What,then,istheconductwhichPurityforbidsfortheprincipleismoreeasilydiscussedinitsnegativeaspect?Asthenormalandobviousendofsexualintercourseisthepropagationofthespecies,somehavethoughtthatallindulgenceofappetite,exceptasameanstothisend,shouldbeprohibited。ButthisdoctrinewouldleadtoarestrictionofconjugalintercoursefartoosevereforCommonSense。Shallwesay,then,thatPurityforbidssuchindulgenceexceptundertheconditionsofconjugaluniondefinedbyLaw?Butthisanswer,again,furtherreflectionshowstobeunsatisfactory。For,first,weshouldnot,onconsideration,callaconjugalunionimpure,merelybecausethepartieshadwilfullyomittedtofulfillegalconditions,andhadmadeacontractwhichthelawdeclinedtoenforce。Wemightcondemntheirconduct,butweshouldnotapplytoitthisnotion。And,secondly,wefeelthatpositivelawmaybeunfavourabletoPurity,andthatinfactPurity,likeJustice,issomethingwhichthelawoughttomaintain,butdoesnotalways。Wehavetoask,then,whatkindofsexualrelationswearetocallessentiallyimpure,whethercountenancedornotbyLawandCustom?Thereappeartobenodistinctprinciples,havinganyclaimtoself-evidence,uponwhichthequestioncanbeansweredsoastocommandgeneralassent。Itwouldbedifficulteventostatesuchaprinciplefordeterminingthedegreeofconsanguinitybetweenhusbandandwifewhichconstitutesaunionincestuous;althoughtheaversionwithwhichsuchunionsarecommonlyregardedisapeculiarlyintensemoralsentiment;andthedifficultybecomesindefinitelygreaterwhenweconsidertherationaleofprohibiteddegreesofaffinity。Again,probablyfewwouldstigmatisealegalpolygynousconnexionasimpure,howevertheymightdisapproveofthelawandofthestateofsocietyinwhichsuchalawwasestablished:
butiflegalPolygynyisnotimpure,isPolyandry,whenlegalandcustomary——asisnotunfrequentlythecaseamongthelowerracesofman——tobesocharacterised?
andifnot,onwhatrationalprinciplecanthenotionbeappliedtoinstitutionsandconduct?Again,wheredivorcebymutualconsent,withsubsequentmarriage,islegalised,wedonotcallthisanoffenceagainstPurity:andyetiftheprincipleoffreechangebeonceadmitted,itseemsparadoxicaltodistinguishpurityfromimpuritymerelybylessrapidityoftransition;
andtocondemnasimpureeven`FreeLove’,insofarasitisearnestlyadvocatedasameanstoacompleterharmonyofsentimentbetweenmenandwomen,andnottomeresensuallicense。
Shallwe,then,fallbackuponthepresenceofmutualaffectionasdistinguishedfrommereappetiteasconstitutingtheessenceofpuresexualrelations?Butthis,again,whiletoolaxfromonepointofview,seemsfromanothertoosevereforCommonSense:aswedonotcondemnmarriageswithoutaffectionasimpure,althoughwedisapproveofthemasproductiveofunhappiness。Suchmarriages,indeed,aresometimesstigmatisedas``legalisedprostitution’’,butthephraseisfelttobeextravagantandparadoxical;anditisevendoubtfulwhetherwedodisapproveofthemunderallcircumstances;ase。g。inthecaseofroyalalliances。
Again,howshallwejudgeofsuchinstitutionsasthoseofPlato’sCommonwealth,establishingcommunityofwomenandchildren,butatthesametimeregulatingsexualindulgencewiththestrictestreferencetosocialends?Ourhabitualstandardsseeminapplicabletosuchnovelcircumstances。
Thetruthseemstobe,thatreflectiononthecurrentsexualmoralitydiscoverstoustwodistinctgroundsforit:firstandchiefly,themaintenanceofacertainsocialorder,believedtobemostconducivetotheprosperouscontinuanceofthehumanrace:and,secondly,theprotectionofhabitsoffeelinginindividualsbelievedtobegenerallymostimportanttotheirperfectionortheirhappiness。Wecommonlyconceivethatboththeseendsaretobeattainedbythesameregulations:andinanidealstateofsocietythiswouldperhapsbethecase:butinactuallifethereisfrequentlyapartialseparationandincompatibilitybetweenthem。Butfurther,iftherepressionofsexuallicenseisprescribedmerelyasameanstotheseends,itdoesnotseemthatwecanaffirmasself-evidentthatitisalwaysanecessarymeansineithercase:onthecontrary,itseemsclearthatsuchanaffirmationwouldbeunreliableapartfromempiricalconfirmation。Wecannotreasonablybesure,withoutinductionfromsociologicalobservations,thatacertainamountofsexuallicensewillbeincompatiblewiththemaintenanceofpopulationinsufficientnumbersandgoodcondition。
Andifweconsiderthematterinitsrelationtotheindividual’sperfection,itiscertainlyclearthathemissesthehighestandbestdevelopmentofhisemotionalnature,ifhissexualrelationsareofamerelysensualkind:
