Thelordtreasurerreceivedhisrents。Thelordstewardandlordchamberlainlookedaftertheexpenseofhisfamily。Thecareofhisstableswascommittedtothelordconstableandthelordmarshal。Hishouseswereallbuiltintheformofcastles，andseemtohavebeentheprincipalfortresseswhichhepossessed。Thekeepersofthosehousesorcastlesmightbeconsideredasasortofmilitarygovernors。Theyseemtohavebeentheonlymilitaryofficerswhomitwasnecessarytomaintainintimeofpeace。Inthesecircumstancestherentofagreatlandedestatemight，uponordinaryoccasions，verywelldefrayallthenecessaryexpensesofgovernment。
InthepresentstateofthegreaterpartofthecivilisedmonarchiesofEurope，therentofallthelandsinthecountry，managedastheyprobablywouldbeiftheyallbelongedtooneproprietor，wouldscarceperhapsamounttotheordinaryrevenuewhichtheylevyuponthepeopleeveninpeaceabletimes。TheordinaryrevenueofGreatBritain，forexample，includingnotonlywhatisnecessaryfordefrayingthecurrentexpenseoftheyear，butforpayingtheinterestofthepublicdebts，andforsinkingapartofthecapitalofthosedebts，amountstoupwardsoftenmillionsayear。Buttheland—tax，atfourshillingsinthepound，fallsshortoftwomillionsayear。Thisland—tax，asitiscalled，however，issupposedtobeone—fifth，notonlyoftherentofalltheland，butofthatofallthehouses，andoftheinterestofallthecapitalstockofGreatBritain，thatpartofitonlyexceptedwhichiseitherlettothepublic，oremployedasfarmingstockinthecultivationofland。Averyconsiderablepartoftheproduceofthistaxarisesfromtherentofhouses，andtheinterestofcapitalstock。Theland—taxofthecityofLondon，forexample，atfourshillingsinthepound，amountstoL123，3996s。7d。ThatofthecityofWestminster，toL63，0921s。5d。ThatofthepalacesofWhitehallandSt。James’s，toL30，7546s。3d。Acertainproportionoftheland—taxisinthesamemannerassesseduponalltheothercitiesandtownscorporateinthekingdom，andarisesalmostaltogether，eitherfromtherentofhouses，orfromwhatissupposedtobetheinterestoftradingandcapitalstock。Accordingtotheestimation，therefore，bywhichGreatBritainisratedtotheland—tax，thewholemassofrevenuearisingfromtherentofallthelands，fromthatofallthehouses，andfromtheinterestofallthecapitalstock，thatpartofitonlyexceptedwhichiseitherlenttothepublic，oremployedinthecultivationofland，doesnotexceedtenmillionssterlingayear，theordinaryrevenuewhichgovernmentleviesuponthepeopleeveninpeaceabletimes。TheestimationbywhichGreatBritainisratedtotheland—taxis，nodoubt，takingthewholekingdomatanaverage，verymuchbelowtherealvalue;thoughinseveralparticularcountiesanddistrictsitissaidtobenearlyequaltothatvalue。Therentofthelandsalone，exclusivelyofthatofhouses，andoftheinterestofstock，hasbymanypeoplebeenestimatedattwentymillions，anestimationmadeinagreatmeasureatrandom，andwhich，Iapprehend，isaslikelytobeaboveasbelowthetruth。ButifthelandsofGreatBritain，inthepresentstateoftheircultivation，donotaffordarentofmorethantwentymillionsayear，theycouldnotwellaffordthehalf，mostprobablynotthefourthpartofthatrent，iftheyallbelongedtoasingleproprietor，andwereputunderthenegligent，expensive，andoppressivemanagementofhisfactorsandagents。ThecrownlandsofGreatBritaindonotatpresentaffordthefourthpartoftherentwhichcouldprobablybedrawnfromthemiftheywerethepropertyofprivatepersons。Ifthecrownlandsweremoreextensive，itisprobabletheywouldbestillworsemanaged。
Therevenuewhichthegreatbodyofthepeoplederivesfromlandisinproportion，nottotherent，buttotheproduceoftheland。Thewholeannualproduceofthelandofeverycountry，ifweexceptwhatisreservedforseed，iseitherannuallyconsumedbythegreatbodyofthepeople，orexchangedforsomethingelsethatisconsumedbythem。Whateverkeepsdowntheproduceofthelandbelowwhatitwouldotherwiserisetokeepsdowntherevenueofthegreatbodyofthepeoplestillmorethanitdoesthatoftheproprietorsofland。Therentofland，thatportionoftheproducewhichbelongstotheproprietors，isscarceanywhereinGreatBritainsupposedtobemorethanathirdpartofthewholeproduce。Ifthelandwhichinonestateofcultivationaffordsarentoftenmillionssterlingayearwouldinanotheraffordarentoftwentymillions，therentbeing，inbothcases，supposedathirdpartoftheproduce，therevenueoftheproprietorswouldbelessthanitotherwisemightbebytenmillionsayearonly;
