andwhich，findingthemetaphysicalargumentdangerous，wasinclinedtofallbackuponthemerelyempiricalargumentofPaley。Ihaveshown，atfullysufficientlength，howbysubstitutinganantinomyforaparalogism，Hamiltonmanagesverballytoevadethisdifficulty；andbyextendingthesphereofbeliefbeyondthesphereofreason，justifiesbeliefinaGodwhoisatonceunknowableandyetmaybeanobjectofworship。
Mansel’saudaciousextensionofthistothehistoricalandmythologicalcreeds，andtheconsequentidentificationofJehovahwiththeAbsoluteandInfinite，canonlyberegardedasalogicalcuriosity。Theonlyresultswere，ontheonehand，MrHerbertSpencer’sagnosticism，andontheother，perhaps，someimpulsetothespeculationoftherisinggeneration。HamiltonandManseldidsomething，bytheirdenunciationsofGermanmysticismandontology，tocallattentiontothedoctrinesattacked。TheGermansmightafterallgivetherightclue；anditmightbepossible，bysubstitutinganewdialecticfortheoldlogic，toregardtheuniverseasstillwovenoutofreason，andtopreserveatheologicaloratleastanidealistmodeofconception。Withthat，however，Ihavenoconcern。
VII。MILLONTHEOLOGY
Hamilton’stheoryatleastrecognisedtheinevitablefailureoftheempiricalorPaleytheologywhichvirtuallymakestheologyadepartmentofscience。Mill，asathoroughempiricist，mighthavebeenexpectedtoabandontheologyalongwithalltranscendentalismandontology。Infact，however，hispositionwasdifferent。IhavealreadypointedoutthatatonepartofhisargumentheappearstobedefendingorthodoxviewsoftheologyasagainstMansel。Thisargumentmightappeartobemerelyadhominem，asintendedtoshowtheabsurdityofMansel’sdoctrineofinconceivability；nottodenytheinconceivabilityitself。
Mill，however，reallygoesfurther。HeapprovesHamilton’sstrangeassertionthat’religiousdisbeliefandphilosophicalscepticismarenotmerelynotthesame，buthavenonaturalconnection，’122*andholdsthatalltherealargumentsfortheexistenceofGodandtheimmortalityofthesoulremainunaffectedbytheassociationtheory。InhisLogicMillhadacceptedComte’s’lawofthethreestages’；butinhislaterstudyofComteheexpresslydeclaresthatthisdoctrineisreconcilablewiththebeliefina’creatorandsupremegovernoroftheworld。’Itimpliesabeliefina’constantorder，’butthatordermaybeduetoaprimitivecreation，andevenconsistentwiththecontinualsuperintendenceofan，intelligentgovernor。’123*Intheposthumousessaysthispositionwasdevelopedinsuchawayastogivesomescandaltohisdisciples。124*Henotonlyleavesroomfortheisticbeliefs，butheseemseventosanctiontheiracceptance。
IntheThreeEssaysonReligionMillisclearlytreadingunfamiliarground。HereferstotheargumentsofLeibniz，Kant，andButler，but，asProfessorBainremarks，125*wasacomparativestrangertothewholesphereofspeculation。HeisnotsomuchathomewithhissubjectashewasintheLogicorthePoliticalEconomy；andthereforescarcelyappreciatescertainconditionsofsuccessfulnavigationoftheseregionsmadesufficientlyobviousbythehistoryofpreviousadventurers。Yethiscandourandhisresolutiontogivefairconsiderationtoalldifficultiesareasconspicuousashiswishtoappreciatethehighestmotivesofhisantagonists。Ofthethreeessays，thefirsttwo，writtenbefore1858On’Nature’andthe’UtilityofReligion’，showlessdispositionthanthelastupon’Theism’
tocompromisewithorthodoxy；andyettheirprinciplesareessentiallythesame。Mill，ofcourse，isstillathoroughempiricist。Oneversionoftheologyisthereforeinconsistentwithhismostessentialtenets。Theso-calledaprioriorontologicalargumentisforhimworthless。Itinvolves，hethinks，theunjustifiableassumptionthatwecaninfer’objectivefactsfromideasorconvictionsofourminds。’The’FirstCauseargument，’again，canonlyuponhisviewofcausationsuggestanindefiniteseriesofantecedents，andoneinwhichthe’higher’
asoftenfollowsthe’lower’cause，asthelowerthehigher。
Mattermaybetheantecedentofmind，aswellasmindofmatter。
Moreover，no’cause’iswantedforthatwhichhasnobeginning；
andasourexperienceshowsabeginningformindbutnobeginningforforceormatter，thepresumptionisagainstmind。126*If，indeed，theworldbesimplyaseriesofseparatephenomena，connectedsolelyasprecedingandsucceeding，thereisnopossibility，itwouldseem，ofinferringanyunityorunderlyingcauseorground。Theveryattempttoreachunityisashopelessasistheproverbialproblemofweavingropesfromsand。ThepossibilityofPhilosophicaltheismisthusdestroyed；fortheGodofphilosophycorrespondstotheendeavourtoassertpreciselytheunitythusdeniedinadvance。By’God’Millmustreallymean，notSpinoza’snecessarysubstancenorKant’s’IdeaofthepureReason，’butabeingwhoisessentiallyonefactoroftheuniverse。Theconfusionisofcriticalimportance。Itisconstantlyassumed，asMillassumes，thatthe’apriori’andtheempiricalargumentsaredifferentmoDesofprovingthesameconclusion。Theword’God’isnodoubtusedinbothcases；butthewordcoversentirelydifferentsenses。TheexistenceofJehovahmightbeprovedordisprovedliketheexistenceofMoses。
