Itwillreadilybeunderstoodthatbyconnectingthecensorshipofthelawswiththeprivateinterestsofmembersofthecommunity，andbyintimatelyunitingtheprosecutionofthelawwiththeprosecutionofanindividual，legislationisprotectedfromwantonassailants，andfromthedailyaggressionsofpartyspirit。Theerrorsofthelegislatorareexposedwhenevertheirevilconsequencesaremostfelt，anditisalwaysapositiveandappreciablefactwhichservesasthebasisofaprosecution。
IaminclinedtobelievethispracticeoftheAmericancourtstobeatoncethemostfavorabletolibertyaswellastopublicorder。Ifthejudgecouldonlyattackthelegislatoropenlyanddirectly，hewouldsometimesbeafraidtoopposeanyresistancetohiswill;andatothermomentspartyspiritmightencouragehimtobraveitateveryturn。Thelawswouldconsequentlybeattackedwhenthepowerfromwhichtheyemanateisweak，andobeyedwhenitisstrong。Thatistosay，whenitwouldbeusefultorespectthemtheywouldbecontested，andwhenitwouldbeeasytoconvertthemintoaninstrumentofoppressiontheywouldberespected。ButtheAmericanjudgeisbroughtintothepoliticalarenaindependentlyofhisownwill。Heonlyjudgesthelawbecauseheisobligedtojudgeacase。Thepoliticalquestionwhichheiscalledupontoresolveisconnectedwiththeinterestofthesuitors，andhecannotrefusetodecideitwithoutabdicatingthedutiesofhispost。Heperformshisfunctionsasacitizenbyfulfillingtheprecisedutieswhichbelongtohisprofessionasamagistrate。Itistruethatuponthissystemthejudicialcensorshipwhichisexercisedbythecourtsofjusticeoverthelegislationcannotextendtoalllawsindiscriminately，inasmuchassomeofthemcannevergiverisetothatexactspeciesofcontestationwhichistermedalawsuit;andevenwhensuchacontestationispossible，itmayhappenthatnoonecarestobringitbeforeacourtofjustice。TheAmericanshaveoftenfeltthisdisadvantage，buttheyhavelefttheremedyincomplete，lesttheyshouldgiveitanefficacywhichmightinsomecasesprovedangerous。WithintheselimitsthepowervestedintheAmericancourtsofjusticeofpronouncingastatutetobeunconstitutionalformsoneofthemostpowerfulbarrierswhichhaseverbeendevisedagainstthetyrannyofpoliticalassemblies。
OtherPowersGrantedToAmericanJudgesTheUnitedStatesallthecitizenshavetherightofindictingpublicfunctionariesbeforetheordinarytribunals—Howtheyusethisright—Art。75oftheFrenchConstitutionoftheAnVIII—
TheAmericansandtheEnglishcannotunderstandthepurportofthisclause。
ItisperfectlynaturalthatinafreecountrylikeAmericaallthecitizensshouldhavetherightofindictingpublicfunctionariesbeforetheordinarytribunals，andthatallthejudgesshouldhavethepowerofpunishingpublicoffences。Therightgrantedtothecourtsofjusticeofjudgingtheagentsoftheexecutivegovernment，whentheyhaveviolatedthelaws，issonaturalaonethatitcannotbelookeduponasanextraordinaryprivilege。NordothespringsofgovernmentappeartometobeweakenedintheUnitedStatesbythecustomwhichrendersallpublicofficersresponsibletothejudgesoftheland。TheAmericansseem，onthecontrary，tohaveincreasedbythismeansthatrespectwhichisduetotheauthorities，andatthesametimetohaverenderedthosewhoareinpowermorescrupulousofoffendingpublicopinion。IwasstruckbythesmallnumberofpoliticaltrialswhichoccurintheUnitedStates，butIhadnodifficultyinaccountingforthiscircumstance。Alawsuit，ofwhatevernatureitmaybe，isalwaysadifficultandexpensiveundertaking。Itiseasytoattackapublicmaninajournal，butthemotiveswhichcanwarrantanactionatlawmustbeserious。
Asolidgroundofcomplaintmustthereforeexisttoinduceanindividualtoprosecuteapublicofficer，andpublicofficersarecarefulnottofurnishthesegroundsofcomplaintwhentheyareafraidofbeingprosecuted。
