Ibid。pp。409—426。]
[Footnotei:Severalotherprivilegesofthesamekindexist，suchasthatwhichempowerstheUniontolegislateonbankruptcy，tograntpatents，andothermattersinwhichitsinterventionisclearlynecessary。]
[Footnotej:Eveninthesecasesitsinterferenceisindirect。
TheUnioninterferesbymeansofthetribunals，aswillbehereaftershown。]
[Footnotek:FederalConstitution，sect。10，art。I。]
[Footnotel:Constitution，sects。8，9，and10;\"Federalist，\"
Nos。30—36，inclusive，and41—44;Kent’s\"Commentaries，\"vol。i。
pp。207and381;Story，pp。329and514。]
InexaminingthebalanceofpowerasestablishedbytheFederalConstitution;inremarkingontheonehandtheportionofsovereigntywhichhasbeenreservedtotheseveralStates，andontheothertheshareofpowerwhichtheUnionhasassumed，itisevidentthattheFederallegislatorsentertainedtheclearestandmostaccuratenotionsonthenatureofthecentralizationofgovernment。TheUnitedStatesformnotonlyarepublic，butaconfederation;neverthelesstheauthorityofthenationismorecentralthanitwasinseveralofthemonarchiesofEuropewhentheAmericanConstitutionwasformed。Take，forinstance，thetwofollowingexamples。
ThirteensupremecourtsofjusticeexistedinFrance，which，generallyspeaking，hadtherightofinterpretingthelawwithoutappeal;andthoseprovinceswhichwerestyledpaysd’etatswereauthorizedtorefusetheirassenttoanimpostwhichhadbeenleviedbythesovereignwhorepresentedthenation。IntheUnionthereisbutonetribunaltointerpret，asthereisonelegislaturetomakethelaws;andanimpostvotedbytherepresentativesofthenationisbindinguponallthecitizens。
Inthesetwoessentialpoints，therefore，theUnionexercisesmorecentralauthoritythantheFrenchmonarchypossessed，althoughtheUnionisonlyanassemblageofconfederaterepublics。
InSpaincertainprovinceshadtherightofestablishingasystemofcustom—housedutiespeculiartothemselves，althoughthatprivilegebelongs，byitsverynature，tothenationalsovereignty。InAmericatheCongressalonehastherightofregulatingthecommercialrelationsoftheStates。ThegovernmentoftheConfederationisthereforemorecentralizedinthisrespectthanthekingdomofSpain。ItistruethatthepoweroftheCrowninFranceorinSpainwasalwaysabletoobtainbyforcewhatevertheConstitutionofthecountrydenied，andthattheultimateresultwasconsequentlythesame;butIamherediscussingthetheoryoftheConstitution。
FederalPowersAfterhavingsettledthelimitswithinwhichtheFederalGovernmentwastoact，thenextpointwastodeterminethepowerswhichitwastoexert。
LegislativePowers*m[Footnotem:[InthischaptertheauthorpointsouttheessenceoftheconflictbetweenthesecedingStatesandtheUnionwhichcausedtheCivilWarof1861。]]
DivisionoftheLegislativeBodyintotwobranches—DifferenceinthemannerofformingthetwoHouses—TheprincipleoftheindependenceoftheStatespredominatesintheformationoftheSenate—TheprincipleofthesovereigntyofthenationinthecompositionoftheHouseofRepresentatives—SingulareffectsofthefactthataConstitutioncanonlybelogicalintheearlystagesofanation。
TheplanwhichhadbeenlaiddownbeforehandfortheConstitutionsoftheseveralStateswasfollowed，inmanypoints，intheorganizationofthepowersoftheUnion。TheFederallegislatureoftheUnionwascomposedofaSenateandaHouseofRepresentatives。Aspiritofconciliationprescribedtheobservanceofdistinctprinciplesintheformationofthesetwoassemblies。IhavealreadyshownthattwocontraryinterestswereopposedtoeachotherintheestablishmentoftheFederalConstitution。Thesetwointerestshadgivenrisetotwoopinions。ItwasthewishofonepartytoconverttheUnionintoaleagueofindependentStates，orasortofcongress，atwhichtherepresentativesoftheseveralpeopleswouldmeettodiscusscertainpointsoftheircommoninterests。TheotherpartydesiredtounitetheinhabitantsoftheAmericancoloniesintoonesolenation，andtoestablishaGovernmentwhichshouldactasthesolerepresentativeofthenation，asfarasthelimitedsphereofitsauthoritywouldpermit。Thepracticalconsequencesofthesetwotheorieswereexceedinglydifferent。
