MetaphysiciansmaydeclinetocallsuchabeingGod；butaproofofsuper-humanwisdomandpowermaybeenoughforpracticalpurposes。138*
Theproof，then，thatsuchabeingexists，mustbemadebyinduction；and，asMillexplains，bythefirstofthefamous’fourmethods，’namely，bythatofAgreement。139*Thisargument，thoughgenerallytheweakest，isinthiscase’strongofitskind。’Heillustratesitbythefamiliarcase。Theeyeisacomplexstructurewhich，asitbeganintime，musthavehadacauseorcauses。’Chance’iseliminatedbythenumberofinstances，andthereforetheremustbesomecausalconnectionbetweenthe’cause’whichbroughttheelementstogetherandthe’factofsight。’Mill，thatis，thinksitnecessarytoprovewhatsciencetakesforgranted。Nomanofsciencedisputesthatthereissomecauseofeyesandofeveryeye。Butherewehavethecurioustransitionintoanotherorderofthought，whichcorrespondstothepassagefromtheempiricaltothetranscendentalmeaning。Itisclearthatsolongasweareinthesphereofscience，theonly’cause’oftheexistenceofaneyeisthesumoftheprecedingorganicprocesses。Agivenanimalhaseyesbecausetheprocessesofreproductioninvolveresemblancetoitsparents。Ifwegobacktoeyelessancestors，wehavetheproblemhoweyesweredeveloped；butthepurelyscientificanswerwouldstillconsistinassigningthepreviousconditionsortheprecedentstageinthewholeprocessofnature。Howdowegetoutofthisseries？Theargument，accordingtoMill，wouldproceedbysayingthat，assightfollowstheeye，thecausemustbea’final’cause；or，inotherwords，correspondtoan’intelligentWill。’ButwhatistherelationofthisWilltotheadmittedseriesofevents？Causationalwayssendsmebackalonganindefinitelyproducibleseries。AmItointerpretthiscauseasan’alternative’towhatmaybecalledthenaturalcause；orascorrespondingtoageneralpower，whichismanifestedthroughthewholeseries？InthelattercasewemayconsidertheGodofnatureasan’immanent’power。Hisoperationismanifestinthegeneralwisdomofthewholesystem。Itisnotonlyconsistentwith，butimplies，thepersistenceofthe’lawsofnature，’andthereforetheevolutionofeyes，iftherewasaperiodbeforeeyesexisted。Ifthatviewbetenable，wemaysave’teleology’byapplyingittonatureasawhole，butthereisnointerventionintheactualseriesofnaturalevents。OntheviewwhichMillaccepts，wehaveanintervention，atsomeparticularpoint。Buthowisthistobeinferred，orwhatcanitmean？Ihavealreadynoticedthefamiliardifficultiesinspeakingof’PhilipBeauchamp。’Thephilosophicalobjectionisclear，140*andinscience’creation’canbeonlyaword；itintroducesanarbitraryandunmeaninginterruption，and，undertheformofexplaining，declaresexplanationtobeimpossible。
Infact，whensuchconceptionsarebroughtintotheargument，when’creation’isusedasanalternativehypothesistoapermanentorder，theansweroftheevolutionistisconclusive。
Here，accordingly，MillfindshimselfconfrontedbyDarwin。Headmitsthatthedoctrineofthe’survivalofthefittest’would’greatlyattenuate，’thoughitwouldbein’nowaywhateverinconsistentwithcreation。’141*Thismeans，apparently，thatDarwinismdoesnotprovethattherewasnota’creation’atsomeindefinitetime；thoughitdoesshowthatthereisnoneedforsupposingacreationsincetheexistingorderbegan。
IhavealreadynoticedMill’sviewofthis’remarkablespeculation。’Herehevirtuallyadmitsthathistheology，suchasitis，and，indeed，hiswholeconceptionofnature，isvirtuallyopposedtoevolution。Science，hesays，mosttruly，leadsustoregardnatureas’oneconnectedsystem，notawebofseparatethreadsinpassivejuxtapositionwithoneanother，butrather，likethehumanoranimalframe，’inperpetual’actionandreaction’；andthenaturalversionofthis，headds，istheism。
Theunityofnature，thatis，hasenabledmonotheismtosupersedepolytheism，becauseitcorrespondstothescientificview。142*
Yet，whilesayingthisingeneralterms，hecannotreconcileittohisowntheories；hestilltalksof’lawsofnature’
