If，however，theindividualisnotlikelytoobtainamaximumofPleasurebyaimingmerelyatPreservation，itremainstoconsiderwhether``quantityoflife’’willserveanybetter。Nowitisofcoursetruethatsofarasnervousactionisattendedbyconsciousnesspleasurableinquality，themorethereisofit，thehappierweshallbe。
Butevenifweassumethatthemoreintenseandfulllifeis``ontheaverage’’
thehappier，itbynomeansfollowsthatweshallgainmaximumpleasurebyaimingmerelyatintensityofconsciousness:forweexperienceintensepainsevenmoreindubitablythanintensepleasures，andinthose``fulltidesofsoul’’，inwhichweseemtobemostalive，painfulconsciousnessmaybemixedinalmostanyproportion。Andfurtherweoftenexperienceexcitementnearlyorquiteneutralinqualityi。e。notdistinctlypleasurableorpainful，whichreachesagreatpitchofintensity，asinthecaseoflaboriousstruggleswithdifficulties，andperplexingconflictsofwhichtheissueisdoubtful。
Itmay，however，berepliedthat``quantityoflife’’mustbetakentoimplynotmerelyintensityofconsciousness，butmultiplicityandvariety——aharmoniousandmany-sideddevelopmentofhumannature。Andexperiencecertainlyseemstosupporttheviewthatmenlosehappinessbyallowingsomeoftheirfacultiesorcapacitiestobewitheredanddwarfedforwantofexercise，andthusnotleavingthemselvessufficientvarietyoffeelingsoractivities:especiallyasregardsthebodilyorgans，itwillbeagreedthatthedueexerciseofmost，ifnotall，isindispensabletothehealthoftheorganism；andfurther，thatthehealthmaintainedbythisbalanceoffunctionsisamoreimportantsourceoftheindividual’shappinessthantheunhealthyover-exerciseofanyoneorgancanbe。Still，itwouldappearthattheharmonyoffunctionsnecessarytohealthisaveryelasticone，andadmitsofaverywidemarginofvariation，asfarastheorgansundervoluntarycontrolareconcerned。Amane。g。
whoexerciseshisbrainalonewillprobablybeillinconsequence:buthemayexercisehisbrainmuchandhislegslittle，orviceversa，withoutanymorbidresults。And，inthesameway，wecannotlaydowntheproposition，thatavariedandmany-sidedlifeisthehappiest，withasmuchprecisionaswouldbenecessaryifitweretobeacceptedasabasisfordeductiveHedonism。Foritseemstobealsolargelytrue，ontheotherside，thatthemorewecometoexerciseanyfacultywithsustainedandprolongedconcentration，themorepleasurewederivefromsuchexercise，uptothepointatwhichitbecomeswearisome，orturnsintoasemi-mechanicalroutinewhichrendersconsciousnessdullandlanguid。Itis，nodoubt，importantforourhappinessthatweshouldkeepwithinthislimit:butwecannotfixitpreciselyinanyparticularcasewithoutspecialexperience:
especiallyasthereseemsalwaystobeacertainamountofwearinessandtediumwhichmustberesistedandovercome，ifwewouldbringourfacultiesintofullplay，andobtainthefullenjoymentofourlabour。Andsimilarlyinrespectofpassiveemotionalconsciousness:iftoomuchsamenessoffeelingresultsinlanguor，toomuchvarietyinevitablyinvolvesshallowness。
Thepointwhereconcentrationoughttostop，andwheredissipationbegins，variesfrommantoman，andmust，itwouldseem，bedecidedbythespecificexperienceofindividuals。
Thereis，however，anotherandsimplerwayinwhichthemaximof`givingfreedevelopmenttoone’snature’maybeunderstood:i。e。inthesenseofyieldingtospontaneousimpulses，insteadofendeavouringtogovernthesebyelaborateforecastsofconsequences:ascientificjustificationforthiscoursebeingfoundinthetheorythatspontaneousorinstinctiveimpulsesreallyrepresenttheeffectsofpreviousexperiencesofpleasureandpainontheorganisminwhichtheyappear，oritsancestors。Onthisground，ithasbeenmaintainedthatincomplicatedproblemsofconduct，experiencewill``enabletheconstitutiontoestimatetherespectiveamountsofpleasureandpainconsequentuponeachalternative’’，whereitis``impossiblefortheintellect’’todothis:and``willfurthercausetheorganisminstinctivelytoshunthatcoursewhichproducesonthewholemostsuffering’’。[1]ThatthereisanimportantelementoftruthinthiscontentionIwouldnotdeny。Butanybroadconclusionthatnon-rationalinclinationisabetterguidethanreasontotheindividual’shappinesswouldbequiteunwarrantedbyanythingthatweknoworcanplausiblyconjecturerespectingbiologicalevolution。