butwecanhardlyknowapriorithatthislowerkindofrelationinterfereswiththedevelopmentofthehighernorindeeddoesexperienceseemtoshowthatthisisuniversallythecase。Andthislatterlineofargumenthasafurtherdifficulty。Forthecommonopinionthatwehavetojustifydoesnotmerelycondemnthelowerkindofdevelopmentincomparisonwiththehigher,butincomparisonwithnoneatall。Sincewedonotpositivelyblameamanforremainingcelibatethoughweperhapsdespisehimsomewhatunlessthecelibacyisadoptedasameanstoanobleend:itisdifficulttoshowwhyweshouldcondemn——initsbearingontheindividual’semotionalperfectionsolely——theimperfectdevelopmentaffordedbymerelysensualrelations。
MuchmoremightbesaidtoexhibittheperplexitiesinwhichtheattempttodefinetheruleofPurityorChastityinvolvesus。ButIdonotdesiretoextendthediscussionbeyondwhatisnecessaryforthecompletionofmyargument。Itseemstomethattheconclusionannouncedin§;2ofthischapterhasnowbeensufficientlyjustified。Wehaveexaminedthemoralnotionsthatpresentthemselveswithaprimafacieclaimtofurnishindependentandself-evidentrulesofmorality:andwehaveineachcasefoundthatfromsuchregulationofconductastheCommonSenseofmankindreallysupports,nopropositioncanbeelicitedwhich,whenfairlycontemplated,evenappearstohavethecharacteristicofascientificaxiom。ItisthereforescarcelyneedfultoproceedtoasystematicexaminationofthemannerinwhichCommonSenseprovidesfortheco-ordinationoftheseprinciples。Infact,thisquestionseemstohavebeenalreadydiscussedasfarasisprofitable:fortheattempttodefineeachprinciplesinglyhasinevitablyledustoconsidertheirmutualrelations:anditwasinthecaseswheretwomoralprinciplescameintocollisionthatwemostclearlysawthevaguenessandinconsistencywithwhichtheboundariesofeacharedeterminedbyCommonSense。Forexample,thedistinctionbetweenperfectlystringentmoralobligations,andsuchlaxerdutiesasmaybemodifiedbyaman’sownact,isoftentaken:anditisonewhich,aswesaw,iscertainlyrequiredinformulatingtheCommon-Senseviewoftheeffectofapromiseincreatingnewobligations:butitisonewhichwecannotapplywithanypracticalprecision,becauseofthehighdegreeofindeterminatenesswhichwefindinthecommonnotionsofdutiestowhichthehighestdegreeofstringencyisyetcommonlyattributed。
Itonlyremainstoguardmyargumentfrombeingunderstoodinamoresweepingsensethanithasbeenintendedorisproperlyabletobear。NothingthatIhavesaideventendstoshowthatwehavenotdistinctmoralimpulses,claimingauthorityoverallothers,andprescribing,orforbiddingkindsofconductastowhichthereisaroughgeneralagreement,atleastamongeducatedpersonsofthesameageandcountry。Itisonlymaintainedthattheobjectsoftheseimpulsesdonotadmitofbeingscientificallydeterminedbyanyreflectiveanalysisofcommonsense。ThenotionsofBenevolence,Justice,GoodFaith,Veracity,Purity,etc。,arenotnecessarilyemptiedofsignificanceforus,becausewehavefounditimpossibletodefinethemwithprecision。
Themainpartoftheconductprescribedundereachnotionissufficientlyclear:andthegeneralruleprescribingitdoesnotnecessarilyloseitsforcebecausethereisineachcaseamarginofconductinvolvedinobscurityandperplexity,orbecausetheruledoesnotonexaminationappeartobeabsoluteandindependent。Inshort,theMoralityofCommonSensemaystillbeperfectlyadequatetogivepracticalguidancetocommonpeopleincommoncircumstances:buttheattempttoelevateitintoasystemofIntuitionalEthicsbringsitsinevitableimperfectionsintoprominencewithouthelpingustoremovethem。
InthefirstchapterofthisthirdBookI
wascarefultopointoutthatmotives,aswellasintentions,formpartofthesubject-matterofourcommonmoraljudgments:andindeedinournotionof`conscientiousness’thehabitofreflectingonmotives,andjudgingthemtobegoodorbad,isaprominentelement。Itisnecessary,therefore,inordertocompleteourexaminationoftheIntuitionalMethod,toconsiderthiscomparisonofmotives,andascertainhowfaritcanbemadesystematic,andpursuedtoconclusionsofscientificvalue。Andthisseemsaconvenientplacefortreating,ofthispartofthesubject:sinceithasbeenmaintainedbyanimportantschoolofEnglishmoraliststhatDesiresandAffectionsratherthanActsarethepropersubjectsoftheethicaljudgment:anditisnaturaltofallbackuponthisviewwhensystematicreflectiononthemoralityofCommonSensehasshownusthedifficultyofobtainingapreciseandsatisfactorydeterminationofrightnessandwrongnessinexternalconduct。