counteractingeachother；143*hecanspeakofsomethingsas’uncaused’；andofa’permanent’and’achangeable’elementinnature，asthoughpersistencewasnotacaseofcausation。Heiswilling，aswehaveseen，toassumethatanythingmaybethecauseofanythingelse。Theuniverseisthereforeultimatelyastrugglebetweenindependentforces，andGodbecomesabeingwhohastostruggleagainstantecedentorindependentthings。Whenscienceisregarded，notasasystemofinterdependenttruths，wherethevalueofeverytheorymustbejudgedbythewayinwhichitaffectsandisaffectedbyallotherascertainabletruth，butasanaggregateofpurelyempiricalobservationsoftheorderofsuccessionofotherwiseunrelatedfacts，itiseasytointroducesuchconceptionsas’creation，’whichvirtuallydenythecontinuityandreasonablenessoftheordergenerally，andtendtoconfuse，ashisantagonistswouldsay，NaturewithaparticularelementinNature；andtomakenoumenatakeasideinthestrugglebetweenphenomena。
Millisthusabletoholdthattheadaptations’innatureaffordalargebalanceofprobabilityinfavourofcreationbyintelligence。’144*Itis，hegrants，onlyaprobability，andnotstrengthenedbyanyindependentarguments。Itstillremainstoconsiderwhetherwecanfindreasonstobelievethatthecreatorismoral。Hethinksthatmost’contrivances’areforthepreservationofthecreatures，andthatthereisnoreasonforattributingthedestructiveagenciestooneBeing，andthepreservingagenciestoanother。WemaythereforegiveupManichaeism，oraconflictbetweengoodandevilpowers；butwemaystillhaveanuncreatedatofthingswithwhichthegoodbeingmuststruggle。WemustbecontenttobelieveinaBeingofgreatbutlimitedpower——howlimitedwecannotevenconjecture；
whoseintelligencemaybeunlimitedthoughitmayalsobemorelimitedthanhispower；whodesiresthehappinessofhiscreaturesbuthasprobablyothermotives。Ifheshowsbenevolence，therearenotracesofjustice。145*Ofimmortalitywecanlearnnothing，unlessfromrevelation。Hedeniesthatarevelation，conflictingwithmorality，canbedivine；butthisforceshimtolimitthepoweroftheDeity。HisGoddesiresmorality。Howcanwediscoverthathedesiresit？Canthesevaguesurmisesbehelpedbyanydirectrevelationormiraculousintervention？MilldiscussestheargumentofHume’sessayandreaches，whatItaketobethetrueconclusion，thattherealquestioniswhetherwehaveindependentreasonsforbelievinginaDeitywhoseinterventionisconceivable。146*Consideringthatwehavesomereasonforbelievinginsuchabeing，heatlastconcludesthat，inspiteofmostseriousdifficulties，historicalandphilosophical，weare’entitledtosaythatthereisnothingsoinherentlyimpossibleorabsolutelyincredibleinthesuppositionthatthe“extremelyprecious“giftofChristianitycamefromadivinelycommissionedmanastoprecludeanyonefromhopingthatitmaybetrue。’Hecangonofurther，forheseesno’evidentiaryvalue’eveninthetestimonyofChristhimself。Thebestmenarethereadiesttoascribetheirownmeritstoahighersource。Mill，ofcourse，doesnotbelieveinthedivinityofChrist；heholdsthatChristhimselfwouldhaveregardedsuchapretensionasblasphemous；butitremainspossiblethat’Christactuallywaswhathesupposedhimselftobe……amanchargedwithaspecial，express，anduniquecommissionfromGodtoleadmankindtotruthandvirtue。’147*
Mill，wesee，declaredpositivismtobereconcilablewiththeism。Comtehimself，whodeclaredatheismtobethemostillogicalformoftheology，wouldhaveagreedthatpositivismdoesnotdisproveGod’sexistence。ButComtewouldhavesaidthatanunverifiablehypothesisaboutaninconceivablebeingwassimplyidleor’otiose。’Millseemstotreattheabsenceofnegativeproofasequivalent——notindeedtothepresenceofpositive，but——totheexistenceofaprobabilityworthentertaining。Histheism，ifsovagueandproblematicaladoctrinecanbecalledtheism，isdefendedasneitherself-contradictorynorinconsistentwithfact。Nowatheorywhichisself-contradictoryisreallynotheoryatall。Norisatheoryscientificallyvaluablesimplybecause’consistent’withfacts。A
theorymusthavesomedefinitesupportinfacts。Itmustatlowestbenotonlyconsistentwiththeknownfacts，butinconsistentwithsomeotherwiseimaginablefacts。Ifitfitseveryconceivablestateofthings，itcanthrowlightuponnone。