Thequestionwas，whetheraleaguewastobeestablishedinsteadofanationalGovernment;whetherthemajorityoftheState，insteadofthemajorityoftheinhabitantsoftheUnion，wastogivethelaw:foreveryState，thesmallaswellasthegreat，wouldthenremaininthefullenjoymentofitsindependence，andentertheUnionuponafootingofperfectequality。If，however，theinhabitantsoftheUnitedStatesweretobeconsideredasbelongingtooneandthesamenation，itwouldbejustthatthemajorityofthecitizensoftheUnionshouldprescribethelaw。OfcoursethelesserStatescouldnotsubscribetotheapplicationofthisdoctrinewithout，infact，abdicatingtheirexistenceinrelationtothesovereigntyoftheConfederation;sincetheywouldhavepassedfromtheconditionofaco—equalandco—legislativeauthoritytothatofaninsignificantfractionofagreatpeople。Butiftheformersystemwouldhaveinvestedthemwithanexcessiveauthority，thelatterwouldhaveannulledtheirinfluencealtogether。Underthesecircumstancestheresultwas，thatthestrictrulesoflogicwereevaded，asisusuallythecasewheninterestsareopposedtoarguments。Amiddlecoursewashituponbythelegislators，whichbroughttogetherbyforcetwosystemstheoreticallyirreconcilable。
TheprincipleoftheindependenceoftheStatesprevailedintheformationoftheSenate，andthatofthesovereigntyofthenationpredominatedinthecompositionoftheHouseofRepresentatives。ItwasdecidedthateachStateshouldsendtwosenatorstoCongress，andanumberofrepresentativesproportionedtoitspopulation。*nItresultsfromthisarrangementthattheStateofNewYorkhasatthepresentdayfortyrepresentativesandonlytwosenators;theStateofDelawarehastwosenatorsandonlyonerepresentative;theStateofDelawareisthereforeequaltotheStateofNewYorkintheSenate，whilstthelatterhasfortytimestheinfluenceoftheformerintheHouseofRepresentatives。Thus，iftheminorityofthenationpreponderatesintheSenate，。itmayparalyzethedecisionsofthemajorityrepresentedintheotherHouse，whichiscontrarytothespiritofconstitutionalgovernment。
[Footnoten:EverytenyearsCongressfixesanewthenumberofrepresentativeswhicheachStateistofurnish。Thetotalnumberwas69in1789，and240in1833。（See\"AmericanAlmanac，\"1834，p。194。）TheConstitutiondecidedthatthereshouldnotbemorethanonerepresentativeforevery30，000persons;butnominimumwasfixedon。TheCongresshasnotthoughtfittoaugmentthenumberofrepresentativesinproportiontotheincreaseofpopulation。ThefirstActwhichwaspassedonthesubject（April14，1792:see\"LawsoftheUnitedStates，\"byStory，vol。i。p。
235）decidedthatthereshouldbeonerepresentativeforevery33，000inhabitants。ThelastAct，whichwaspassedin1832，fixestheproportionatonefor48，000。Thepopulationrepresentediscomposedofallthefreemenandofthree—fifthsoftheslaves。
[ThelastActofapportionment，passedFebruary2，1872，fixestherepresentationatoneto134，684inhabitants。Therearenow（1875）283membersofthelowerHouseofCongress，and9
fortheStatesatlarge，makinginall292members。TheoldStateshaveofcourselosttherepresentativeswhichthenewStateshavegained。—Translator’sNote。]]
Thesefactsshowhowrareandhowdifficultitisrationallyandlogicallytocombinealltheseveralpartsoflegislation。