buttherevenueofthegreatbodyofthepeoplewouldbelessthanitotherwisemightbebythirtymillionsayear，deductingonlywhatwouldbenecessaryforseed。Thepopulationofthecountrywouldbelessbythenumberofpeoplewhichthirtymillionsayear，deductingalwaystheseed，couldmaintainaccordingtotheparticularmodeoflivingandexpensewhichmighttakeplaceinthedifferentranksofmenamongwhomtheremainderwasdistributed。
Thoughthereisnotatpresent，inEurope，anycivilisedstateofanykindwhichderivesthegreaterpartofitspublicrevenuefromtherentoflandswhicharethepropertyofthestate，yetinallthegreatmonarchiesofEuropetherearestillmanylargetractsoflandwhichbelongtothecrown。Theyaregenerallyforest;andsometimesforestwhere，aftertravellingseveralmiles，youwillscarcefindasingletree;amerewasteandlossofcountryinrespectbothofproduceandpopulation。IneverygreatmonarchyofEuropethesaleofthecrownlandswouldproduceaverylargesumofmoney，which，ifappliedtothepaymentofthepublicdebts，woulddeliverfrommortgageamuchgreaterrevenuethananywhichthoselandshaveeveraffordedtothecrown。Incountrieswherelands，improvedandcultivatedveryhighly，andyieldingatthetimeofsaleasgreatarentascaneasilybegotfromthem，commonlysellatthirtyyears’purchase，theunimproved，uncultivated，andlow—rentedcrownlandsmightwellbeexpectedtosellatforty，fifty，orsixtyyears’
purchase。Thecrownmightimmediatelyenjoytherevenuewhichthisgreatpricewouldredeemfrommortgage。Inthecourseofafewyearsitwouldprobablyenjoyanotherrevenue。Whenthecrownlandshadbecomeprivateproperty，theywould，inthecourseofafewyears，becomewellimprovedandwellcultivated。Theincreaseoftheirproducewouldincreasethepopulationofthecountrybyaugmentingtherevenueandconsumptionofthepeople。Buttherevenuewhichthecrownderivesfromthedutiesofcustomsandexcisewouldnecessarilyincreasewiththerevenueandconsumptionofthepeople。
Therevenuewhich，inanycivilisedmonarchy，thecrownderivesfromthecrownlands，thoughitappearstocostnothingtoindividuals，inrealitycostsmoretothesocietythanperhapsanyotherequalrevenuewhichthecrownenjoys。Itwould，inallcases，befortheinterestofthesocietytoreplacethisrevenuetothecrownbysomeotherequalrevenue，andtodividethelandsamongthepeople，whichcouldnotwellbedonebetter，perhaps，thanbyexposingthemtopublicsale。
Landsforthepurposesofpleasureandmagnificence—parks，gardens，publicwalks，etc。，possessionswhichareeverywhereconsideredascausesofexpense，notassourcesofrevenue—seemtobetheonlylandswhich，inagreatandcivilisedmonarchy，oughttobelongtothecrown。
Publicstockandpubliclands，therefore，thetwosourcesofrevenuewhichmaypeculiarlybelongtothesovereignorcommonwealth，beingbothimproperandinsufficientfundsfordefrayingthenecessaryexpenseofanygreatandcivilisedstate，itremainsthatthisexpensemust，thegreaterpartofit，bedefrayedbytaxesofonekindoranother;thepeoplecontributingapartoftheirownprivaterevenueinordertomakeupapublicrevenuetothesovereignorcommonwealth。
PART2
OfTaxesTHEprivaterevenueofindividuals，ithasbeenshowninthefirstbookofthisInquiry，arisesultimatelyfromthreedifferentsources:Rent，Profit，andWages。Everytaxmustfinallybepaidfromsomeoneorotherofthosethreedifferentsortsofrevenue，orfromallofthemindifferently。IshallendeavourtogivethebestaccountIcan，first，ofthosetaxeswhich，itisintended，shouldfalluponrent;secondly，ofthosewhich，itisintended，shouldfalluponprofit;thirdly，ofthosewhich，itisintended，shouldfalluponwages;and，fourthly，ofthosewhich，itisintended，shouldfallindifferentlyuponallthosethreedifferentsourcesofprivaterevenue。Theparticularconsiderationofeachofthesefourdifferentsortsoftaxeswilldividethesecondpartofthepresentchapterintofourarticles，threeofwhichwillrequireseveralothersubdivisions。Manyofthosetaxes，itwillappearfromthefollowingreview，arenotfinallypaidfromthefund，orsourceofrevenue，uponwhichitwasintendedtheyshouldfall。
