ThatthisexplanationistrueforsomemindsinsomemoodsIwouldnotdeny。StillIthinkthatwhenamanseriouslyasks`whyheshoulddo’anything，hecommonlyassumesinhimselfadeterminationtopursuewhateverconductmaybeshownbyargumenttobereasonable，eventhoughitbeverydifferentfromthattowhichhisnon-rationalinclinationsmayprompt。Andwearegenerallyagreedthatreasonableconductinanycasehastobedeterminedonprinciples，inapplyingwhichtheagent’sinclination——asitexistsapartfromsuchdetermination——isonlyoneelementamongseveralthathavetobeconsidered，andcommonlynotthemostimportantelement。Butwhenweaskwhattheseprinciplesare，thediversityofanswerswhichwefindmanifestlydeclaredinthesystemsandfundamentalformulaeofprofessedmoralistsseemstobereallypresentinthecommonpracticalreasoningofmengenerally；withthisdifference，thatwhereasthephilosopherseeksunityofprinciple，andconsistencyofmethodattheriskofparadox，theunphilosophicmanisapttoholddifferentprinciplesatonce，andtoapplydifferentmethodsinmoreorlessconfusedcombination。Ifthisbeso，wecanofferanotherexplanationofthepersistentunsatisfieddemandforanultimatereason，abovenoticed。
Foriftherearedifferentviewsoftheultimatereasonablenessofconduct，implicitinthethoughtofordinarymen，thoughnotbroughtintoclearrelationtoeachother，-itiseasytoseethatanysingleanswertothequestion’why’willnotbecompletelysatisfactory，asitwillbegivenonlyfromoneofthesepointsofview，andwillalwaysleaveroomtoaskthequestionfromsomeother。
Iammyselfconvincedthatthisisthemainexplanationofthephenomenon:anditisonthisconvictionthattheplanofthepresenttreatiseisbased。Wecannot，ofcourse，regardasvalidreasoningsthatleadtoconflictingconclusions；andIthereforeassumeasafundamentalpostulateofEthics，thatsofarastwomethodsconflict，oneorotherofthemmustbemodifiedorrejected。ButIthinkitfundamentallyimportanttorecognise，attheoutsetofEthicalinquiry，thatthereisadiversityofmethodsappliedinordinarypracticalthought。
Whatthenarethesedifferentmethods？whatarethedifferentpracticalprincipleswhichthecommonsenseofmankindisprimafaciepreparedtoacceptasultimate？Somecareisneededinansweringthisquestion:becausewefrequentlyprescribethatthisorthat`ought’tobedoneoraimedatwithoutanyexpressreferencetoanulteriorend，whileyetsuchanendistacitlypresupposed。Itisobviousthatsuchprescriptionsaremerely，whatKantcallsthem，HypotheticalImperatives；theyarenotaddressedtoanyonewhohasnotfirstacceptedtheend。
Forinstance:ateacherofanyartassumesthathispupilwantstoproducetheproductoftheart，ortoproduceitexcellentinquality:betellshimthatbeoughttoholdtheawl，thehammer，thebrushdifferently。Aphysicianassumesthathispatientwantshealth:
hetellshimthatheoughttoriseearly，toliveplainly，totakehardexercise。Ifthepatientdeliberatelypreferseaseandgoodlivingtohealth，thephysician’spreceptsfalltotheground:theyarenolongeraddressedtohim。So，again，amanoftheworldassumesthathishearerswishtogetoninsociety，whenhelaysdownrulesofdress，manner，conversation，habitsoflife。Asimilarviewmaybeplausiblytakenofmanyrulesprescribingwhataresometimescalled``dutiestooneself’’:itmaybesaidthattheyaregivenontheassumptionthatamanregardshisownHappinessasanultimateend:thatifanyoneshouldbesoexceptionalastodisregardit，hedoesnotcomewithintheirscope:inshort，thatthe`ought’
insuchformulaisstillimplicitlyrelativetoanoptionalend。
Itdoesnot，however，seemtomethatthisaccountofthematterisexhaustive。
