Continualsuccessinobtainingthosethingswhichamanfromtimetotimedesireth，thatistosay，continualprospering，isthatmencallfelicity；Imeanthefelicityofthislife。Forthereisnosuchthingasperpetualtranquillityofmind，whilewelivehere；
becauselifeitselfisbutmotion，andcanneverbewithoutdesire，norwithoutfear，nomorethanwithoutsense。WhatkindoffelicityGodhathordainedtothemthatdevoutlyhonourhim，amanshallnosoonerknowthanenjoy；beingjoysthatnowareasincomprehensibleasthewordofSchoolmen，beatificalvision，isunintelligible。
Theformofspeechwherebymensignifytheiropinionofthegoodnessofanythingispraise。Thatwherebytheysignifythepowerandgreatnessofanythingismagnifying。Andthatwherebytheysignifytheopiniontheyhaveofaman’sfelicityisbytheGreekscalledmakarismos，forwhichwehavenonameinourtongue。Andthusmuchissufficientforthepresentpurposetohavebeensaidofthepassions。
OFTHEENDSORRESOLUTIONSOFDISCOURSE
OFALLdiscoursegovernedbydesireofknowledge，thereisatlastanend，eitherbyattainingorbygivingover。Andinthechainofdiscourse，wheresoeveritbeinterrupted，thereisanendforthattime。
Ifthediscoursebemerelymental，itconsistethofthoughtsthatthethingwillbe，andwillnotbe；orthatithasbeen，andhasnotbeen，alternately。Sothatwheresoeveryoubreakoffthechainofaman’sdiscourse，youleavehiminapresumptionofitwillbe，or，itwillnotbe；orithasbeen，or，hasnotbeen。Allwhichisopinion。Andthatwhichisalternateappetite，indeliberatingconcerninggoodandevil，thesameisalternateopinionintheenquiryofthetruthofpastandfuture。Andasthelastappetiteindeliberationiscalledthewill，sothelastopinioninsearchofthetruthofpastandfutureiscalledthejudgement，orresoluteandfinalsentenceofhimthatdiscourseth。Andasthewholechainofappetitesalternateinthequestionofgoodorbadiscalleddeliberation；sothewholechainofopinionsalternateinthequestionoftrueorfalseiscalleddoubt。
Nodiscoursewhatsoevercanendinabsoluteknowledgeoffact，pastortocome。For，asfortheknowledgeoffact，itisoriginallysense，andeveraftermemory。Andfortheknowledgeofconsequence，whichIhavesaidbeforeiscalledscience，itisnotabsolute，butconditional。Nomancanknowbydiscoursethatthis，orthat，is，hasbeen，orwillbe；whichistoknowabsolutely：butonlythatifthisbe，thatis；ifthishasbeen，thathasbeen；ifthisshallbe，thatshallbe；whichistoknowconditionally：andthatnottheconsequenceofonethingtoanother，butofonenameofathingtoanothernameofthesamething。
Andtherefore，whenthediscourseisputintospeech，andbeginswiththedefinitionsofwords，andproceedsbyconnexionofthesameintogeneralaffirmations，andoftheseagainintosyllogisms，theendorlastsumiscalledtheconclusion；andthethoughtofthemindbyitsignifiedisthatconditionalknowledge，orknowledgeoftheconsequenceofwords，whichiscommonlycalledscience。Butifthefirstgroundofsuchdiscoursebenotdefinitions，orifthedefinitionsbenotrightlyjoinedtogetherintosyllogisms，thentheendorconclusionisagainopinion，namelyofthetruthofsomewhatsaid，thoughsometimesinabsurdandsenselesswords，withoutpossibilityofbeingunderstood。Whentwoormoremenknowofoneandthesamefact，theyaresaidtobeconsciousofitonetoanother；
whichisasmuchastoknowittogether。Andbecausesucharefittestwitnessesofthefactsofoneanother，orofathird，itwasandeverwillbereputedaveryevilactforanymantospeakagainsthisconscience；ortocorruptorforceanothersotodo：