ThisdoesnotdependupontherepublicanformofAmericaninstitutions，forthesamefactspresentthemselvesinEngland。
ThesetwonationsdonotregardtheimpeachmentoftheprincipalofficersofStateasasufficientguaranteeoftheirindependence。Buttheyholdthattherightofminorprosecutions，whicharewithinthereachofthewholecommunity，isabetterpledgeoffreedomthanthosegreatjudicialactionswhicharerarelyemployeduntilitistoolate。
IntheMiddleAges，whenitwasverydifficulttoovertakeoffenders，thejudgesinflictedthemostdreadfultorturesonthefewwhowerearrested，whichbynomeansdiminishedthenumberofcrimes。Ithassincebeendiscoveredthatwhenjusticeismorecertainandmoremild，itisatthesametimemoreefficacious。
TheEnglishandtheAmericansholdthattyrannyandoppressionaretobetreatedlikeanyothercrime，bylesseningthepenaltyandfacilitatingconviction。
IntheyearVIIIoftheFrenchRepublicaconstitutionwasdrawnupinwhichthefollowingclausewasintroduced:\"Art。75。
AlltheagentsofthegovernmentbelowtherankofministerscanonlybeprosecutedforoffencesrelatingtotheirseveralfunctionsbyvirtueofadecreeoftheConseild’Etat;inwhichthecasetheprosecutiontakesplacebeforetheordinarytribunals。\"Thisclausesurvivedthe\"Constitutiondel’AnVIII，\"
anditisstillmaintainedinspiteofthejustcomplaintsofthenation。IhavealwaysfoundtheutmostdifficultyinexplainingitsmeaningtoEnglishmenorAmericans。TheywereatonceledtoconcludethattheConseild’EtatinFrancewasagreattribunal，establishedinthecentreofthekingdom，whichexercisedapreliminaryandsomewhattyrannicaljurisdictioninallpoliticalcauses。ButwhenItoldthemthattheConseild’Etatwasnotajudicialbody，inthecommonsenseoftheterm，butanadministrativecouncilcomposedofmendependentontheCrown，sothattheking，afterhavingorderedoneofhisservants，calledaPrefect，tocommitaninjustice，hasthepowerofcommandinganotherofhisservants，calledaCouncillorofState，topreventtheformerfrombeingpunished;whenIdemonstratedtothemthatthecitizenwhohasbeeninjuredbytheorderofthesovereignisobligedtosolicitfromthesovereignpermissiontoobtainredress，theyrefusedtocreditsoflagrantanabuse，andweretemptedtoaccusemeoffalsehoodorofignorance。ItfrequentlyhappenedbeforetheRevolutionthataParliamentissuedawarrantagainstapublicofficerwhohadcommittedanoffence，andsometimestheproceedingswerestoppedbytheauthorityoftheCrown，whichenforcedcompliancewithitsabsoluteanddespoticwill。Itispainfultoperceivehowmuchlowerwearesunkthanourforefathers，sinceweallowthingstopassunderthecolorofjusticeandthesanctionofthelawwhichviolencealonecouldimposeuponthem。
ChapterVII:PoliticalJurisdictionInTheUnitedStatesChapterSummaryDefinitionofpoliticaljurisdiction—WhatisunderstoodbypoliticaljurisdictioninFrance，inEngland，andintheUnitedStates—InAmericathepoliticaljudgecanonlypasssentenceonpublicofficers—Hemorefrequentlypassesasentenceofremovalfromofficethanapenalty—PoliticaljurisdictionasitexistsintheUnitedStatesis，notwithstandingitsmildness，andperhapsinconsequenceofthatmildness，amostpowerfulinstrumentinthehandsofthemajority。
PoliticalJurisdictionInTheUnitedStatesIunderstand，bypoliticaljurisdiction，thattemporaryrightofpronouncingalegaldecisionwithwhichapoliticalbodymaybeinvested。
Inabsolutegovernmentsnoutilitycanaccruefromtheintroductionofextraordinaryformsofprocedure;theprinceinwhosenameanoffenderisprosecutedisasmuchthesovereignofthecourtsofjusticeasofeverythingelse，andtheideawhichisentertainedofhispowerisofitselfasufficientsecurity。