Wedonotalllookwithsimpleindifferenceonamanwhodeclinestotaketherightmeanstoattainhisownhappiness，onnoothergroundthanthathedoesnotcareabouthappiness。Mostmenwouldregardsucharefusalasirrational，withacertaindisapprobation；theywouldthusimplicitlyassenttoButler’sstatementthat``interest，one’sownhappiness，isamanifestobligation’’。Inotherwords，theywouldthinkthatamanoughttocareforhisownhappiness。Theword`ought’thususedisnolongerrelative:happinessnowappearsasanultimateend，thepursuitofwhich——atleastwithinthelimitsimposedbyotherduties——appearstobeprescribedbyreason’categorically，’asKantwouldsay，i。e。withoutanytacitassumptionofastillulteriorend。Andithasbeenwidelyheldbyevenorthodoxmoraliststhatallmoralityrestsultimatelyonthebasisof``reasonableself-love’’；i。e。thatitsrulesareultimatelybindingonanyindividualonlysofarasitishisinterestonthewholetoobservethem。
Still，commonmoralopinioncertainlyregardsthedutyorvirtueofPrudenceasonlyapart——andnotthemostimportantpart——ofdutyorvirtueingeneral。Commonmoralopinionrecognisesandinculcatesotherfundamentalrules——e。g。thoseofJustice，GoodFaith，Veracity——which，initsordinaryjudgmentsonparticularcases，itisinclinedtotreatasbindingwithoutqualificationandwithoutregardtoulteriorconsequences。And，intheordinaryformoftheIntuitionalviewofEthics，the``categorical’’prescriptionofsuchrulesismaintainedexplicitlyanddefinitely，asaresultofphilosophicalreflection:andtherealisationofVirtueinact——atleastinthecaseofthevirtuesjustmentioned——isheldtoconsistinstrictandunswervingconformitytosuchrules。
OntheotherhanditiscontendedbymanyUtilitariansthatalltherulesofconductwhichmenprescribetooneanotherasmoralrulesarereally——thoughinpartunconsciously——prescribedasmeanstothegeneralhappinessofmankind，orofthewholeaggregateofsentientbeings；anditisstillmorewidelyheldbyUtilitarianthinkersthatsuchrules，howevertheymayoriginate，areonlyvalidsofarastheirobservance。
isconducivetothegeneralhappiness。ThiscontentionIshallhereafterexaminewithduecare。HereIwishonlytopointoutthat，ifthedutyofaimingatthegeneralhappinessisthustakentoincludeallotherduties，assubordinateapplicationsofit，weseemtobeagainledtothenotionofHappinessasanultimateendcategoricallyprescribed，——onlyitisnowGeneralHappinessandnottheprivatehappinessofanyindividual。
AndthisistheviewthatImyselftakeoftheUtilitarianprinciple。
Atthesametime，itisnotnecessary，inthemethodicalinvestigationofrightconduct，consideredrelativelytotheendeitherofprivateorofgeneralhappiness，toassumethattheenditselfisdeterminedorprescribedbyreason:weonlyrequiretoassume，inreasoningtocogentpracticalconclusions，thatitisadoptedasultimateandparamount。Forifamanacceptsanyendasultimateandparamount，heacceptsimplicitlyashis``methodofethics’’whateverprocessofreasoningenableshimtodeterminetheactionsmostconducivetothisend。Since，however，toeverydifferenceintheendacceptedatleastsomedifferenceinmethodwillgenerallycorrespond:ifalltheendswhichmenarefoundpracticallytoadoptasultimatesubordinatingeverythingelsetotheattainmentofthemundertheinfluenceof`rulingpassions’，weretakenasprinciplesforwhichthestudentofEthicsiscalledupontoconstructrationalmethods，histaskwouldbeverycomplexandextensive。Butifweconfineourselvestosuchendsasthecommonsenseofmankindappearstoacceptasrationalultimateends，thetaskisreduced，Ithink，withinmanageablelimits；sincethiscriterionwillexcludeatleastmanyoftheobjectswhichmenpracticallyseemtoregardasparamount。Thusmanymensacrificehealth，fortune，happiness，toFame，butnoone，sofarasI
know，hasdeliberatelymaintainedthatFameisanobjectwhichitisreasonableformentoseekforitsownsake。Itonlycommendsitselftoreflectivemindseither1asasourceofHappinesstothepersonwhogainsit，or2asignofhisExcellence，moralorintellectual，or3becauseitatteststheachievementbyhimofsomeimportantbenefittosociety，andatthesametimestimulateshimandotherstofurtherachievementinthefuture:andtheconceptionof``benefit’’would，whenexaminedinitsturn，leadusagaintoHappinessorExcellenceofhumannature，——sinceamaniscommonlythoughttobenefitotherseitherbymakingthemhappierorbymakingthemwiserandmorevirtuous。