ButthisisobviouslythecasewithMill’stheory。Hemakeswayforagoodbeingbyanarbitrarydivisionofnatureintotwosetsofforces。Hesavesthebenevolencebylimitingthepowerofthedeity；butthenthelimitsare，byhisownadmission，utterlyunknowable。Apower，restrainedbyunknowablebounds，isapowerfromwhichnothingcanbeinferred。Whateveritsattributes，wedonotknowwhethertheywillaffectanystateofthings。Thegoodnessmaybeindefinitelyfrustrated。Infact，onMill’sshowing，apoweromnipotentbutnotbenevolent，oranindefinitemultitudeofpowersofvaryingattributes，oragoodandabadpowereternallystruggling，or，inshort，anyreligiousdoctrinethathaseverbeenheldamongmen，wouldsuitthefacts。Mill’s’pluralityofcauses’mighthavesuggestedthisdifficulty。Iseeacorpse。Thedeathmayhavebeenduetoanyoneofanindefinitenumberofcauses。WhatrighthaveItoselectone？IaminthesamepositionwhenIregardthewholeofnatureaswhatHumecalleda’uniqueeffect。’Thefourmethodsofinductionbecomeinapplicable，fortherearenootheruniversesandIhavenocompasstosteerbyintheregionoftheunverifiable。
What，then，canbetheadvantageofanybeliefwhereconflictinghypothesesmustbeallequallyprobable？ThequestionispartlydiscussedinthesecondessayupontheutilityofReligion。HereMilltakesuptheoldargumentof’PhilipBeauchamp，’the’onlydirectdiscussion’ofthepointwithwhichheisacquainted，148*andendeavourstostatethecasemorefairlyandinalesshostilespirit。Hisargument，however，isingeneralconformitywithBenthamandGrote，andisveryforciblyput。Onepointmaybenoticed。Hevirtuallyidentifies’religion’
withabeliefin’thesupernatural。’149*Hecomparestheefficacyofsuchbeliefswiththeefficacyofeducationwhich，ashecharacteristicallysays，is’almostboundless’150*andofpublicopinion，andshowswith’Beauchamp’thatwhenconflictoccurs，theseinfluencesarestrongerthanthosederivedfromsupernaturalsanctions。Nowwhenwebelieveinarevelationitisintelligibletoask，Whatistheinfluenceofacreed？Itrepresentsanewforceinfluencingmen’smindsfromwithout。Butwhenthecreedissupposedtobegeneratedfromantecedentbeliefs，theargumentmustbealteredbyconsideringwhatarethetruecausesofthebelief。Howdiditcometoprevail？AnadmirerofComtemighthavebroughtoutmoredistinctlythefactthatsuchbeliefsmarkanessentialstageofprogress，thatwhatarenowsporadicsuperstitionswereoncepartsofasystematicreligionandrepresentedthegermsofscience。Theywereapproximatehypotheseswhichhadtoberemodelledbyextricatingordroppingthe’supernatural’element。Afullrecognitionofthiswoulddiminishtheparadoxicalappearanceofthestatementfromwhichhestarts，that’areligionmaybemorallyusefulwithoutbeingintellectuallysustainable。’Thetruthsurelyisthatwecannotseparatethetwoelementsofacreed。DoubtlesstherewerenosuchbeingsastheZeusorApolloofpopularbelief；butpolytheismmaystillhaveprovidedtheonlyforminwhichcertaintruthscouldbepresented；andwas，asComtewouldhavesaid，astageintheprocessfromfetichismtowardsmonotheismandpositivism。Adiscussionoftheutilityofbeliefinthe’supernatural’withoutreferencetotheplaceofthesupernaturalinthewholesystemofbeliefmustbenecessarilyinadequate。Milladmitsthisinsubstance，andarguesthatthemoraltruthmaysurvivethesuperstitionsinwhichitwasboundup。151*Hegoesontoargue，asComtehadargued，thattheinstinctswhichoncefoundtheirsanctioninthesupernaturalworldmightfindtheirembodimentinthe’ReligionofHumanity。’152*Thisheholdstobenotonlyentitledtothenameofreligion，buttobe’abetterreligionthananyofthoseordinarilycalledbythattitle。’Itisdisinterestedanddoesnottendtocramptheintellectordegenerateintoaworshipofmerepower。MillsaysemphaticallythattheBenthammodeofconsideringreligionasasupplementtopolicebyproviding’sanctions’isinadequate；andthatreligion，likepoetry，isvaluableassuggestinghigheridealsandgratifyingthecravingforknowledgeofcorrespondingrealities。Totheselfish，supernaturalreligionoffersheaven；andtothe’tenderandgrateful’itofferstheloveofGod。Hepointsoutthatitdoesnotfollowthatwemust’travelbeyondtheboundariesoftheworldweinhabit’inordertoobtainsuchconsolation。153*Andtheessayconcludesbysayingthat，thoughthe’supernaturalreligions’havealwaystheadvantageofofferingimmortality，thevaluesetuponimmortalitymaydiminishaslifebecomeshigherandhappierandannihilationmayseemmoredesirable。154*
YetinthemiddleofthisargumentwehavethedefenceofManichaeismasapossiblecreed，155*andinthelastessayweseemtoreachthetrueaccountofhisleaningstosuchabelief。