Butnoone，Ithink，willcontendthatwecanalwayssuppressentirelyastrongemotion；andsuchsuppressionwillbeespeciallydifficultifwearetodotheacttowhichthewrongimpulseprompts；whileyet，ifthatactbeclearlyadutywhichnooneelsecansoproperlyperform，itwouldbeabsurdtosaythatweoughttoomititbecausewecannotaltogetherexcludeanobjectionablemotive。Itissometimessaidthat，thoughwemaynotbeableindoingourdutytoexcludeabadmotivealtogetherfromourminds，itisstillpossibletorefusetoactfromit。ButIthinkthatthisisonlypossiblesofarasthedetailsofactiontowhicharightmotivewouldpromptdiffertosomeextentfromthosetowhichawrongmotivewouldprompt。Nodoubtthisisoftenthecase:——thus，inBentham’sexample，amalevolentprosecutormaybepromptedtotakeunfairadvantageofhisenemy，orcausehimneedlesspainbystudiedinsults；anditisobviouslypossibleforhim——andhisduty——toresistsuchpromptings。Butsofaraspreciselythesameactionispromptedbytwodifferentmotives，bothpresentinmyconsciousness，Iamnotconsciousofanypowertocausethisactiontobedeterminedbyoneofthetwomotivestotheexclusionoftheother。Inotherwords，whileamancanresolvetoaimatanyendwhichheconceivesasapossibleresultofhisvoluntaryaction，hecannotsimultaneouslyresolvenottoaimatanyotherendwhichhebelieveswillbepromotedbythesameaction；andifthatotherendbeanobjectofdesiretohim，hecannot，whileaimingatit，refusetoactfromthisdesire。[4]
Onthewhole，then，Iconclude1thatwhilemanyactionsarecommonlyjudgedtobemadebetterorworsebythepresenceorabsenceofcertainmotives，ourjudgmentsofrightandwrongstrictlyspeakingrelatetointentions，asdistinguishedfrommotives；and2thatwhileintentionsaffectingtheagent’sownfeelingsandcharacteraremorallyprescribednolessthanintentionstoproducecertainexternaleffects，still，thelatterformtheprimary——thoughnotthesole——contentofthemainprescriptionsofduty，ascommonlyaffirmedandunderstood:buttheextenttowhichthisisthecase，willbecomemoreclearasweproceed。
Ithasindeedbeenmaintainedbymoralistsofinfluencethatthemoralvalueofourconductdependsuponthedegreetowhichweareactuatedbytheonemotivewhichtheyregardastrulymoral:viz。thedesireorfreechoiceofdoingwhatisrightassuch，realisingdutyorvirtuefordutyorvirtue’ssake:andthataperfectlygoodactmustbedoneentirelyfromthismotive。
Ithink，however，thatitisdifficulttocombinethisview——whichImayconvenientlydistinguishasStoical——withthebelief，whichmodernorthodoxmoralistshaveusuallybeenconcernedtomaintain，thatitisalwaysaman’strueinteresttoactvirtuously。Idonotmeanthatamanwhoholdsthisbeliefmustnecessarilybeanegoist:butitseemstomeimpossibleforhimtoexcludefromhismotivesaregardforhisowninterest，whileyetbelievingthatitwillbepromotedbytheactwhichheiswillingIf，therefore，weholdthatthisself-regardimpairsthemoralvalueofanactotherwisevirtuous，andatthesametimeholdthatvirtueisalwaysconducivetothevirtuousagent’sinterest，weseemdriventotheconclusionthatknowledgeofthetruerelationbetweenvirtueandhappinessisaninsuperableobstacletotheattainmentofmoralperfection。Icannotacceptthisparadox:andinsubsequentchaptersIshalltrytoshowthattheStoicalviewofmoralgoodnessisnotonthewholesustainedbyacomprehensivesurveyandcomparisonofcommonmoraljudgments:sinceinsomecasesactsappeartohavethequalityofvirtueevenmorestrikinglywhenperformedfromsomemotiveotherthantheloveofvirtueassuch。ForthepresentIwishrathertopointoutthatthedoctrineabovestatedisdiametricallyopposedtotheviewthattheuniversalornormalmotivesofhumanactionareeitherparticulardesiresofpleasureoraversionstopainfortheagenthimself，orthemoregeneralregardtohishappinessonthewholewhichItermSelf-lovethatitalsoexcludesthelessextremedoctrinethatdutiesmaybetosomeextentproperlydonefromsuchself-regardingmotives；andthatoneorotherofthesepositionshasfrequentlybeenheldbywriterswhohaveexpresslyadoptedanIntuitionalmethodofEthics。