BeforeIenterupontheexaminationofparticulartaxes，itisnecessarytopremisethefourfollowingmaximswithregardtotaxesingeneral。
I。Thesubjectsofeverystateoughttocontributetowardsthesupportofthegovernment，asnearlyaspossible，inproportiontotheirrespectiveabilities;thatis，inproportiontotherevenuewhichtheyrespectivelyenjoyundertheprotectionofthestate。Theexpenseofgovernmenttotheindividualsofagreatnationisliketheexpenseofmanagementtothejointtenantsofagreatestate，whoareallobligedtocontributeinproportiontotheirrespectiveinterestsintheestate。Intheobservationorneglectofthismaximconsistswhatiscalledtheequalityorinequalityoftaxation。Everytax，itmustbeobservedonceforall，whichfallsfinallyupononeonlyofthethreesortsofrevenueabovementioned，isnecessarilyunequalinsofarasitdoesnotaffecttheothertwo。InthefollowingexaminationofdifferenttaxesIshallseldomtakemuchfurthernoticeofthissortofinequality，butshall，inmostcases，confinemyobservationstothatinequalitywhichisoccasionedbyaparticulartaxfallingunequallyevenuponthatparticularsortofprivaterevenuewhichisaffectedbyit。
II。Thetaxwhicheachindividualisboundtopayoughttobecertain，andnotarbitrary。Thetimeofpayment，themannerofpayment，thequantitytobepaid，oughtalltobeclearandplaintothecontributor，andtoeveryotherperson。Whereitisotherwise，everypersonsubjecttothetaxisputmoreorlessinthepowerofthetax—gathered，whocaneitheraggravatethetaxuponanyobnoxiouscontributor，orextort，bytheterrorofsuchaggravation，somepresentorperquisitetohimself。Theuncertaintyoftaxationencouragestheinsolenceandfavoursthecorruptionofanorderofmenwhoarenaturallyunpopular，evenwheretheyareneitherinsolentnorcorrupt。Thecertaintyofwhateachindividualoughttopayis，intaxation，amatterofsogreatimportancethataveryconsiderabledegreeofinequality，itappears，Ibelieve，fromtheexperienceofallnations，isnotnearsogreatanevilasaverysmalldegreeofuncertainty。
III。Everytaxoughttobeleviedatthetime，orinthemanner，inwhichitismostlikelytobeconvenientforthecontributortopayit。Ataxupontherentoflandorofhouses，payableatthesametermatwhichsuchrentsareusuallypaid，isleviedatthetimewhenitismostlikelytobeconvenientforthecontributortopay;or，whenheismostlikelytohavewherewithaltopay。Taxesuponsuchconsumablegoodsasarearticlesofluxuryareallfinallypaidbytheconsumer，andgenerallyinamannerthatisveryconvenientforhim。Hepaysthembylittleandlittle，ashehasoccasiontobuythegoods。
Asheisatliberty，too，eithertobuy，ornottobuy，ashepleases，itmustbehisownfaultifheeversuffersanyconsiderableinconveniencyfromsuchtaxes。
IV。Everytaxoughttobesocontrivedasbothtotakeoutandtokeepoutofthepocketsofthepeopleaslittleaspossibleoverandabovewhatitbringsintothepublictreasuryofthestate。Ataxmayeithertakeoutorkeepoutofthepocketsofthepeopleagreatdealmorethanitbringsintothepublictreasury，inthefourfollowingways。First，thelevyingofitmayrequireagreatnumberofofficers，whosesalariesmayeatupthegreaterpartoftheproduceofthetax，andwhoseperquisitesmayimposeanotheradditionaltaxuponthepeople。
Secondly，itmayobstructtheindustrythepeople，anddiscouragethemfromapplyingtocertainbranchesofbusinesswhichmightgivemaintenanceandunemploymenttogreatmultitudes。Whileitobligesthepeopletopay，itmaythusdiminish，orperhapsdestroy，someofthefundswhichmightenablethemmoreeasilytodoso。Thirdly，bytheforfeituresandotherpenaltieswhichthoseunfortunateindividualsincurwhoattemptunsuccessfullytoevadethetax，itmayfrequentlyruinthem，andtherebyputanendtothebenefitwhichthecommunitymighthavereceivedfromtheemploymentoftheircapitals。Aninjudicioustaxoffersagreattemptationtosmuggling。Butthepenaltiesofsmugglingmustriseinproportiontothetemptation。Thelaw，contrarytoalltheordinaryprinciplesofjustice，firstcreatesthetemptation，andthenpunishesthosewhoyieldtoit;anditcommonlyenhancesthepunishment，too，inproportiontotheverycircumstancewhichoughtcertainlytoalleviateit，thetemptationtocommitthecrime。Fourthly，bysubjectingthepeopletothefrequentvisitsandtheodiousexaminationofthetax—gatherers，itmayexposethemtomuchunnecessarytrouble，vexation，andoppression;andthoughvexationisnot，strictlyspeaking，expense，itiscertainlyequivalenttotheexpenseatwhicheverymanwouldbewillingtoredeemhimselffromit。Itisinsomeoneorotherofthesefourdifferentwaysthattaxesarefrequentlysomuchmoreburdensometothepeoplethantheyarebeneficialtothesovereign。
