第56章
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  Inthefirstplace,ithastobedecidedwhetherwearetoincludeinourlistofmotivestheMoralSentiments,orimpulsestowardsparticularkindsofvirtuousconductassuch,e。g。Candour,Veracity,Fortitude。Itseemsunwarrantabletoexcludethem,assuchsentimentsareobservableasdistinctandindependentimpulsesinmostwell-trainedminds,andwesometimesrecognisetheirexistenceinconsiderableintensity,aswhenwespeakofamanbeing`enthusiasticallybrave’,or`intenselyveracious’,oras`havingapassionforjustice’。

  Atthesametimetheiradmissionplacesusinthefollowingdilemma。Eithertheobjectsoftheseimpulsesarerepresentedbytheverynotionsthatwehavebeenexamining——inwhichcase,afterwehavedecidedthatanyimpulseisbetterthanitsrival,alltheperplexitiessetforthinthepreviouschapterswillrecur,beforewecanactonourdecision;forwhatavailsittorecognisethesuperiorityoftheimpulsetodojustice,ifwedonotknowwhatitisjusttodo?——orifinanycasetheobjectwhichamoralsentimentpromptsustorealiseisconceivedmoresimply,withoutthequalificationswhichacompletereflectiononCommonSenseforcedustorecognise;then,asthepreviousinvestigationshows,weshallcertainlynotfindagreementastotherelationbetweenthisandotherimpulses。

  Forexample,adispute,whethertheimpulsetospeakthetruthoughtoroughtnottobefollowed,willinevitablyarisewhenVeracityseemsopposedeithertothegeneralgood,ortotheinterestsofsomeparticularperson;

  thatis,whenitconflictswith`particular’or`universal’benevolence。

  Hutchesonexpresslyplacestheselatterimpulsesinahigherrankthan``candour,veracity,fortitude’’;reservingthehighestmoralapprobationfor``themostextensivebenevolence’’or``calm,stable,universalgoodwilltoall’’。[1]Butthisview,whichcoincidespracticallywithUtilitarianism,wouldcertainlybedisputedbymostIntuitionalmoralists。Again,someofthesemoralistsasKantregardallactionsasbad——ornotgood——whicharenotdonefrompureregardfordutyorchoiceofRightasRight:whileHutcheson,whorepresentstheoppositepoleofIntuitionalEthics,equallydistinguishestheloveofVirtueasaseparateimpulse;buttreatsitasatonceco-ordinateinrankandcoincidentinitseffectswithuniversalBenevolence。

  So,again,moralistsdivergewidelyinestimatingtheethicalvalueofSelf-love。

  ForButlerseemstoregarditasoneoftwosuperiorandnaturallyauthoritativeimpulses,theotherbeingConscience:nay,inapassagebeforequoted,heevenconcedesthatitwouldbereasonableforConsciencetoyieldtoit,ifthetwocouldpossiblyconflict。OthermoralistsandButlerelsewhere

  appeartoplaceSelf-loveamongvirtuousimpulsesunderthenameofPrudence:

  thoughamongthesetheyoftenrankitratherlow,andwouldhaveityieldincaseofconflict,tonoblervirtues。Others,again,excludeitfromVirtuealtogether:e。g。Kant,inoneofhistreatises,saysthattheendofSelf-love,one’sownhappiness,cannotbeanendfortheMoralReason;thattheforceofthereasonablewill,inwhichVirtueconsists,isalwaysexhibitedinresistancetonaturalegoisticimpulses。

  Dr。Martineau,whosesystemisframedonthebasisthatIamnowexamining,attemptstoavoidsomeofthedifficultiesjustpointedoutbyrefusingtoadmittheexistenceofanyvirtuousimpulsesexceptthe``preferenceforthesuperiorofthecompetingspringsofactionineachcase’’ofaconflictofmotives。``I

  cannotadmit’’,hesays,``eitherthelovesofVirtues——ofcandour,veracity,fortitude——orthevirtuesthemselves,assomanyadditionalimpulsesoverandabovethosefromtheconflictofwhichtheyareformed。

