjudges,andaccordinglytheypronouncedsentenceuponhim。

  ThiswasmoderatedbythelawoftheTwelveTables;wherebyitwasordainedthatnonebutthegreatassembliesofthepeople[62]shouldtryacitizenincapitalcases。Hencethebodyoftheplebeians,or,whichamountstotheverysame,thecomitiabytribes,hadnolongeranypowerofhearingcriminalcauses,exceptsuchaswerepunishedwithfines。Toinflictacapitalpunishmentalawwasrequisite;buttocondemntoapecuniarymulct,therewasoccasiononlyforaplebiscitum。

  ThisregulationofthelawoftheTwelveTableswasextremelyprudent。

  Itproducedanadmirablebalancebetweenthebodyoftheplebeiansandthesenate。Forasthefulljudiciarypowerofbothdependedonthegreatnessofthepunishmentandthenatureofthecrime,itwasnecessarytheyshouldbothagree。

  TheValerianlawabolishedalltheremainsoftheRomangovernmentinanywayrelatingtothatofthekingsoftheheroictimesofGreece。Theconsulsweredivestedofthepowertopunishcrimes。Thoughallcrimesarepublic,yetwemustdistinguishbetweenthosewhichmorenearlyconcernthemutualintercourseofthecitizensandthosewhichmoreimmediatelyinterestthestateintherelationitbearstoitssubjects。

  Thefirstarecalledprivate,thesecondpublic。Thelatterweretriedbythepeople;andinregardtotheformer,theynamedbyparticularcommissionaqu?storfortheprosecutionofeachcrime。Thepersonchosenbythepeoplewasfrequentlyoneofthemagistrates,sometimesaprivateman。Hewascalledthequ?storofparricide,andismentionedinthelawoftheTwelveTables。[63]

  Thequ?stornominatedthejudgeofthequestion,whodrewlotsforthejudges,andregulatedthetribunalinwhichhepresided。[64]

  Hereitispropertoobservewhatsharethesenatehadinthenominationofthequ?stor,thatwemayseehowfarthetwopowerswerebalanced。

  Sometimesthesenatecausedadictatortobechosen,inordertoexercisetheofficeofqu?stor;[65]atothertimestheyordainedthatthepeopleshouldbeconvenedbyatribune,withtheviewofproceedingtothenominationofaqu?stor;[66]and,infine,thepeoplefrequentlyappointedamagistratetomakehisreporttothesenateconcerningaparticularcrime,andtodesirethemtonameaqu?stor,asmaybeseeninthejudgmentuponLuciusScipio[67]inLivy。[68]

  IntheyearofRome604,someofthesecommissionswererenderedpermanent。[69]Allcriminalcausesweregraduallydividedintodifferentparts;towhichtheygavethenameofperpetualquestions。Differentpr?torswerecreated,toeachofwhomsomeofthosequestionswereassigned。Theyhadapowerconferreduponthemforthetermofayear,oftryingsuchcriminalcausesasboreanyrelationtothosequestions,andthentheyweresenttogoverntheirprovince。

  AtCarthagethesenateofthehundredwascomposedofjudgeswhoenjoyedthatdignityforlife。[70]ButatRomethepr?torswereannual;andthejudgeswerenotevenforsolongaterm,butwerenominatedforeachcause。Wehavealreadyshowninthesixthchapterofthisbookhowfavourablethisregulationwastolibertyinparticulargovernments。

  Thejudgeswerechosenfromtheorderofsenators,tillthetimeoftheGracchi。TiberiusGracchuscausedalawtopassthattheyshouldbetakenfromtheequestrianorder;achangesoveryconsiderablethatthetribuneboastedofhavingcut,byonerogationonly,thesinewsofthesenatorialdignity。

  Itisnecessarytoobservethatthethreepowersmaybeverywelldistributedinregardtothelibertyoftheconstitution,thoughnotsowellinrespecttothelibertyofthesubject。AtRomethepeoplehadthegreatestshareofthelegislative,apartoftheexecutive,andpartofthejudiciarypower;bywhichmeanstheyhadsogreataweightinthegovernmentasrequiredsomeotherpowertobalanceit。Thesenateindeedhadpartoftheexecutivepower,andsomeshareofthelegislative;[71]

  butthiswasnotsufficienttocounterbalancetheweightofthepeople。

  Itwasnecessarythattheyshouldpartakeofthejudiciarypower:andaccordinglytheyhadasharewhenthejudgeswerechosenfromamongthesenators。ButwhentheGracchideprivedthesenatorsofthejudicialpower,[72]thesenatewerenolongerabletowithstandthepeople。Tofavour,therefore,thelibertyofthesubject,theystruckatthatoftheconstitution;buttheformerperishedwiththelatter。