Theevidentjusticeandutilityoftheforegoingmaximshaverecommendedthemmoreorlesstotheattentionofallnations。
Allnationshaveendeavoured，tothebestoftheirjudgment，torendertheirtaxesasequalastheycouldcontrive;ascertain，asconvenienttothecontributor，bothinthetimeandinthemodeofpayment，and，inproportiontotherevenuewhichtheybroughttotheprince，aslittleburdensometothepeople。Thefollowingshortreviewofsomeoftheprincipaltaxeswhichhavetakenplaceindifferentagesandcountrieswillshowthattheendeavoursofallnationshavenotinthisrespectbeenequallysuccessful。
ARTICLEI
TaxesuponRent。TaxesupontheRentofLandAtaxupontherentoflandmayeithereverydistrictbeingvaluedatacertainrent，beimposedaccordingtoacertaincanon，whichvaluationisnotafterwardstobealtered，oritmaybeimposedinsuchamannerastovarywitheveryvariationintherealrentoftheland，andtoriseorfallwiththeimprovementordeclensionofitscultivation。
Aland—taxwhich，likethatofGreatBritain，isassesseduponeachdistrictaccordingtoacertaininvariablecanon，thoughitshouldbeequalatthetimeofitsfirstestablishment，necessarilybecomesunequalinprocessoftime，accordingtotheunequaldegreesofimprovementorneglectinthecultivationofthedifferentpartsofthecountry。InEngland，thevaluationaccordingtowhichthedifferentcountriesandparisheswereassessedtotheland—taxbythe4thofWilliamandMarywasveryunequalevenatitsfirstestablishment。Thistax，therefore，sofaroffendsagainstthefirstofthefourmaximsabovementioned。
Itisperfectlyagreeabletotheotherthree。Itisperfectlycertain。Thetimeofpaymentforthetax，beingthesameasthatfortherent，isasconvenientasitcanbetothecontributorthoughthelandlordisinallcasestherealcontributor，thetaxiscommonlyadvancedbythetenant，towhomthelandlordisobligedtoallowitinthepaymentoftherent。Thistaxisleviedbyamuchsmallernumberofofficersthananyotherwhichaffordsnearlythesamerevenue。Asthetaxuponeachdistrictdoesnotrisewiththeriseoftherent，thesovereigndoesnotshareintheprofitsofthelandlord’simprovements。Thoseimprovementssometimescontribute，indeed，tothedischargeoftheotherlandlordsofthedistrict。Buttheaggravationofthetaxwhichmaysometimesoccasionuponaparticularestateisalwayssoverysmallthatitnevercandiscouragethoseimprovements，norkeepdowntheproduceofthelandbelowwhatitwouldotherwiseriseto。Asithasnotendencytodiminishthequantity，itcanhavenonetoraisethepriceofthatproduce。Itdoesnotobstructtheindustryofthepeople。Itsubjectsthelandlordtonootherinconveniencybesidestheunavoidableoneofpayingthetax。
Theadvantage，however，whichthelandlordhasderivedfromtheinvariableconstancyofthevaluationbywhichallthelandsofGreatBritainareratedtotheland—tax，hasbeenprincipallyowingtosomecircumstancesaltogetherextraneoustothenatureofthetax。
Ithasbeenowinginparttothegreatprosperityofalmosteverypartofthecountry，therentsofalmostalltheestatesofGreatBritainhaving，sincethetimewhenthisvaluationwasfirstestablished，beencontinuallyrising，andscarceanyofthemhavingfallen。Thelandlords，therefore，havealmostallgainedthedifferencebetweenthetaxwhichtheywouldhavepaidaccordingtothepresentrentoftheirestates，andthatwhichtheyactuallypayaccordingtotheancientvaluation。Hadthestateofthecountrybeendifferent，hadrentsbeengraduallyfallinginconsequenceofthedeclensionofcultivation，thelandlordswouldalmostallhavelostthisdifference。Inthestateofthingswhichhashappenedtotakeplacesincetherevolution，theconstancyofthevaluationhasbeenadvantageoustothelandlordandhurtfultothesovereign。Inadifferentstateofthingsitmighthavebeenadvantageoustothesovereignandhurtfultothelandlord。
