Theexecutivepower，pursuantofwhathasbeenalreadysaid，oughttohaveashareinthelegislaturebythepowerofrejecting，otherwiseitwouldsoonbestrippedofitsprerogative。Butshouldthelegislativepowerusurpashareoftheexecutive，thelatterwouldbeequallyundone。
Iftheprinceweretohaveapartinthelegislaturebythepowerofresolving，libertywouldbelost。Butasitisnecessaryheshouldhaveashareinthelegislatureforthesupportofhisownprerogative，thissharemustconsistinthepowerofrejecting。
ThechangeofgovernmentatRomewasowingtothis，thatneitherthesenate，whohadonepartoftheexecutivepower，northemagistrates，whowereentrustedwiththeother，hadtherightofrejecting，whichwasentirelylodgedinthepeople。
Herethenisthefundamentalconstitutionofthegovernmentwearetreatingof。Thelegislativebodybeingcomposedoftwoparts，theycheckoneanotherbythemutualprivilegeofrejecting。Theyarebothrestrainedbytheexecutivepower，astheexecutiveisbythelegislative。
Thesethreepowersshouldnaturallyformastateofreposeorinaction。
Butasthereisanecessityformovementinthecourseofhumanaffairs，theyareforcedtomove，butstillinconcert。
Astheexecutivepowerhasnootherpartinthelegislativethantheprivilegeofrejecting，itcanhavenoshareinthepublicdebates。Itisnotevennecessarythatitshouldpropose，becauseasitmayalwaysdisapproveoftheresolutionsthatshallbetaken，itmaylikewiserejectthedecisionsonthoseproposalswhichweremadeagainstitswill。
Insomeancientcommonwealths，wherepublicdebateswerecarriedonbythepeopleinabody，itwasnaturalfortheexecutivepowertoproposeanddebateinconjunctionwiththepeople，otherwisetheirresolutionsmusthavebeenattendedwithastrangeconfusion。
Weretheexecutivepowertodeterminetheraisingofpublicmoney，otherwisethanbygivingitsconsent，libertywouldbeatanend；
becauseitwouldbecomelegislativeinthemostimportantpointoflegislation。
Ifthelegislativepowerwastosettlethesubsidies，notfromyeartoyear，butforever，itwouldruntheriskoflosingitsliberty，becausetheexecutivepowerwouldbenolongerdependent；andwhenonceitwaspossessedofsuchaperpetualright，itwouldbeamatterofindifferencewhetherithelditofitselforofanother。Thesamemaybesaidifitshouldcometoaresolutionofentrusting，notanannual，butaperpetualcommandofthefleetsandarmiestotheexecutivepower。
Topreventtheexecutivepowerfrombeingabletooppress，itisrequisitethatthearmieswithwhichitisentrustedshouldconsistofthepeople，andhavethesamespiritasthepeople，aswasthecaseatRometillthetimeofMarius。Toobtainthisend，thereareonlytwoways，eitherthatthepersonsemployedinthearmyshouldhavesufficientpropertytoanswerfortheirconducttotheirfellow—subjects，andbeenlistedonlyforayear，aswascustomaryatRome：orifthereshouldbeastandingarmy，composedchieflyofthemostdespicablepartofthenation，thelegislativepowershouldhavearighttodisbandthemassoonasitpleased；thesoldiersshouldliveincommonwiththerestofthepeople；andnoseparatecamp，barracks，orfortressshouldbesuffered。
Whenonceanarmyisestablished，itoughtnottodependimmediatelyonthelegislative，butontheexecutive，power；andthisfromtheverynatureofthething，itsbusinessconsistingmoreinactionthanindeliberation。