  Infinitewerethemischiefsthatthencearose。Theconstitutionwaschangedatatimewhenthefireofcivildiscordhadscarcelyleftanysuchthingasaconstitution。Theknightsceasedtobethatmiddleorderwhichunitedthepeopletothesenate;andthechainoftheconstitutionwasbroken。

  Therewereevenparticularreasonsagainsttransferringthejudiciarypowertotheequestrianorder。TheconstitutionofRomewasfoundedonthisprinciple,thatnoneshouldbeenlistedassoldiersbutsuchasweremenofsufficientpropertytoanswerfortheirconducttotherepublic。Theknights,aspersonsofthegreatestproperty,formedthecavalryofthelegions。Butwhentheirdignityincreased,theyrefusedtoserveanylongerinthatcapacity,andanotherkindofcavalrywasobligedtoberaised:thusMariusenlistedallsortsofpeopleintohisarmy,andsoonaftertherepublicwaslost。[73]

  Besides,theknightswerethefarmersoftherevenue;menwhosegreatrapaciousnessincreasedthepubliccalamities。Insteadofgivingtosuchasthosethejudicialpower,theyoughttohavebeenconstantlyundertheeyeofthejudges。ThiswemustsayincommendationoftheancientFrenchlaws,thattheyhaveactedtowardstheofficersoftherevenuewithasgreatadiffidenceaswouldbeobservedbetweenenemies。WhenthejudiciarypoweratRomewastransferredtothepublicans,therewasthenanendofallvirtue,polity,laws,andgovernment。

  OfthiswefindaveryingeniousdescriptioninsomefragmentsofDiodorusSiculusandDio。\"MutiusSc?vola,\"saysDiodorus,[74]\"wantedtorevivetheancientmanners,andthelaudablecustomofsoberandfrugalliving。Forhispredecessorshavingenteredintoacontractwiththefarmersoftherevenue,whoatthattimewerepossessedofthejudiciarypoweratRome,hadinfectedtheprovincewithallmannerofcorruption。ButSc?volamadeanexampleofthepublicans,andimprisonedthosebywhomothershadbeenconfined。\"

  Dioinformsus[75]thatPubliusRutilius,hislieutenant,wasequallyobnoxioustotheequestrianorder,andthatuponhisreturntheyaccusedhimofhavingreceivedsomepresents,andcondemnedhimtoafine;uponwhichheinstantlymadeacessionofhisgoods。Hisinnocenceappearedinthis,thathewasfoundtobeworthagreatdeallessthanwhathewaschargedwithhavingextorted,andheshowedajusttitletowhathepossessed:buthewouldnotliveanylongerinthesamecitywithsuchprofligatewretches。

  TheItalians,saysDiodorusagain,[76]boughtupwholedrovesofslavesinSicily,totilltheirlandsandtotakecareoftheircattle;butrefusedthemanecessarysubsistence。Thesewretcheswerethenforcedtogoandrobonthehighways,armedwithlancesandclubs,coveredwithbeasts’skins,andfollowedbylargemastiffs。Thusthewholeprovincewaslaidwaste,andtheinhabitantscouldnotcallanythingtheirownbutwhatwassecuredbyfortresses。Therewasneitherproconsulnorpr?torthatcouldorwouldopposethisdisorder,orthatpresumedtopunishtheseslaves,becausetheybelongedtotheknights,whoatRomewerepossessedofthejudiciarypower。[77]Andyetthiswasoneofthecausesofthewaroftheslaves。ButIshalladdonlyonewordmore。A

  professiondeafandinexorable,thatcanhavenootherviewthanlucre,thatwasalwaysaskingandnevergranting,thatimpoverishedtherichandincreasedeventhemiseryofthepoor——suchaprofession,Isay,shouldneverhavebeenentrustedwiththejudiciarypoweratRome。

  19。OftheGovernmentoftheRomanProvinces。SuchwasthedistributionofthethreepowersinRome。Buttheywerefarfrombeingthusdistributedintheprovinces。Libertyprevailedinthecentreandtyrannyintheextremeparts。

  WhileRomeextendedherdominionsnofartherthanItaly,thepeopleweregovernedasconfederates,andthelawsofeachrepublicwerepreserved。