Asthetaxismadepayableinmoney，sothevaluationofthelandisexpressedinmoney。Sincetheestablishmentofthisvaluationthevalueofsilverhasbeenprettyuniform，andtherehasbeennoalterationinthestandardofthecoineitherastoweightorfineness。Hadsilverrisenconsiderablyinitsvalue，asitseemstohavedoneinthecourseofthetwocenturieswhichprecededthediscoveryoftheminesofAmerica，theconstancyofthevaluationmighthaveprovedveryoppressivetothelandlord。
Hadsilverfallenconsiderablyinitsvalue，asitcertainlydidforaboutacenturyatleastafterthediscoveryofthosemines，thesameconstancyofvaluationwouldhavereducedverymuchthisbranchoftherevenueofthesovereign。Hadanyconsiderablealterationbeenmadeinthestandardofthemoney，eitherbysinkingthesamequantityofsilvertoalowerdenomination，orbyraisingittoahigher;hadanounceofsilver，forexample，insteadofbeingcoinedintofiveshillingsandtwopence，beencoinedeitherintopieceswhichboresolowadenominationastwoshillingsandsevenpence，orintopieceswhichboresohighaoneastenshillingsandfourpence，itwouldintheonecasehavehurttherevenueoftheproprietor，intheotherthatofthesovereign。
Incircumstances，therefore，somewhatdifferentfromthosewhichhaveactuallytakenplace，thisconstancyofvaluationmighthavebeenaverygreatinconveniency，eithertothecontributors，ortothecommonwealth。Inthecourseofagessuchcircumstances，however，must，atsometimeorother，happen。Butthoughempires，likealltheotherworksofmen，haveallhithertoprovedmortal，yeteveryempireaimsatimmortality。
Everyconstitution，therefore，whichitismeantshouldbeaspermanentastheempireitself，oughttobeconvenient，notincertaincircumstancesonly，butinallcircumstances;oroughttobesuited，nottothosecircumstanceswhicharetransitory，occasional，oraccidental，buttothosewhicharenecessaryandthereforealwaysthesame。
Ataxupontherentoflandwhichvarieswitheveryvariationoftherent，orwhichrisesandfallsaccordingtotheimprovementorneglectofcultivation，isrecommendedbythatsectofmenoflettersinFrancewhocallthemselvesTheEconomistsasthemostequitableofalltaxes。Alltaxes，theypretend，fallultimatelyupontherentofland，andoughtthereforetobeimposedequallyuponthefundwhichmustfinallypaythem。Thatalltaxesoughttofallasequallyaspossibleuponthefundwhichmustfinallypaythemiscertainlytrue。Butwithoutenteringintothedisagreeablediscussionofthemetaphysicalargumentsbywhichtheysupporttheirveryingenioustheory，itwillsufficientlyappear，fromthefollowingreview，whatarethetaxeswhichfallfinallyupontherentoftheland，andwhatarethosewhichfallfinallyuponsomeotherfund。
IntheVenetianterritoryallthearablelandswhicharegiveninleasetofarmersaretaxedatatenthoftherent。Theleasesarerecordedinapublicregisterwhichiskeptbytheofficersofrevenueineachprovinceordistrict。Whentheproprietorcultivateshisownlands，theyarevaluedaccordingtoanequitableestimation，andheisallowedadeductionofone—fifthofthetax，sothatforsuchlandshepaysonlyeightinsteadoftenpercentofthesupposedrent。
Aland—taxofthiskindiscertainlymoreequalthantheland—taxofEngland。Itmightnot，perhaps，bealtogethersocertain，andtheassessmentofthetaxmightfrequentlyoccasionagooddealmoretroubletothelandlord。Itmight，too，beagooddealmoreexpensiveinthelevying。
Suchasystemofadministration，however，mightperhapsbecontrivedaswould，inagreatmeasure，bothpreventthisuncertaintyandmoderatethisexpense。
Thelandlordandtenant，forexample，mightjointlybeobligedtorecordtheirleaseinapublicregister。Properpenaltiesmightbeenactedagainstconcealingormisrepresentinganyoftheconditions;andifpartofthosepenaltiesweretobepaidtoeitherofthetwopartieswhoinformedagainstandconvictedtheotherofsuchconcealmentormisrepresentation，itwouldeffectuallydeterthemfromcombiningtogetherinordertodefraudthepublicrevenue。Alltheconditionsoftheleasemightbesufficientlyknownfromsucharecord。
