WemayconvenientlybeginbydefiningmoreexactlythenotionofVoluntaryaction，towhich，accordingtoallmethodsofEthicsalike，thepredicates`right’and`whatoughttobedone’——inthestrictestethicalsense——areexclusivelyapplicable。Inthefirstplace，Voluntaryactionisdistinguishedas`conscious’fromactionsormovementsofthehumanorganismwhichare`unconscious’or`mechanical’。
Thepersonwhoseorganismperformssuchmovementsonlybecomesawareofthem，ifatall，aftertheyhavebeenperformed；accordinglytheyarenotimputedtohimasaperson，orjudgedtobemorallywrongorimprudent；
thoughtheymaysometimesbejudgedtobegoodorbadinrespectoftheirconsequences，withtheimplicationthattheyoughttobeencouragedorcheckedasfarasthiscanbedoneindirectlybyconsciouseffort。
Soagain，inthecaseofconsciousactions，theagentisnotregardedasmorallyculpable，exceptinanindirectway，forentirelyunforeseeneffectsofhisvoluntaryactions。Nodoubtwhenaman’sactionhascausedsomeunforeseenharm，thepopularmoraljudgmentoftenblameshimforcarelessness；butitwouldbegenerallyadmittedbyreflectivepersonsthatinsuchcasesstrictlymoralblameonlyattachestotheagentinanindirectway，insofarashiscarelessnessistheresultofsomewilfulneglectofduty。Thustheproperimmediateobjectsofmoralapprovalordisapprovalwouldseemtobealwaystheresultsofaman’svolitionssofarastheywereintended——i。e。representedinthoughtascertainorprobableconsequencesofhisvolitions:——or，morestrictly，thevolitionsthemselvesinwhichsuchresultsweresointended，sincewedonotconsiderthatamanisrelievedfrommoralblamebecausehiswrongintentionremainsunrealisedthroughexternalcauses。
Thisviewseemsatfirstsighttodifferfromthecommonopinionthatthemoralityofactsdependsontheir`motives’；ifbymotivesareunderstoodthedesiresthatwefeelforsomeoftheforeseenconsequencesofouracts。ButIdonotthinkthatthosewhoholdthisopinionwoulddenythatweareblameworthyforanyprohibitedresultwhichweforesawinwilling，whetheritwastheobjectofdesireornot。Nodoubtitiscommonlyheldthatacts，similarasregardstheirforeseenresults，maybe`better’or`worse’throughthepresenceofcertaindesiresoraversions。Stillsofarasthesefeelingsarenotaltogetherunderthecontrolofthewill，thejudgmentof`right’and`wrong’——inthestrictestsenseoftheseterms——seemstobenotproperlyapplicabletothefeelingsthemselves，butrathertotheexertionoromissionofvoluntaryefforttocheckbadmotivesandencouragegoodones，ortotheconsciousadoptionofanobjectofdesireasanendtobeaimedat——whichisaspeciesofvolition。
Wemayconcludethenthatjudgmentsofrightandwrongrelateproperlytovolitionsaccompaniedwithintentionwhethertheintendedconsequencesbeexternal，orsomeeffectsproducedontheagent’sownfeelingsorcharacter。Thisexcludesfromthescopeofsuchjudgmentsthoseconsciousactionswhicharenotintentional，strictlyspeaking；aswhensuddenstrongfeelingsofpleasureandpaincausemovementswhichweareawareofmaking，butwhicharenotprecededbyanyrepresentationinideaeitherofthemovementsthemselvesoroftheireffects。Forsuchactions，sometimesdistinguishedas`instinctive’，weareonlyheldtoberesponsibleindirectlysofarasanybadconsequencesofthemmighthavebeenpreventedbyvoluntaryeffortstoformhabitsofmorecompleteself-control。
Wehavetoobservefurtherthatourcommonmoraljudgmentsrecogniseanimportantdistinctionbetweenimpulsiveanddeliberatewrongdoing，condemningthe，lattermorestronglythantheformer。Thelinebetweenthetwocannotbesharplydrawn:butwemaydefine`impulsive’actionsasthosewheretheconnexionbetweenthefeelingthatpromptsandtheactionpromptedissosimpleandimmediatethat，thoughintentionisdistinctlypresent，theconsciousnessofpersonalchoiceoftheintendedresultisevanescent。Indeliberatevolitionsthereisalwaysaconsciousselectionoftheresultasoneoftwoormorepracticalalternatives。
Inthecase，then，ofsuchvolitionsasarepre-eminentlytheobjectsofmoralcondemnationandapprobation，thepsychicalfact`volition’
