Thelordtreasurerreceivedhisrents。Thelordstewardandlordchamberlainlookedaftertheexpenseofhisfamily。Thecareofhisstableswascommittedtothelordconstableandthelordmarshal。Hishouseswereallbuiltintheformofcastles,andseemtohavebeentheprincipalfortresseswhichhepossessed。Thekeepersofthosehousesorcastlesmightbeconsideredasasortofmilitarygovernors。Theyseemtohavebeentheonlymilitaryofficerswhomitwasnecessarytomaintainintimeofpeace。Inthesecircumstancestherentofagreatlandedestatemight,uponordinaryoccasions,verywelldefrayallthenecessaryexpensesofgovernment。
InthepresentstateofthegreaterpartofthecivilisedmonarchiesofEurope,therentofallthelandsinthecountry,managedastheyprobablywouldbeiftheyallbelongedtooneproprietor,wouldscarceperhapsamounttotheordinaryrevenuewhichtheylevyuponthepeopleeveninpeaceabletimes。TheordinaryrevenueofGreatBritain,forexample,includingnotonlywhatisnecessaryfordefrayingthecurrentexpenseoftheyear,butforpayingtheinterestofthepublicdebts,andforsinkingapartofthecapitalofthosedebts,amountstoupwardsoftenmillionsayear。Buttheland—tax,atfourshillingsinthepound,fallsshortoftwomillionsayear。Thisland—tax,asitiscalled,however,issupposedtobeone—fifth,notonlyoftherentofalltheland,butofthatofallthehouses,andoftheinterestofallthecapitalstockofGreatBritain,thatpartofitonlyexceptedwhichiseitherlettothepublic,oremployedasfarmingstockinthecultivationofland。Averyconsiderablepartoftheproduceofthistaxarisesfromtherentofhouses,andtheinterestofcapitalstock。Theland—taxofthecityofLondon,forexample,atfourshillingsinthepound,amountstoL123,3996s。7d。ThatofthecityofWestminster,toL63,0921s。5d。ThatofthepalacesofWhitehallandSt。James’s,toL30,7546s。3d。Acertainproportionoftheland—taxisinthesamemannerassesseduponalltheothercitiesandtownscorporateinthekingdom,andarisesalmostaltogether,eitherfromtherentofhouses,orfromwhatissupposedtobetheinterestoftradingandcapitalstock。Accordingtotheestimation,therefore,bywhichGreatBritainisratedtotheland—tax,thewholemassofrevenuearisingfromtherentofallthelands,fromthatofallthehouses,andfromtheinterestofallthecapitalstock,thatpartofitonlyexceptedwhichiseitherlenttothepublic,oremployedinthecultivationofland,doesnotexceedtenmillionssterlingayear,theordinaryrevenuewhichgovernmentleviesuponthepeopleeveninpeaceabletimes。TheestimationbywhichGreatBritainisratedtotheland—taxis,nodoubt,takingthewholekingdomatanaverage,verymuchbelowtherealvalue;thoughinseveralparticularcountiesanddistrictsitissaidtobenearlyequaltothatvalue。Therentofthelandsalone,exclusivelyofthatofhouses,andoftheinterestofstock,hasbymanypeoplebeenestimatedattwentymillions,anestimationmadeinagreatmeasureatrandom,andwhich,Iapprehend,isaslikelytobeaboveasbelowthetruth。ButifthelandsofGreatBritain,inthepresentstateoftheircultivation,donotaffordarentofmorethantwentymillionsayear,theycouldnotwellaffordthehalf,mostprobablynotthefourthpartofthatrent,iftheyallbelongedtoasingleproprietor,andwereputunderthenegligent,expensive,andoppressivemanagementofhisfactorsandagents。ThecrownlandsofGreatBritaindonotatpresentaffordthefourthpartoftherentwhichcouldprobablybedrawnfromthemiftheywerethepropertyofprivatepersons。Ifthecrownlandsweremoreextensive,itisprobabletheywouldbestillworsemanaged。
Therevenuewhichthegreatbodyofthepeoplederivesfromlandisinproportion,nottotherent,buttotheproduceoftheland。Thewholeannualproduceofthelandofeverycountry,ifweexceptwhatisreservedforseed,iseitherannuallyconsumedbythegreatbodyofthepeople,orexchangedforsomethingelsethatisconsumedbythem。Whateverkeepsdowntheproduceofthelandbelowwhatitwouldotherwiserisetokeepsdowntherevenueofthegreatbodyofthepeoplestillmorethanitdoesthatoftheproprietorsofland。Therentofland,thatportionoftheproducewhichbelongstotheproprietors,isscarceanywhereinGreatBritainsupposedtobemorethanathirdpartofthewholeproduce。Ifthelandwhichinonestateofcultivationaffordsarentoftenmillionssterlingayearwouldinanotheraffordarentoftwentymillions,therentbeing,inbothcases,supposedathirdpartoftheproduce,therevenueoftheproprietorswouldbelessthanitotherwisemightbebytenmillionsayearonly;