Theonlythinghehastofearis，thattheexternalformalitiesofjusticeshouldbeneglected，andthathisauthorityshouldbedishonoredfromawishtorenderitmoreabsolute。Butinmostfreecountries，inwhichthemajoritycanneverexercisethesameinfluenceuponthetribunalsasanabsolutemonarch，thejudicialpowerhasoccasionallybeenvestedforatimeintherepresentativesofthenation。Ithasbeenthoughtbettertointroduceatemporaryconfusionbetweenthefunctionsofthedifferentauthoritiesthantoviolatethenecessaryprincipleoftheunityofgovernment。
England，France，andtheUnitedStateshaveestablishedthispoliticaljurisdictionbylaw;anditiscurioustoexaminethedifferentadaptationswhichthesethreegreatnationshavemadeoftheprinciple。InEnglandandinFrancetheHouseofLordsandtheChambredesParis*aconstitutethehighestcriminalcourtoftheirrespectivenations，andalthoughtheydonothabituallytryallpoliticaloffences，theyarecompetenttotrythemall。AnotherpoliticalbodyenjoystherightofimpeachmentbeforetheHouseofLords:theonlydifferencewhichexistsbetweenthetwocountriesinthisrespectis，thatinEnglandtheCommonsmayimpeachwhomsoevertheypleasebeforetheLords，whilstinFrancetheDeputiescanonlyemploythismodeofprosecutionagainsttheministersoftheCrown。
[Footnotea:[Asitexistedundertheconstitutionalmonarchydownto1848。]]
InbothcountriestheUpperHousemaymakeuseofalltheexistingpenallawsofthenationtopunishthedelinquents。
IntheUnitedStates，aswellasinEurope，onebranchofthelegislatureisauthorizedtoimpeachandanothertojudge:
theHouseofRepresentativesarraignstheoffender，andtheSenateawardshissentence。ButtheSenatecanonlytrysuchpersonsasarebroughtbeforeitbytheHouseofRepresentatives，andthosepersonsmustbelongtotheclassofpublicfunctionaries。ThusthejurisdictionoftheSenateislessextensivethanthatofthePeersofFrance，whilsttherightofimpeachmentbytheRepresentativesismoregeneralthanthatoftheDeputies。ButthegreatdifferencewhichexistsbetweenEuropeandAmericais，thatinEuropepoliticaltribunalsareempoweredtoinflictallthedispositionsofthepenalcode，whileinAmerica，whentheyhavedeprivedtheoffenderofhisofficialrank，andhavedeclaredhimincapableoffillinganypoliticalofficeforthefuture，theirjurisdictionterminatesandthatoftheordinarytribunalsbegins。
Suppose，forinstance，thatthePresidentoftheUnitedStateshascommittedthecrimeofhightreason;theHouseofRepresentativesimpeacheshim，andtheSenatedegradeshim;hemustthenbetriedbyajury，whichalonecandeprivehimofhislibertyorhislife。Thisaccuratelyillustratesthesubjectwearetreating。ThepoliticaljurisdictionwhichisestablishedbythelawsofEuropeisintendedtotrygreatoffenders，whatevermaybetheirbirth，theirrank，ortheirpowersintheState;andtothisendalltheprivilegesofthecourtsofjusticearetemporarilyextendedtoagreatpoliticalassembly。Thelegislatoristhentransformedintothemagistrate;heiscalledupontoadmit，todistinguish，andtopunishtheoffence;andasheexercisesalltheauthorityofajudge，thelawrestrictshimtotheobservanceofallthedutiesofthathighoffice，andofalltheformalitiesofjustice。WhenapublicfunctionaryisimpeachedbeforeanEnglishoraFrenchpoliticaltribunal，andisfoundguilty，thesentencedepriveshimipsofactoofhisfunctions，anditmaypronouncehimtobeincapableofresumingthemoranyothersforthefuture。Butinthiscasethepoliticalinterdictisaconsequenceofthesentence，andnotthesentenceitself。InEuropethesentenceofapoliticaltribunalistoberegardedasajudicialverdictratherthanasanadministrativemeasure。IntheUnitedStatesthecontrarytakesplace;andalthoughthedecisionoftheSenateisjudicialinitsform，sincetheSenatorsareobligedtocomplywiththepracticesandformalitiesofacourtofjustice;althoughitisjudicialinrespecttothemotivesonwhichitisfounded，sincetheSenateisingeneralobligedtotakeanoffenceatcommonlawasthebasisofitssentence;neverthelesstheobjectoftheproceedingispurelyadministrative。