Somelandlords，insteadofraisingtherent，takeafinefortherenewalofthelease。Thispracticeisinmostcasestheexpedientofaspendthrift，whoforasumofreadymoneysellsafuturerevenueofmuchgreatervalue。Itisinmostcases，therefore，hurtfultothelandlords。Itisfrequentlyhurtfultothetenant，anditisalwayshurtfultothecommunity。Itfrequentlytakesfromthetenantsogreatapartofhiscapital，andtherebydiminishessomuchhisabilitytocultivatetheland，thathefindsitmoredifficulttopayasmallrentthanitwouldotherwisehavebeentopayagreatone。Whateverdiminisheshisabilitytocultivate，necessarilykeepsdown，belowwhatitwouldotherwisehavebeen，themostimportantpartoftherevenueofthecommunity。Byrenderingthetaxuponsuchfinesagooddealheavierthanupontheordinaryrent，thishurtfulpracticemightbediscouraged，tothenosmalladvantageofallthedifferentpartiesconcerned，ofthelandlord，ofthetenant，ofthesovereign，andofthewholecommunity。
Someleasesprescribetothetenantacertainmodeofcultivationandacertainsuccessionofcropsduringthewholecontinuanceofthelease。Thiscondition，whichisgenerallytheeffectofthelandlord’sconceitofhisownsuperiorknowledge（aconceitinmostcasesveryillfounded），oughtalwaystobeconsideredasanadditionalrent;asarentinserviceinsteadofarentinmoney。Inordertodiscouragethepractice，whichisgenerallyafoolishone，thisspeciesofrentmightbevaluedratherhigh，andconsequentlytaxedsomewhathigherthancommonmoneyrents。
Somelandlords，insteadofarentinmoney，requirearentinkind，incorn，cattle，poultry，wine，oil，etc。;others，again，requirearentinservice。Suchrentsarealwaysmorehurtfultothetenantthanbeneficialtothelandlord。Theyeithertakemoreorkeepmoreoutofthepocketoftheformerthantheyputintothatofthelatter。Ineverycountrywheretheytakeplacethetenantsarepoorandbeggarly，prettymuchaccordingtothedegreeinwhichtheytakeplace。Byvaluing，inthesamemanner，suchrentsratherhigh，andconsequentlytaxingthemsomewhathigherthancommonmoneyrents，apracticewhichishurtfultothewholecommunitymightperhapsbesufficientlydiscouraged。
Whenthelandlordchosetooccupyhimselfapartofhisownlands，therentmightbevaluedaccordingtoanequitablearbitrationofthefarmersandlandlordsintheneighbourhood，andamoderateabatementofthetaxmightbegrantedtohim，inthesamemannerasintheVenetianterritory，providedtherentofthelandswhichheoccupieddidnotexceedacertainsum。Itisofimportancethatthelandlordshouldbeencouragedtocultivateapartofhisownland。Hiscapitalisgenerallygreaterthanthatofthetenant，andwithlessskillhecanfrequentlyraiseagreaterproduce。Thelandlordcanaffordtotryexperiments，andisgenerallydisposedtodoso。Hisunsuccessfulexperimentsoccasiononlyamoderatelosstohimself。Hissuccessfulonescontributetotheimprovementandbettercultivationofthewholecountry。Itmightbeofimportance，however，thattheabatementofthetaxshouldencouragehimtocultivatetoacertainextentonly。Ifthelandlordsshould，thegreaterpartofthem，betemptedtofarmthewholeoftheirownlands，thecountry（insteadofsoberandindustrioustenants，whoareboundbytheirowninteresttocultivateaswellastheircapitalandskillwillallowthem）
wouldbefilledwithidleandprofligatebailiffs，whoseabusivemanagementwouldsoondegradethecultivationandreducetheannualproduceoftheland，tothediminution，notonlyoftherevenueoftheirmasters，butofthemostimportantpartofthatofthewholesociety。
Suchasystemofadministrationmight，perhaps，freeataxofthiskindfromanydegreeofuncertaintywhichcouldoccasioneitheroppressionorinconveniencyofthecontributor;andmightatthesametimeservetointroduceintothecommonmanagementoflandsuchaplanorpolicyasmightcontributeagooddealtothegeneralimprovementandgoodcultivationofthecountry。
Theexpenseoflevyingaland—taxwhichvariedwitheveryvariationoftherentwouldnodoubtbesomewhatgreaterthanthatoflevyingonewhichwasalreadyratedaccordingtoafixedvaluation。Someadditionalexpensewouldnecessarilybeincurredbothbythedifferentregisterofficeswhichitwouldbepropertoestablishinthedifferentdistrictsofthecountry，andbythedifferentvaluationswhichmightoccasionallybemadeofthelandswhichtheproprietorchosetooccupyhimself。Theexpenseofallthis，however，mightbeverymoderate，andmuchbelowwhatisincurredinthelevyingofmanyothertaxeswhichaffordaveryinconsiderablerevenueincomparisonofwhatmighteasilybedrawnfromataxofthiskind。