buttherevenueofthegreatbodyofthepeoplewouldbelessthanitotherwisemightbebythirtymillionsayear,deductingonlywhatwouldbenecessaryforseed。Thepopulationofthecountrywouldbelessbythenumberofpeoplewhichthirtymillionsayear,deductingalwaystheseed,couldmaintainaccordingtotheparticularmodeoflivingandexpensewhichmighttakeplaceinthedifferentranksofmenamongwhomtheremainderwasdistributed。
Thoughthereisnotatpresent,inEurope,anycivilisedstateofanykindwhichderivesthegreaterpartofitspublicrevenuefromtherentoflandswhicharethepropertyofthestate,yetinallthegreatmonarchiesofEuropetherearestillmanylargetractsoflandwhichbelongtothecrown。Theyaregenerallyforest;andsometimesforestwhere,aftertravellingseveralmiles,youwillscarcefindasingletree;amerewasteandlossofcountryinrespectbothofproduceandpopulation。IneverygreatmonarchyofEuropethesaleofthecrownlandswouldproduceaverylargesumofmoney,which,ifappliedtothepaymentofthepublicdebts,woulddeliverfrommortgageamuchgreaterrevenuethananywhichthoselandshaveeveraffordedtothecrown。Incountrieswherelands,improvedandcultivatedveryhighly,andyieldingatthetimeofsaleasgreatarentascaneasilybegotfromthem,commonlysellatthirtyyears’purchase,theunimproved,uncultivated,andlow—rentedcrownlandsmightwellbeexpectedtosellatforty,fifty,orsixtyyears’
purchase。Thecrownmightimmediatelyenjoytherevenuewhichthisgreatpricewouldredeemfrommortgage。Inthecourseofafewyearsitwouldprobablyenjoyanotherrevenue。Whenthecrownlandshadbecomeprivateproperty,theywould,inthecourseofafewyears,becomewellimprovedandwellcultivated。Theincreaseoftheirproducewouldincreasethepopulationofthecountrybyaugmentingtherevenueandconsumptionofthepeople。Buttherevenuewhichthecrownderivesfromthedutiesofcustomsandexcisewouldnecessarilyincreasewiththerevenueandconsumptionofthepeople。
Therevenuewhich,inanycivilisedmonarchy,thecrownderivesfromthecrownlands,thoughitappearstocostnothingtoindividuals,inrealitycostsmoretothesocietythanperhapsanyotherequalrevenuewhichthecrownenjoys。Itwould,inallcases,befortheinterestofthesocietytoreplacethisrevenuetothecrownbysomeotherequalrevenue,andtodividethelandsamongthepeople,whichcouldnotwellbedonebetter,perhaps,thanbyexposingthemtopublicsale。
Landsforthepurposesofpleasureandmagnificence—parks,gardens,publicwalks,etc。,possessionswhichareeverywhereconsideredascausesofexpense,notassourcesofrevenue—seemtobetheonlylandswhich,inagreatandcivilisedmonarchy,oughttobelongtothecrown。
Publicstockandpubliclands,therefore,thetwosourcesofrevenuewhichmaypeculiarlybelongtothesovereignorcommonwealth,beingbothimproperandinsufficientfundsfordefrayingthenecessaryexpenseofanygreatandcivilisedstate,itremainsthatthisexpensemust,thegreaterpartofit,bedefrayedbytaxesofonekindoranother;thepeoplecontributingapartoftheirownprivaterevenueinordertomakeupapublicrevenuetothesovereignorcommonwealth。
PART2
OfTaxesTHEprivaterevenueofindividuals,ithasbeenshowninthefirstbookofthisInquiry,arisesultimatelyfromthreedifferentsources:Rent,Profit,andWages。Everytaxmustfinallybepaidfromsomeoneorotherofthosethreedifferentsortsofrevenue,orfromallofthemindifferently。IshallendeavourtogivethebestaccountIcan,first,ofthosetaxeswhich,itisintended,shouldfalluponrent;secondly,ofthosewhich,itisintended,shouldfalluponprofit;thirdly,ofthosewhich,itisintended,shouldfalluponwages;and,fourthly,ofthosewhich,itisintended,shouldfallindifferentlyuponallthosethreedifferentsourcesofprivaterevenue。Theparticularconsiderationofeachofthesefourdifferentsortsoftaxeswilldividethesecondpartofthepresentchapterintofourarticles,threeofwhichwillrequireseveralothersubdivisions。Manyofthosetaxes,itwillappearfromthefollowingreview,arenotfinallypaidfromthefund,orsourceofrevenue,uponwhichitwasintendedtheyshouldfall。