Inthecourseoftimedifferentinterestsarise，anddifferentprinciplesaresanctionedbythesamepeople;andwhenageneralconstitutionistobeestablished，theseinterestsandprinciplesaresomanynaturalobstaclestotherigorousapplicationofanypoliticalsystem，withallitsconsequences。Theearlystagesofnationalexistencearetheonlyperiodsatwhichitispossibletomaintainthecompletelogicoflegislation;andwhenweperceiveanationintheenjoymentofthisadvantage，beforewehastentoconcludethatitiswise，weshoulddowelltorememberthatitisyoung。WhentheFederalConstitutionwasformed，theinterestsofindependencefortheseparateStates，andtheinterestofunionforthewholepeople，weretheonlytwoconflictinginterestswhichexistedamongsttheAnglo—Americans，andacompromisewasnecessarilymadebetweenthem。
Itis，however，justtoacknowledgethatthispartoftheConstitutionhasnothithertoproducedthoseevilswhichmighthavebeenfeared。AlltheStatesareyoungandcontiguous;theircustoms，theirideas，andtheirexigenciesarenotdissimilar;
andthedifferenceswhichresultfromtheirsizeorinferioritydonotsufficetosettheirinterestsatvariance。ThesmallStateshaveconsequentlyneverbeeninducedtoleaguethemselvestogetherintheSenatetoopposethedesignsofthelargerones;
andindeedthereissoirresistibleanauthorityinthelegitimateexpressionofthewillofapeoplethattheSenatecouldofferbutafeebleoppositiontothevoteofthemajorityoftheHouseofRepresentatives。
Itmustnotbeforgotten，ontheotherhand，thatitwasnotinthepoweroftheAmericanlegislatorstoreducetoasinglenationthepeopleforwhomtheyweremakinglaws。TheobjectoftheFederalConstitutionwasnottodestroytheindependenceoftheStates，buttorestrainit。Byacknowledgingtherealauthorityofthesesecondarycommunities（anditwasimpossibletodeprivethemofit），theydisavowedbeforehandthehabitualuseofconstraintinenforcinggthedecisionsofthemajority。
UponthisprincipletheintroductionoftheinfluenceoftheStatesintothemechanismoftheFederalGovernmentwasbynomeanstobewonderedat，sinceitonlyattestedtheexistenceofanacknowledgedpower，whichwastobehumoredandnotforciblychecked。
AFurtherDifferenceBetweenTheSenateAndTheHouseOfRepresentativesTheSenatenamedbytheprovinciallegislators，theRepresentativesbythepeople—Doubleelectionoftheformer;
singleelectionofthelatter—Termofthedifferentoffices—
PeculiarfunctionsofeachHouse。
TheSenatenotonlydiffersfromtheotherHouseintheprinciplewhichitrepresents，butalsointhemodeofitselection，inthetermforwhichitischosen，andinthenatureofitsfunctions。TheHouseofRepresentativesisnamedbythepeople，theSenatebythelegislatorsofeachState;theformerisdirectlyelected，thelatteriselectedbyanelectedbody;
thetermforwhichtherepresentativesarechosenisonlytwoyears，thatofthesenatorsissix。ThefunctionsoftheHouseofRepresentativesarepurelylegislative，andtheonlyshareittakesinthejudicialpowerisintheimpeachmentofpublicofficers。TheSenateco—operatesintheworkoflegislation，andtriesthosepoliticaloffenceswhichtheHouseofRepresentativessubmitstoitsdecision。Italsoactsasthegreatexecutivecouncilofthenation;thetreatieswhichareconcludedbythePresidentmustberatifiedbytheSenate，andtheappointmentshemaymakemustbedefinitelyapprovedbythesamebody。*o[Footnoteo:See\"TheFederalist，\"Nos。52—56，inclusive;Story，pp。199—314;ConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，sects。2and3。]
TheExecutivePower*p[Footnotep:See\"TheFederalist，\"Nos。67—77;ConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，art。2;Story，p。315，pp。615—780;Kent’s\"Commentaries，\"p。255。]
