ItischieflyontheLibertariansidethatIfindatendencytotheexaggerationofwhichIhavejustspoken。SomeLibertarianwritersmaintainthattheconceptionoftheFreedomoftheWill，alienasitmaybetopositivescience，isyetquiteindispensabletoEthicsandJurisprudence；sinceinjudgingthatI``ought’’todoanythingIimplythatI``can’’doit，andsimilarlyinpraisingorblamingtheactionsofothersIimplythatthey``could’’haveactedotherwise。Ifaman’sactionsaremerelinksinachainofcausationwhich，aswetraceitback，ultimatelycarriesustoeventsanteriortohispersonalexistence，hecannot，itissaid，reallyhaveeithermeritordemerit；andifhehasnotmeritordemerit，itisrepugnanttothecommonmoralsenseofmankindtorewardorpunish——eventopraiseorblame——him。Inconsideringthisargument，itwillbeconvenient——forclearnessofdiscussion——toassumeinthefirstinstancethatthereisnodoubtorconflictinourviewofwhatitisrighttodo，exceptsuchasmaybecausedbythepresentquestion。
ItwillalsobeconvenienttoseparatethediscussionoftheimportanceofFreeWillinrelationtomoralactiongenerallyfromthespecialquestionofitsimportanceinrelationtopunishingandrewarding；since，inthelatterspeciesofaction，whatchieflyclaimsattentionisnotthepresentFreedomoftheagent，butthepastFreedomofthepersonnowactedon。
Asregardsactiongenerally，theDeterministallowsthatamanisonlymorallyboundtodowhatis``inhispower’’；butheexplains``inhispower’’tomeanthattheresultinquestionwillbeproducedifthemanchoosetoproduceit。Andthisis，Ithink，thesenseinwhichtheproposition``whatIoughttodoIcando’’iscommonlyaccepted:itmeans``candoifIchoose’’，not``canchoosetodo’’。Stillthequestionremains``CanIchoosetodowhatinordinarythoughtIjudgetoberighttodo？’’Heremyownviewisthat——withinthelimitsaboveexplained——IinevitablyconceivethatIcanchoose；however，Icansupposemyselftoregardthisconceptionasillusory，andtojudge，inferringthefuturefromthepast，thatIcertainlyshallnotchoose，andaccordinglythatsuchchoiceisnotreallypossibletome。Thisbeingsupposed，itseemstomeundeniablethatthisjudgmentwillexcludeorweakentheoperationofthemoralmotiveinthecaseoftheactcontemplated:IeithershallnotjudgeitreasonabletochoosetodowhatIshouldotherwisesojudge，orifIdopassthejudgment，Ishallalsojudgetheconceptionofdutyappliedinittobeillusory，nolessthantheconceptionofFreedom。SofarIconcedetheLibertariancontentionastothedemoralisingeffectofDeterminism，ifheldwitharealforceofconviction。ButIthinkthecasesarerareinwhichitisevenonDeterministprincipleslegitimatetoconcludeittobecertain——andnotmerelyhighlyprobable——thatIshalldeliberatelychoosetodowhatIjudgetobeunwise。Ordinarilythelegitimateinferencefromaman’spastexperience，andfromhisgeneralknowledgeofhumannature，wouldnotgobeyondaverystrongprobabilitythathewouldchoosetodowrong:
andamereprobability——howeverstrong——thatIshallnotwilltodorightcannotberegardedbymeindeliberationasareasonfornotwilling:whileitcertainlysuppliesarationalgroundforwillingstrongly——justasastrongprobabilityofanyotherevilsuppliesarationalgroundforspecialexertionstoavoidit。Indeed，IdonotseewhyaLibertarianshouldnot——equallywithaDeterminist——acceptasvalid，andfinditinstructivetocontemplate，theconsiderationsthatrenderitprobablethathewillnotchoosetodorightinanyparticularcircumstances。Inallordinarycases，therefore，itdoesnotseemtomerelevanttoethicaldeliberationtodeterminethemetaphysicalvalidityofmyconsciousnessoffreedomtochoosewhateverImayconcludetobereasonable，unlesstheaffirmationornegationoftheFreedomoftheWillsomehowmodifiesmyviewofwhatitwouldbereasonabletochoosetodoifIcouldsochoose。
Idonotthinkthatanysuchmodificationofviewcanbemaintained，asregardstheultimateendsofrationalactionwhich，inchap。i。，Itookasbeingcommonlyaccepted。