IfithadbeentheintentionoftheAmericanlegislatortoinvestapoliticalbodywithgreatjudicialauthority，itsactionwouldnothavebeenlimitedtothecircleofpublicfunctionaries，sincethemostdangerousenemiesoftheStatemaybeinthepossessionofnofunctionsatall;andthisisespeciallytrueinrepublics，wherepartyinfluenceisthefirstofauthorities，andwherethestrengthofmanyareaderisincreasedbyhisexercisingnolegalpower。
IfithadbeentheintentionoftheAmericanlegislatortogivesocietythemeansofrepressingStateoffencesbyexemplarypunishment，accordingtothepracticeofordinaryjustice，theresourcesofthepenalcodewouldallhavebeenplacedatthedisposalofthepoliticaltribunals。Buttheweaponwithwhichtheyareintrustedisanimperfectone，anditcanneverreachthemostdangerousoffenders，sincemenwhoaimattheentiresubversionofthelawsarenotlikelytomurmuratapoliticalinterdict。
ThemainobjectofthepoliticaljurisdictionwhichobtainsintheUnitedStatesis，therefore，todeprivetheill—disposedcitizenofanauthoritywhichhehasusedamiss，andtopreventhimfromeveracquiringitagain。Thisisevidentlyanadministrativemeasuresanctionedbytheformalitiesofajudicialdecision。InthismattertheAmericanshavecreatedamixedsystem;theyhavesurroundedtheactwhichremovesapublicfunctionarywiththesecuritiesofapoliticaltrial;andtheyhavedeprivedallpoliticalcondemnationsoftheirseverestpenalties。Everylinkofthesystemmayeasilybetracedfromthispoint;weatonceperceivewhytheAmericanconstitutionssubjectallthecivilfunctionariestothejurisdictionoftheSenate，whilstthemilitary，whosecrimesareneverthelessmoreformidable，areexemptedfromthattribunal。InthecivilservicenoneoftheAmericanfunctionariescanbesaidtoberemovable;theplaceswhichsomeofthemoccupyareinalienable，andtheothersarechosenforatermwhichcannotbeshortened。
Itisthereforenecessarytotrythemallinordertodeprivethemoftheirauthority。ButmilitaryofficersaredependentonthechiefmagistrateoftheState，whoishimselfacivilfunctionary，andthedecisionwhichcondemnshimisablowuponthemall。
IfwenowcomparetheAmericanandtheEuropeansystems，weshallmeetwithdifferencesnolessstrikinginthedifferenteffectswhicheachofthemproducesormayproduce。InFranceandinEnglandthejurisdictionofpoliticalbodiesislookeduponasanextraordinaryresource，whichisonlytobeemployedinordertorescuesocietyfromunwonteddangers。Itisnottobedeniedthatthesetribunals，astheyareconstitutedinEurope，areapttoviolatetheconservativeprincipleofthebalanceofpowerintheState，andtothreatenincessantlythelivesandlibertiesofthesubject。ThesamepoliticaljurisdictionintheUnitedStatesisonlyindirectlyhostiletothebalanceofpower;itcannotmenacethelivesofthecitizens，anditdoesnothover，asinEurope，overtheheadsofthecommunity，sincethoseonlywhohavesubmittedtoitsauthorityonacceptingofficeareexposedtotheseverityofitsinvestigations。Itisatthesametimelessformidableandlessefficacious;indeed，ithasnotbeenconsideredbythelegislatorsoftheUnitedStatesasaremedyforthemoreviolentevilsofsociety，butasanordinarymeansofconductingthegovernment。InthisrespectitprobablyexercisesmorerealinfluenceonthesocialbodyinAmericathaninEurope。WemustnotbemisledbytheapparentmildnessoftheAmericanlegislationinallthatrelatestopoliticaljurisdiction。Itistobeobserved，inthefirstplace，thatintheUnitedStatesthetribunalwhichpassessentenceiscomposedofthesameelements，andsubjecttothesameinfluences，asthebodywhichimpeachestheoffender，andthatthisuniformitygivesanalmostirresistibleimpulsetothevindictivepassionsofparties。IfpoliticaljudgesintheUnitedStatescannotinflictsuchheavypenaltiesasthoseofEurope，thereisthelesschanceoftheiracquittingaprisoner;andtheconviction，ifitislessformidable，ismorecertain。TheprincipalobjectofthepoliticaltribunalsofEuropeistopunishtheoffender;thepurposeofthoseinAmericaistodeprivehimofhisauthority。
