Wehavetoaskhow,onUtilitarianprinciples,thisinfluenceistobeexercised。HereIshallassumethat,forhumanbeingsgenerally,lifeontheaverageyieldsapositivebalanceofpleasureoverpain。Thishasbeendeniedbythoughtfulpersons:butthedenialseemstomeclearlyopposedtothecommonexperienceofmankind,asexpressedintheircommonlyacceptedprinciplesofaction。Thegreatmajorityofmen,inthegreatmajorityofconditionsunderwhichhumanlifeislived,certainlyactasifdeathwereoneoftheworstofevils,forthemselvesandforthosewhomtheylove:andtheadministrationofcriminaljusticeproceedsonasimilarassumption。
Assuming,then,thattheaveragehappinessofhumanbeingsisapositivequantity,itseemsclearthat,supposingtheaveragehappinessenjoyedremainsundiminished,Utilitarianismdirectsustomakethenumberenjoyingitasgreataspossible。Butifweforeseeaspossiblethatanincreaseinnumberswillbeaccompaniedbyadecreaseinaveragehappinessorviceversa,apointariseswhichhasnotonlyneverbeenformallynoticed,butwhichseemstohavebeensubstantiallyoverlookedbymanyUtilitarians。ForifwetakeUtilitarianismtoprescribe,astheultimateendofaction,happinessonthewhole,andnotanyindividual’shappiness,unlessconsideredasanelementofthewhole,itwouldfollowthat,iftheadditionalpopulationenjoyonthewholepositivehappiness,weoughttoweightheamountofhappinessgainedbytheextranumberagainsttheamountlostbytheremainder。Sothat,strictlyconceived,thepointuptowhich,onUtilitarianprinciples,populationoughttobeencouragedtoincrease,isnotthatatwhichaveragehappinessisthegreatestpossible,asappearstobeoftenassumedbypoliticaleconomistsoftheschoolofMalthus——butthatatwhichtheproductformedbymultiplyingthenumberofpersonslivingintotheamountofaveragehappinessreachesitsmaximum。
ItmaybewellheretomakearemarkwhichhasawideapplicationinUtilitariandiscussion。TheconclusionjustgivenwearsacertainairofabsurditytotheviewofCommonSense;becauseitsshowofexactnessisgrotesquelyincongruouswithourconsciousnessoftheinevitableinexactnessofallsuchcalculationsinactualpractice。
But,thatourpracticalUtilitarianreasoningsmustnecessarilyberough,isnoreasonfornotmakingthemasaccurateasthecaseadmits;andweshallbemorelikelytosucceedinthisifwekeepbeforeourmindasdistinctlyaspossiblethestricttypeofthecalculationthatweshouldhavetomake,ifalltherelevantconsiderationscouldbeestimatedwithmathematicalprecision。
Thereisonemorepointthatremainstobenoticed。Itisevidentthattheremaybemanydifferentwaysofdistributingthesamequantumofhappinessamongthesamenumberofpersons;inorder,therefore,thattheUtilitariancriterionofrightconductmaybeascompleteaspossible,weoughttoknowwhichofthesewaysistobepreferred。ThisquestionisoftenignoredinexpositionsofUtilitarianism。
Ithasperhapsseemedsomewhatidleassuggestingapurelyabstractandtheoreticalperplexity,thatcouldhavenopracticalexemplification;andnodoubt,ifalltheconsequencesofactionswerecapableofbeingestimatedandsummedupwithmathematicalprecision,weshouldprobablyneverfindtheexcessofpleasureoverpainexactlyequalinthecaseoftwocompetingalternativesofconduct。Buttheveryindefinitenessofallhedonisticcalculations,whichwassufficientlyshowninBookii。,rendersitbynomeansunlikelythattheremaybenocognisabledifferencebetweenthequantitiesofhappinessinvolvedintwosetsofconsequencesrespectively;themoreroughourestimatesnecessarilyare,thelesslikelyweshallbetocometoanycleardecisionbetweentwoapparentlybalancedalternatives。Inallsuchcases,therefore,itbecomespracticallyimportanttoaskwhetheranymodeofdistributingagivenquantumofhappinessisbetterthananyother。NowtheUtilitarianformulaseemstosupplynoanswertothisquestion:
atleastwehavetosupplementtheprincipleofseekingthegreatesthappinessonthewholebysomeprincipleofJustorRightdistributionofthishappiness。
TheprinciplewhichmostUtilitarianshaveeithertacitlyorexpresslyadoptedisthatofpureequality——asgiveninBentham’sformula,``everybodytocountforone,andnobodyformorethanone’’。Andthisprincipleseemstheonlyonewhichdoesnotneedaspecialjustification;for,aswesaw,itmustbereasonabletotreatanyonemaninthesamewayasanyother,iftherebenoreasonapparentfortreatinghimdifferently。[2]