Whetherthereareanyendsbesidesthesetwo，whichcanbereasonablyregardedasultimate，itwillhereafterbepartofourbusinesstoinvestigate:
butwemayperhapssaythatprimafacietheonlytwoendswhichhaveastronglyandwidelysupportedclaimtoberegardedasrationalultimateendsarethetwojustmentioned，HappinessandPerfectionorExcellenceofhumannature——meaninghereby`Excellence’notprimarilysuperioritytoothers，butapartialrealisationof，orapproximationto，anidealtypeofhumanPerfection。Andwemustobservethattheadoptionoftheformeroftheseendsleadsustotwoprimafaciedistinctmethods，accordingasitissoughttoberealiseduniversally，orbyeachindividualforhimselfalone。Forthoughdoubtlessamanmayoftenbestpromotehisownhappinessbylabouringandabstainingforthesakeofothers，itseemstobeimpliedinourcommonnotionofself-sacrificethatactionsmostconducivetothegeneralhappinessdonot——inthisworldatleast——alwaystendalsotothegreatesthappinessoftheagent。Andamongthosewhoholdthat``happinessisourbeing’sendandaim’’weseemtofindafundamentaldifferenceofopinionastowhosehappinessitisthatitisultimatelyreasonabletoaimat。Fortosomeitseemsthat``theconstantlyproperendofactiononthepartofanyindividualatthemomentofactionishisrealgreatesthappinessfromthatmomenttotheendofhislife’’；
[6]whereasothersholdthattheviewofreasonisessentiallyuniversal，andthatitcannotbereasonabletotakeasanultimateandparamountendthehappinessofanyoneindividualratherthanthatofanyother——atanyrateifequallydeservingandsusceptibleofit——sothatgeneralhappinessmustbethe``truestandardofrightandwrong，inthefieldofmorals’’
nolessthanofpolitics。[7]Itis，ofcourse，possibletoadoptanendintermediatebetweenthetwo，andtoaimatthehappinessofsomelimitedportionofmankind，suchasone’sfamilyornationorrace:butanysuchlimitationseemsarbitrary，andprobablyfewwouldmaintainittobereasonableperse，exceptasthemostpracticablewayofaimingatthegeneralhappiness，orofindirectlysecuringone’sown。
ThecaseseemstobeotherwisewithExcellenceorPerfection。Atfirstsight，indeed，thesamealternativespresentthemselves:itseemsthattheExcellenceaimedatmaybetakeneitherindividuallyoruniversally；andcircumstancesareconceivableinwhichamanisnotunlikelytothinkthathecouldbestpromotetheExcellenceofothersbysacrificinghisown。ButnomoralistwhotakesExcellenceasanultimateendhaseverapprovedofsuchsacrifice，atleastsofarasMoralExcellenceisconcerned；noonehaseverdirectedanindividualtopromotethevirtueofothersexceptinsofarasthispromotioniscompatiblewith，orratherinvolvedin，thecompleterealisationofVirtueinhimself。Sofar，then，thereseemstobenoneedofseparatingthemethodofdeterminingrightconductwhichtakestheExcellenceorPerfectionoftheindividualastheultimateaimfromthatwhichaimsattheExcellenceorPerfectionofthehumancommunity。AndsinceVirtueiscommonlyconceivedasthemostvaluableelementofhumanExcellence——andanelementessentiallypreferabletoanyotherelementthatcancomeintocompetitionwithitasanalternativeforrationalchoice——anymethodwhichtakesPerfectionorExcellenceofhumannatureasultimateEndwillprimafaciecoincidetoagreatextentwiththatbasedonwhatIcalledtheIntuitionalview:
andIhaveaccordinglydecidedtotreatitasaspecialformofthislatter。
ThetwomethodswhichtakehappinessasanultimateenditwillbeconvenienttodistinguishasEgoisticandUniversalisticHedonism:andasitisthelatterofthese，astaughtbyBenthamandhissuccessors，thatismoregenerallyunderstoodundertheterm`Utilitarianism’，Ishallalwaysrestrictthatwordtothissignification。ForEgoisticHedonismitissomewhathardtofindasingleperfectlyappropriateterm。IshalloftencallthissimplyEgoism:butitmaysometimesbeconvenienttocallitEpicureanism:forthoughthisnamemoreproperlydenotesaparticularhistoricalsystem，ithascometobecommonlyusedinthewidersenseinwhichIwishtoemployit。