Mydifficultywas,asIhavesaid,thatthisclaimofconscience,whetherutilitarianornot,hadtobeharmonisedwiththeclaimofRationalSelf-love;
andthatIvaguelysupposedButlertoavoidoroverride[thelatterclaim]。
Butreadinghimatthisstagewithmorecare,I
foundinhim,withpleasureandsurprise,aviewverysimilartothatwhichhaddevelopeditselfinmyownmindinstrugglingtoassimilateMillandKant。Ifoundheexpresslyadmittedthat``interest,myownhappiness,isamanifestobligation’’,andthat``ReasonableSelf-love’’[is``oneofthetwochieforsuperiorprinciplesinthenatureofman’’]。Thatis,herecogniseda``DualismoftheGoverningFaculty’’——orasIprefertosay``DualismofthePracticalReason’’,sincethe`authority’onwhichButlerlaidstressmustpresentitselftomymindastheauthorityofreason,beforeIcanadmitit。
Ofthismorepresently:whatInowwishtomakeclearisthatitwasonthisside——ifImaysosay——thatIenteredintoButler’ssystemandcameundertheinfluenceofhispowerfulandcautiousintellect。ButtheeffectofhisinfluencecarriedmeafurtherstepawayfromMill:forIwasledbyittoabandonthedoctrineofPsychologicalHedonism,andtorecognisetheexistenceof`disinterested’or`extra-regarding’
impulsestoaction,[impulses]notdirectedtowardstheagent’spleasure[cf。chapiv。ofBooki。ofTheMethodsofEthics]。InfactasregardswhatImaycall。aPsychologicalbasisofEthics,IfoundmyselfmuchmoreinagreementwithButlerthanMill。
AndthisledmetoreconsidermyrelationtoIntuitionalEthics。ThestrengthandvehemenceofButler’scondemnationofpureUtilitarianism,insocautiousawriter,naturallyimpressedmemuch。AndIhadmyselfbecome,asIhadtoadmittomyself,anIntuitionisttoacertainextent。
Forthesupremeruleofaimingatthegeneralhappiness,asIhadcometosee,mustrestonafundamentalmoralintuition,ifIwastorecogniseitasbindingatall。AndinreadingthewritingsoftheearlierEnglishIntuitionists,MoreandClarke,IfoundtheaxiomIrequiredformyUtilitarianism[ThatarationalagentisboundtoaimatUniversalHappiness],inoneformoranother,holdingaprominentplacecf。HistoryofEthics,pp。172,181。
Ihadthen,theoreticallyaswellaspractically,acceptedthisfundamentalmoralintuition;andtherewasalsotheKantianprinciple,whichIrecognisedasirresistiblyvalid,thoughnotadequatetogivecompleteguidance——Iwasthenan``intuitional’’moralisttothisextent:andifso,whynotfurther?TheorthodoxmoralistssuchasWhewelltheninvoguesaidthattherewasawholeintelligiblesystemofintuitions:buthowweretheytobelearnt?1couldnotacceptButler’sviewastothesufficiencyofaplainman’sconscience:foritappearedtomethatplainmenagreedratherverballythanreally。
InthisstateofmindIhadtoreadAristotleagain;
andalightseemedtodawnuponmeastothemeaninganddriftofhisprocedure——especiallyinBooksii。,iii。,iv。oftheEthics——cf。HistoryofEthics,chap。ii。§;9,p。58,readtoendofsection。
WhathegaveustherewastheCommonSenseMoralityofGreece,reducedtoconsistencybycarefulcomparison:givennotassomethingexternaltohimbutaswhat``we’’——heandothers——think,ascertainedbyreflection。AndwasnotthisreallytheSocraticinduction,elicitedbyinterrogation?MightInotimitatethis:dothesameforourmoralityhereandnow,inthesamemannerofimpartialreflectiononcurrentopinion?