InBookii。,wherewediscussedthemethodofEgoisticHedonism,wedidnottakeoccasiontoexamineanyproofofitsfirstprinciple:
andinthecaseofUniversalisticHedonismalso,whatprimarilyconcernsusisnothowitsprincipleistobeprovedtothosewhodonotacceptit,butwhatconsequencesarelogicallyinvolvedinitsacceptance。Atthesametimeitisimportanttoobservethattheprincipleofaimingatuniversalhappinessismoregenerallyfelttorequiresomeproof,oratleastasMillputsitsome``considerationsdeterminingthemindtoacceptit’’,thantheprincipleofaimingatone’sownhappiness。Fromthepointofview,indeed,ofabstractphilosophy,IdonotseewhytheEgoisticprincipleshouldpassunchallengedany’morethantheUniversalistic。I
donotsee-whytheaxiomofPrudenceshouldnotbequestioned,whenitconflictswithpresentinclination,onagroundsimilartothatonwhichEgoistsrefusetoadmittheaxiomofRationalBenevolence。IftheUtilitarianhastoanswerthequestion,`WhyshouldIsacrificemyownhappinessforthegreaterhappinessofanother?’itmustsurelybeadmissibletoasktheEgoist,`WhyshouldIsacrificeapresentpleasureforagreateroneinthefuture?WhyshouldIconcernmyselfaboutmyownfuturefeelingsanymorethanaboutthefeelingsofotherpersons?’ItundoubtedlyseemstoCommonSenseparadoxicaltoaskforareasonwhyoneshouldseekone’sownhappinessoilthewhole;butIdonotseehowthedemandcanberepudiatedasabsurdbythosewhoadopttheviewsoftheextremeempiricalschoolofpsychologists,althoughthoseviewsarecommonlysupposedtohaveacloseaffinitywithEgoisticHedonism。GrantthattheEgoismerelyasystem。
ofcoherentphenomena,thatthepermanentidentical`I’isnotafactbutafiction,asHumeandhisfollowersmaintain;why,then,shouldonepartoftheseriesoffeelingsintowhichtheEgoisresolvedbeconcernedwithanotherpartofthesameseries,anymorethanwithanyotherseries?
However,Iwillnotpressthisquestionnow;sinceIadmitthatCommonSensedoesnotthinkitworthwhiletosupplytheindividualwithreasonsforseekinghisowninterest。
Reasonsfordoinghisduty——accordingtothecommonlyacceptedstandardofduty——arenotheldtobeequallysuperfluous:indeedwefindthatutilitarianreasonsarecontinuallygivenforoneorotherofthecommonlyreceivedrulesofmorality。Stillthefactthatcertainrulesarecommonlyreceivedasbinding,thoughitdoesnotestablishtheirself-evidence,rendersitgenerallyunnecessarytoprovetheirauthoritytotheCommonSensethatreceivesthem:whileforthesamereasonaUtilitarianwhoclaimstosupersedethembyahigherprincipleisnaturallychallenged,byIntuitionistsnolessthanbyEgoists,todemonstratethelegitimacyofhisclaim。TothischallengesomeUtilitarianswouldreplybysayingthatitisimpossibleto``prove’’afirstprincipleandthisisofcoursetrue,ifbyproofwemeanaprocesswhichexhibitstheprincipleinquestionasaninferencefrompremisesuponwhichitremainsdependentforitscertainty;forthesepremises,andnottheinferencedrawnfromthem,wouldthenbetherealfirstprinciples。Nay,ifUtilitarianismistobeprovedtoamanwhoalreadyholdssomeothermoralprinciples,——whetherhebeanIntuitionalmoralist,whoregardsasfinaltheprinciplesofTruth,Justice,Obediencetoauthority,Purity,etc。,oranEgoistwhoregardshisowninterestastheultimatelyreasonableendofhisconduct,——itwouldseemthattheprocessmustbeonewhichestablishesaconclusionactuallysuperiorinvaliditytothepremisesfromwhichitstarts。FortheUtilitarianprescriptionsofdutyareprimafacieinconflict,atcertainpointsandundercertaincircumstances,bothwithruleswhichtheIntuitionistregardsasself-evident,andwiththedictatesofRationalEgoism;sothatUtilitarianism,ifacceptedatall,mustbeacceptedasoverrulingIntuitionismandEgoism。
Atthesametime,iftheotherprinciplesarenotthroughouttakenasvalid,theso-calledproofdoesnotseemtobeaddressedtotheIntuitionistorEgoistatall。Howshallwedealwiththisdilemma?Howissuchaprocess——clearlydifferentfromordinaryproof——possibleorconceivable?Yettherecertainlyseemstobeageneraldemandforit。Perhapswemaysaythatwhatisneededisalineofargumentwhichontheonehandallowsthevalidity,toacertainextent,ofthemaximsalreadyaccepted,andontheotherhandshowsthemtobenotabsolutelyvalid,butneedingtobecontrolledandcompletedbysomemorecomprehensiveprinciple。