Itisnaturalformankindtosetahighervalueuponcouragethantimidity，onactivitythanprudence，onstrengththancounsel。Hencethearmywilleverdespiseasenate，andrespecttheirownofficers。Theywillnaturallyslighttheorderssentthembyabodyofmenwhomtheylookuponascowards，andthereforeunworthytocommandthem。Sothatassoonasthetroopsdependentirelyonthelegislativebody，itbecomesamilitarygovernment；andifthecontraryhaseverhappened，ithasbeenowingtosomeextraordinarycircumstances。Itisbecausethearmywasalwayskeptdivided；itisbecauseitwascomposedofseveralbodiesthatdependedeachonaparticularprovince；itisbecausethecapitaltownswerestrongplaces，defendedbytheirnaturalsituation，andnotgarrisonedwithregulartroops。Holland，forinstance，isstillsaferthanVenice；shemightdrownorstarvetherevoltedtroops；forastheyarenotquarteredintownscapableoffurnishingthemwithnecessarysubsistence，thissubsistenceisofcourseprecarious。
InperusingtheadmirabletreatiseofTacitusOntheMannersoftheGermans，[13]wefinditisfromthatnationtheEnglishhaveborrowedtheideaoftheirpoliticalgovernment。Thisbeautifulsystemwasinventedfirstinthewoods。
Asallhumanthingshaveanend，thestatewearespeakingofwillloseitsliberty，willperish。HavenotRome，Sparta，andCarthageperished？
Itwillperishwhenthelegislativepowershallbemorecorruptthantheexecutive。
ItisnotmybusinesstoexaminewhethertheEnglishactuallyenjoythislibertyornot。Sufficientitisformypurposetoobservethatitisestablishedbytheirlaws；andIinquirenofurther。
NeitherdoIpretendbythistoundervalueothergovernments，nortosaythatthisextremepoliticallibertyoughttogiveuneasinesstothosewhohaveonlyamoderateshareofit。HowshouldIhaveanysuchdesign，Iwhothinkthateventhehighestrefinementofreasonisnotalwaysdesirable，andthatmankindgenerallyfindtheiraccountbetterinmediumsthaninextremes？
Harrington，inhisOceana，hasalsoinquiredintotheutmostdegreeoflibertytowhichtheconstitutionofastatemaybecarried。Butofhimindeeditmaybesaidthatforwantofknowingthenatureofreallibertyhebusiedhimselfinpursuitofanimaginaryone；andthathebuiltaChalcedon，thoughhehadaByzantiumbeforehiseyes。
7。OftheMonarchiesweareacquaintedwith。Themonarchiesweareacquaintedwithhavenot，likethatwehavebeenspeakingof，libertyfortheirdirectview：theonlyaimisthegloryofthesubject，ofthestate，andofthesovereign。Buthencethereresultsaspiritofliberty，whichinthosestatesiscapableofachievingasgreatthings，andofcontributingasmuchperhapstohappinessaslibertyitself。
Herethethreepowersarenotdistributedandfoundedonthemodeloftheconstitutionabove—mentioned；theyhaveeachaparticulardistribution，accordingtowhichtheybordermoreorlessonpoliticalliberty；andiftheydidnotborderuponit，monarchywoulddegenerateintodespoticgovernment。
8。WhytheAncientshadnotaclearIdeaofMonarchy。Theancientshadnonotionofagovernmentfoundedonabodyofnobles，andmuchlessonalegislativebodycomposedoftherepresentativesofthepeople。TherepublicsofGreeceandItalywerecitiesthathadeachtheirownformofgovernment，andconvenedtheirsubjectswithintheirwalls。BeforeRomehadswallowedupalltheotherrepublics，therewasscarcelyanywhereakingtobefound，no，notinItaly，Gaul，Spain，orGermany；
theywereallpettystatesorrepublics。EvenAfricaitselfwassubjecttoagreatcommonwealth：andAsiaMinorwasoccupiedbyGreekcolonies。
Therewas，therefore，noinstanceofdeputiesoftownsorassembliesofthestates；onemusthavegoneasfarasPersiatofindamonarchy。