seemstoinclude——besidesintention，orrepresentationoftheresultsofaction——alsotheconsciousnessofselfaschoosing，resolving，determiningtheseresults。AndthequestionwhichIunderstandtobeatissueintheFreeWillcontroversymaybestatedthus:IstheselftowhichIrefermydeliberatevolitionsaselfofstrictlydeterminatemoralqualities，adefinitecharacterpartlyinherited，partlyformedbymypastactionsandfeelings，andbyanyphysicalinfluencesthatitmayhaveunconsciouslyreceived；sothatmyvoluntaryaction，forgoodorforevil，isatanymomentcompletelycausedbythedeterminatequalitiesofthischaracter，togetherwithmycircumstances，ortheexternalinfluencesactingonmeatthemoment——includingunderthislattertermmypresentbodilyconditions？——oristherealwaysapossibilityofmychoosingtoactinthemannerthatInowjudgetobereasonableandright，whatevermypreviousactionsandexperiencesmayhavebeen？
Intheabovequestionsamaterialistwouldsubstitute`brainandnervoussystem’for`character’，andtherebyobtainaclearernotion；butIhaveavoidedusingtermswhichsuggestmaterialisticassumptions，becauseDeterminismbynomeansinvolvesMaterialism。Forthepresentpurposethedifferenceisunimportant。Thesubstantialdisputerelatestothecompletenessofthecausaldependenceofanyvolitionuponthestateofthingsattheprecedinginstant，whetherwespecifytheseas`characterandcircumstances’，or`brainandenvironingforces’。
OntheDeterministsidethereisacumulativeargumentofgreatforce。Thebeliefthateventsaredeterminatelyrelatedtothestateofthingsimmediatelyprecedingthemisnowheldbyallcompetentthinkersinrespectofallkindsofoccurrencesexcepthumanvolitions。
Ithassteadilygrownbothintensivelyandextensively，bothinclearnessandcertaintyofconvictionandinuniversalityofapplication，asthehumanmindhasdevelopedandhumanexperiencehasbeensystematisedandenlarged。Stepbystepinsuccessivedepartmentsoffactconflictingmodesofthoughthaverecededandfaded，untilatlengththeyhavevanishedeverywhere，exceptfromthismysteriouscitadelofWill。Everywhereelsethebeliefissofirmlyestablishedthatsomedeclareitsoppositetobeinconceivable:
othersevenmaintainthatitalwayswasso。Everyscientificprocedureassumesit:eachsuccessofscienceconfirmsit。Andnotonlyarewefindingevernewproofthateventsarecognisablydetermined，butalsothatthedifferentmodesofdeterminationofdifferentkindsofeventsarefundamentallyidenticalandmutuallydependent:andnaturally，withtheincreasingconvictionoftheessentialunityofthecognisableuniverse，increasestheindispositiontoallowtheexceptionalcharacterclaimedbyLibertariansforthedepartmentofhumanaction。
Again，whenwefixourattentiononhumanaction，weobservethattheportionofitwhichisoriginatedunconsciouslyisadmittedlydeterminedbyphysicalcauses:andwefindthatnoclearlinecanbedrawnbetweenactsofthiskindandthosewhichareconsciousandvoluntary。Notonlyaremanyactsoftheformerclassentirelysimilartothoseofthelatter，exceptinbeingunconscious:butweremarkfurtherthatactionswhichwehabituallyperformcontinuallypassfromtheconsciousclassintothe——whollyorpartly——unconscious:andthefurtherweinvestigate，themoretheconclusionisforceduponus，thatthereisnokindofactionoriginatedbyconsciousvolitionwhichcannotalso，undercertaincircumstances，beoriginatedunconsciously。Again，whenwelookcloselyatourconsciousacts，wefindthatinrespectofsuchofthemasIhavecharacterisedas`impulsive’——actsdonesuddenlyunderthestimulusofamomentarysensationoremotion——ourconsciousnesscanhardlybesaidtosuggestthattheyarenotcompletelydeterminedbythestrengthofthestimulusandthestateofourpreviouslydeterminedtemperamentandcharacteratthetimeofitsoperation:andhereagain，aswasbeforeobserved，itisdifficulttodrawalineclearlyseparatingtheseactionsfromthoseinwhichtheapparentconsciousnessof`freechoice’becomesdistinct。
Further，wealwaysexplainthevoluntaryactionofallmenexceptourselvesontheprincipleofcausationbycharacterandcircumstances。Indeedotherwisesociallifewouldbeimpossible:
forthelifeofmaninsocietyinvolvesdailyamassofminuteforecastsoftheactionsofothermen，foundedonexperienceofmankindgenerally，orofparticularclassesofmen，orofindividuals；whoarethusnecessarilyregardedasthingshavingdeterminateproperties，causeswhoseeffectsarecalculable。Weinfergenerallythefutureactionsofthosewhomweknowfromtheirpastactions；andifourforecastturnsoutinanycasetobeerroneous，wedonotattributethediscrepancytothedisturbinginfluenceofFreeWill，buttoourincompleteacquaintancewiththeircharacterandmotives。Andpassingfromindividualstocommunities，whetherwebelieveina``socialscience’’ornot，wealladmitandtakepartindiscussionsofsocialphenomenainwhichthesameprincipleisassumed:andhoweverwemaydifferastoparticulartheories，weneverdoubtthevalidityoftheassumption:andifwefindanythinginexplicableinhistory，pastorpresent，itneveroccurstoustoattributeittoanextensiveexerciseoffreewillinaparticulardirection。Nay，evenasregardsourownactions，however`free’wefeelourselvesatanymoment，howeverunconstrainedbypresentmotivesandcircumstancesandunfetteredbytheresultofwhatwehavepreviouslybeenandfelt，ourvolitionalchoicemayappear:still，whenitisoncewellpast，andwesurveyitintheseriesofouractions，itsrelationsofcausationandresemblancetootherpartsofourlifeappear，andwenaturallyexplainitasaneffectofournature，education，andcircumstances。Nayweevenapplythesameconceptionstoourfutureaction，andthemore，inproportionasourmoralsentimentsaredeveloped:forwithoursenseofdutygenerallyincreasesoursenseofthedutyofmoralculture，andourdesireofself-improvement:andthepossibilityOfmoralself-culturedependsontheassumptionthatbyapresentvolitionwecandeterminetosomeextentouractionsinthemoreorlessremotefuture。
Nodoubtwehabituallytakeatthesametimetheopposite，Libertarian，viewastoourfuture:webelieve，forexample，thatweareperfectlyabletoresisthenceforwardtemptationstowhichwehavecontinuallyyieldedinthepast。Butitshouldbeobservedthatthisbeliefisasmoralistsofallschoolsadmitandevenurgeatanyratetoagreatextentillusoryandmisleading。ThoughLibertarianscontendthatitispossibleforusatanymomenttoactinamanneropposedtoouracquiredtendenciesandpreviouscustoms，——still，theyandDeterministsaliketeachthatitismuchlesseasythanmencommonlyimaginetobreakthesubtleunfelttrammelsofhabit。
AgainsttheformidablearrayofcumulativeevidenceofferedforDeterminismthereistobesettheimmediateaffirmationofconsciousnessinthemomentofdeliberateaction。CertainlywhenIhaveadistinctconsciousnessofchoosingbetweenalternativesofconduct，oneofwhichIconceiveasrightorreasonable，IfinditimpossiblenottothinkthatIcannowchoosetodowhatIsoconceive，——supposingthatthereisnoobstacletomydoingitotherthantheconditionofmydesiresandvoluntaryhabits，——howeverstrongmaybemyinclinationtoactunreasonably，andhoweveruniformlyImayhaveyieldedtosuchinclinationsinthepast。[1]Irecognisethateachconcessiontoviciousdesiremakesthedifficultyofresistingitgreaterwhenthedesirerecurs:butthedifficultyalwaysseemstoremainseparatedfromimpossibilitybyanimpassablegulf。Idonotdenythattheexperienceofmankindincludescasesinwhichcertainimpulses——suchasaversiontodeathorextremepain，ormorbidappetiteforalcoholoropium-havereachedapointofintensityatwhichtheyhavebeenfeltasirresistiblyovermasteringvoluntarychoice。Ithinkwecommonlyjudgethatwhenthispointisreachedtheindividualceasestobemorallyresponsiblefortheactdoneundersuchovermasteringimpulse:butatanyratethemoralproblemthuspresentedisveryexceptional；inordinarycasesofyieldingtotemptationthisconsciousnessoftheirresistibilityofimpulsedoesnotcomein。
Ordinarily，howeverstrongmaybetherushofappetiteorangerthatcomesoverme，itdoesnotpresentitselfasirresistible；and，ifIdeliberateatsuchamoment，IcannotregardthemereforceoftheimpulseasareasonfordoingwhatIotherwisejudgetobeunreasonable。Icansupposethatmyconvictionoffreechoicemaybeillusory:thatifIknewmyownnature，Imightseeittobepredeterminedthat，beingsoconstitutedandinsuchcircumstances，Ishouldactontheoccasioninquestioncontrarytomyrationaljudgment。ButIcannotconceivemyselfseeingthis，withoutatthesametimeconceivingmywholeconceptionofwhatInowcall``my’’
actionfundamentallyaltered:IcannotconceivethatifIcontemplatedtheactionsofmyorganisminthislightIshouldreferthemtomy“self“——i。e。tothemindsocontemplating——inthesenseinwhichInowreferthem。
Inthisconflictofarguments，itisnotsurprisingthatthetheoreticalquestionastotheFreedomoftheWillisstilldifferentlydecidedbythinkersofrepute；andIdonotmyselfwishatpresenttopronounceanydecisiononit。ButIthinkitpossibleandusefultoshowthattheethicalimportanceofdecidingitonewayoranotherisliabletobeexaggerated；
andthatanyonewhowillconsiderthemattersoberlyandcarefullywillfindthisimportancetobeofastrictlylimitedkind。