ApoliticalcondemnationintheUnitedStatesmay，therefore，belookeduponasapreventivemeasure;andthereisnoreasonforrestrictingthejudgestotheexactdefinitionsofcriminallaw。
NothingcanbemorealarmingthantheexcessivelatitudewithwhichpoliticaloffencesaredescribedinthelawsofAmerica。
ArticleII。，Section4，oftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesrunsthus:—\"ThePresident，Vice—President，andallcivilofficersoftheUnitedStatesshallberemovedfromofficeonimpeachmentfor，andconvictionof，treason，bribery，orotherhighcrimesandmisdemeanors。\"ManyoftheConstitutionsoftheStatesareevenlessexplicit。\"Publicofficers，\"saystheConstitutionofMassachusetts，*b\"shallbeimpeachedformisconductormaladministration;\"theConstitutionofVirginiadeclaresthatallthecivilofficerswhoshallhaveoffendedagainsttheState，bymaladministration，corruption，orotherhighcrimes，maybeimpeachedbytheHouseofDelegates;insomeconstitutionsnooffencesarespecified，inordertosubjectthepublicfunctionariestoanunlimitedresponsibility。*cButI
willventuretoaffirmthatitispreciselytheirmildnesswhichrenderstheAmericanlawsmostformidableinthisrespect。WehaveshownthatinEuropetheremovalofafunctionaryandhispoliticalinterdictionaretheconsequencesofthepenaltyheistoundergo，andthatinAmericatheyconstitutethepenaltyitself。TheconsequenceisthatinEuropepoliticaltribunalsareinvestedwithrightswhichtheyareafraidtouse，andthatthefearofpunishingtoomuchhindersthemfrompunishingatall。ButinAmericanoonehesitatestoinflictapenaltyfromwhichhumanitydoesnotrecoil。Tocondemnapoliticalopponenttodeath，inordertodeprivehimofhispower，istocommitwhatalltheworldwouldexecrateasahorribleassassination;buttodeclarethatopponentunworthytoexercisethatauthority，todeprivehimofit，andtoleavehimuninjuredinlifeandlimb，maybejudgedtobethefairissueofthestruggle。Butthissentence，whichitissoeasytopronounce，isnotthelessfatallyseveretothemajorityofthoseuponwhomitisinflicted。Greatcriminalsmayundoubtedlybraveitsintangiblerigor，butordinaryoffenderswilldreaditasacondemnationwhichdestroystheirpositionintheworld，castsablightupontheirhonor，andcondemnsthemtoashamefulinactivityworsethandeath。TheinfluenceexercisedintheUnitedStatesupontheprogressofsocietybythejurisdictionofpoliticalbodiesmaynotappeartobeformidable，butitisonlythemoreimmense。Itdoesnotdirectlycoercethesubject，butitrendersthemajoritymoreabsoluteoverthoseinpower;itdoesnotconferanunboundedauthorityonthelegislatorwhichcanbeexertedatsomemomentouscrisis，butitestablishesatemperateandregularinfluence，whichisatalltimesavailable。Ifthepowerisdecreased，itcan，ontheotherhand，bemoreconvenientlyemployedandmoreeasilyabused。BypreventingpoliticaltribunalsfrominflictingjudicialpunishmentstheAmericansseemtohaveeludedtheworstconsequencesoflegislativetyranny，ratherthantyrannyitself;andIamnotsurethatpoliticaljurisdiction，asitisconstitutedintheUnitedStates，isnotthemostformidableweaponwhichhaseverbeenplacedintherudegraspofapopularmajority。WhentheAmericanrepublicsbegintodegenerateitwillbeeasytoverifythetruthofthisobservation，byremarkingwhetherthenumberofpoliticalimpeachmentsaugments。*d[Footnoteb:Chap。I。sect。ii。Section8。]