BeforeIenterupontheexaminationofparticulartaxes,itisnecessarytopremisethefourfollowingmaximswithregardtotaxesingeneral。
I。Thesubjectsofeverystateoughttocontributetowardsthesupportofthegovernment,asnearlyaspossible,inproportiontotheirrespectiveabilities;thatis,inproportiontotherevenuewhichtheyrespectivelyenjoyundertheprotectionofthestate。Theexpenseofgovernmenttotheindividualsofagreatnationisliketheexpenseofmanagementtothejointtenantsofagreatestate,whoareallobligedtocontributeinproportiontotheirrespectiveinterestsintheestate。Intheobservationorneglectofthismaximconsistswhatiscalledtheequalityorinequalityoftaxation。Everytax,itmustbeobservedonceforall,whichfallsfinallyupononeonlyofthethreesortsofrevenueabovementioned,isnecessarilyunequalinsofarasitdoesnotaffecttheothertwo。InthefollowingexaminationofdifferenttaxesIshallseldomtakemuchfurthernoticeofthissortofinequality,butshall,inmostcases,confinemyobservationstothatinequalitywhichisoccasionedbyaparticulartaxfallingunequallyevenuponthatparticularsortofprivaterevenuewhichisaffectedbyit。
II。Thetaxwhicheachindividualisboundtopayoughttobecertain,andnotarbitrary。Thetimeofpayment,themannerofpayment,thequantitytobepaid,oughtalltobeclearandplaintothecontributor,andtoeveryotherperson。Whereitisotherwise,everypersonsubjecttothetaxisputmoreorlessinthepowerofthetax—gathered,whocaneitheraggravatethetaxuponanyobnoxiouscontributor,orextort,bytheterrorofsuchaggravation,somepresentorperquisitetohimself。Theuncertaintyoftaxationencouragestheinsolenceandfavoursthecorruptionofanorderofmenwhoarenaturallyunpopular,evenwheretheyareneitherinsolentnorcorrupt。Thecertaintyofwhateachindividualoughttopayis,intaxation,amatterofsogreatimportancethataveryconsiderabledegreeofinequality,itappears,Ibelieve,fromtheexperienceofallnations,isnotnearsogreatanevilasaverysmalldegreeofuncertainty。
III。Everytaxoughttobeleviedatthetime,orinthemanner,inwhichitismostlikelytobeconvenientforthecontributortopayit。Ataxupontherentoflandorofhouses,payableatthesametermatwhichsuchrentsareusuallypaid,isleviedatthetimewhenitismostlikelytobeconvenientforthecontributortopay;or,whenheismostlikelytohavewherewithaltopay。Taxesuponsuchconsumablegoodsasarearticlesofluxuryareallfinallypaidbytheconsumer,andgenerallyinamannerthatisveryconvenientforhim。Hepaysthembylittleandlittle,ashehasoccasiontobuythegoods。
Asheisatliberty,too,eithertobuy,ornottobuy,ashepleases,itmustbehisownfaultifheeversuffersanyconsiderableinconveniencyfromsuchtaxes。
IV。Everytaxoughttobesocontrivedasbothtotakeoutandtokeepoutofthepocketsofthepeopleaslittleaspossibleoverandabovewhatitbringsintothepublictreasuryofthestate。Ataxmayeithertakeoutorkeepoutofthepocketsofthepeopleagreatdealmorethanitbringsintothepublictreasury,inthefourfollowingways。First,thelevyingofitmayrequireagreatnumberofofficers,whosesalariesmayeatupthegreaterpartoftheproduceofthetax,andwhoseperquisitesmayimposeanotheradditionaltaxuponthepeople。
Secondly,itmayobstructtheindustrythepeople,anddiscouragethemfromapplyingtocertainbranchesofbusinesswhichmightgivemaintenanceandunemploymenttogreatmultitudes。Whileitobligesthepeopletopay,itmaythusdiminish,orperhapsdestroy,someofthefundswhichmightenablethemmoreeasilytodoso。Thirdly,bytheforfeituresandotherpenaltieswhichthoseunfortunateindividualsincurwhoattemptunsuccessfullytoevadethetax,itmayfrequentlyruinthem,andtherebyputanendtothebenefitwhichthecommunitymighthavereceivedfromtheemploymentoftheircapitals。Aninjudicioustaxoffersagreattemptationtosmuggling。Butthepenaltiesofsmugglingmustriseinproportiontothetemptation。Thelaw,contrarytoalltheordinaryprinciplesofjustice,firstcreatesthetemptation,andthenpunishesthosewhoyieldtoit;anditcommonlyenhancesthepunishment,too,inproportiontotheverycircumstancewhichoughtcertainlytoalleviateit,thetemptationtocommitthecrime。Fourthly,bysubjectingthepeopletothefrequentvisitsandtheodiousexaminationofthetax—gatherers,itmayexposethemtomuchunnecessarytrouble,vexation,andoppression;andthoughvexationisnot,strictlyspeaking,expense,itiscertainlyequivalenttotheexpenseatwhicheverymanwouldbewillingtoredeemhimselffromit。Itisinsomeoneorotherofthesefourdifferentwaysthattaxesarefrequentlysomuchmoreburdensometothepeoplethantheyarebeneficialtothesovereign。