insomuchthatthepleaofconsciencehasbeenalwayshearkeneduntoverydiligentlyinalltimes。Afterwards，menmadeuseofthesamewordmetaphoricallyfortheknowledgeoftheirownsecretfactsandsecretthoughts；andthereforeitisrhetoricallysaidthattheconscienceisathousandwitnesses。Andlastofall，men，vehementlyinlovewiththeirownnewopinions，thoughneversoabsurd，andobstinatelybenttomaintainthem，gavethosetheiropinionsalsothatreverencednameofconscience，asiftheywouldhaveitseemunlawfultochangeorspeakagainstthem；andsopretendtoknowtheyaretrue，whentheyknowatmostbutthattheythinkso。
Whenaman’sdiscoursebeginnethnotatdefinitions，itbeginnetheitheratsomeothercontemplationofhisown，andthenitisstillcalledopinion，oritbeginnethatsomesayingofanother，ofwhoseabilitytoknowthetruth，andofwhosehonestyinnotdeceiving，hedoubtethnot；andthenthediscourseisnotsomuchconcerningthething，astheperson；andtheresolutioniscalledbelief，andfaith：faith，intheman；belief，bothoftheman，andofthetruthofwhathesays。Sothatinbeliefaretwoopinions；oneofthesayingoftheman，theotherofhisvirtue。Tohavefaithin，ortrustto，orbelieveaman，signifythesamething；namely，anopinionoftheveracityoftheman：buttobelievewhatissaidsignifiethonlyanopinionofthetruthofthesaying。Butwearetoobservethatthisphrase，Ibelievein；asalsotheLatin，credoin；andtheGreek，pisenoeis，areneverusedbutinthewritingsofdivines。Insteadofthem，inotherwritingsareput：Ibelievehim；Itrusthim；Ihavefaithinhim；Irelyonhim；andinLatin，credoilli；fidoilli；
andinGreek，pisenoanto；andthatthissingularityoftheecclesiasticuseofthewordhathraisedmanydisputesabouttherightobjectoftheChristianfaith。
Butbybelievingin，asitisintheCreed，ismeant，nottrustintheperson，butconfessionandacknowledgementofthedoctrine。FornotonlyChristians，butallmannerofmendosobelieveinGodastoholdallfortruththeyhearHimsay，whethertheyunderstanditornot，whichisallthefaithandtrustcanpossiblybehadinanypersonwhatsoever；buttheydonotallbelievethedoctrineoftheCreed。
Fromwhencewemayinferthatwhenwebelieveanysaying，whatsoeveritbe，tobetrue，fromargumentstaken，notfromthethingitself，orfromtheprinciplesofnaturalreason，butfromtheauthorityandgoodopinionwehaveofhimthathathsaidit；thenisthespeaker，orpersonwebelievein，ortrustin，andwhosewordwetake，theobjectofourfaith；andthehonourdoneinbelievingisdonetohimonly。Andconsequently，whenwebelievethattheScripturesarethewordofGod，havingnoimmediaterevelationfromGodHimself，ourbelief，faith，andtrustisintheChurch；whosewordwetake，andacquiescetherein。AndtheythatbelievethatwhichaprophetrelatesuntotheminthenameofGodtakethewordoftheprophet，dohonourtohim，andinhimtrustandbelieve，touchingthetruthofwhatherelateth，whetherhebeatrueorafalseprophet。Andsoitisalsowithallotherhistory。ForifIshouldnotbelieveallthatiswrittenbyhistoriansofthegloriousactsofAlexanderorCaesar，IdonotthinktheghostofAlexanderorCaesarhadanyjustcausetobeoffended，oranybodyelsebutthehistorian。IfLivysaythegodsmadeonceacowspeak，andwebelieveitnot，wedistrustnotGodtherein，butLivy。Sothatitisevidentthatwhatsoeverwebelieve，uponnootherreasonthanwhatisdrawnfromauthorityofmenonly，andtheirwritings，whethertheybesentfromGodornot，isfaithinmenonly。
OFTHEVIRTUESCOMMONLYCALLEDINTELLECTUAL；
ANDTHEIRCONTRARYDEFECTS