Iamnotignorantthattherewereconfederaterepublics；inwhichseveraltownssentdeputiestoanassembly。ButIaffirmtherewasnomonarchyonthatmodel。
Thefirstplan，therefore，ofthemonarchiesweareacquaintedwithwasthusformed。TheGermannationsthatconqueredtheRomanempirewerecertainlyafreepeople。OfthiswemaybeconvincedonlybyreadingTacitusOntheMannersoftheGermans。Theconquerorsspreadthemselvesoverallthecountry；livingmostlyinthefields，andverylittleintowns。WhentheywereinGermany，thewholenationwasabletoassemble。
Thistheycouldnolongerdowhendispersedthroughtheconqueredprovinces。Andyetasitwasnecessarythatthenationshoulddeliberateonpublicaffairs，pursuanttotheirusualmethodbeforetheconquest，theyhadrecoursetorepresentatives。SuchistheoriginoftheGothicgovernmentamongstus。Atfirstitwasmixedwitharistocracyandmonarchy——amixtureattendedwiththisinconvenience，thatthecommonpeoplewerebondmen。Thecustomafterwardssucceededofgrantinglettersofenfranchisement，andwassoonfollowedbysoperfectaharmonybetweenthecivillibertyofthepeople，theprivilegesofthenobilityandclergy，andtheprince’sprerogative，thatIreallythinkthereneverwasintheworldagovernmentsowelltemperedasthatofeachpartofEurope，solongasitlasted。Surprisingthatthecorruptionofthegovernmentofaconqueringnationshouldhavegivenbirthtothebestspeciesofconstitutionthatcouldpossiblybeimaginedbyman！
9。Aristotle’sMannerofThinking。Aristotleisgreatlypuzzledintreatingofmonarchy。[14]Hemakesfivespecies；andhedoesnotdistinguishthembytheformofconstitution，butbythingsmerelyaccidental，asthevirtuesandvicesoftheprince；orbythingsextrinsic，suchastyrannyusurpedorinherited。
AmongthenumberofmonarchiesheranksthePersianempireandthekingdomofSparta。Butisitnotevidentthattheonewasadespoticstateandtheotherarepublic？
Theancients，whowerestrangerstothedistributionofthethreepowersinthegovernmentofasingleperson，couldneverformajustideaofmonarchy。
10。WhatotherPoliticiansthought。Totempermonarchy，Arybas，kingofEpirus，[15]foundnootherremedythanarepublic。TheMolossi，notknowinghowtolimitthesamepower，madetwokings，[16]bywhichmeansthestatewasweakenedmorethantheprerogative；theywantedrivals，andtheycreatedenemies。
TwokingsweretolerablenowherebutatSparta；heretheydidnotform，butwereonlyapartoftheconstitution。
11。OftheKingsoftheheroicTimesofGreece。IntheheroictimesofGreece，akindofmonarchyarosethatwasnotoflongduration。[17]
Thosewhohadbeeninventorsofarts，whohadfoughtintheircountry’scause，whohadestablishedsocieties，ordistributedlandsamongthepeople，obtainedtheregalpower，andtransmittedittotheirchildren。
Theywerekings，priests，andjudges。ThiswasoneofthefivespeciesofmonarchymentionedbyAristotle；[18]andtheonlyonethatcangiveusanyideaofthemonarchicalconstitution。Buttheplanofthisconstitutionisoppositetothatofourmodernmonarchies。
Thethreepowersweretheredistributedinsuchamannerthatthepeoplewerethelegislature，[19]andthekinghadtheexecutivetogetherwiththejudiciarypower；whereasinmodernmonarchiestheprinceisinvestedwiththeexecutiveandlegislativepowers，oratleastwithpartofthelegislative，butdoesnotactinajudiciarycapacity。