Theevidentjusticeandutilityoftheforegoingmaximshaverecommendedthemmoreorlesstotheattentionofallnations。
Allnationshaveendeavoured,tothebestoftheirjudgment,torendertheirtaxesasequalastheycouldcontrive;ascertain,asconvenienttothecontributor,bothinthetimeandinthemodeofpayment,and,inproportiontotherevenuewhichtheybroughttotheprince,aslittleburdensometothepeople。Thefollowingshortreviewofsomeoftheprincipaltaxeswhichhavetakenplaceindifferentagesandcountrieswillshowthattheendeavoursofallnationshavenotinthisrespectbeenequallysuccessful。
ARTICLEI
TaxesuponRent。TaxesupontheRentofLandAtaxupontherentoflandmayeithereverydistrictbeingvaluedatacertainrent,beimposedaccordingtoacertaincanon,whichvaluationisnotafterwardstobealtered,oritmaybeimposedinsuchamannerastovarywitheveryvariationintherealrentoftheland,andtoriseorfallwiththeimprovementordeclensionofitscultivation。
Aland—taxwhich,likethatofGreatBritain,isassesseduponeachdistrictaccordingtoacertaininvariablecanon,thoughitshouldbeequalatthetimeofitsfirstestablishment,necessarilybecomesunequalinprocessoftime,accordingtotheunequaldegreesofimprovementorneglectinthecultivationofthedifferentpartsofthecountry。InEngland,thevaluationaccordingtowhichthedifferentcountriesandparisheswereassessedtotheland—taxbythe4thofWilliamandMarywasveryunequalevenatitsfirstestablishment。Thistax,therefore,sofaroffendsagainstthefirstofthefourmaximsabovementioned。
Itisperfectlyagreeabletotheotherthree。Itisperfectlycertain。Thetimeofpaymentforthetax,beingthesameasthatfortherent,isasconvenientasitcanbetothecontributorthoughthelandlordisinallcasestherealcontributor,thetaxiscommonlyadvancedbythetenant,towhomthelandlordisobligedtoallowitinthepaymentoftherent。Thistaxisleviedbyamuchsmallernumberofofficersthananyotherwhichaffordsnearlythesamerevenue。Asthetaxuponeachdistrictdoesnotrisewiththeriseoftherent,thesovereigndoesnotshareintheprofitsofthelandlord’simprovements。Thoseimprovementssometimescontribute,indeed,tothedischargeoftheotherlandlordsofthedistrict。Buttheaggravationofthetaxwhichmaysometimesoccasionuponaparticularestateisalwayssoverysmallthatitnevercandiscouragethoseimprovements,norkeepdowntheproduceofthelandbelowwhatitwouldotherwiseriseto。Asithasnotendencytodiminishthequantity,itcanhavenonetoraisethepriceofthatproduce。Itdoesnotobstructtheindustryofthepeople。Itsubjectsthelandlordtonootherinconveniencybesidestheunavoidableoneofpayingthetax。
Theadvantage,however,whichthelandlordhasderivedfromtheinvariableconstancyofthevaluationbywhichallthelandsofGreatBritainareratedtotheland—tax,hasbeenprincipallyowingtosomecircumstancesaltogetherextraneoustothenatureofthetax。
Ithasbeenowinginparttothegreatprosperityofalmosteverypartofthecountry,therentsofalmostalltheestatesofGreatBritainhaving,sincethetimewhenthisvaluationwasfirstestablished,beencontinuallyrising,andscarceanyofthemhavingfallen。Thelandlords,therefore,havealmostallgainedthedifferencebetweenthetaxwhichtheywouldhavepaidaccordingtothepresentrentoftheirestates,andthatwhichtheyactuallypayaccordingtotheancientvaluation。Hadthestateofthecountrybeendifferent,hadrentsbeengraduallyfallinginconsequenceofthedeclensionofcultivation,thelandlordswouldalmostallhavelostthisdifference。Inthestateofthingswhichhashappenedtotakeplacesincetherevolution,theconstancyofthevaluationhasbeenadvantageoustothelandlordandhurtfultothesovereign。Inadifferentstateofthingsitmighthavebeenadvantageoustothesovereignandhurtfultothelandlord。