IndeedoughtInottodothisbeforedecidingonthequestionwhetherIhadorhadnotasystemofmoralintuitions?Atanyratetheresultwouldbeuseful,whateverconclusionIcameto。
SothiswasthepartofmybookfirstwrittenBookiii。,chaps。i——xi。,andacertainimitationofAristotle’smannerwasverymarkedinitatfirst,andthoughIhavetriedtoremoveitwhereitseemedtomeaffectedorpedantic,itstillremainstosomeextent。
ButtheresultoftheexaminationwastobringoutwithfreshforceandvividnessthedifferencebetweenthemaximsofCommonSenseMoralityeventhestrongestandstrictest,e。g。VeracityandGoodFaithandtheintuitionswhichIhadalreadyattained,i。e。theKantianPrincipleofwhichInowsawtheonlycertainelementinJustice——``treatsimilarcasessimilarly’’——tobeaparticularapplication,andtheFundamentalPrincipleofUtilitarianism。AndthislatterwasinperfectharmonywiththeKantianPrinciple。Icertainlycouldwillittobeauniversallawthatmenshouldactinsuchawayastopromoteuniversalhappiness;infactitwastheonlylawthatitwasperfectlycleartomethatIcouldthusdecisivelywill,fromauniversalpointofview。
IwasthenaUtilitarianagain,butonanIntuitionalbasis。
Butfurther,thereflectiononCommonSenseMoralitywhichIhadgonethrough,hadcontinuallybroughthometomeitscharacterasasystemofrulestendingtothepromotionofgeneralhappinesscf。
[MethodsofEthics]pp。
AlsothepreviousreflectiononhedonisticmethodforBookii。hadshownmeitsweaknesses。Whatwasthentobedone?[The]
conservativeattitude[tobeobserved]towardsCommonSense[is]giveninchapterv。ofBookiv。:``Adheregenerally,deviateandattemptreformonlyinexceptionalcasesinwhich,——notwithstandingtheroughnessofhedonisticmethod,——theargumentagainstCommonSenseisdecisive。’’
InthisstateofmindIpublishedmybook:ItriedtosaywhatIhadfound:thattheoppositionbetweenUtilitarianismandIntuitionismwasduetoamisunderstanding。Therewasindeedafundamentaloppositionbetweentheindividual’sinterestandeithermorality,whichIcouldnotsolvebyanymethodIhadyetfoundtrustworthy,withouttheassumptionofthemoralgovernmentoftheworld:sofarIagreedwithbothButlerandKant。
ButIcouldfindnorealoppositionbetweenIntuitionismandUtilitarianism?TheUtilitarianismofMillandBenthamseemedtometowantabasis:thatbasiscouldonlybesuppliedbyafundamentalintuition;
ontheotherhandthebestexamination1couldmakeoftheMoralityofCommonSenseshowedmenoclearandself-evidentprinciplesexceptsuchaswereperfectlyconsistentwithUtilitarianism。
Still,investigationoftheUtilitarianmethodledmetoseedefects[init]:themerelyempiricalexaminationoftheconsequencesofactionsisunsatisfactory,andbeingthusconsciousofthepracticalimperfectioninmanycasesoftheguidanceoftheUtilitariancalculus,Iremainedanxioustotreatwithrespect,andmakeuseof,theguidanceaffordedbyCommonSenseinthesecases,onthegroundofthegeneralpresumptionwhichevolutionaffordedthatmoralsentimentsandopinionswouldpointtoconductconducivetogeneralhappiness;thoughIcouldnotadmitthispresumptionasagroundforoverrulingastrongprobabilityoftheopposite,derivedfromutilitariancalculations。’’
ItonlyremainstomentionthattheTableofContentsandtheIndexhavebeenrevisedinaccordancewiththechangesinthetext。
ThisEditionisareprintoftheSixth,theonlychangesbesidescorrectionofafewclericalerrorsbeinganalterationoftypeinthepassagewhichoccursonp。45intheSixthEditionandpp。
inthisEdition,togetherwithconsequentchanges1inpagingandindexing,2inthereferencetothepassageinquestioninthereprintedPrefacetotheSixthEdition,and3intheinsertionofthenoteonp。
HenrySidgwick
TheboundariesofthestudycalledEthicsarevariouslyandoftenvaguelyconceived:buttheywillperhapsbesufficientlydefined,attheoutset,forthepurposesofthepresenttreatise,ifa`MethodofEthics’isexplainedtomeananyrationalprocedurebywhichwedeterminewhatindividualhumanbeings`ought’——orwhatitis`right’forthem-todo,ortoseektorealisebyvoluntaryaction。Byusingtheword``individual’’IprovisionallydistinguishthestudyofEthicsfromthatofPolitics,whichseekstodeterminetheproperconstitutionandtherightpublicconductofgovernedsocieties:
bothEthicsandPoliticsbeing,inmyview,distinguishedfrompositivesciencesbyhavingastheirspecialandprimaryobjecttodeterminewhatoughttobe,andnottoascertainwhatmerelyis,hasbeen,orwillbe。
ThestudentofEthicsseekstoattainsystematicandprecisegeneralknowledgeofwhatoughttobe,andinthissensehisaimsandmethodsmayproperlybetermed`scientific’:butIhavepreferredtocallEthicsastudyratherthanascience,becauseitiswidelythoughtthataSciencemustnecessarilyhavesomedepartmentofactualexistenceforitssubject-matter。Andinfacttheterm`EthicalScience’might,withoutviolationofusage,denoteeitherthedepartmentofPsychologythatdealswithvoluntaryactionanditssprings,andwithmoralsentimentsandjudgments,asactualphenomenaofindividualhumanminds;orthedepartmentofSociologydealingwithsimilarphenomena,asmanifestedbynormalmembersoftheorganisedgroupsofhumanbeingswhichwecallsocieties。Weobserve,however,thatmostpersonsdonotpursueeitherofthesestudiesmerelyfromcuriosity,inordertoascertainwhatactuallyexists,hasexisted,orwillexistintime。Theycommonlywishnotonlytounderstandhumanaction,butalsotoregulateit;inthisviewtheyapplytheideas`good’and`bad’,`right’
and`wrong’,totheconductorinstitutionswhichtheydescribe;andthuspass,asIshouldsay,fromthepointofviewofPsychologyorSociologytothatofEthicsorPolitics。MydefinitionofEthicsisdesignedtomarkclearlythefundamentalimportanceofthistransition。Itistruethatthemutualimplicationofthetwokindsofstudy——thepositiveandthepractical——is,onanytheory,verycloseandcomplete。Onanytheory,ourviewofwhatoughttobemustbelargelyderived,indetails,fromourapprehensionofwhatis;themeansofrealisingouridealcanonlybethoroughlylearnt。byacarefulstudyofactualphenomenaandtoanyindividualaskinghimself`WhatoughtItodooraimat?’itisimportanttoexaminetheanswerswhichhisfellow-menhaveactuallygiventosimilarquestions。Stillitseemsclearthatanattempttoascertainthegenerallawsoruniformitiesbywhichthevarietiesofhumanconduct,andofmen’ssentimentsandjudgmentsrespectingconduct,maybeexplained,isessentiallydifferentfromanattempttodeterminewhichamongthesevarietiesofconductisrightandwhichofthesedivergentjudgmentsvalid。
Itis,then,thesystematicconsiderationoftheselatterquestionswhichconstitutes,inmyview,thespecialanddistinctaimofEthicsandPolitics。
InthelanguageoftheprecedingsectionIcouldnotavoidtakingaccountoftwodifferentformsinwhichthefundamentalproblemofEthicsisstated;thedifferencebetweenwhichleads,asweshallpresentlysee,toratherimportantconsequences。EthicsissometimesconsideredasaninvestigationofthetrueMorallawsorrationalpreceptsofConduct;sometimesasaninquiryintothenatureoftheUltimateEndofreasonablehumanaction——theGoodor`TrueGood’ofman——andthemethodofattainingit。Boththeseviewsarefamiliar,andwillhavetobecarefullyconsidered:buttheformerseemsmostprominentinmodernethicalthought,andmosteasilyapplicabletomodernethicalsystemsgenerally。FortheGoodinvestigatedinEthicsislimitedtoGoodinsomedegreeattainablebyhumaneffort;accordinglyknowledgeoftheendissoughtinordertoascertainwhatactionsaretherightmeanstoitsattainment。ThushoweverprominentthenotionofanUltimateGood——otherthanvoluntaryactionofanykind——maybeinanethicalsystem,andwhateverinterpretationmaybegiventothisnotion,wemuststillarrivefinally,ifitistobepracticallyuseful,atsomedeterminationofpreceptsordirectiverulesofconduct。
Ontheotherhand,theconceptionofEthicsasessentiallyaninvestigationofthe`UltimateGood’ofManandthemeansofattainingitisnotuniversallyapplicable,withoutstraining,totheviewofMoralitywhichwemayconvenientlydistinguishastheIntuitionalview;accordingtowhichconductisheldtoberightwhenconformedtocertainpreceptsorprinciplesofDuty,intuitivelyknowntobeunconditionallybinding。InthisviewtheconceptionofUltimateGoodisnotnecessarilyoffundamentalimportanceinthedeterminationofRightconductexceptontheassumptionthatRightconductitself——orthecharacterrealisedinanddevelopedthroughRightconduct——isthesoleUltimateGoodforman。ButthisassumptionisnotimpliedintheIntuitionalviewofEthics:
norwouldit,Iconceive,accordwiththemoralcommonsenseofmodernChristiancommunities。ForwecommonlythinkthatthecompletenotionofhumanGoodorWell-beingmustincludetheattainmentofHappinessaswellastheperformanceofDuty;evenifweholdwithButlerthat``thehappinessoftheworldistheconcernofHimwhoistheLordandtheProprietorofit’’,andthat,accordingly,itisnotrightformentomaketheirperformanceofDutyconditionalontheirknowledgeofitsconducivenesstotheirHappiness。
Forthosewhoholdthis,whatmenoughttotakeasthepracticallyultimateendoftheiractionandstandardofRightconduct,mayinsomecaseshavenologicalconnexionwiththeconceptionofUltimateGoodforman:sothat,insuchcases,howeverindispensablethislatterconceptionmaybetothecompletenessofanethicalsystem,itwouldstillnotbeimportantforthemethodicaldeterminationofRightconduct。
ItisonaccountoftheprevalenceoftheIntuitionalviewjustmentioned,andtheprominentplacewhichitconsequentlyoccupiesinmydiscussion,thatindefiningEthicsIhaveavoidedtheterm`ArtofConduct’whichsomewouldregardasitsmoreappropriatedesignation。Fortheterm`Art’——whenappliedtothecontentsofatreatise——seemstosignifysystematicexpressknowledgeasdistinguishedfromtheimplicitknowledgeororganisedhabitwhichwecallskilloftherightmeanstoagivenend。Nowifweassumethattherightnessofactiondependsonitsconducivenesstosomeulteriorend,thennodoubt——whenthisendhasbeenclearlyascertained——theprocessofdeterminingtherightrulesofconductforhumanbeingsindifferentrelationsandcircumstanceswouldnaturallycomeunderthenotionofArt。ButontheviewthatthepracticallyultimateendofmoralactionisoftentheRightnessoftheactionitself——ortheVirtuerealisedinandconfirmedbysuchaction——andthatthisisknownintuitivelyineachcaseorclassofcases,wecanhardlyregardtheterm`Art’asproperlyapplicabletothesystematisationofsuchknowledge。
Hence,asIdonotwishtostartwithanyassumptionincompatiblewiththislatterview,IprefertoconsiderEthicsasthescienceorstudyofwhatisrightorwhatoughttobe,sofarasthisdependsuponthevoluntaryactionofindividuals。
If,however,thisviewofthescopeofEthicsisaccepted,thequestionariseswhyitiscommonlytakentoconsist,toagreatextent,ofpsychologicaldiscussionastothe`natureofthemoralfaculty’;especiallyasIhavemyselfthoughtitrighttoincludesomediscussionofthiskindinthepresenttreatise。ForitdoesnotatfirstappearwhythisshouldbelongtoEthics,anymorethandiscussionsaboutthemathematicalfacultyorthefacultyofsense-perceptionbelongtomathematicsandphysicsrespectively。Whydowenotsimplystartwithcertainpremises,statingwhatoughttobedoneorsought,withoutconsideringthefacultybywhichweapprehendtheirtruth?
Oneansweristhatthemoralisthasapracticalaim:wedesireknowledgeofrightconductinordertoactonit。Nowwecannothelpbelievingwhatweseetobetrue,butwecanhelpdoingwhatweseetoberightorwise,andinfactoftendowhatweknowtobewrongorunwise:thusweareforcedtonoticetheexistenceinusofirrationalspringsofaction,conflictingwithourknowledgeandpreventingitspracticalrealisation:andtheveryimperfectnessoftheconnexionbetweenourpracticaljudgmentandourwillimpelsustoseekformorepreciseknowledgeastothenatureofthatconnexion。
Butthisisnotall。Menneverask,`WhyshouldIbelievewhatIseetobetrue?’buttheyfrequentlyask,`WhyshouldIdowhatIseetoberight?’Itiseasytoreplythatthequestionisfutile,sinceitcouldonlybeansweredbyareferencetosomeotherrecognisedprincipleofrightconduct,andthequestionmightjustaswellbeaskedasregardsthatagain,andsoon。Butstillwedoaskthequestionwidelyandcontinually,andthereforethisdemonstrationofitsfutilityisnotcompletelysatisfactory:werequirebesidessomeexplanationofitspersistency。
Oneexplanationthatmaybeofferedisthat,sincewearemovedtoactionnotbymoraljudgmentalone,butalsobydesiresandinclinationsthatoperateindependentlyofmoraljudgment,theanswerwhichwereallywanttothequestion`WhyshouldIdoit?’isonewhichdoesnotmerelyproveacertainactiontoberight,butalsostirsinusapredominantinclinationtodotheaction