Inthegovernmentofthekingsoftheheroictimes，thethreepowerswereill—distributed。Hencethosemonarchiescouldnotlongsubsist。Forassoonasthepeoplegotthelegislativepowerintotheirhands，theymight，astheyeverywheredid，upontheveryleastcaprice，subverttheregalauthority。
Amongafreepeoplepossessedofthelegislativepower，andenclosedwithinwalls，whereeverythingtendingtowardsoppressionappearsstillmoreodious，itisthemasterpieceoflegislationtoknowwheretoplaceproperlythejudiciarypower。Butitcouldnotbeinworsehandsthaninthoseofthepersontowhomtheexecutivepowerhadbeenalreadycommitted。Fromthatveryinstantthemonarchbecameterrible。Butatthesametimeashehadnoshareinthelegislature，hecouldmakenodefenceagainstit，thushispowerwasinonesensetoogreat，inanothertoolittle。
Theyhadnotasyetdiscoveredthatthetruefunctionofaprincewastoappointjudges，andnottositasjudgehimself。Theoppositepolicyrenderedthegovernmentofasinglepersoninsupportable。Henceallthesekingswerebanished。TheGreekshadnonotionoftheproperdistributionofthethreepowersinthegovernmentofoneperson；theycouldseeitonlyinthatofmany；andthiskindofconstitutiontheydistinguishedbythenameofPolity。[20]
12。OftheGovernmentoftheKingsofRome，andinwhatMannerthethreePowersweretheredistributed。ThegovernmentofthekingsofRomehadsomerelationtothatofthekingsoftheheroictimesofGreece。Itssubversion，likethelatter’s，wasowingtoitsgeneraldefect，thoughinitsownparticularnatureitwasexceedinglygood。
Inordertogiveanadequateideaofthisgovernment，Ishalldistinguishthatofthefirstfivekings，thatofServiusTullius，andthatofTarquin。
Thecrownwaselective，andunderthefirstfivekingsthesenatehadthegreatestshareintheelection。
Upontheking’sdeceasethesenateexaminedwhethertheyshouldcontinuetheestablishedformofgovernment。Iftheythoughtpropertocontinueit，theynamedamagistrate[21]takenfromtheirownbody，whochoseaking；thesenateweretoapproveoftheelection，thepeopletoconfirmit，andtheaugurstodeclaretheapprobationofthegods。Ifanyofthesethreeconditionswaswanting，theywereobligedtoproceedtoanotherelection。
Theconstitutionwasamixtureofmonarchy，aristocracy，anddemocracy；
andsuchwastheharmonyofpowerthattherewasnoinstanceofjealousyordisputeinthefirstreigns。Thekingcommandedthearmies，andhadthedirectionofthesacrifices：hehadthepowerofdetermining[22]
civilandcriminal[23]causes；hecalledthesenatetogether，convenedthepeople，laidsomeaffairsbeforethelatter，andregulatedtherestwiththesenate。[24]
Theauthorityofthesenatewasverygreat。Thekingsoftentimespitcheduponsenatorswithwhomtheysatinjudgment；andtheyneverlaidanyaffairbeforethepeopletillithadbeenpreviouslydebated[25]inthataugustassembly。
Thepeoplehadtherightofchoosing[26]magistrates，ofconsentingtothenewlaws，and，withtheking’spermission，ofmakingwarandpeace；
buttheyhadnotthejudicialpower。WhenTulliusHostiliusreferredthetrialofHoratiustothepeople，hehadhisparticularreasons，whichmaybeseeninDionysiusHalicarnassus。[27]
Theconstitutionalteredunder[28]ServiusTullius。Thesenatehadnoshareinhiselection；hecausedhimselftobeproclaimedbythepeople；
heresignedthepowerofhearingcivilcauses，[29]reservingnonetohimselfbutthoseofacriminalnature；helaidallaffairsdirectlybeforethepeople，easedthemofthetaxes，andimposedthewholeburdenonthepatricians。Henceinproportionasheweakenedtheregaltogetherwiththesenatorialpower，heaugmentedthatoftheplebeians。[30]