Suchalineofargument,addressedtoEgoism,wasgiveninchap。xiii。oftheforegoingbook。ItshouldbeobservedthattheapplicabilityofthisargumentdependsonthemannerinwhichtheEgoisticfirstprincipleisformulated。IftheEgoiststrictlyconfineshimselftostatinghisconvictionthatheoughttotakehisownhappinessorpleasureashisultimateend,thereseemsnoopeningforanylineofreasoningtoleadhimtoUniversalisticHedonismasafirstprinciple;
itcannotbeprovedthatthedifferencebetweenhisownhappinessandanother’shappinessisnotforhimall-important。InthiscaseallthattheUtilitariancandoistoeffectasfaraspossibleareconciliationbetweenthetwoprinciples,byexpoundingtotheEgoistthesanctionsofrulesdeducedfromtheUniversalisticprinciple,——i。e。bypointingoutthepleasuresandpainsthatmaybeexpectedtoaccruetotheEgoisthimselffromtheobservationandviolationrespectivelyofsuchrules。
Itisobviousthatsuchanexpositionhasnotendencytomakehimacceptthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumberashisultimateend;butonlyasameanstotheendofhisownhappiness。ItisthereforetotallydifferentfromaproofasaboveexplainedofUniversalisticHedonism。
When,however,theEgoistputsforward,implicitlyorexplicitly,thepropositionthathishappinessorpleasureisGood,notonlyforhimbutfromthepointofviewoftheUniverse,——ase。g。bysayingthat`naturedesignedhimtoseekhisownhappiness,’——itthenbecomesrelevanttopointouttohimthathishappinesscannotbeamoreimportantpartofGood,takenuniversally,thantheequalhappinessofanyotherperson。
Andthus,startingwithhisownprinciple,hemaybebroughttoacceptUniversalhappinessorpleasureasthatwhichisabsolutelyandwithoutqualificationGoodorDesirable:asanend,therefore,towhichtheactionofareasonableagentassuchoughttobedirected。
This,itwillberemembered,isthereasoningthatIusedinchap。xiii。oftheprecedingbookinexhibitingtheprincipleofRationalBenevolenceasoneofthefewIntuitionswhichstandthetestofrigorouscriticism。Itshouldbeobserved,however,thatasaddressedtotheIntuitionist,thisreasoningonlyshowstheUtilitarianfirstprincipletobeonemoralaxiom:
itdoesnotprovethatitissoleorsupreme。ThepremiseswithwhichtheIntuitioniststartscommonlyincludeotherformulaeheldasindependentandself-evident。Utilitarianismhasthereforetoexhibititselfinthetwofoldrelationabovedescribed,atoncenegativeandpositive,totheseformulae。TheUtilitarianmust,inthefirstplace,endeavourtoshowtotheIntuitionistthattheprinciplesofTruth,Justice,etc。
haveonlyadependentandsubordinatevalidity:arguingeitherthattheprincipleisreallyonlyaffirmedbyCommonSenseasageneralruleadmittingofexceptionsandqualifications,asinthecaseofTruth,andthatwerequiresomefurtherprincipleforsystematisingtheseexceptionsandqualifications;
orthatthefundamentalnotionisvagueandneedsfurtherdetermination,asinthecaseofJustice;andfurther,thatthedifferentrulesareliabletoconflictwitheachother,andthatwerequiresomehigherprincipletodecidetheissuethusraised;andagain,thattherulesaredifferentlyformulatedbydifferentpersons,andthatthesedifferencesadmitofnoIntuitionalsolution,whiletheyshowthevaguenessandambiguityofthecommonmoralnotionstowhichtheIntuitionistappeals。
ThispartoftheargumentIhaveperhapssufficientlydevelopedintheprecedingbook。ItremainstosupplementthislineofreasoningbydevelopingthepositiverelationthatexistsbetweenUtilitarianismandtheMoralityofCommonSense:byshowinghowUtilitarianismsustainsthegeneralvalidityofthecurrentmoraljudgments,andthussupplementsthedefectswhichreflectionfindsintheintuitiverecognitionoftheirstringency;andatthesametimeaffordsaprincipleofsynthesis,andamethodforbindingtheunconnectedandoccasionallyconflictingprinciplesofcommonmoralreasoningintoacompleteandharmonioussystem。IfsystematicreflectionuponthemoralityofCommonSensethusexhibitstheUtilitarianprincipleasthattowhichCommonSensenaturallyappealsforthatfurtherdevelopmentofitssystemwhichthissamereflectionshowstobenecessary,theproofofUtilitarianismseemsascompleteasitcanbemade。Andsince,further——apartfromthequestionofproof——itisimportantinconsideringthemethodofUtilitarianismtodetermineexactlyitsrelationtothecommonlyreceivedrulesofmorality,itwillbepropertoexaminethisrelationatsomelengthinthefollowingchapter。