  Butwhensheenlargedherconquests,andthesenatehadnolongeranimmediateinspectionovertheprovinces,northemagistratesresidingatRomewereanylongercapableofgoverningtheempire,theywereobligedtosendpr?torsandproconsuls。Thenitwasthattheharmonyofthethreepowerswaslost。ThepersonsappointedtothatofficewereentrustedwithapowerwhichcomprehendedthatofalltheRomanmagistracies;nay,eventhatofthepeople。[78]Theyweredespoticmagistrates,extremelywelladaptedtothedistanceoftheplacestowhichtheyweredestined。Theyexercisedthethreepowers;andwere,ifImaypresumetousetheexpression,thebashawsoftherepublic。

  Wehaveelsewhereobserved[79]thatinacommonwealththesamemagistrateoughttobepossessedoftheexecutivepower,aswellcivilasmilitary。Henceaconqueringrepubliccanhardlycommunicatehergovernment,andruletheconqueredstateaccordingtoherownconstitution。Andindeedasthemagistrateshesendstogovernisinvestedwiththeexecutivepower,bothcivilandmilitary,hemustalsohavethelegislative:forwhoisitthatcouldmakelawswithouthim?Itisnecessary,therefore,thatthegovernorshesendsbeentrustedwiththethreepowers,aswaspractisedintheRomanprovinces。

  Itismoreeasyforamonarchytocommunicateitsgovernment,becausetheofficersitsendshave,somethecivilexecutive,andothersthemilitaryexecutivepower,whichdoesnotnecessarilyimplyadespoticauthority。

  ItwasaprivilegeoftheutmostconsequencetoaRomancitizentohavenonebutthepeopleforhisjudge。Wereitnotforthis,hewouldhavebeensubjectintheprovincestothearbitrarypowerofaproconsulorofapropr?tor。Thecityneverfeltthetyrannywhichwasexercisedonlyonconquerednations。

  Thus,intheRomanworld,asatSparta,thefreemenenjoyedthehighestdegreeofliberty,whilethosewhowereslaveslabouredundertheextremityofservitude。

  Whilethecitizenspaidtaxes,theywereraisedwithgreatjusticeandequality。TheregulationofServiusTulliuswasobserved,whohaddistributedthepeopleintosixclasses,accordingtotheirdifferenceofproperty,andfixedtheseveralsharesofthepublicimpostsinproportiontothatwhicheachpersonhadinthegovernment。Hencetheyborewiththegreatnessofthetaxbecauseoftheirproportionablegreatnessofcredit,andconsoledthemselvesforthesmallnessoftheircreditbecauseofthesmallnessofthetax。

  Therewasalsoanotherthingworthyofadmiration,whichis,thatasServiusTullius’sdivisionintoclasseswasinsomemeasurethefundamentalprincipleoftheconstitution,itthencefollowedthatanequallevyingofthetaxeswassoconnectedwiththisfundamentalprinciplethattheonecouldnotbeabolishedwithouttheother。

  Butwhilethecitypaidthetaxesasshepleased,orpaidnoneatall,[80]theprovinceswereplunderedbytheknights,whowerethefarmersofthepublicrevenue。Wehavealreadymadementionoftheiroppressiveextortions,withwhichallhistoryabounds。

  \"AllAsia,\"saysMithridates,[81]\"expectsmeasherdeliverer;sogreatisthehatredwhichtherapaciousnessoftheproconsuls,[82]theconfiscationsmadebytheofficersoftherevenue,andthequirksandcavilsofjudicialproceedings,[83]haveexcitedagainsttheRomans。\"

  Henceitwasthatthestrengthoftheprovincesdidnotincrease,butratherweakened,thestrengthoftherepublic。HenceitwasthattheprovinceslookeduponthelossofthelibertyofRomeastheepochoftheirownfreedom。

  20。TheEndofthisBook。Ishouldbegladtoinquireintothedistributionofthethreepowers,inallthemoderategovernmentsweareacquaintedwith,inordertocalculatethedegreesoflibertywhicheachmayenjoy。Butwemustnotalwaysexhaustasubject,soastoleavenoworkatallforthereader。Mybusinessisnottomakepeopleread,buttomakethemthink。

  ______

  1。\"Ihavecopied,\"saysCicero,\"Sc?vola’sedict,whichpermitstheGreekstoterminatetheirdifferenceamongthemselvesaccordingtotheirownlaws;thismakesthemconsiderthemselvesafreepeople。\"

  2。TheRussianscouldnotbearthatCzarPetershouldmakethemcutitoff。

  3。TheCappadociansrefusedtheconditionofarepublicanstate,whichwasofferedthembytheRomans。

  4。Thenaturalendofastatethathasnoforeignenemies,orthatthinksitselfsecuredagainstthembybarriers。