Thediscouragementwhichavariableland—taxofthiskindmightgivetotheimprovementoflandseemstobethemostimportantobjectionwhichcanbemadetoit。Thelandlordwouldcertainlybelessdisposedtoimprovewhenthesovereign，whocontributednothingtotheexpense，wastoshareintheprofitoftheimprovement。Eventhisobjectionmightperhapsbeobviatedbyallowingthelandlord，beforehebeganhisimprovement，toascertain，inconjunctionwiththeofficersofrevenue，theactualvalueofhislandsaccordingtotheequitablearbitrationofacertainnumberoflandlordsandfarmersintheneighborhood，equallychosenbybothparties，andbyratinghimaccordingtothisvaluationforsuchanumberofyearsasmightbefullysufficientforhiscompleteindemnification。Todrawtheattentionofthesovereigntowardstheimprovementoftheland，fromaregardtotheincreaseofhisownrevenue，isoneoftheprincipaladvantagesproposedbythisspeciesofland—tax。Theterm，therefore，allowedfortheindemnificationofthelandlordoughtnottobeagreatdeallongerthanwhatwasnecessaryforthatpurpose，lesttheremotenessoftheinterestshoulddiscouragetoomuchthisattention。Ithadbetter，however，besomewhattoolongthaninanyrespecttooshort。Noincitementtotheattentionofthesovereigncanevercounterbalancethesmallestdiscouragementtothatofthelandlord。Theattentionofthesovereigncanbeatbestbutaverygeneralandvagueconsiderationofwhatislikelytocontributetothebettercultivationofthegreaterpartofhisdominions。Theattentionofthelandlordisaparticularandminuteconsiderationofwhatislikelytobethemostadvantageousapplicationofeveryinchofgrounduponhisestate。Theprincipalattentionofthesovereignoughttobetoencourage，byeverymeansinhispower，theattentionbothofthelandlordandofthefarmer，byallowingbothtopursuetheirowninterestintheirownwayandaccordingtotheirownjudgment;bygivingtoboththemostperfectsecuritythattheyshallenjoythefullrecompenseoftheirownindustry;andbyprocuringtoboththemostextensivemarketforeverypartoftheirproduce，inconsequenceofestablishingtheeasiestandsafestcommunicationsbothbylandandbywaterthrougheverypartofhisowndominionsaswellasthemostunboundedfreedomofexportationtothedominionsofallotherprinces。
Ifbysuchasystemofadministrationataxofthiskindcouldbesomanagedastogive，notonlynodiscouragement，but，onthecontrary，someencouragementtotheimprovementofland，itdoesnotappearlikelytooccasionanyotherinconveniencytothelandlord，exceptalwaystheunavoidableoneofbeingobligedtopaythetax。
Inallthevariationsofthestateofthesociety，intheimprovementandinthedeclensionofagriculture;inallthevariationsinthevalueofsilver，andinallthoseinthestandardofthecoin，ataxofthiskindwould，ofitsownaccordandwithoutanyattentionofgovernment，readilysuititselftotheactualsituationofthings，andwouldbeequallyjustandequitableinallthosedifferentchanges。Itwould，therefore，bemuchmorepropertobeestablishedasaperpetualandunalterableregulation，oraswhatiscalledafundamentallawofthecommonwealth，thananytaxwhichwasalwaystobeleviedaccordingtoacertainvaluation。
Somestates，insteadofthesimpleandobviousexpedientofaregisterofleases，havehadrecoursetothelaboriousandexpensiveoneofanactualsurveyandvaluationofallthelandsinthecountry。Theyhavesuspected，probably，thatthelessorandlessee，inordertodefraudthepublicrevenue，mightcombinetoconcealtherealtermsofthelease。Domesday—Bookseemstohavebeentheresultofaveryaccuratesurveyofthiskind。
IntheancientdominionsoftheKingofPrussia，theland—taxisassessedaccordingtoanactualsurveyandvaluation，whichisreviewedandalteredfromtimetotime。Accordingtothatvaluation，thelayproprietorspayfromtwentytotwenty—fivepercentoftheirrevenue。Ecclesiasticsfromfortytoforty—fivepercent。ThesurveyandvaluationofSilesiawasmadebyorderofthepresentking;itissaidwithgreataccuracy。Accordingtothatvaluation，thelandsbelongingtotheBishopofBreslawaretaxedattwenty—fivepercentoftheirrent。Theotherrevenuesoftheecclesiasticsofbothreligions，atfiftypercent。ThecommanderiesoftheTeutonicorder，andofthatofMalta，atfortypercent。Landsheldbyanobletenure，atthirty—eightandone—thirdpercent。Landsheldbyabasetenure，atthirty—fiveandone—thirdpercent。