  Idonotconfessmyfaultinordertobecandid?unlessIamaprig,Ineverthinkofcandour,aspredicable,orgoingtobepredicable,ofmeatall。’’[4]Iamnot,however,surewhetherDr。MartineaureallymeanstodenytheexistenceofpersonswhoactfromaconsciousdesiretorealiseanidealofCandourorFortitude,orwhetherhemerelymeanstoexpressdisapprovalofsuchpersons:intheformersensehisstatementseemstomeapsychologicalparadox,inconflictwithordinaryexperience:inthelattersenseitseemsanethicalparadox,affordingastrikingexampleofthatdiversityofjudgmentsastotherankofmotives,towhichIamnowdrawingattention。

  ButevenifweputoutofsighttheMoralsentimentsandSelf-love,itisstillscarcelypossibletoframeascaleofmotivesarrangedinorderofmerit,forwhichwecouldclaimanythinglikeaclearconsent,evenofcultivatedandthoughtfulpersons。Ononeortwopoints,indeed,weseemtobegenerallyagreed;e。g。thatthebodilyappetitesareinferiortothebenevolentaffectionsandtheintellectualdesires;andperhapsthatimpulsestendingprimarilytothewell-beingoftheindividualarelowerinrankthanthosewhichweclassasextra-regardingordisinterested。Butbeyondafewvaguestatementsofthiskind,itisverydifficulttoproceed。Forexample,whenwecomparepersonalaffectionswiththeloveofknowledgeorofbeauty,orthepassionfortheidealinanyform,muchdoubtanddivergenceofopinionbecomemanifest。Indeed,weshouldhardlyagreeontherelativerankofthebenevolentaffectionstakenbythemselves;forsomewouldpreferthemoreintense,thoughnarrower,whileotherswouldplacethecalmerandwiderfeelingsinthehighestrank。Oragain,sinceLove,aswesaw,isacomplexemotion,andcommonlyincludes,besidesthedesireofthegoodorhappinessofthebeloved,adesireforunionorintimacyofsomekind;somewouldconsideranaffectionmoreelevatedinproportionastheformerelementpredominated,whileotherswouldregardthelatterasatleastequallyessentialtothehighestkindofaffection。

  Again,wemaynoticetheloveofFameasanimportantandwidelyoperativemotive,whichwouldberankedverydifferentlybydifferentpersons:forsomewouldplacetheformer``spurthattheclearspiritdothraise’’amongthemostelevatedimpulsesafterthemoralsentiments;

  whileothersthinkitdegradingtodependforone’shappinessonthebreathofpopularfavour。

  Further,themorewecontemplatetheactualpromptingsthatprecedeanyvolition,themoreweseemtofindcomplexityofmotivetheruleratherthantheexception,atleastinthecaseofeducatedpersons:

  andfromthiscompositionofimpulsesthereresultsafundamentalperplexityastotheprinciplesonwhichourdecisionistobemade,evensupposingthatwehaveaclearviewoftherelativeworthoftheelementaryimpulses。

  Forthecompoundwillgenerallycontainnoblerandbaserelements,andwecanhardlygetridofthelatter;since——asIhavebeforesaid——thoughwemayfrequentlysuppressandexpelamotivebyfirmlyresistingit,itdoesnotseempossibletoexcludeitifwedotheacttowhichitprompts。