Asthetaxismadepayableinmoney,sothevaluationofthelandisexpressedinmoney。Sincetheestablishmentofthisvaluationthevalueofsilverhasbeenprettyuniform,andtherehasbeennoalterationinthestandardofthecoineitherastoweightorfineness。Hadsilverrisenconsiderablyinitsvalue,asitseemstohavedoneinthecourseofthetwocenturieswhichprecededthediscoveryoftheminesofAmerica,theconstancyofthevaluationmighthaveprovedveryoppressivetothelandlord。
Hadsilverfallenconsiderablyinitsvalue,asitcertainlydidforaboutacenturyatleastafterthediscoveryofthosemines,thesameconstancyofvaluationwouldhavereducedverymuchthisbranchoftherevenueofthesovereign。Hadanyconsiderablealterationbeenmadeinthestandardofthemoney,eitherbysinkingthesamequantityofsilvertoalowerdenomination,orbyraisingittoahigher;hadanounceofsilver,forexample,insteadofbeingcoinedintofiveshillingsandtwopence,beencoinedeitherintopieceswhichboresolowadenominationastwoshillingsandsevenpence,orintopieceswhichboresohighaoneastenshillingsandfourpence,itwouldintheonecasehavehurttherevenueoftheproprietor,intheotherthatofthesovereign。
Incircumstances,therefore,somewhatdifferentfromthosewhichhaveactuallytakenplace,thisconstancyofvaluationmighthavebeenaverygreatinconveniency,eithertothecontributors,ortothecommonwealth。Inthecourseofagessuchcircumstances,however,must,atsometimeorother,happen。Butthoughempires,likealltheotherworksofmen,haveallhithertoprovedmortal,yeteveryempireaimsatimmortality。
Everyconstitution,therefore,whichitismeantshouldbeaspermanentastheempireitself,oughttobeconvenient,notincertaincircumstancesonly,butinallcircumstances;oroughttobesuited,nottothosecircumstanceswhicharetransitory,occasional,oraccidental,buttothosewhicharenecessaryandthereforealwaysthesame。
Ataxupontherentoflandwhichvarieswitheveryvariationoftherent,orwhichrisesandfallsaccordingtotheimprovementorneglectofcultivation,isrecommendedbythatsectofmenoflettersinFrancewhocallthemselvesTheEconomistsasthemostequitableofalltaxes。Alltaxes,theypretend,fallultimatelyupontherentofland,andoughtthereforetobeimposedequallyuponthefundwhichmustfinallypaythem。Thatalltaxesoughttofallasequallyaspossibleuponthefundwhichmustfinallypaythemiscertainlytrue。Butwithoutenteringintothedisagreeablediscussionofthemetaphysicalargumentsbywhichtheysupporttheirveryingenioustheory,itwillsufficientlyappear,fromthefollowingreview,whatarethetaxeswhichfallfinallyupontherentoftheland,andwhatarethosewhichfallfinallyuponsomeotherfund。
IntheVenetianterritoryallthearablelandswhicharegiveninleasetofarmersaretaxedatatenthoftherent。Theleasesarerecordedinapublicregisterwhichiskeptbytheofficersofrevenueineachprovinceordistrict。Whentheproprietorcultivateshisownlands,theyarevaluedaccordingtoanequitableestimation,andheisallowedadeductionofone—fifthofthetax,sothatforsuchlandshepaysonlyeightinsteadoftenpercentofthesupposedrent。
Aland—taxofthiskindiscertainlymoreequalthantheland—taxofEngland。Itmightnot,perhaps,bealtogethersocertain,andtheassessmentofthetaxmightfrequentlyoccasionagooddealmoretroubletothelandlord。Itmight,too,beagooddealmoreexpensiveinthelevying。
Suchasystemofadministration,however,mightperhapsbecontrivedaswould,inagreatmeasure,bothpreventthisuncertaintyandmoderatethisexpense。
Thelandlordandtenant,forexample,mightjointlybeobligedtorecordtheirleaseinapublicregister。Properpenaltiesmightbeenactedagainstconcealingormisrepresentinganyoftheconditions;andifpartofthosepenaltiesweretobepaidtoeitherofthetwopartieswhoinformedagainstandconvictedtheotherofsuchconcealmentormisrepresentation,itwouldeffectuallydeterthemfromcombiningtogetherinordertodefraudthepublicrevenue。Alltheconditionsoftheleasemightbesufficientlyknownfromsucharecord。