VIRTUEgenerally，inallsortsofsubjects，issomewhatthatisvaluedforeminence；andconsistethincomparison。Forifallthingswereequallyinallmen，nothingwouldbeprized。Andbyvirtuesintellectualarealwaysunderstoodsuchabilitiesofthemindasmenpraise，value，anddesireshouldbeinthemselves；andgocommonlyunderthenameofagoodwit；thoughthesameword，wit，beusedalsotodistinguishonecertainabilityfromtherest。
Thesevirtuesareoftwosorts；naturalandacquired。Bynatural，Imeannotthatwhichamanhathfromhisbirth：forthatisnothingelsebutsense；whereinmendiffersolittleonefromanother，andfrombrutebeasts，asitisnottobereckonedamongstvirtues。ButImeanthatwitwhichisgottenbyuseonly，andexperience，withoutmethod，culture，orinstruction。Thisnaturalwitconsistethprincipallyintwothings：celerityofimaginingthatis，swiftsuccessionofonethoughttoanother；andsteadydirectiontosomeapprovedend。Onthecontrary，aslowimaginationmakeththatdefectorfaultofthemindwhichiscommonlycalleddullness，stupidity，andsometimesbyothernamesthatsignifyslownessofmotion，ordifficultytobemoved。
Andthisdifferenceofquicknessiscausedbythedifferenceofmen’spassions；thatloveanddislike，someonething，someanother：
andthereforesomemen’sthoughtsrunoneway，someanother，andareheldto，observedifferentlythethingsthatpassthroughtheirimagination。Andwhereasinthissuccessionofmen’sthoughtsthereisnothingtoobserveinthethingstheythinkon，buteitherinwhattheybelikeoneanother，orinwhattheybeunlike，orwhattheyservefor，orhowtheyservetosuchapurpose；thosethatobservetheirsimilitudes，incasetheybesuchasarebutrarelyobservedbyothers，aresaidtohaveagoodwit；bywhich，inthisoccasion，ismeantagoodfancy。Buttheythatobservetheirdifferences，anddissimilitudes，whichiscalleddistinguishing，anddiscerning，andjudgingbetweenthingandthing，incasesuchdiscerningbenoteasy，aresaidtohaveagoodjudgement：andparticularlyinmatterofconversationandbusiness，whereintimes，places，andpersonsaretobediscerned，thisvirtueiscalleddiscretion。Theformer，thatis，fancy，withoutthehelpofjudgement，isnotcommendedasavirtue；
butthelatterwhichisjudgement，anddiscretion，iscommendedforitself，withoutthehelpoffancy。Besidesthediscretionoftimes，places，andpersons，necessarytoagoodfancy，thereisrequiredalsoanoftenapplicationofhisthoughtstotheirend；thatistosay，tosomeusetobemadeofthem。Thisdone，hethathaththisvirtuewillbeeasilyfittedwithsimilitudesthatwillplease，notonlybyillustrationofhisdiscourse，andadorningitwithnewandaptmetaphors，butalso，bytherarityoftheirinvention。Butwithoutsteadiness，anddirectiontosomeend，greatfancyisonekindofmadness；suchastheyhavethat，enteringintoanydiscourse，aresnatchedfromtheirpurposebyeverythingthatcomesintheirthought，intosomanyandsolongdigressionsandparentheses，thattheyutterlylosethemselves：whichkindoffollyIknownoparticularnamefor：butthecauseofitissometimeswantofexperience；wherebythatseemethtoamannewandrarewhichdothnotsotoothers：sometimespusillanimity；bywhichthatseemsgreattohimwhichothermenthinkatrifle：andwhatsoeverisnew，orgreat，andthereforethoughtfittobetold，withdrawsamanbydegreesfromtheintendedwayofhisdiscourse。
Inagoodpoem，whetheritbeepicordramatic，asalsoinsonnets，epigrams，andotherpieces，bothjudgementandfancyarerequired：butthefancymustbemoreeminent；becausetheypleasefortheextravagancy，butoughtnottodispleasebyindiscretion。
Inagoodhistory，thejudgementmustbeeminent；becausethegoodnessconsistethinthechoiceofthemethod，inthetruth，andinthechoiceoftheactionsthataremostprofitabletobeknown。