DependenceofthePresident—Heiselectiveandresponsible—Heisfreetoactinhisownsphereundertheinspection，butnotunderthedirection，oftheSenate—Hissalaryfixedathisentryintooffice—Suspensiveveto。
TheAmericanlegislatorsundertookadifficulttaskinattemptingtocreateanexecutivepowerdependentonthemajorityofthepeople，andneverthelesssufficientlystrongtoactwithoutrestraintinitsownsphere。Itwasindispensabletothemaintenanceoftherepublicanformofgovernmentthattherepresentativeoftheexecutivepowershouldbesubjecttothewillofthenation。
ThePresidentisanelectivemagistrate。Hishonor，hisproperty，hisliberty，andhislifearethesecuritieswhichthepeoplehasforthetemperateuseofhispower。Butintheexerciseofhisauthorityhecannotbesaidtobeperfectlyindependent;theSenatetakescognizanceofhisrelationswithforeignpowers，andofthedistributionofpublicappointments，sothathecanneitherbebribednorcanheemploythemeansofcorruption。ThelegislatorsoftheUnionacknowledgedthattheexecutivepowerwouldbeincompetenttofulfilitstaskwithdignityandutility，unlessitenjoyedagreaterdegreeofstabilityandofstrengththanhadbeengrantedtoitintheseparateStates。
ThePresidentischosenforfouryears，andhemaybereelected;sothatthechancesofaprolongedadministrationmayinspirehimwithhopefulundertakingsforthepublicgood，andwiththemeansofcarryingthemintoexecution。ThePresidentwasmadethesolerepresentativeoftheexecutivepoweroftheUnion，andcarewastakennottorenderhisdecisionssubordinatetothevoteofacouncil—adangerousmeasure，whichtendsatthesametimetoclogtheactionoftheGovernmentandtodiminishitsresponsibility。TheSenatehastherightofannullinggcertainactsofthePresident;butitcannotcompelhimtotakeanysteps，nordoesitparticipateintheexerciseoftheexecutivepower。
Theactionofthelegislatureontheexecutivepowermaybedirect;andwehavejustshownthattheAmericanscarefullyobviatedthisinfluence;butitmay，ontheotherhand，beindirect。Publicassemblieswhichhavethepowerofdeprivinganofficerofstateofhissalaryencroachuponhisindependence;
andastheyarefreetomakethelaws，itistobefearedlesttheyshouldgraduallyappropriatetothemselvesaportionofthatauthoritywhichtheConstitutionhadvestedinhishands。Thisdependenceoftheexecutivepowerisoneofthedefectsinherentinrepublicanconstitutions。TheAmericanshavenotbeenabletocounteractthetendencywhichlegislativeassemblieshavetogetpossessionofthegovernment，buttheyhaverenderedthispropensitylessirresistible。ThesalaryofthePresidentisfixed，atthetimeofhisenteringuponoffice，forthewholeperiodofhismagistracy。ThePresidentis，moreover，providedwithasuspensiveveto，whichallowshimtoopposethepassingofsuchlawsasmightdestroytheportionofindependencewhichtheConstitutionawardshim。ThestrugglebetweenthePresidentandthelegislaturemustalwaysbeanunequalone，sincethelatteriscertainofbearingdownallresistancebyperseveringinitsplans;butthesuspensivevetoforcesitatleasttoreconsiderthematter，and，ifthemotionbepersistedin，itmustthenbebackedbyamajorityoftwo—thirdsofthewholehouse。Thevetois，infact，asortofappealtothepeople。Theexecutivepower，which，withoutthissecurity，mighthavebeensecretlyoppressed，adoptsthismeansofpleadingitscauseandstatingitsmotives。
Butifthelegislatureiscertainofoverpoweringallresistancebyperseveringinitsplans，Ireply，thatintheconstitutionsofallnations，ofwhateverkindtheymaybe，acertainpointexistsatwhichthelegislatorisobligedtohaverecoursetothegoodsenseandthevirtueofhisfellow—citizens。Thispointismoreprominentandmorediscoverableinrepublics，whilstitismoreremoteandmorecarefullyconcealedinmonarchies，butitalwaysexistssomewhere。Thereisnocountryintheworldinwhicheverythingcanbeprovidedforbythelaws，orinwhichpoliticalinstitutionscanproveasubstituteforcommonsenseandpublicmorality。