Tarquinwouldneitherbechosenbythesenatenorbythepeople；heconsideredServiusTulliusasausurper，andseizedthecrownashishereditaryright。Hedestroyedmostofthesenators；thosewhoremainedheneverconsulted；nordidheevensomuchassummonthemtoassistathisdecisions。[31]Thushispowerincreased：buttheodiumofthatpowerreceivedanewaddition，byusurpingalsotheauthorityofthepeople，againstwhoseconsentheenactedseverallaws。Thethreepowerswerebythesemeansre—unitedinhisperson；butthepeopleatacriticalminuterecollectedthattheywerelegislators，andtherewasanendofTarquin。
13。GeneralReflectionsontheStateofRomeaftertheExpulsionofitsKings。ItisimpossibletobetiredofsoagreeableasubjectasancientRome：thusstrangersatpresentleavethemodernpalacesofthatcelebratedcapitaltovisittheruins；andthustheeye，afterrecreatingitselfwiththeviewofflowerymeads，ispleasedwiththewildprospectofrocksandmountains。
Thepatricianfamilieswereatalltimespossessedofgreatprivileges。
Thesedistinctions，whichwereconsiderableunderthekings，becamemuchmoreimportantaftertheirexpulsion。Hencearosethejealousyoftheplebeians，whowantedtoreducethem。Theconteststruckattheconstitution，withoutweakeningthegovernment；foritwasveryindifferentastowhatfamilywerethemagistrates，providedthemagistracypreserveditsauthority。
Anelectivemonarchy，likethatofRome，necessarilysupposesapowerfularistocraticbodytosupportit，withoutwhichitchangesimmediatelyintotyrannyorintoapopularstate。Butapopularstatehasnoneedofthisdistinctionoffamiliestomaintainitself。Tothisitwasowingthatthepatricians，whowereanecessarypartoftheconstitutionundertheregalgovernment，becameasuperfluousbranchundertheconsuls；thepeoplecouldsuppressthemwithouthurtingthemselves，andchangetheconstitutionwithoutcorruptingit。
AfterServiusTulliushadreducedthepatricians，itwasnaturalthatRomeshouldfallfromtheregalhandsintothoseofthepeople。Butthepeoplehadnooccasiontobeafraidofrelapsingunderaregalpowerbyreducingthepatricians。
Astatemayalterintwodifferentways，eitherbytheamendmentorbythecorruptionoftheconstitution。Ifithaspreserveditsprinciplesandtheconstitutionchanges，thisisowingtoitsamendment；ifuponchangingtheconstitutionitsprinciplesarelost，thisisbecauseithasbeencorrupted。
ThegovernmentofRome，aftertheexpulsionofthekings，shouldnaturallyhavebeenademocracy。Thepeoplehadalreadythelegislativepowerintheirhands；itwastheirunanimousconsentthathadexpelledtheTarquins；andiftheyhadnotcontinuedsteadytothoseprinciples，theTarquinsmighteasilyhavebeenrestored。Topretendthattheirdesigninexpellingthemwastorenderthemselvesslavestoafewfamiliesisquiteabsurd。ThesituationthereforeofthingsrequiredthatRomeshouldhaveformedademocracy，andyetthisdidnothappen。
Therewasanecessitythatthepoweroftheprincipalfamiliesshouldbetempered，andthatthelawsshouldhaveabiastodemocracy。
Theprosperityofstatesisfrequentlygreaterintheinsensibletransitionfromoneconstitutiontoanotherthanineitherofthoseconstitutions。Thenitisthatallthespringsofgovernmentareuponthestretch，thatthecitizensasserttheirclaims，thatfriendshipsorenmitiesareformedamongstthejarringparties，andthatthereisanobleemulationbetweenthosewhodefendtheancientandthosewhoarestrenuousinpromotingthenewconstitution。