  Suppose,then,thatweareimpelledinonedirectionbyacombinationofhighandlowmotives,andinanotherbyanimpulsethatranksbetweenthetwointhescale,howshallwedecidewhichcoursetofollow?Suchacaseisbynomeansuncommon:e。g。aninjuredmanmaybemovedbyanimpulseofpitytosparehisinjurer,whilearegardforjusticeandadesireofrevengecombinedimpelhimtoinflictpunishment。Or,again,aJewofliberalviewsmightberestrainedfromeatingporkbyadesirenottoshockthefeelingsofhisfriends,andmightbemovedtoeatitbythedesiretovindicatetruereligiouslibertycombinedwithalikingforpork。Howarewetodealwithsuchacaseasthis?Foritwillhardlybesuggestedthatweshouldestimatetherelativeproportionsofthedifferentmotivesanddecideaccordingly;——qualitativeanalysisofourmotivesistosomeextentpossibletous,butthequantitativeanalysisthatthiswouldrequireisnotinourpower。

  Butevenapartfromthisdifficultyarisingfromcomplexityofmotives,Ithinkitimpossibletoassignadefiniteandconstantethicalvaluetoeachdifferentkindofmotive,withoutreferencetotheparticularcircumstancesunderwhichithasarisen,theextentofindulgencethatitdemands,andtheconsequencestowhichthisindulgencewouldleadinanyparticularcase。Imayconvenientlyillustratethisbyreferencetothetable,drawnupbyDr。Martineau,ofspringsofactionarrangedinorderofmerit。

  LOWEST。

  SecondaryPassions:——Censoriousness,Vindictiveness,Suspiciousness。

  SecondaryOrganicPropensions:——LoveofEaseandSensualPleasure。

  PrimaryOrganicPropensions:——Appetites。

  PrimaryAnimalPropension:——SpontaneousActivityunselective。

  LoveofGainreflectivederivativefromAppetite。

  SecondaryAffectionssentimentalindulgenceofsympatheticfeelings。

  PrimaryPassions:——Antipathy,Fear,Resentment。

  Causalenergy:——LoveofPower,orAmbition;LoveofLiberty。

  SecondarySentiments:——LoveofCulture。

  PrimarySentimentsofWonderandAdmiration。

  PrimaryAffections,ParentalandSocial;withapproximatelyGenerosityandGratitude。

  PrimaryAffectionofCompassion。

  PrimarySentimentofReverence。

  Thisscaleseemstomeopentomuchcriticism,bothfromapsychologicalandfromanethicalpointofview:[3]but,grantingthatitcorrespondsbroadlytothejudgmentsthatmencommonlypassastothedifferentelevationofdifferentmotives,itseemstomeinthehighestdegreeparadoxicaltolaydownthateachclassofmotivesisalwaystobepreferredtotheclassbelowit,withoutregardtocircumstancesandconsequences。Sofarasitistruethat``theconsciencesaystoeveryone,`Donoteattillyouarehungryandstopwhenyouarehungrynomore’’’,itisnot,Iventuretothink,becausea``regulativerightisclearlyvestedinprimaryinstinctiveneeds,relativelytotheirsecondaries’’,butbecauseexperiencehasshownthattoseekthegratificationofthepalateapartfromthesatisfactionofhungerisgenerallydangeroustophysicalwell-being;anditisinviewofthisdangerthattheconscienceoperates。Ifwecondemn``ashipcaptain’’,who,``caughtinafogoffaleeshore,neglects,throughindolenceandloveofease,toslackenspeedandtakecautioussoundingsandopenhissteam-whistle’’,itisnotbecauseweintuitivelydiscernFeartobeahighermotivethanLoveofEase,butbecausetheconsequencesdisregardedarejudgedtobeindefinitelymoreimportantthanthegratificationobtained:ifwetookacaseinwhichfearwasnotsimilarlysustainedbyprudence,ourjudgmentwouldcertainlybedifferent。