For——overlookingtheeffectofnaturalselectiontofosterimpulsestendingtothepreservationoftheraceratherthanthepleasureoftheindividual，andgrantingthateverysentientorganismtendstoadaptitselftoitsenvironment，insuchamannerastoacquireinstinctsofsomevalueinguidingittopleasureandawayfrompain——itbynomeansfollowsthatinthehumanorganismoneparticularkindofadaptation，thatwhichproceedsbyunconsciousmodificationofinstinct，istobepreferredtothatotherkindofadaptationwhichisbroughtaboutbyconsciouscomparisonandinference。Itratherseemsclear，thatthispropositioncanonlybejustifiedbyacomparisonoftheconsequencesofyieldingtoinstinctiveimpulseswiththeconsequencesofcontrollingthembycalculationsofresultingpleasureandpain。Butitwillhardlybemaintainedthatinthemajorityofclearinstanceswherenon-rationalimpulseconflictswithrationalforecast，asubsequentcalculationofconsequencesappearstojustifytheformer，theassertionwouldbeintooflagrantconflictwiththecommonsenseandcommonexperienceofmankind。
Hence，howevertrueitmaybethatincertaincasesinstinctisonthewholeasaferguidethanprudentialcalculation，itwouldstillseemthatwecanonlyascertainthesecasesbycarefulreflectiononexperience:
wecannotdeterminethelimitstowhichprudentialcalculationmayprudentlybecarried，exceptbythisverycalculationitself。
Weseem，then，forcedtoconcludethatthereisnoscientificshort-cuttotheascertainmentoftherightmeanstotheindividual’shappiness:everyattempttofinda`highprioriroad’tothisgoalbringsusbackinevitablytotheempiricalmethod。Forinsteadofaclearprincipleuniversallyvalid，weonlygetatbestavagueandgeneralrule，basedonconsiderationswhichitisimportantnottooverlook，buttherelativevalueofwhichwecanonlyestimatebycarefulobservationandcomparisonofindividualexperience。Whateveruncertaintybesetstheseprocessesmustnecessarilyextendtoallourreasoningsabouthappiness。
Ihavenowishtoexaggeratetheseuncertainties，feelingthatwemustallcontinuetoseekhappinessforourselvesandforothers，inwhateverobscuritywemayhavetogropeafterit:butthereisnothinggainedbyunderratingthem，anditisidletoargue。asiftheydidnotexist。
Theefforttoexamine，closelybutquiteneutrally，thesystemofEgoisticHedonism，withwhichwehavebeenengagedinthelastBook，maynotimprobablyhaveproducedonthereader’smindacertainaversiontotheprincipleandmethodexamined，eventhoughlikemyselfhemayfinditdifficultnottoadmitthe`authority’
ofself-love，orthe`rationality’ofseekingone’sownindividualhappiness。
Inconsidering`enlightenedself-interest’assupplyingaprimafacietenableprincipleforthesystematisationofconduct，Ihavegivennoexpressiontothissentimentofaversion，beinganxioustoascertainwithscientificimpartialitytheresultstowhichthisprinciplelogicallyleads。When，however，weseemtofindoncarefulexaminationofEgoismasworkedoutonastrictlyempiricalbasisthatthecommonpreceptsofduty，whichwearetrainedtoregardassacred，mustbetotheegoistrulestowhichitisonlygenerallyspeakingandforthemostpartreasonabletoconform，butwhichunderspecialcircumstancesmustbedecisivelyignoredandbroken，——theoffencewhichEgoismintheabstractgivestooursympatheticandsocialnatureaddsforcetotherecoilfromitcausedbytheperceptionofitsoccasionalpracticalconflictwithcommonnotionsofduty。Butfurther，weareaccustomedtoexpectfromMoralityclearanddecisivepreceptsorcounsels:andsuchrulesascanbelaiddownforseekingtheindividual’sgreatesthappinesscannotbutappearwantinginthesequalities。AdubiousguidancetoanignobleendappearstobeallthatthecalculusofEgoisticHedonismhastooffer。AnditisbyappealingtothesuperiorcertaintywithwhichthedictatesofConscienceortheMoralFacultyareissued，thatButlermaintainsthepracticalsupremacyofConscienceoverSelf-love，inspiteofhisadmissioninthepassagebeforequotedoftheoreticalpriorityintheclaimsofthelatter。Amanknowscertainly，hesays，whatheoughttodo:buthedoesnotcertainlyknowwhatwillleadtohishappiness。