Toavoidconfusion,itshouldbeobservedthattheterm`motive’iscommonlyusedintwoways。Itissometimesappliedtothoseamongtheforeseenconsequencesofanyactwhichtheagentdesiredinwilling:andsometimestothedesire,orconsciousimpulseitself。Thetwomeaningsareinamannercorrespondent,as,whereimpulsesaredifferent,theremustalwaysbesomesortofdifferenceintheirrespectiveobjects。Butforourpresentpurposeitismoreconvenienttotakethelattermeaning:asitisourownimpulsivenaturethatwehavepracticallytodealwith,inthewayofcontrolling,resisting,indulgingthedifferentimpulses;andthereforeitistheethicalvalueofthesethatweareprimarilyconcernedtoestimate:andweoftenfindthattwoimpulses,whichwouldbeplacedveryfarapartinanypsychologicallist,aredirectedtowardsanendmateriallyidentical,thoughregardedfromadifferentpointofviewineachcase。Ase。g。bothappetiteandRationalself-lovemayimpelamantoseekaparticularsensualgratification;
thoughinthelattercaseitisregardedunderthegeneralnotionofpleasure,andasformingpartofasumcalledHappiness。Inthischapter,then,I
shallusethetermMotivetodenotethedesiresofparticularresults,believedtobeattainableasconsequencesofourvoluntaryacts,bywhichdesireswearestimulatedtowillthoseacts。[1]
Thefirstpointtonoticeinconsideringtheethicalresultofacomprehensivecomparisonofmotivesis,thattheissueinanyinternalconflictisnotusuallythoughttobebetweenpositivelygoodandbad,butbetweenbetterandlessgood,moreorlessestimableorelevatedmotives。Theonlykindofmotivewhichifanywecommonlyjudgetobeintrinsicallybad,apartfromthecircumstancesunderwhichitoperates,ismalevolentaffection;thatis,thedesire,howeveraroused,toinflictpainorharmonsomeothersentientbeing。Andreflectionshowsaswesawinchap。viii。ofthisBookthatCommonSensedoesnotpronounceeventhiskindofimpulseabsolutelybad:sincewecommonlyrecognisetheexistenceof`legitimateresentment’and`righteousindignation’;andthoughmoraliststrytodistinguishbetweenangerdirected`againsttheact’and`againsttheagent’,andbetweentheimpulsetoinflictpainandthedesireoftheantipatheticpleasurethattheagentwillreapfromthisinfliction,itmaybefairlydoubtedwhetheritiswithinthecapacityofordinaryhumannaturetomaintainthesedistinctionsinpractice。AtanyratethereisnoothermotiveexceptdeliberatemalevolencewhichCommonSensecondemnsasabsolutelybad。Theothermotivesthatarecommonlyspokenofin`dyslogistic’
termsseemtobemostproperlycalledinBentham’slanguage’Seductive’
ratherthanbad。Thatis,theyprompttoforbiddenconductwithconspicuousforceandfrequency:butwhenweconsiderthemcarefullywefindthattherearecertainlimits,howevernarrow,withinwhichtheiroperationislegitimate。
Thequestion,then,ishowfartheintuitiveknowledgethatourcommonjudgmentsseemtoimplyoftherelativegoodnessofdifferentkindsofmotivesisfoundonreflectiontosatisfytheconditionslaiddownintheprecedingchapter。Ihavebeforearguedthatitisincorrecttoregardthiscomparisonofmotivesasthenormalformofourcommonmoraljudgments,nordoIseeanygroundforholdingittobetheoriginalform。Ithinkthatinthenormaldevelopmentofman’smoralconsciousness,bothintheindividualandintherace,moraljudgmentsarefirstpassedonoutwardacts,andthatmotivesdonotcometobedefinitelyconsideredtilllater;justasexternalperceptionofphysicalobjectsprecedesintrospection。
Atthesametime,inmyview,itdoesnotthereforefollowthatthecomparisonofmotivesisnotthefinalandmostperfectformofthemoraljudgment。
Itmightapproveitselfassuchbythesystematicclearnessandmutualconsistencyoftheresultstowhichitled,whenpursuedbydifferentthinkersindependently:andbyitsfreedomfromthepuzzlesanddifficultiestowhichotherdevelopmentsoftheIntuitionalMethodseemtobeexposed。
Itappears,however,onexaminationthat,ontheonehand,manyifnotallofthedifficultieswhichhaveemergedintheprecedingdiscussionofthecommonlyreceivedprinciplesofconductarereproducedinadifferentformwhenwetrytoarrangeMotivesinorderofexcellence:andontheotherhand,suchaconstructionpresentsdifficultiespeculiartoitself,andtheattempttosolvetheseexhibitsgreaterandmorefundamentaldifferencesamongIntuitivemoralists,asregardsRankofMotive,thanwefoundtoexistasregardsRightnessofoutwardacts。