DifferencesBetweenThePositionOfThePresidentOfTheUnitedStatesAndThatOfAConstitutionalKingOfFranceExecutivepowerintheNorthernStatesaslimitedandaspartialasthesupremacywhichitrepresents—ExecutivepowerinFranceasuniversalasthesupremacyitrepresents—TheKingabranchofthelegislature—ThePresidentthemereexecutorofthelaw—
Otherdifferencesresultingfromthedurationofthetwopowers—
ThePresidentcheckedintheexerciseoftheexecutiveauthority—TheKingindependentinitsexercise—NotwithstandingthesediscrepanciesFranceismoreakintoarepublicthantheUniontoamonarchy—Comparisonofthenumberofpublicofficersdependingupontheexecutivepowerinthetwocountries。
TheexecutivepowerhassoimportantaninfluenceonthedestiniesofnationsthatIaminclinedtopauseforaninstantatthisportionofmysubject，inordermoreclearlytoexplainthepartitsustainsinAmerica。InordertoformanaccurateideaofthepositionofthePresidentoftheUnitedStates，itmaynotbeirrelevanttocompareittothatofoneoftheconstitutionalkingsofEurope。InthiscomparisonIshallpaybutlittleattentiontotheexternalsignsofpower，whicharemoreapttodeceivetheeyeoftheobserverthantoguidehisresearches。Whenamonarchyisbeinggraduallytransformedintoarepublic，theexecutivepowerretainsthetitles，thehonors，theetiquette，andeventhefundsofroyaltylongafteritsauthorityhasdisappeared。TheEnglish，afterhavingcutofftheheadofonekingandexpelledanotherfromhisthrone，wereaccustomedtoaccostthesuccessorofthoseprincesupontheirknees。Ontheotherhand，whenarepublicfallsundertheswayofasingleindividual，thedemeanorofthesovereignissimpleandunpretending，asifhisauthoritywasnotyetparamount。Whentheemperorsexercisedanunlimitedcontroloverthefortunesandthelivesoftheirfellow—citizens，itwascustomarytocallthemCaesarinconversation，andtheywereinthehabitofsuppingwithoutformalityattheirfriends’houses。Itisthereforenecessarytolookbelowthesurface。
ThesovereigntyoftheUnitedStatesissharedbetweentheUnionandtheStates，whilstinFranceitisundividedandcompact:hencearisesthefirstandthemostnotabledifferencewhichexistsbetweenthePresidentoftheUnitedStatesandtheKingofFrance。IntheUnitedStatestheexecutivepowerisaslimitedandpartialasthesovereigntyoftheUnioninwhosenameitacts;inFranceitisasuniversalastheauthorityoftheState。TheAmericanshaveafederalandtheFrenchanationalGovernment。
ChapterVIII:TheFederalConstitution—PartII
Thiscauseofinferiorityresultsfromthenatureofthings，butitisnottheonlyone;thesecondinimportanceisasfollows:Sovereigntymaybedefinedtobetherightofmakinglaws:inFrance，theKingreallyexercisesaportionofthesovereignpower，sincethelawshavenoweighttillhehasgivenhisassenttothem;heis，moreover，theexecutorofalltheyordain。ThePresidentisalsotheexecutorofthelaws，buthedoesnotreallyco—operateintheirformation，sincetherefusalofhisassentdoesnotannulthem。Heisthereforemerelytobeconsideredastheagentofthesovereignpower。ButnotonlydoestheKingofFranceexerciseaportionofthesovereignpower，healsocontributestothenominationofthelegislature，whichexercisestheotherportion。Hehastheprivilegeofappointingthemembersofonechamber，andofdissolvingtheotherathispleasure;whereasthePresidentoftheUnitedStateshasnoshareintheformationofthelegislativebody，andcannotdissolveanypartofit。TheKinghasthesamerightofbringingforwardmeasuresastheChambers;arightwhichthePresidentdoesnotpossess。TheKingisrepresentedineachassemblybyhisministers，whoexplainhisintentions，supporthisopinions，andmaintaintheprinciplesoftheGovernment。ThePresidentandhisministersarealikeexcludedfromCongress;sothathisinfluenceandhisopinionscanonlypenetrateindirectlyintothatgreatbody。TheKingofFranceisthereforeonanequalfootingwiththelegislature，whichcannomoreactwithouthimthanhecanwithoutit。ThePresidentexercisesanauthorityinferiorto，anddependingupon，thatofthelegislature。