  TheviewofCommonSenseappearsrathertobethatmostnaturalimpulseshavetheirproperspheres,withinwhichtheyshouldbenormallyoperative,andthereforethequestionwhetherinanycaseahighermotiveshouldyieldtoaloweronecannotbeanswereddecisivelyinthegeneralwayinwhichDr。Martineauanswersit:theanswermustdependontheparticularconditionsandcircumstancesoftheconflict。Werecogniseitaspossiblethatamotivewhichwecommonlyrankashighermaywronglyintrudeintothepropersphereofonewhichwerankaslower,justasthelowerisliabletoencroachonthehigher;onlysincethereisverymuchlessdangeroftheformerintrusion,itnaturallyfallsintothebackgroundinethicaldiscussionsandexhortationsthathaveapracticalaim。Thematteriscomplicatedbythefurtherconsiderationthatasthecharacterofamoralagentbecomesbetter,themotivesthatwerankas``higher’’

  tendtobedeveloped,sothattheirnormalsphereofoperationisenlargedattheexpenseofthelower。Hencetherearetwodistinctaimsinmoralregulationandculture,sofarastheyrelatetomotives:1tokeepthe``lower’’motivewithinthelimitswithinwhichitsoperationisconsideredtobelegitimateandgoodonthewhole,solongaswecannotsubstituteforittheequallyeffectiveoperationofahighermotiveandatthesametime2toeffectthissubstitutionof``higher’’for``lower’’gradually,asfarascanbedonewithoutdanger,uptoalimitwhichwecannotdefinitelyfix,butwhichwecertainlyconceive,forthemostpart,asfallingshortofcompleteexclusionofthelowermotive。

  ImayillustratebyreferencetothepassionofresentmentofwhichIbeforespoke。Theviewofreflectivecommonsenseis,Ithink,thatthemalevolentimpulsesodesignated,aslongasitisstrictlylimitedtoresentmentagainstwrongandoperatesinaidofjustice,hasalegitimatesphereofactioninthesociallifeofhumanbeingsasactuallyconstituted:that,indeed,itssuppressionwouldbegravelymischievous,unlesswecouldatthesametimeintensifytheordinaryman’sregardforjusticeorforsocialwell-beingsothatthetotalstrengthofmotivespromptingtothepunishmentofcrimeshouldnotbediminished。Itis,nodoubt,``tobewished’’,asButlersays,thatmenwouldrepresswrongfromthesehighermotivesratherthanfrompassionateresentment;butwecannothopetoeffectthischangeinhumanbeingsgenerallyexceptbyaslowandgradualprocessofelevationofcharacter:thereforesupposingaconflictbetween``Compassion’’,whichishighestbutoneinDr。Martineau’sscale,and’’Resentment’’,whichheplacesaboutthemiddle,itisbynomeanstobelaiddownasageneralrulethatcompassionoughttoprevail。Weoughtrather——withButler——toregardresentmentasasalutary``balancetotheweaknessofpity’’,whichwouldbeliabletopreventtheexecutionofjusticeifresentmentwereexcluded。

  OrwemightsimilarlytaketheimpulsewhichcomeslowestamongthosenotcondemnedaltogetherinDr。Martineau’sscale——the``LoveofEaseandSensualPleasure’’。Nodoubtthisimpulse,orgroupofimpulses,iscontinuallyleadingmentoshirkorscamptheirstrictduty,ortofallinsomelessdefinitewaybelowtheirownidealofconduct;

  hencetheattitudehabituallymaintainedtowardsitbypreachersandpracticalmoralistsisthatofrepression。Still,commonsensesurelyrecognisesthattherearecasesinwhicheventhisimpulseoughttoprevailoverimpulsesrankedaboveitinDr。Martineau’sscale;weoftenfindmenprompted——sayby``loveofgain’’——toshortenundulytheirhoursofrecreation;andinthecaseofaconflictofmotivesundersuchcircumstancesweshouldjudgeitbestthatvictoryshouldremainonthesideofthe“loveofeaseandpleasure’’,andthattheencroachmentof``loveofgain’’shouldberepelled。

  Idonot,however,thinkthatineitheroftheseinstancestheconflictofmotiveswouldremainsuchasIhavejustdescribed:

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