Somelandlords,insteadofraisingtherent,takeafinefortherenewalofthelease。Thispracticeisinmostcasestheexpedientofaspendthrift,whoforasumofreadymoneysellsafuturerevenueofmuchgreatervalue。Itisinmostcases,therefore,hurtfultothelandlords。Itisfrequentlyhurtfultothetenant,anditisalwayshurtfultothecommunity。Itfrequentlytakesfromthetenantsogreatapartofhiscapital,andtherebydiminishessomuchhisabilitytocultivatetheland,thathefindsitmoredifficulttopayasmallrentthanitwouldotherwisehavebeentopayagreatone。Whateverdiminisheshisabilitytocultivate,necessarilykeepsdown,belowwhatitwouldotherwisehavebeen,themostimportantpartoftherevenueofthecommunity。Byrenderingthetaxuponsuchfinesagooddealheavierthanupontheordinaryrent,thishurtfulpracticemightbediscouraged,tothenosmalladvantageofallthedifferentpartiesconcerned,ofthelandlord,ofthetenant,ofthesovereign,andofthewholecommunity。
Someleasesprescribetothetenantacertainmodeofcultivationandacertainsuccessionofcropsduringthewholecontinuanceofthelease。Thiscondition,whichisgenerallytheeffectofthelandlord’sconceitofhisownsuperiorknowledge(aconceitinmostcasesveryillfounded),oughtalwaystobeconsideredasanadditionalrent;asarentinserviceinsteadofarentinmoney。Inordertodiscouragethepractice,whichisgenerallyafoolishone,thisspeciesofrentmightbevaluedratherhigh,andconsequentlytaxedsomewhathigherthancommonmoneyrents。
Somelandlords,insteadofarentinmoney,requirearentinkind,incorn,cattle,poultry,wine,oil,etc。;others,again,requirearentinservice。Suchrentsarealwaysmorehurtfultothetenantthanbeneficialtothelandlord。Theyeithertakemoreorkeepmoreoutofthepocketoftheformerthantheyputintothatofthelatter。Ineverycountrywheretheytakeplacethetenantsarepoorandbeggarly,prettymuchaccordingtothedegreeinwhichtheytakeplace。Byvaluing,inthesamemanner,suchrentsratherhigh,andconsequentlytaxingthemsomewhathigherthancommonmoneyrents,apracticewhichishurtfultothewholecommunitymightperhapsbesufficientlydiscouraged。
Whenthelandlordchosetooccupyhimselfapartofhisownlands,therentmightbevaluedaccordingtoanequitablearbitrationofthefarmersandlandlordsintheneighbourhood,andamoderateabatementofthetaxmightbegrantedtohim,inthesamemannerasintheVenetianterritory,providedtherentofthelandswhichheoccupieddidnotexceedacertainsum。Itisofimportancethatthelandlordshouldbeencouragedtocultivateapartofhisownland。Hiscapitalisgenerallygreaterthanthatofthetenant,andwithlessskillhecanfrequentlyraiseagreaterproduce。Thelandlordcanaffordtotryexperiments,andisgenerallydisposedtodoso。Hisunsuccessfulexperimentsoccasiononlyamoderatelosstohimself。Hissuccessfulonescontributetotheimprovementandbettercultivationofthewholecountry。Itmightbeofimportance,however,thattheabatementofthetaxshouldencouragehimtocultivatetoacertainextentonly。Ifthelandlordsshould,thegreaterpartofthem,betemptedtofarmthewholeoftheirownlands,thecountry(insteadofsoberandindustrioustenants,whoareboundbytheirowninteresttocultivateaswellastheircapitalandskillwillallowthem)
wouldbefilledwithidleandprofligatebailiffs,whoseabusivemanagementwouldsoondegradethecultivationandreducetheannualproduceoftheland,tothediminution,notonlyoftherevenueoftheirmasters,butofthemostimportantpartofthatofthewholesociety。
Suchasystemofadministrationmight,perhaps,freeataxofthiskindfromanydegreeofuncertaintywhichcouldoccasioneitheroppressionorinconveniencyofthecontributor;andmightatthesametimeservetointroduceintothecommonmanagementoflandsuchaplanorpolicyasmightcontributeagooddealtothegeneralimprovementandgoodcultivationofthecountry。
Theexpenseoflevyingaland—taxwhichvariedwitheveryvariationoftherentwouldnodoubtbesomewhatgreaterthanthatoflevyingonewhichwasalreadyratedaccordingtoafixedvaluation。Someadditionalexpensewouldnecessarilybeincurredbothbythedifferentregisterofficeswhichitwouldbepropertoestablishinthedifferentdistrictsofthecountry,andbythedifferentvaluationswhichmightoccasionallybemadeofthelandswhichtheproprietorchosetooccupyhimself。Theexpenseofallthis,however,mightbeverymoderate,andmuchbelowwhatisincurredinthelevyingofmanyothertaxeswhichaffordaveryinconsiderablerevenueincomparisonofwhatmighteasilybedrawnfromataxofthiskind。