Evenintheexerciseoftheexecutivepower，properlysocalled—thepointuponwhichhispositionseemstobemostanalogoustothatoftheKingofFrance—thePresidentlaborsunderseveralcausesofinferiority。TheauthorityoftheKing，inFrance，has，inthefirstplace，theadvantageofdurationoverthatofthePresident，anddurabilityisoneofthechiefelementsofstrength;nothingiseitherlovedorfearedbutwhatislikelytoendure。ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesisamagistrateelectedforfouryears;theKing，inFrance，isanhereditarysovereign。IntheexerciseoftheexecutivepowerthePresidentoftheUnitedStatesisconstantlysubjecttoajealousscrutiny。Hemaymake，buthecannotconclude，atreaty;hemaydesignate，buthecannotappoint，apublicofficer。*qTheKingofFranceisabsolutewithinthelimitsofhisauthority。ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesisresponsibleforhisactions;
butthepersonoftheKingisdeclaredinviolablebytheFrenchCharter。*r[Footnoteq:TheConstitutionhadleftitdoubtfulwhetherthePresidentwasobligedtoconsulttheSenateintheremovalaswellasintheappointmentofFederalofficers。\"TheFederalist\"
（No。77）seemedtoestablishtheaffirmative;butin1789
Congressformallydecidedthat，asthePresidentwasresponsibleforhisactions，heoughtnottobeforcedtoemployagentswhohadforfeitedhisesteem。SeeKent’s\"Commentaries，vol。i。p。
289。]
[Footnoter:[ThiscomparisonappliedtotheConstitutionalKingofFranceandtothepowersheheldundertheCharterof1830，tilltheoverthrowofthemonarchyin1848。—Translator’sNote。]]
Nevertheless，thesupremacyofpublicopinionisnolessabovetheheadoftheonethanoftheother。Thispowerislessdefinite，lessevident，andlesssanctionedbythelawsinFrancethaninAmerica，butinfactitexists。InAmerica，itactsbyelectionsanddecrees;inFranceitproceedsbyrevolutions;butnotwithstandingthedifferentconstitutionsofthesetwocountries，publicopinionisthepredominantauthorityinbothofthem。Thefundamentalprincipleoflegislation—aprincipleessentiallyrepublican—isthesameinbothcountries，althoughitsconsequencesmaybedifferent，anditsresultsmoreorlessextensive。WhenceIamledtoconcludethatFrancewithitsKingisnearerakintoarepublicthantheUnionwithitsPresidentistoamonarchy。
InwhatIhavebeensayingIhaveonlytoucheduponthemainpointsofdistinction;andifIcouldhaveenteredintodetails，thecontrastwouldhavebeenrenderedstillmorestriking。
IhaveremarkedthattheauthorityofthePresidentintheUnitedStatesisonlyexercisedwithinthelimitsofapartialsovereignty，whilstthatoftheKinginFranceisundivided。I
mighthavegoneontoshowthatthepoweroftheKing’sgovernmentinFranceexceedsitsnaturallimits，howeverextensivetheymaybe，andpenetratesinathousanddifferentwaysintotheadministrationofprivateinterests。Amongsttheexamplesofthisinfluencemaybequotedthatwhichresultsfromthegreatnumberofpublicfunctionaries，whoallderivetheirappointmentsfromtheGovernment。Thisnumbernowexceedsallpreviouslimits;itamountsto138，000*snominations，eachofwhichmaybeconsideredasanelementofpower。ThePresidentoftheUnitedStateshasnottheexclusiverightofmakinganypublicappointments，andtheirwholenumberscarcelyexceeds12，000。*t[Footnotes:ThesumsannuallypaidbytheStatetotheseofficersamountto200，000，000fr。（$40，000，000）。]