Forinstance，wefindLockelayingdown，withoutreserveorqualification，that``goodandevilarenothingbutpleasureandpain，orthatwhichoccasionsorprocurespleasureorpaintous’’[6]:sothat``itwouldbeutterlyinvaintosupposearulesettothefreeactionsofman，withoutannexingittosomerewardorpunishmenttodeterminehiswill’’。Ontheotherhand，heexpresses，withnolessemphasis，theconvictionthat``fromself-evidentpropositions，bynecessaryconsequences，asincontestableasthoseinmathematics，themeasuresofrightandwrongmightbemadeout’’[7]，sothat``moralitymightbeplacedamongthesciencescapableofdemonstration’’。ThecombinationofthesetwodoctrinesgivesustheviewthatmoralrulesareessentiallylawsofGod，whichmenareimpelledtoobey，solelyormainly，fromfearorhopeofdivinepunishmentsorrewards；andsomesuchviewasthisseemstobewidelyaccepted，byplainmenwithoutveryrefinedmoralsensibilities。
Asanexample，again，ofthinkerswho，whilerecognisinginhumannatureadisinterestedregardfordutyorvirtueassuch，stillconsiderthatself-loveisaproperandlegitimatemotivetorightconduct，wemayrefertoButlerandhisdisciples。Butlerregards``reasonableself-love’’
asnotmerelyanormalmotivetohumanaction，butasbeing——nolessthanconscience——a``chieforsuperiorprincipleinthenatureofman’’；sothatanaction``becomesunsuitable’’tothisnature，iftheprincipleofself-lovebeviolated。Accordinglytheaimofhisteachingisnottoinducementochoosedutyratherthaninterest，buttoconvincethemthatthereisnoinconsistencybetweenthetwo；thatself-loveandconsciencelead``tooneandthesamecourseoflife’’。
Thisintermediatedoctrineappearstometobemoreinharmonywiththecommonsenseofmankindonthewholethaneitheroftheextremeviewsbeforecontrasted。ButIdonotconceivethatanyoneofthethreepositionsisinconsistentwithfundamentalassumptionsoftheIntuitionalmethod。Eventhosewhoholdthathumanbeingscannotreasonablybeexpectedtoconformtomoralrulesdisinterestedly，orfromanyothermotivethanthatsuppliedbythesanctionsdivinelyattachedtothem，stillcommonlyconceiveGodassupremeReason，whoselawsmustbeessentiallyreasonable:andsofarassuchlawsareheldtobecognisablebythe`lightofnature’——sothatmorality，asLockesays，maybeplacedamongdemonstrativesciences——themethodofdeterminingthemwillbenonethelessintuitionalbecauseitiscombinedwiththebeliefthatGodwillrewardtheirobservanceandpunishtheirviolation。Ontheotherhandthosewhoholdthatregardfordutyasdutyisanindispensableconditionofactingrightly，wouldgenerallyadmitthatactingrightlyisnotadequatelydefinedasactingfromapuredesiretoactrightly；thatthough，inacertainsense，amanwhosincerelydesiresandintendstoactrightlydoesallhecan，andcompletelyfulfilsduty，stillsuchamanmayhaveawrongjudgmentastotheparticularsofhisduty，andtherefore，inanothersense，mayactwrongly。Ifthisbeadmitted，itisevidentthat，evenontheviewthatthedesireorresolutiontofulfildutyassuchisessentialtorightaction，adistinctionbetweentwokindsofrightnessisrequired；whichwemayexpressbysayingthatanactis——onthisview——``formally’’right，iftheagentinwillingismovedbypuredesiretofulfildutyorchoosesdutyforduty’ssake；``materially’’right，ifheintendstherightparticulareffects。Thisdistinctionbeingtaken，itbecomesplainthatthereisnoreasonwhythesameprinciplesandmethodfordeterminingmaterialrightness，orrightnessofparticulareffects，shouldnotbeadoptedbythinkerswhodiffermostwidelyonthequestionofformalrightness；anditis，obviously，withmaterialrightnessthattheworkofthesystematicmoralistismainlyconcerned。
Theterm`formalrightness’，asaboveused，implyingadesireorchoiceoftheactasright，impliesalsoabeliefthatitisso。
Butthelatterconditionmayexistwithouttheformer:Icannotperformanactfrompureloveofdutywithoutbelievingittoberight:butIcanbelieveittoberightandyetdoitfromsomeothermotive。AndthereseemstobemoreagreementamongmoralistswhoadopttheIntuitionalMethodastothemoralindispensabilityofsuchabelief，thanwehavefoundwithrespecttothequestionofmotive:atleast，itwould，Iconceive，beuniversallyheldthatnoactcanbeabsolutelyright，whateveritsexternalaspectandrelations，whichisbelievedbytheagenttobewrong。[1]Suchanactwemaycall``subjectively’’wrong，eventhough``objectively“right。