IfHappiness，whetherprivateorgeneral，betakenastheultimateendofactiononaLibertarianview，theadoptionofaDeterministviewaffordsnogroundforrejectingit:andifExcellenceisinitselfadmirableanddesirable，itsurelyremainsequallysowhetheranyindividual’sapproximationtoitisentirelydeterminedbyinheritednatureandexternalinfluencesornot:——exceptsofarasthenotionofExcellenceincludesthatofFreeWill。NowFreeWillisobviouslynotincludedinourcommonidealofphysicalandintellectualperfection:anditseemstomealsonottobeincludedinthecommonnotionsoftheexcellencesofcharacterwhichwecallvirtues:
themanifestationsofcourage，temperance，andjusticedonotbecomelessadmirablebecausewecantracetheirantecedentsinahappybalanceofinheriteddispositionsdevelopedbyacarefuleducation。
Can，then，theaffirmationornegationofFreeWillaffectourviewofthefittestmeansfortheattainmentofeitherend？Inconsideringthiswehavetodistinguishbetweenthecaseofaconnexionbetweenmeansandendbelievedtoexistonempiricalorotherscientificgrounds，andthecasewherethebeliefinsuchconnexionisaninferencefromthebeliefinamoralgovernmentoftheworld。Accordingtothereceivedviewofthemoralgovernmentoftheworld，theperformanceofDutyisthebestmeansofattainingtheagent’shappinesslargelythroughitsexpectedconsequencesinanotherworld，inwhichvirtuewillberewardedandvicepunishedbyGod:if，then，thebeliefinthemoralgovernmentoftheworldandafuturelifeformenisheldtodependontheassumptionofFreeWill，thislatterbecomesobviouslyoffundamentalethicalimportance:not，indeed，indeterminingaman’sDuty，butinreconcilingitwithhisInterest。This，Ithink，isthemainelementoftruthintheviewthatthedenialofFreeWillremovesmotivestotheperformanceofDuty:andIadmitthevalidityofthecontention，sofaras1thecourseofactionconducivetoanindividual’sInterestwouldbethoughttodivergefromhisDuty，apartfromtheologicalconsiderations，and2inthetheologicalreasoningthatremovesthisdivergenceFreeWillisanindispensableassumption。Theformerpointwillbeexaminedinasubsequentchapter；thelatterithardlyfallswithinthescopeofthistreatisetodiscuss。
Ifweconfineourattentiontosuchconnexionbetweenmeansandendsasisscientificallycognisable，itdoesnotappearthatanactnowdeliberatedoncanbelessormoreameanstoanyulteriorend，becauseitispredetermined。Itmay，however，beurgedthatinconsideringhowweoughttoactinanycase，wehavetotakeintoaccounttheprobablefutureactionsofothers，andalsoofourselves；andthatwithregardtotheseitisnecessarytodecidethequestionofFreeWill，inorderthatwemayknowwhetherthefutureiscapableofbeingpredictedfromthepast。
Buthere，again，itseemstomethatnodefinitepracticalconsequenceswouldlogicallyfollowfromthisdecision。ForhoweverfarwemaygoinadmittingFreeWillasacause，theactualoperationofwhichmayfalsifythemostscientificforecastsofhumanaction，stillsinceitisexhypothesianabsolutelyunknowncause，ourrecognitionofitcannotleadustomodifyanysuchforecasts:atmost，itcanonlyaffectourrelianceonthem。
Wemayillustratethisbyanimaginaryextremecase。SupposeweweresomehowconvincedthatalltheplanetswereendowedwithFreeWill，andthattheyonlymaintainedtheirperiodicmotionsbythecontinualexerciseoffreechoice，inresistancetostrongcentrifugalorcentripetalinclinations。Ourgeneralconfidenceinthefutureofthesolarsystemmightreasonablybeimpaired，thoughitisnoteasytosay
howmuch；butthedetailsofourastronomicalcalculationswouldbeclearlyunaffected:thefreewillscouldinnowaybetakenasanelementinthereckoning。Andthecasewouldbesimilar，Isuppose，intheforecastofhumanconduct，ifpsychologyandsociologyshouldeverbecomeexactsciences。
Atpresent，however，theyaresofarfrombeingsuchthatthisadditionalelementofuncertaintycanhardlyhaveevenanyemotionaleffect。
Tosumup:wemaysaythat，insofaraswereasontoanydefiniteconclusionsastowhatthefutureactionsofourselvesorotherswillbe，wemustconsiderthemasdeterminedbyunvaryinglaws:
iftheyarenotcompletelysodeterminedourreasoningisprotantoliabletoerror:butnootherisopentous。Whileontheotherhand，whenweareendeavouringtoascertainonanyprincipleswhatchoiceitisreasonabletomakebetweentwoalternativesofpresentconduct，Deterministconceptionsareasirrelevantastheyareintheformercaseinevitable。
Andfromneitherpointofviewdoesitseempracticallyimportant，forthegeneralregulationofconduct，todecidethemetaphysicalquestionatissueintheFree-willControversy:unless——passingfromEthicsintoTheology——werestthereconciliationofDutyandInterestonatheologicalargumentthatrequirestheassumptionofFreeWill。
SofarIhavebeenarguingthattheadoptionofDeterminismwillnot-exceptincertainexceptionalcircumstancesoroncertaintheologicalassumptions-reasonablymodifyaman’sviewofwhatitisrightforhimtodoorhisreasonsfordoingit。Itmay，however，besaidthat——grantingthereasonsforrightactiontoremainunaltered——stillthemotivesthatprompttoitwillbeweakened；sinceamanwillnotfeelremorseforhisactions，ifheregardsthemasnecessaryresultsofcausesanteriortohispersonalexistence。Iadmitthatsofarasthesentimentofremorseimpliesself-blameirremovablyfixedontheselfblamed，itmusttendtovanishfromthemindofaconvincedDeterminist。StillIdonotseewhytheimaginationofaDeterministshouldnotbeasvivid，hissympathyaskeen，hisloveofgoodnessasstrongasaLibertarian’s:
andIthereforeseenoreasonwhydislikeforhisownshortcomingsandforthemischievousqualitiesofhischaracterwhichhavecausedbadactionsinthepastshouldnotbeaseffectiveaspringofmoralimprovementasthesentimentofremorsewouldbe。Foritappearstomethatmeningeneraltakeatleastasmuchpainstocuredefectsintheircircumstances，organicdefects，anddefectsofintellectwhichcausethemnoremorse——astheydotocuremoraldefects；sofarastheyconsidertheformertobenolessmischievousandnolessremovablethanthelatter。
ThisleadsmetotheconsiderationoftheeffectofDeterministdoctrinesontheallotmentofpunishmentandreward。Foritmustbeadmitted，Ithink，thatthecommonretributiveviewofpunishment，andtheordinarynotionsof``merit’’，``demerit’’，and``responsibility’’，alsoinvolvetheassumptionofFreeWill:ifthewrongact，andthebadqualitiesofcharactermanifestedinit，areconceivedasthenecessaryeffectsofcausesantecedentorexternaltotheexistenceoftheagent，themoralresponsibility——intheordinarysense——forthemischiefcausedbythemcannolongerrestonhim。Atthesametime，theDeterministcangivetotheterms``ill-desert’’and``responsibility’’
asignificationwhichisnotonlyclearanddefinite，but，fromanutilitarianpointofview，theonlysuitablemeaning。Inthisview，ifIaffirmthatAisresponsibleforaharmfulact，Imeanthatitisrighttopunishhimforit；primarily，inorderthatthefearofpunishmentmaypreventhimandothersfromcommittingsimilaractsinfuture。Thedifferencebetweenthesetwoviewsofpunishmentistheoreticallyverywide。Ishall，however，whenIcometoexamineindetailthecurrentconceptionofJustice，endeavourtoshowthatthisadmissioncanhardlyhaveanypracticaleffect；sinceitispracticallyimpossibletobeguided，eitherinremuneratingservicesorinpunishingmischievousarts，byanyotherconsiderationsthanthosewhichtheDeterministinterpretationofdesertwouldinclude。Forinstance，thetreatmentoflegalpunishmentasdeterrentandreformatoryratherthanretributiveseemstobeforceduponusbythepracticalexigencesofsocialorderandwellbeing——quiteapartfromanyDeterministphilosophy。Moreover，asIshallhereaftershow，iftheretributiveviewofPunishmentbestrictlytaken——abstractingcompletelyfromthepreventiveview——itbringsourconceptionofJusticeintoconflictwithBenevolence，aspunishmentpresentsitselfasapurelyuselessevil。Similarly，asregardsthesentimentswhichprompttotheexpressionofmoralpraiseandblame——IadmitthatinthemindofaconvincedDeterminist，thedesiretoencouragegoodandpreventbadconductmusttaketheplaceofadesiretorequitetheoneortheother:
butagainIseenoreasonwhytheDeterministspeciesofmoralsentimentsshouldnotbeaseffectiveinpromotingvirtueandsocialwellbeingastheLibertarianspecies。