[Footnotet:Thisnumberisextractedfromthe\"NationalCalendar\"for1833。The\"NationalCalendar\"isanAmericanalmanacwhichcontainsthenamesofalltheFederalofficers。ItresultsfromthiscomparisonthattheKingofFrancehaseleventimesasmanyplacesathisdisposalasthePresident，althoughthepopulationofFranceisnotmuchmorethandoublethatoftheUnion。
[IhavenotthemeansofascertainingthenumberofappointmentsnowatthedisposalofthePresidentoftheUnitedStates，buthispatronageandtheabuseofithavelargelyincreasedsince1833。—Translator’sNote，1875。]]
AccidentalCausesWhichMayIncreaseTheInfluenceOfTheExecutiveGovernmentExternalsecurityoftheUnion—Armyofsixthousandmen—Fewships—ThePresidenthasnoopportunityofexercisinghisgreatprerogatives—Intheprerogativesheexercisesheisweak。
IftheexecutivegovernmentisfeeblerinAmericathaninFrance，thecauseismoreattributabletothecircumstancesthantothelawsofthecountry。
Itischieflyinitsforeignrelationsthattheexecutivepowerofanationiscalledupontoexertitsskillanditsvigor。IftheexistenceoftheUnionwereperpetuallythreatened，andifitschiefinterestswereindailyconnectionwiththoseofotherpowerfulnations，theexecutivegovernmentwouldassumeanincreasedimportanceinproportiontothemeasuresexpectedofit，andthosewhichitwouldcarryintoeffect。ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesisthecommander—in—chiefofthearmy，butofanarmycomposedofonlysixthousandmen;hecommandsthefleet，butthefleetreckonsbutfewsail;heconductstheforeignrelationsoftheUnion，buttheUnitedStatesareanationwithoutneighbors。Separatedfromtherestoftheworldbytheocean，andtooweakasyettoaimatthedominionoftheseas，theyhavenoenemies，andtheirinterestsrarelycomeintocontactwiththoseofanyothernationoftheglobe。
ThepracticalpartofaGovernmentmustnotbejudgedbythetheoryofitsconstitution。ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesisinthepossessionofalmostroyalprerogatives，whichhehasnoopportunityofexercising;andthoseprivilegeswhichhecanatpresentuseareverycircumscribed。Thelawsallowhimtopossessadegreeofinfluencewhichcircumstancesdonotpermithimtoemploy。
Ontheotherhand，thegreatstrengthoftheroyalprerogativeinFrancearisesfromcircumstancesfarmorethanfromthelaws。Theretheexecutivegovernmentisconstantlystrugglingagainstprodigiousobstacles，andexertingallitsenergiestorepressthem;sothatitincreasesbytheextentofitsachievements，andbytheimportanceoftheeventsitcontrols，withoutmodifyingitsconstitution。IfthelawshadmadeitasfeebleandascircumscribedasitisintheUnion，itsinfluencewouldverysoonbecomestillmorepreponderant。
WhyThePresidentOfTheUnitedStatesDoesNotRequireTheMajorityOfTheTwoHousesInOrderToCarryOnTheGovernmentItisanestablishedaxiominEuropethataconstitutionalKingcannotpersevereinasystemofgovernmentwhichisopposedbythetwootherbranchesofthelegislature。ButseveralPresidentsoftheUnitedStateshavebeenknowntolosethemajorityinthelegislativebodywithoutbeingobligedtoabandonthesupremepower，andwithoutinflictingaseriouseviluponsociety。IhaveheardthisfactquotedasaninstanceoftheindependenceandthepoweroftheexecutivegovernmentinAmerica:amoment’sreflectionwillconvinceus，onthecontrary，thatitisaproofofitsextremeweakness。
AKinginEuroperequiresthesupportofthelegislaturetoenablehimtoperformthedutiesimposeduponhimbytheConstitution，becausethosedutiesareenormous。A