Thediscouragementwhichavariableland—taxofthiskindmightgivetotheimprovementoflandseemstobethemostimportantobjectionwhichcanbemadetoit。Thelandlordwouldcertainlybelessdisposedtoimprovewhenthesovereign,whocontributednothingtotheexpense,wastoshareintheprofitoftheimprovement。Eventhisobjectionmightperhapsbeobviatedbyallowingthelandlord,beforehebeganhisimprovement,toascertain,inconjunctionwiththeofficersofrevenue,theactualvalueofhislandsaccordingtotheequitablearbitrationofacertainnumberoflandlordsandfarmersintheneighborhood,equallychosenbybothparties,andbyratinghimaccordingtothisvaluationforsuchanumberofyearsasmightbefullysufficientforhiscompleteindemnification。Todrawtheattentionofthesovereigntowardstheimprovementoftheland,fromaregardtotheincreaseofhisownrevenue,isoneoftheprincipaladvantagesproposedbythisspeciesofland—tax。Theterm,therefore,allowedfortheindemnificationofthelandlordoughtnottobeagreatdeallongerthanwhatwasnecessaryforthatpurpose,lesttheremotenessoftheinterestshoulddiscouragetoomuchthisattention。Ithadbetter,however,besomewhattoolongthaninanyrespecttooshort。Noincitementtotheattentionofthesovereigncanevercounterbalancethesmallestdiscouragementtothatofthelandlord。Theattentionofthesovereigncanbeatbestbutaverygeneralandvagueconsiderationofwhatislikelytocontributetothebettercultivationofthegreaterpartofhisdominions。Theattentionofthelandlordisaparticularandminuteconsiderationofwhatislikelytobethemostadvantageousapplicationofeveryinchofgrounduponhisestate。Theprincipalattentionofthesovereignoughttobetoencourage,byeverymeansinhispower,theattentionbothofthelandlordandofthefarmer,byallowingbothtopursuetheirowninterestintheirownwayandaccordingtotheirownjudgment;bygivingtoboththemostperfectsecuritythattheyshallenjoythefullrecompenseoftheirownindustry;andbyprocuringtoboththemostextensivemarketforeverypartoftheirproduce,inconsequenceofestablishingtheeasiestandsafestcommunicationsbothbylandandbywaterthrougheverypartofhisowndominionsaswellasthemostunboundedfreedomofexportationtothedominionsofallotherprinces。
Ifbysuchasystemofadministrationataxofthiskindcouldbesomanagedastogive,notonlynodiscouragement,but,onthecontrary,someencouragementtotheimprovementofland,itdoesnotappearlikelytooccasionanyotherinconveniencytothelandlord,exceptalwaystheunavoidableoneofbeingobligedtopaythetax。
Inallthevariationsofthestateofthesociety,intheimprovementandinthedeclensionofagriculture;inallthevariationsinthevalueofsilver,andinallthoseinthestandardofthecoin,ataxofthiskindwould,ofitsownaccordandwithoutanyattentionofgovernment,readilysuititselftotheactualsituationofthings,andwouldbeequallyjustandequitableinallthosedifferentchanges。Itwould,therefore,bemuchmorepropertobeestablishedasaperpetualandunalterableregulation,oraswhatiscalledafundamentallawofthecommonwealth,thananytaxwhichwasalwaystobeleviedaccordingtoacertainvaluation。
Somestates,insteadofthesimpleandobviousexpedientofaregisterofleases,havehadrecoursetothelaboriousandexpensiveoneofanactualsurveyandvaluationofallthelandsinthecountry。Theyhavesuspected,probably,thatthelessorandlessee,inordertodefraudthepublicrevenue,mightcombinetoconcealtherealtermsofthelease。Domesday—Bookseemstohavebeentheresultofaveryaccuratesurveyofthiskind。
IntheancientdominionsoftheKingofPrussia,theland—taxisassessedaccordingtoanactualsurveyandvaluation,whichisreviewedandalteredfromtimetotime。Accordingtothatvaluation,thelayproprietorspayfromtwentytotwenty—fivepercentoftheirrevenue。Ecclesiasticsfromfortytoforty—fivepercent。ThesurveyandvaluationofSilesiawasmadebyorderofthepresentking;itissaidwithgreataccuracy。Accordingtothatvaluation,thelandsbelongingtotheBishopofBreslawaretaxedattwenty—fivepercentoftheirrent。Theotherrevenuesoftheecclesiasticsofbothreligions,atfiftypercent。ThecommanderiesoftheTeutonicorder,andofthatofMalta,atfortypercent。Landsheldbyanobletenure,atthirty—eightandone—thirdpercent。Landsheldbyabasetenure,atthirty—fiveandone—thirdpercent。