14。InwhatMannertheDistributionofthethreePowersbegantochangeaftertheExpulsionoftheKings。TherewerefourthingsthatgreatlyprejudicedthelibertyofRome。Thepatricianshadengrossedtothemselvesallpublicemploymentswhatever；anexorbitantpowerwasannexedtotheconsulate；thepeoplewereofteninsulted；and，infine，theyhadscarcelyanyinfluenceatallleftinthepublicsuffrages。
Thesefourabuseswereredressedbythepeople。
1st。Itwasregulatedthattheplebeiansmightaspiretosomemagistracies；andbydegreestheywererenderedcapableofthemall，exceptthatofInter—rex。
2nd。Theconsulatewasdissolvedintoseveralothermagistracies；[32]
pr？torswerecreated，onwhomthepowerwasconferredoftryingprivatecauses；qu？stors[33]werenominatedfordeterminingthoseofacriminalnature；？dileswereestablishedfortheciviladministration；
treasurers[34]weremadeforthemanagementofthepublicmoney；and，infine，bythecreationofcensorstheconsulsweredivestedofthatpartofthelegislativepowerwhichregulatesthemoralsofthecitizensandthetransientpolityofthedifferentbodiesofthestate。Thechiefprivilegesleftthemweretopresideinthegreatmeetings[35]ofthepeople，toassemblethesenate，andtocommandthearmies。
3rd。Thesacredlawsappointedtribunes，whohadapowerofcheckingtheencroachmentsofthepatricians，andpreventednotonlyprivatebutlikewisepublicinjuries。
Infine，theplebeiansincreasedtheirinfluenceinthegeneralassemblies。ThepeopleofRomeweredividedinthreedifferentmanners——bycenturies，bycuri？，andbytribes；andwhenevertheygavetheirvotes，theywereconvenedinoneofthosethreeways。
Inthefirstthepatricians，theleadingmen，therichandthesenate，whichwasverynearlythesamething，hadalmostthewholeauthority；inthesecondtheyhadless；andlessstillinthethird。
ThedivisionintocenturieswasadivisionratherofestatesandfortunesthanofpersonsThewholepeopleweredistributedintoahundredandninety—threecenturies，[36]whichhadeachasinglevote。
Thepatriciansandleadingmencomposedthefirstninety—eightcenturies；andtheotherninety—fiveconsistedoftheremainderofthecitizens。Inthisdivisionthereforethepatriciansweremastersofthesuffrages。
Inthedivisionintocuri？，[37]thepatricianshadnotthesameadvantages；some，however，theyhad，foritwasnecessarytoconsulttheaugurs，whowereunderthedirectionofthepatricians；andnoproposalcouldbemadetheretothepeopleunlessithadbeenpreviouslylaidbeforethesenate，andapprovedofbyasenatus—consultum。But，inthedivisionintotribestheyhadnothingtodoeitherwiththeaugursorwiththedecreesofthesenate；andthepatricianswereexcluded。
Nowthepeopleendeavouredconstantlytohavethosemeetingsbycuri？
whichhadbeencustomarybycenturies，andbytribes，thosetheyusedtohavebeforebycuri？；bywhichmeansthedirectionofpublicaffairssoondevolvedfromthepatricianstotheplebeians。
Thuswhentheplebeiansobtainedthepoweroftryingthepatricians——apowerwhichcommencedintheaffairofCoriolanus，[38]theyinsisteduponassemblingbytribes，[39]andnotbycenturies；andwhenthenewmagistracies[40]oftribunesand？dileswereestablishedinfavourofthepeople，thelatterobtainedthattheyshouldmeetbycuri？inordertonominatethem；andaftertheirpowerwasquitesettled，theygained[41]sofartheirpointastoassemblebytribestoproceedtothisnomination。