constitutionalKinginEuropeisnotmerelytheexecutorofthelaw，buttheexecutionofitsprovisionsdevolvessocompletelyuponhimthathehasthepowerofparalyzingitsinfluenceifitopposeshisdesigns。Herequirestheassistanceofthelegislativeassembliestomakethelaw，butthoseassembliesstandinneedofhisaidtoexecuteit:thesetwoauthoritiescannotsubsistwithouteachother，andthemechanismofgovernmentisstoppedassoonastheyareatvariance。
InAmericathePresidentcannotpreventanylawfrombeingpassed，norcanheevadetheobligationofenforcingit。Hissincereandzealousco—operationisnodoubtuseful，butitisnotindispensable，inthecarryingonofpublicaffairs。Allhisimportantactsaredirectlyorindirectlysubmittedtothelegislature，andofhisownfreeauthorityhecandobutlittle。
Itisthereforehisweakness，andnothispower，whichenableshimtoremaininoppositiontoCongress。InEurope，harmonymustreignbetweentheCrownandtheotherbranchesofthelegislature，becauseacollisionbetweenthemmayproveserious;
inAmerica，thisharmonyisnotindispensable，becausesuchacollisionisimpossible。
ElectionOfThePresidentDangersoftheelectivesystemincreaseinproportiontotheextentoftheprerogative—ThissystempossibleinAmericabecausenopowerfulexecutiveauthorityisrequired—Whatcircumstancesarefavorabletotheelectivesystem—WhytheelectionofthePresidentdoesnotcauseadeviationfromtheprinciplesoftheGovernment—InfluenceoftheelectionofthePresidentonsecondaryfunctionaries。
Thedangersofthesystemofelectionappliedtotheheadoftheexecutivegovernmentofagreatpeoplehavebeensufficientlyexemplifiedbyexperienceandbyhistory，andtheremarksIamabouttomakerefertoAmericaalone。Thesedangersmaybemoreorlessformidableinproportiontotheplacewhichtheexecutivepoweroccupies，andtotheimportanceitpossessesintheState;
andtheymayvaryaccordingtothemodeofelectionandthecircumstancesinwhichtheelectorsareplaced。Themostweightyargumentagainsttheelectionofachiefmagistrateis，thatitofferssosplendidaluretoprivateambition，andissoapttoinflamemeninthepursuitofpower，thatwhenlegitimatemeansarewantingforcemaynotunfrequentlyseizewhatrightdenied。
Itisclearthatthegreatertheprivilegesoftheexecutiveauthorityare，thegreateristhetemptation;themoretheambitionofthecandidatesisexcited，themorewarmlyaretheirinterestsespousedbyathrongofpartisanswhohopetosharethepowerwhentheirpatronhaswontheprize。Thedangersoftheelectivesystemincrease，therefore，intheexactratiooftheinfluenceexercisedbytheexecutivepowerintheaffairsofState。TherevolutionsofPolandwerenotsolelyattributabletotheelectivesystemingeneral，buttothefactthattheelectedmonarchwasthesovereignofapowerfulkingdom。Beforewecandiscusstheabsoluteadvantagesoftheelectivesystemwemustmakepreliminaryinquiriesastowhetherthegeographicalposition，thelaws，thehabits，themanners，andtheopinionsofthepeopleamongstwhomitistobeintroducedwilladmitoftheestablishmentofaweakanddependentexecutivegovernment;fortoattempttorendertherepresentativeoftheStateapowerfulsovereign，andatthesametimeelective，is，inmyopinion，toentertaintwoincompatibledesigns。Toreducehereditaryroyaltytotheconditionofanelectiveauthority，theonlymeansthatI
amacquaintedwitharetocircumscribeitssphereofactionbeforehand，graduallytodiminishitsprerogatives，andtoaccustomthepeopletolivewithoutitsprotection。Nothing，however，isfurtherfromthedesignsoftherepublicansofEuropethanthiscourse:asmanyofthemowetheirhatredoftyrannytothesufferingswhichtheyhavepersonallyundergone，itisoppression，andnottheextentoftheexecutivepower，whichexcitestheirhostility，andtheyattacktheformerwithoutperceivinghownearlyitisconnectedwiththelatter。