ThesurveyandvaluationofBohemiaissaidtohavebeentheworkofmorethanahundredyears。Itwasnotperfectedtillafterthepeaceof1748,bytheordersofthepresentempressqueen。ThesurveyoftheduchyofMilan,whichwasbeguninthetimeofCharlesVI,wasnotperfectedtillafter1760。Itisesteemedoneofthemostaccuratethathaseverbeenmade。ThesurveyofSavoyandPiedmontwasexecutedundertheordersofthelateKingofSardinia。
InthedominionsoftheKingofPrussiatherevenueofthechurchistaxedmuchhigherthanthatoflayproprietors。Therevenueofthechurchis,thegreaterpartofit,aburdenupontherentofland。Itseldomhappensthatanypartofitisappliedtowardstheimprovementofland,orissoemployedastocontributeinanyrespecttowardsincreasingtherevenueofthegreatbodyofthepeople。HisPrussianMajestyhadprobably,uponthataccount,thoughtitreasonablethatitshouldcontributeagooddealmoretowardsrelievingtheexigenciesofthestate。Insomecountriesthelandsofthechurchareexemptedfromalltaxes。Inotherstheyaretaxedmorelightlythanotherlands。IntheduchyofMilan,thelandswhichthechurchpossessedbefore1575areratedtothetaxatathirdonlyoftheirvalue。
InSilesia,landsheldbyanobletenurearetaxedthreepercenthigherthanthoseheldbyabasetenure。Thehonoursandprivilegesofdifferentkindsannexedtotheformer,hisPrussianMajestyhadprobablyimagined,wouldsufficientlycompensatetotheproprietorasmallaggravationofthetax;whileatthesametimethehumiliatinginferiorityofthelatterwouldbeinsomemeasurealleviatedbybeingtaxedsomewhatmorelightly。Inothercountries,thesystemoftaxation,insteadofalleviating,aggravatesthisinequality。InthedominionsoftheKingofSardinia,andinthoseprovincesofFrancewhicharesubjecttowhatiscalledtherealorpredialtaille,thetaxfallsaltogetheruponthelandsheldbyabasetenure。Thoseheldbyanobleoneareexempted。
Aland—taxassessedaccordingtoageneralsurveyandvaluation,howequalsoeveritmaybeatfirst,must,inthecourseofaverymoderateperiodoftime,becomeunequal。Topreventitsbecomingsowouldrequirethecontinualandpainfulattentionofgovernmenttoallthevariationsinthestateandproduceofeverydifferentfarminthecountry。ThegovernmentsofPrussia,ofBohemia,ofSardinia,andoftheduchyofMilanactuallyexertanattentionofthiskind;anattentionsounsuitabletothenatureofgovernmentthatitisnotlikelytobeoflongcontinuance,andwhich,ifitiscontinued,willprobablyinthelong—runoccasionmuchmoretroubleandvexationthanitcanpossiblybringrelieftothecontributors。
In1666,thegeneralityofMontaubanwasassessedtotherealorpredialtailleaccording,itissaid,toaveryexactsurveyandvaluation。By1727,thisassessmenthadbecomealtogetherunequal。Inordertoremedythisinconveniency,governmenthasfoundnobetterexpedientthantoimposeuponthewholegeneralityanadditionaltaxofahundredandtwentythousandlivres。Thisadditionaltaxisrateduponallthedifferentdistrictssubjecttothetailleaccordingtotheoldassessment。Butitisleviedonlyuponthosewhichintheactualstateofthingsarebythatassessmentundertaxed,anditisappliedtothereliefofthosewhichbythesameassessmentareovertaxed。Twodistricts,forexample,oneofwhichoughtintheactualstateofthingstobetaxedatninehundred,theotheratelevenhundredlivres,arebytheoldassessmentbothtaxedatathousandlivres。Boththesedistrictsarebytheadditionaltaxratedatelevenhundredlivreseach。Butthisadditionaltaxisleviedonlyuponthedistrictundercharged,anditisappliedaltogethertothereliefofthatovercharged,whichconsequentlypaysonlyninehundredlivres。Thegovernmentneithergainsnorlosesbytheadditionaltax,whichisappliedaltogethertoremedytheinequalitiesarisingfromtheoldassessment。Theapplicationisprettymuchregulatedaccordingtothediscretionoftheintendantofthegenerality,andmust,therefore,beinagreatmeasurearbitrary。
Taxeswhichareproportioned,nottotheRent,buttotheProduceofLandTaxesupontheproduceoflandareinrealitytaxesupontherent;andthoughtheymaybeoriginallyadvancedbythefarmer,arefinallypaidbythelandlord。Whenacertainportionoftheproduceistobepaidawayforatax,thefarmercomputes,aswellashecan,whatthevalueofthisportionis,oneyearwithanother,likelytoamountto,andhemakesaproportionableabatementintherentwhichheagreestopaytothelandlord。