[Footnotec:SeetheconstitutionsofIllinois，Maine，Connecticut，andGeorgia。]
[Footnoted:SeeAppendix，N。
[TheimpeachmentofPresidentAndrewJohnsonin1868—whichwasresortedtobyhispoliticalopponentssolelyasameansofturninghimoutofoffice，foritcouldnotbecontendedthathehadbeenguiltyofhighcrimesandmisdemeanors，andhewasinfacthonorablyacquittedandreinstatedinoffice—isastrikingconfirmationofthetruthofthisremark。—Translator’sNote，1874。]]
ChapterVIII:TheFederalConstitution—PartI
IhavehithertoconsideredeachStateasaseparatewhole，andIhaveexplainedthedifferentspringswhichthepeoplesetsinmotion，andthedifferentmeansofactionwhichitemploys。
ButalltheStateswhichIhaveconsideredasindependentareforcedtosubmit，incertaincases，tothesupremeauthorityoftheUnion。ThetimeisnowcomeformetoexamineseparatelythesupremacywithwhichtheUnionhasbeeninvested，andtocastarapidglanceovertheFederalConstitution。
ChapterSummaryOriginofthefirstUnion—Itsweakness—Congressappealstotheconstituentauthority—IntervaloftwoyearsbetweenthisappealandthepromulgationofthenewConstitution。
HistoryOfTheFederalConstitutionThethirteencolonieswhichsimultaneouslythrewofftheyokeofEnglandtowardstheendofthelastcenturyprofessed，asIhavealreadyobserved，thesamereligion，thesamelanguage，thesamecustoms，andalmostthesamelaws;theywerestrugglingagainstacommonenemy;andthesereasonsweresufficientlystrongtounitethemonetoanother，andtoconsolidatethemintoonenation。Butaseachofthemhadenjoyedaseparateexistenceandagovernmentwithinitsowncontrol，thepeculiarinterestsandcustomswhichresultedfromthissystemwereopposedtoacompactandintimateunionwhichwouldhaveabsorbedtheindividualimportanceofeachinthegeneralimportanceofall。
Hencearosetwooppositetendencies，theonepromptingtheAnglo—Americanstounite，theothertodividetheirstrength。Aslongasthewarwiththemother—countrylastedtheprincipleofunionwaskeptalivebynecessity;andalthoughthelawswhichconstituteditweredefective，thecommontiesubsistedinspiteoftheirimperfections。*aButnosoonerwaspeaceconcludedthanthefaultsofthelegislationbecamemanifest，andtheStateseemedtobesuddenlydissolved。Eachcolonybecameanindependentrepublic，andassumedanabsolutesovereignty。Thefederalgovernment，condemnedtoimpotencebyitsconstitution，andnolongersustainedbythepresenceofacommondanger，witnessedtheoutragesofferedtoitsflagbythegreatnationsofEurope，whilstitwasscarcelyabletomaintainitsgroundagainsttheIndiantribes，andtopaytheinterestofthedebtwhichhadbeencontractedduringthewarofindependence。Itwasalreadyonthevergeofdestruction，whenitofficiallyproclaimeditsinabilitytoconductthegovernment，andappealedtotheconstituentauthorityofthenation。*bIfAmericaeverapproached（forhoweverbriefatime）thatloftypinnacleofglorytowhichthefancyofitsinhabitantsiswonttopoint，itwasatthesolemnmomentatwhichthepowerofthenationabdicated，asitwere，theempireoftheland。Allageshavefurnishedthespectacleofapeoplestrugglingwithenergytowinitsindependence;andtheeffortsoftheAmericansinthrowingofftheEnglishyokehavebeenconsiderablyexaggerated。
Separatedfromtheirenemiesbythreethousandmilesofocean，andbackedbyapowerfulally，thesuccessoftheUnitedStatesmaybemorejustlyattributedtotheirgeographicalpositionthantothevaloroftheirarmiesorthepatriotismoftheircitizens。
ItwouldberidiculoustocomparetheAmericanwastothewarsoftheFrenchRevolution，ortheeffortsoftheAmericanstothoseoftheFrenchwhentheywereattackedbythewholeofEurope，withoutcreditandwithoutallies，yetcapableofopposingatwentiethpartoftheirpopulationtotheworld，andofbearingthetorchofrevolutionbeyondtheirfrontierswhilsttheystifleditsdevouringflamewithinthebosomoftheircountry。