Itmaystillbeaskedwhetheritisbetterinanyparticularcasethatamanshoulddowhathemistakenlybelievestobehisduty，orwhatreallyishisdutyintheparticularcircumstances——consideredapartfromhismistakenbelief——andwouldbecompletelyrightifhecouldonlythinkso。ThequestionisrathersubtleandperplexingtoCommonSense:itisthereforeworthwhiletopointoutthatitcanhaveonlyalimitedandsubordinatepracticalapplication。Fornoone，inconsideringwhatheoughthimselftodoinanyparticularcase，candistinguishwhathebelievestoberightfromwhatreallyisso:thenecessityforapracticalchoicebetween`subjective’and`objective’rightnesscanonlypresentitselfinrespectoftheconductofanotherpersonwhomitisinourpowertoinfluence。Ifanotherisabouttodowhatwethinkwrongwhilehethinksitright，andwecannotalterhisbeliefbutcanbringothermotivestobearonhimthatmayoverbalancehissenseofduty，itbecomesnecessarytodecidewhetherweoughtthustotempthimtorealisewhatwebelievetobeobjectivelyrightagainsthisownconvictions。Ithinkthatthemoralsenseofmankindwouldpronounceagainstsuchtemptation，——thusregardingtheSubjectiverightnessofanactionasmoreimportantthantheObjective，——unlesstheeviloftheactpromptedbyamistakensenseofdutyappearedtobeverygrave。Buthoweveressentialitmaybethatamoralagentshoulddowhathebelievestoberight，thisconditionofrightconductistoosimpletoadmitofsystematicdevelopment:itis，therefore，clearthatthedetailsofourinvestigationmustrelatemainlyto`objective’rightness。
Thereis，however，onepracticalruleofsomevalue，tobeobtainedbymerelyreflectingonthegeneralnotionofrightness[3]，ascommonlyconceived。
InapreviouschapterIendeavouredtomakethisnotionclearerbysayingthat`whatIjudgetoberightmust，unlessIaminerror，bejudgedtobesobyallrationalbeingswhojudgetrulyofthematter’。Thisstatementdoesnotimplythatwhatisjudgedtoberightforonemanmustnecessarilybejudgedsoforanother:`objective’rightnessmayvaryfromAtoBnolessthanthe`objective’factsoftheirnatureandcircumstancesvary。
Thereseems，however，tobethisdifferencebetweenourconceptionsofethicalandphysicalobjectivityrespectively:thatwecommonlyrefusetoadmitinthecaseoftheformer——whatexperiencecompelsustoadmitasregardsthelatter——variationsforwhichwecandiscovernorationalexplanation。Inthevarietyofcoexistentphysicalfactswefindanaccidentalorarbitraryelementinwhichwehavetoacquiesce，aswecannotconceiveittobeexcludedbyanyextensionofourknowledgeofphysicalcausation。
Ifweask，forexample，whyanyportionofspaceempiricallyknowntouscontainsmorematterthananysimilaradjacentportion，physicalsciencecanonlyanswerbystatingalongwithcertainlawsofchangesomeantecedentpositionofthepartsofmatterwhichneedsexplanationnolessthanthepresent；andhoweverfarbackwecarryourascertainmentofsuchantecedentpositions，theonewithwhichweleaveoffseemsasarbitraryasthatwithwhichwestarted。Butwithintherangeofourcognitionsofrightandwrong，itwillbegenerallyagreedthatwecannotadmitasimilarunexplainedvariation。WecannotjudgeanactiontoberightforAandwrongforB，unlesswecanfindinthenaturesorcircumstancesofthetwosomedifferencewhichwecanregardasareasonablegroundfordifferenceintheirduties。
IfthereforeIjudgeanyactiontoberightformyself，Iimplicitlyjudgeittoberightforanyotherpersonwhosenatureandcircumstancesdonotdifferfrommyowninsomeimportantrespects。Nowbymakingthislatterjudgmentexplicit，wemayprotectourselvesagainstthedangerwhichbesetstheconscience，ofbeingwarpedandpervertedbystrongdesire，sothatwetooeasilythinkthatweoughttodowhatweverymuchwishtodo。Forifweaskourselveswhetherwebelievethatanysimilarpersoninsimilarcircumstancesoughttoperformthecontemplatedaction，thequestionwilloftendispersethefalseappearanceofrightnesswhichourstronginclinationhasgiventoit。Weseethatweshouldnotthinkitrightforanother，andthereforethatitcannotberightforus。Indeedthistestoftherightnessofourvolitionsissogenerallyeffective，thatKantseemstohaveheldthatallparticularrulesofdutycanbededucedfromtheonefundamentalrule``Actasifthemaximofthyactionweretobecomebythywillauniversallawofnature。’’[4]ButthisappearstomeanerroranalogoustothatofsupposingthatFormalLogicsuppliesacompletecriterionoftruth。Ishouldagreethatavolitionwhichdoesnotstandthistestistobecondemned；
butIholdthatavolitionwhichdoesstanditmayafterallbewrong。
ForIconceivethatalloralmostallpersonswhoactconscientiouslycouldsincerelywillthemaximsonwhichtheyacttobeuniversallyadopted:
whileatthesametimewecontinuallyfindsuchpersonsinthoroughlyconscientiousdisagreementastowhateachoughttodoinagivensetofcircumstances。