Insayingthis，Butlerappearstomefairlytorepresentthecommonmoralsenseofordinarymankind，inourownagenolessthaninhis。Themoraljudgmentsthatmenhabituallypassononeanotherinordinarydiscourseimplyforthemostpartthatdutyisusuallynotadifficultthingforanordinarymantoknow，thoughvariousseductiveimpulsesmaymakeitdifficultforhimtodoit。Andinsuchmaximsasthatdutyshouldbeperformed’adviennequepourra’，thattruthshouldbespokenwithoutregardtoconsequences，thatjusticeshouldbedone`thoughtheskyshouldfall’，itisimpliedthatwehavethepowerofseeingclearlythatcertainkindsofactionsarerightandreasonableinthemselves，apartfromtheirconsequences；——orratherwithamerelypartialconsiderationofconsequences，fromwhichotherconsequencesadmittedtobepossiblygoodorbadaredefinitelyexcluded。Andsuchapowerisclaimedforthehumanmindbymostofthewriterswhohavemaintainedtheexistenceofmoralintuitions；IhavethereforethoughtmyselfjustifiedintreatingthisclaimascharacteristicofthemethodwhichIdistinguishasIntuitional。Atthesametime，asIhavebeforeobserved，thereisawidersenseinwhichtheterm’intuitional’mightbelegitimatelyappliedtoeitherEgoisticorUniversalisticHedonism；sofaraseithersystemlaysdownasafirstprinciple——whichifknownatallmustbeintuitivelyknown——thathappinessistheonlyrationalultimateendofaction。TothismeaningIshallrecurintheconcludingchaptersxiii。andxiv。
ofthisBookinwhichIshalldiscussmorefullytheintuitivecharacterofthesehedonisticprinciples。Butsincetheadoptionofthiswidermeaningwouldnotleadustoadistinctethicalmethod，Ihavethoughtitbest，inthedetaileddiscussionofIntuitionismwhichoccupiesthefirstelevenchaptersofthisBook，toconfinemyselfasfaraspossibletoMoralIntuitionunderstoodinthenarrowersenseabovedefined。
Here，perhaps，itmaybesaidthatinthusdefiningIntuitionismIhaveomitteditsmostfundamentalcharacteristic；thattheIntuitionistproperlyspeaking——incontrastwiththeUtilitarian——doesnotjudgeactionsbyanexternalstandardatall——thattruemorality，inhisview，isnotconcernedwithoutwardactionsassuch，butwiththestateofmindinwhichactsaredone——inshortwith``intentions’’and``motives’’。[1]Ithink，however，thatthisobjectionispartlyduetoamisunderstanding。Moralistsofallschools，Iconceive，wouldagreethatthemoraljudgmentswhichwepassonactionsrelateprimarilytointentionalactionsregardedasintentional。
Inotherwords，whatwejudgetobe`wrong’——inthestrictestethicalsense——isnotanypartoftheactualeffects，assuch，ofthemuscularmovementsimmediatelycausedbytheagent’svolition，buttheeffectswhichheforesawinwillingtheact；or，morestrictly，hisvolitionorchoiceofrealisingtheeffectsasforeseen。WhenIspeakthereforeofacts，I
mustbeunderstoodtomean——unlessthecontraryisstated——actspresumedtobeintentionalandjudgedassuch:onthispointIdonotthinkthatanydisputeneedarise。
Thecaseofmotivesisdifferentandrequirescarefuldiscussion。Inthefirstplacethedistinctionbetween``motive’’and``intention’’inordinarylanguageisnotveryprecise:sinceweapplytheterm``motive’’toforeseenconsequencesofanact，sofarastheyareconceivedtobeobjectsofdesiretotheagent，ortothedesireofsuchconsequences:andwhenwespeakoftheintentionofanactweusually，nodoubt，havedesiredconsequencesinview。Ithink，however，thatforpurposesofexactmoralorjuraldiscussion，itisbesttoincludeundertheterm`intention’alltheconsequencesofanactthatareforeseenascertainorprobable；sinceitwillbeadmittedthatwecannotevaderesponsibilityforanyforeseenbadconsequencesofouractsbythepleathatwefeltnodesireforthem，eitherfortheirownsakeorasmeanstoulteriorends:suchundesiredaccompanimentsofthedesiredresultsofourvolitionsareclearlychosenorwilledbyus。
Hencetheintentionofanactmaybejudgedtobewrong，whilethemotiveisrecognisedasgood；aswhenamancommitsperjurytosaveaparent’sorabenefactor’slife。Suchjudgmentsare，infact，continuallypassedincommonmoraldiscourse。Itmay，however，besaidthatanactcannotberight，evenwhentheintentionissuchasdutywouldprescribe，ifitbedonefromabadmotive:that——totakeacasesuggestedbyBentham——amanwhoprosecutesfrommaliceapersonwhomhebelievestobeguilty，doesnotreallyactrightly；for，thoughitmaybehisdutytoprosecute，heoughtnottodoitfrommalice。Itisdoubtlesstruethatitisourdutytogetridofbadmotivesifwecan；sothataman’sintentioncannotbewhollyright，unlessitincludestherepression，sofaraspossible，ofamotiveknowntobebad。