Butitisanoveltyinthehistoryofsocietytoseeagreatpeopleturnacalmandscrutinizingeyeuponitself，whenapprisedbythelegislaturethatthewheelsofgovernmentarestopped;toseeitcarefullyexaminetheextentoftheevil，andpatientlywaitfortwowholeyearsuntilaremedywasdiscovered，whichitvoluntarilyadoptedwithouthavingwrungatearoradropofbloodfrommankind。AtthetimewhentheinadequacyofthefirstconstitutionwasdiscoveredAmericapossessedthedoubleadvantageofthatcalmwhichhadsucceededtheeffervescenceoftherevolution，andofthosegreatmenwhohadledtherevolutiontoasuccessfulissue。Theassemblywhichacceptedthetaskofcomposingthesecondconstitutionwassmall;
*cbutGeorgeWashingtonwasitsPresident，anditcontainedthechoicesttalentsandthenoblestheartswhichhadeverappearedintheNewWorld。Thisnationalcommission，afterlongandmaturedeliberation，offeredtotheacceptanceofthepeoplethebodyofgenerallawswhichstillrulestheUnion。AlltheStatesadopteditsuccessively。*dThenewFederalGovernmentcommenceditsfunctionsin1789，afteraninterregnumoftwoyears。TheRevolutionofAmericaterminatedwhenthatofFrancebegan。
[Footnotea:Seethearticlesofthefirstconfederationformedin1778。ThisconstitutionwasnotadoptedbyalltheStatesuntil1781。Seealsotheanalysisgivenofthisconstitutionin\"TheFederalist\"fromNo。15toNo。22，inclusive，andStory’s\"CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，\"pp。
85—115。]
[Footnoteb:CongressmadethisdeclarationonFebruary21，1787。]
[Footnotec:Itconsistedoffifty—fivemembers;Washington，Madison，Hamilton，andthetwoMorriseswereamongstthenumber。]
[Footnoted:Itwasnotadoptedbythelegislativebodies，butrepresentativeswereelectedbythepeopleforthissolepurpose;
andthenewconstitutionwasdiscussedatlengthineachoftheseassemblies。]
SummaryOfTheFederalConstitutionDivisionofauthoritybetweentheFederalGovernmentandtheStates—TheGovernmentoftheStatesistherule，theFederalGovernmenttheexception。
ThefirstquestionwhichawaitedtheAmericanswasintricate，andbynomeanseasyofsolution:theobjectwassotodividetheauthorityofthedifferentStateswhichcomposedtheUnionthateachofthemshouldcontinuetogovernitselfinallthatconcerneditsinternalprosperity，whilsttheentirenation，representedbytheUnion，shouldcontinuetoformacompactbody，andtoprovideforthegeneralexigenciesofthepeople。Itwasasimpossibletodeterminebeforehand，withanydegreeofaccuracy，theshareofauthoritywhicheachoftwogovernmentswastoenjoy，astoforeseealltheincidentsintheexistenceofanation。
TheobligationsandtheclaimsoftheFederalGovernmentweresimpleandeasilydefinable，becausetheUnionhadbeenformedwiththeexpresspurposeofmeetingthegeneralexigenciesofthepeople;buttheclaimsandobligationsoftheStateswere，ontheotherhand，complicatedandvarious，becausethoseGovernmentshadpenetratedintoallthedetailsofsociallife。
TheattributesoftheFederalGovernmentwerethereforecarefullyenumeratedandallthatwasnotincludedamongstthemwasdeclaredtoconstituteapartoftheprivilegesoftheseveralGovernmentsoftheStates。ThusthegovernmentoftheStatesremainedtherule，andthatoftheConfederationbecametheexception。*e[Footnotee:SeetheAmendmenttotheFederalConstitution;
\"Federalist，\"No。32;Story，p。711;Kent’s\"Commentaries，\"vol。
i。p。364。
ItistobeobservedthatwhenevertheexclusiverightofregulatingcertainmattersisnotreservedtoCongressbytheConstitution，theStatesmaytakeuptheaffairuntilitisbroughtbeforetheNationalAssembly。Forinstance，Congresshastherightofmakingagenerallawonbankruptcy，which，however，itneglectstodo。EachStateisthenatlibertytomakealawforitself。Thispointhasbeenestablishedbydiscussioninthelaw—courts，andmaybesaidtobelongmoreproperlytojurisprudence。]