15。InwhatMannerRome，intheflourishingStateofthatRepublic，suddenlylostitsLiberty。Intheheatofthecontestsbetweenthepatriciansandtheplebeians，thelatterinsisteduponhavingfixedlaws，totheendthatthepublicjudgmentsshouldnolongerbetheeffectofcapriciouswillorarbitrarypower。Thesenate，afteragreatdealofresistance，acquiesced；anddecemvirswerenominatedtocomposethoselaws。Itwasthoughtpropertograntthemanextraordinarypower，becausetheyweretogivelawstopartieswhoseviewsandinterestitwasalmostimpossibletounite。Thenominationofallmagistrateswassuspended；andthedecemvirswerechoseninthecomitiasoleadministratorsoftherepublic。Thustheyfoundthemselvesinvestedwiththeconsularandthetribunitionpower。Byonetheyhadtheprivilegeofassemblingthesenate，bytheotherthatofconveningthepeople；buttheyassembledneithersenatenorpeople。Tenmenonlyoftherepublichadthewholelegislative，thewholeexecutive，andthewholejudiciarypower。RomesawherselfenslavedbyascruelatyrannyasthatofTarquin。WhenTarquintrampledonthelibertyofthatcity，shewasseizedwithindignationatthepowerhehadusurped；whenthedecemvirsexercisedeveryactofoppression，shewasastonishedattheextraordinarypowershehadgranted。
Whatastrangesystemoftyranny——atyrannycarriedonbymenwhohadobtainedthepoliticalandmilitarypower，merelyfromtheirknowledgeincivilaffairs，andwhoatthatveryjuncturestoodinneedofthecourageofthosecitizenstoprotectthemabroadwhosotamelysubmittedtodomesticoppression！
ThespectacleofVirginia’sdeath，whomherfatherimmolatedtochastityandliberty，putanendtothepowerofthedecemvirs。Everymanbecamefree，becauseeverymanhadbeeninjured；eachshowedhimselfacitizenbecauseeachhadatieoftheparent。Thesenateandthepeopleresumedalibertywhichhadbeencommittedtoridiculoustyrants。
NopeopleweresoeasilymovedbypublicspectaclesastheRomans。ThatoftheempurpledbodyofLucretiaputanendtotheregalgovernment。
Thedebtorwhoappearedintheforumcoveredwithwoundscausedanalterationintherepublic。ThedecemvirsowedtheirexpulsiontothetragedyofVirginia。TocondemnManlius，itwasnecessarytokeepthepeoplefromseeingtheCapitol。C？sar’sbloodygarmentflungRomeagainintoslavery。
16。OfthelegislativePowerintheRomanRepublic。Therewerenorightstocontestunderthedecemvirs：butupontherestorationofliberty，jealousiesrevived；andsolongasthepatricianshadanyprivilegesleft，theyweresuretobestrippedofthembytheplebeians。
Themischiefwouldnothavebeensogreathadtheplebeiansbeensatisfiedwiththissuccess；buttheyalsoinjuredthepatriciansascitizens。Whenthepeopleassembledbycuri？orcenturies，theywerecomposedofsenators，patricians，andplebeians；intheirdisputestheplebeiansgainedthispoint，[42]thattheyalonewithoutpatriciansorsenateshouldenactthelawscalledPlebiscita；andtheassembliesinwhichtheyweremadehadthenameofcomitiabytribes。Thustherewerecasesinwhichthepatricians[43]hadnoshareinthelegislativepower，but[44]weresubjecttothelegislationofanotherbodyofthestate。
Thiswastheextravaganceofliberty。Thepeople，toestablishademocracy，actedagainsttheveryprinciplesofthatgovernment。Onewouldhaveimaginedthatsoexorbitantapowermusthavedestroyedtheauthorityofthesenate。ButRomehadadmirableinstitutions。Twoofthesewereespeciallyremarkable：onebywhichthelegislativepowerofthepeoplewasestablished，andtheotherbywhichitwaslimited。