ThesurveyandvaluationofBohemiaissaidtohavebeentheworkofmorethanahundredyears。Itwasnotperfectedtillafterthepeaceof1748，bytheordersofthepresentempressqueen。ThesurveyoftheduchyofMilan，whichwasbeguninthetimeofCharlesVI，wasnotperfectedtillafter1760。Itisesteemedoneofthemostaccuratethathaseverbeenmade。ThesurveyofSavoyandPiedmontwasexecutedundertheordersofthelateKingofSardinia。
InthedominionsoftheKingofPrussiatherevenueofthechurchistaxedmuchhigherthanthatoflayproprietors。Therevenueofthechurchis，thegreaterpartofit，aburdenupontherentofland。Itseldomhappensthatanypartofitisappliedtowardstheimprovementofland，orissoemployedastocontributeinanyrespecttowardsincreasingtherevenueofthegreatbodyofthepeople。HisPrussianMajestyhadprobably，uponthataccount，thoughtitreasonablethatitshouldcontributeagooddealmoretowardsrelievingtheexigenciesofthestate。Insomecountriesthelandsofthechurchareexemptedfromalltaxes。Inotherstheyaretaxedmorelightlythanotherlands。IntheduchyofMilan，thelandswhichthechurchpossessedbefore1575areratedtothetaxatathirdonlyoftheirvalue。
InSilesia，landsheldbyanobletenurearetaxedthreepercenthigherthanthoseheldbyabasetenure。Thehonoursandprivilegesofdifferentkindsannexedtotheformer，hisPrussianMajestyhadprobablyimagined，wouldsufficientlycompensatetotheproprietorasmallaggravationofthetax;whileatthesametimethehumiliatinginferiorityofthelatterwouldbeinsomemeasurealleviatedbybeingtaxedsomewhatmorelightly。Inothercountries，thesystemoftaxation，insteadofalleviating，aggravatesthisinequality。InthedominionsoftheKingofSardinia，andinthoseprovincesofFrancewhicharesubjecttowhatiscalledtherealorpredialtaille，thetaxfallsaltogetheruponthelandsheldbyabasetenure。Thoseheldbyanobleoneareexempted。
Aland—taxassessedaccordingtoageneralsurveyandvaluation，howequalsoeveritmaybeatfirst，must，inthecourseofaverymoderateperiodoftime，becomeunequal。Topreventitsbecomingsowouldrequirethecontinualandpainfulattentionofgovernmenttoallthevariationsinthestateandproduceofeverydifferentfarminthecountry。ThegovernmentsofPrussia，ofBohemia，ofSardinia，andoftheduchyofMilanactuallyexertanattentionofthiskind;anattentionsounsuitabletothenatureofgovernmentthatitisnotlikelytobeoflongcontinuance，andwhich，ifitiscontinued，willprobablyinthelong—runoccasionmuchmoretroubleandvexationthanitcanpossiblybringrelieftothecontributors。
In1666，thegeneralityofMontaubanwasassessedtotherealorpredialtailleaccording，itissaid，toaveryexactsurveyandvaluation。By1727，thisassessmenthadbecomealtogetherunequal。Inordertoremedythisinconveniency，governmenthasfoundnobetterexpedientthantoimposeuponthewholegeneralityanadditionaltaxofahundredandtwentythousandlivres。Thisadditionaltaxisrateduponallthedifferentdistrictssubjecttothetailleaccordingtotheoldassessment。Butitisleviedonlyuponthosewhichintheactualstateofthingsarebythatassessmentundertaxed，anditisappliedtothereliefofthosewhichbythesameassessmentareovertaxed。Twodistricts，forexample，oneofwhichoughtintheactualstateofthingstobetaxedatninehundred，theotheratelevenhundredlivres，arebytheoldassessmentbothtaxedatathousandlivres。Boththesedistrictsarebytheadditionaltaxratedatelevenhundredlivreseach。Butthisadditionaltaxisleviedonlyuponthedistrictundercharged，anditisappliedaltogethertothereliefofthatovercharged，whichconsequentlypaysonlyninehundredlivres。Thegovernmentneithergainsnorlosesbytheadditionaltax，whichisappliedaltogethertoremedytheinequalitiesarisingfromtheoldassessment。Theapplicationisprettymuchregulatedaccordingtothediscretionoftheintendantofthegenerality，andmust，therefore，beinagreatmeasurearbitrary。
Taxeswhichareproportioned，nottotheRent，buttotheProduceofLandTaxesupontheproduceoflandareinrealitytaxesupontherent;andthoughtheymaybeoriginallyadvancedbythefarmer，arefinallypaidbythelandlord。Whenacertainportionoftheproduceistobepaidawayforatax，thefarmercomputes，aswellashecan，whatthevalueofthisportionis，oneyearwithanother，likelytoamountto，andhemakesaproportionableabatementintherentwhichheagreestopaytothelandlord。