Butasitwasforeseenthat，inpractice，questionsmightariseastotheexactlimitsofthisexceptionalauthority，andthatitwouldbedangeroustosubmitthesequestionstothedecisionoftheordinarycourtsofjustice，establishedintheStatesbytheStatesthemselves，ahighFederalcourtwascreated，*fwhichwasdestined，amongstotherfunctions，tomaintainthebalanceofpowerwhichhadbeenestablishedbytheConstitutionbetweenthetworivalGovernments。*g[Footnotef:Theactionofthiscourtisindirect，asweshallhereaftershow。]
[Footnoteg:Itisthusthat\"TheFederalist，\"No。45，explainsthedivisionofsupremacybetweentheUnionandtheStates:\"ThepowersdelegatedbytheConstitutiontotheFederalGovernmentarefewanddefined。ThosewhicharetoremainintheStateGovernmentsarenumerousandindefinite。Theformerwillbeexercisedprincipallyonexternalobjects，aswar，peace，negotiation，andforeigncommerce。ThepowersreservedtotheseveralStateswillextendtoalltheobjectswhich，intheordinarycourseofaffairs，concerntheinternalorderandprosperityoftheState。\"Ishalloftenhaveoccasiontoquote\"TheFederalist\"inthiswork。WhenthebillwhichhassincebecometheConstitutionoftheUnitedStateswassubmittedtotheapprovalofthepeople，andthediscussionswerestillpending，threemen，whohadalreadyacquiredaportionofthatcelebritywhichtheyhavesinceenjoyed—JohnJay，Hamilton，andMadison—
formedanassociationwiththeintentionofexplainingtothenationtheadvantagesofthemeasurewhichwasproposed。Withthisviewtheypublishedaseriesofarticlesintheshapeofajournal，whichnowformacompletetreatise。Theyentitledtheirjournal\"TheFederalist，\"anamewhichhasbeenretainedinthework。\"TheFederalist\"isanexcellentbook，whichoughttobefamiliartothestatesmenofallcountries，althoughitespeciallyconcernsAmerica。]
PrerogativeOfTheFederalGovernmentPowerofdeclaringwar，makingpeace，andlevyinggeneraltaxesvestedintheFederalGovernment—Whatpartoftheinternalpolicyofthecountryitmaydirect—TheGovernmentoftheUnioninsomerespectsmorecentralthantheKing’sGovernmentintheoldFrenchmonarchy。
Theexternalrelationsofapeoplemaybecomparedtothoseofprivateindividuals，andtheycannotbeadvantageouslymaintainedwithouttheagencyofasingleheadofaGovernment。
Theexclusiverightofmakingpeaceandwar，ofconcludingtreatiesofcommerce，ofraisingarmies，andequippingfleets，wasgrantedtotheUnion。*hThenecessityofanationalGovernmentwaslessimperiouslyfeltintheconductoftheinternalpolicyofsociety;buttherearecertaingeneralinterestswhichcanonlybeattendedtowithadvantagebyageneralauthority。TheUnionwasinvestedwiththepowerofcontrollingthemonetarysystem，ofdirectingthepostoffice，andofopeningthegreatroadswhichweretoestablishacommunicationbetweenthedifferentpartsofthecountry。*iTheindependenceoftheGovernmentofeachStatewasformallyrecognizedinitssphere;nevertheless，theFederalGovernmentwasauthorizedtointerfereintheinternalaffairsoftheStates*jinafewpredeterminedcases，inwhichanindiscreetabuseoftheirindependencemightcompromisethesecurityoftheUnionatlarge。Thus，whilstthepowerofmodifyingandchangingtheirlegislationatpleasurewaspreservedinalltherepublics，theywereforbiddentoenactexpostfactolaws，ortocreateaclassofnoblesintheircommunity。*kLastly，asitwasnecessarythattheFederalGovernmentshouldbeabletofulfilitsengagements，itwasendowedwithanunlimitedpoweroflevyingtaxes。*l[Footnoteh:SeeConstitution，sect。8;\"Federalist，\"Nos。41and42;Kent’s\"Commentaries，\"vol。i。p。207;Story，pp。358—382;