  5。InconvenienceoftheLiberumveto。

  6。AtVenice。

  7。AsatAthens。

  8。SeeAristotle,Politics,iv。4。

  9。SeeAristotle,Politics,ii,10。

  10。Ibid。,9。

  11。Theseweremagistrateschosenannuallybythepeople。SeeStephenofByzantium。

  12。ItwaslawfultoaccusetheRomanmagistratesaftertheexpirationoftheirseveraloffices。SeeinDionysiusHalicarnassus,ix,theaffairofGenutiusthetribune。

  13。Deminoribusrebusprincipesconsultant,demajoribusomnes;itatamenliteaquoquequorumpenesplebemarbitriumest,apudprincipespertractentur。——ix。

  14。Politics,iii。14。

  15。SeeJustin,xvii。3。

  16。Aristotle,Politics,v。11。

  17。Ibid。,iii。14。

  18。Ibid。

  19。SeewhatPlutarchsaysintheTheseus。SeelikewiseThucydides,i。

  20。Aristotle,Politics,iv。8。

  21。DionysiusHalicarnassus,ii,p。120,andiv,pp。242,243。

  22。SeeTanaquil’sDiscourseonLivy,idec。l,andtheregulationsofServiusTulliusinDionysiusHalicarnassus,iv。p。229。

  23。SeeDionysiusHalicarnassus,ii,p。118,andiii,p。171。

  24。Itwasbyvirtueofasenatus—consultumthatTulliusHostiliusorderedAlbatobedestroyed。——Ibid。,iii,pp。167and172。

  25。Ibid。,iv,p。276。

  26。Ibid。,ii。Andyettheycouldnothavethenominationofalloffices,sinceValeriusPublicolamadethatfamouslawbywhicheverycitizenwasforbiddentoexerciseanyemployment,unlesshehadobtaineditbythesuffrageofthepeople。

  27。Ibid。,iii,p。159。

  28。Ibid。,iv。

  29。Hedivestedhimselfofhalftheregalpower,saysDionysiusHalicarnassus,iv,p。229。

  30。ItwasthoughtthatifhehadnotbeenpreventedbyTarquinhewouldhaveestablishedapopulargovernment。——Ibid。,iv,p。243。

  31。Ibid。,iv。

  32。Livy,dec。1,vi。

  33。Qu?storesparricidii。——Pomponius,Leg。2,§23,ff。deorig。jur。

  34。Plutarch,Poplicola。

  35。Comitiiscenturiatis。

  36。SeeLivy,i,43;DionysiusHalicarnassus,iv,vii。

  37。DionysiusHalicarnassus,ix,p。598。

  38。Ibid。,vii。

  39。Contrarytotheancientcustom,asmaybeseen:ibid。,v,p。320。

  40。Ibid。,pp。410,411。

  41。Ibid。,ix,p。605。

  42。Ibid。,xi,p。725。

  43。Bythesacredlaws,theplebeianshadthepowerofmakingtheplebiscitabythemselves,withoutadmittingthepatriciansintotheirassembly——Ibid。,vi,p。410;vii,p。430。

  44。Bythelawenactedaftertheexpulsionofthedecemvirs,thepatriciansweremadesubjecttotheplebiscita,thoughtheyhadnotarightofvotingthere。Livy,iii。55,andDionysiusHalicarnassus,xi,p。725。ThislawwasconfirmedbythatofPubliusPhilothedictator,intheyearofRome416。Livy,viii。12。

  45。Intheyear312ofRometheconsulsperformedstillthebusinessofsurveyingthepeopleandtheirestates,asappearsbyDionysiusHalicarnassus,ix。

  46。Suchasthosebywhichitwasallowedtoappealfromthedecisionsofallthemagistratestothepeople。

  47。Bookvi。

  48。IntheyearofRome444,Livy,dec。1,ix。30。AsthewaragainstPerseusappearedsomewhatdangerous,itwasordainedbyasenatus—consultumthatthislawshouldbesuspended,andthepeopleagreedtoit。Livy,dec。5,ii。

  49。Theyextorteditfromthesenate,saysFreinshemius,dec。2,vi。

  50。Thereisnomannerofdoubtbuttheconsulshadthepoweroftryingcivilcausesbeforethecreationofthepr?tors。SeeLivy,dec。l,ii。

  1;DionysiusHalicarnassus,x,pp。627,645。

  51。Thetribunesfrequentlytriedcausesbythemselvesonly,butnothingrenderedthemmoreodious。——DionysiusHalicarnassus,xi,p。709。

  52。Judiciaextraordinaria。SeetheInstitutes,iv。

  53。Bookvi,p。360。

  54。AlbumJudicium。

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