TheGodofSpinozaisprovedfromthelogicalnecessityoftheunityandregularityoftheuniverse。OneBeingmayinterfereorsuperintendbecauseheisonlypartofawhole。Theothercorrespondstothewhole，andinterferencesormiraclesbecomeabsurd。Mill，therefore，bycalmlydismissingtheaprioriargumentisreallygivinguptheGodofphilosophy，andtryingwhathecandowiththeparticularorfinitebeingreallyimpliedinPaley。Theologyonthisshowingcanbeonlyapartofnaturalscience，andpreciselythatpartinwhichweknownothing。
ToknowanythingorGod，inwhateversense，wemustgoto’Nature。’InthefirstessayMilldiscussesthequestionwhetheranythingcanbemadeofthevarioussystemswhichprescribe’imitationofNature’orobediencetothelawsofNature。IfNaturebetakeninthewidestsense，asincludingman，suchsystemsaremigratory。Disobediencetoa’lawofNature’isnotwrongbutimpossible。Wemay，however，takeNatureinthenarrowersenseinwhichitistheantithesisofart；or，asheputsit，asmeaning’thatwhichtakesplacewithouthumanintervention。’127*Itisplainthat，inthissense，thewholeaimofallhumanendeavourmustbetoimprove。Nature。MillemphasisesthisbyexpandingtheindictmentagainstNature，whichhasbecomemorefamiliarindiscussionsofthe’struggleforexistence。’The’absoluterecklessnessofthegreatcosmicforces，’128*thevarietyoftorments，suchastheworsttyrantshavehardlyused，inflicteduponalllivingbeingswithouttheslightestregardtojustice，areamplysufficientreasonsfornot’imitatingNature。’HenceMillprotestsemphaticallyagainstthenotionthat’goodnessisnatural。’129*Allthevirtuesareinhissense’artificial。’Sympathybeginsasaformofselfishness——selfishnessfortwo——andthesentimentofjusticeisdevelopedbythenecessityofexternallaw。Itisthepressurefromwithout，theinterestofeachinthegoodnessofothers，whichhasreallycreatedthemoralworld。The’germs’ofallthesevirtuesmust，itistrue，havebeenpresent；thespeciescouldnothaveexistedhaditnotbeenendowedwithdesireforusefulends；butthen，wemustalsoadmittheexistenceofbadinstincts，producing’ranklyluxuriantgrowths’ofviceagainstwhichalongandprecariousstrugglemustbecarriedon。130*
Millisthussayingemphaticallymuchthathasbeensaidbylaterevolutionists。Oneremarkisobvious。Thedistinctionbetween’Natural’and’Artificial’inthissenseisclearlyarbitraryforonewho，likeMill，rejectsthedoctrineofFreewill。IfNaturemakesmenwithcertaincapacities，Naturemustalsobetakentobethecauseofallhuman’intervention。’
Thesphereofthe’artificial’ismerelyonepartofthesphereofthe’natural。’’Sympathy’and’justice’arenotthelessnaturalbecausetheyareinthissenseartificial。Millis，ofcourse，fullyawareofthefactthathis’nature’ishereatmostdepartmentofNatureinthewidersense。Yettheillegitimatedistinctionseemsmoreorlesstoaffecthisconclusions。Hecomestospeakasifthedistinctioncorrespondedtoalinebetweendifferentworlds。Inthenon-humanworldweappeartocatch’Nature’aloneandunaided；wecanseewhatitcandoitsbyitself，andjudge，ifnotofitsjustice，atleastofbenevolence。HeisthusledtouselanguageaboutmenamendingNatureor’co-operatingwiththebeneficentpowers，’131*whichwouldbemoreconsistentinathorough-goingadvocateofFreewill，butwhichinhismouthmustbetakenasametaphoricalorprovisionalmodeofspeech。Toonewhouses’nature’inthewidestsenseasimplyingaconceptionoftheuniverseasawhole，thenarrowerusewouldbemeaningless。But，asweshallnowsee，theunityofnatureisaconceptionwhichMillvirtuallyrejects。
MillhasshownconclusivelythatitisimpossibletointerpretNatureastheworkofomnipotentBenevolence。Sofar，heagreeswithmanypredecessors，includingHumeandMansel；132*buthedoesnotwithHumebecomesimplysceptical，norfollowManselinpronouncingthatwemustbelieveadoctrinewhichweareunableto’construetothemind’asconceivable。Hesuggestsanalternativeview。ItispossibletobelieveinaGodwhoisbenevolentthoughnotomnipotent。This，hedeclares，istheonly’religiousexplanationoftheorderofNature，’whichisneitherself-contradictorynorinconsistentwithfacts。133*He’venturestoassert，’moreover，thatithasbeentherealfaithofallwhohavedrawnaworthysupportfromtrustinProvidence；
’theyhavealwayssaved[God’s]goodnessattheexpenseofHispower。’This，forexample，isthetruemeaningofLeibniz’s’bestofallpossibleworlds。’134*MilldeclaresthatthedoctrineoftheManichaeans，whichheknowstohavebeen’devoutlyheldbyatleastonecultivatedandconscientiouspersonofourownday，’istheonly’formofbeliefinthesupernaturalwhichstandswhollyclearbothofintellectualcontradictionandmoralobliquity。’135*Hepointsout，too，thatevenChristianityadmitsadevil，thoughitplacesupontheCreatortheresponsibilityofnotannihilatinghim。136*NowManichaeismisaclearconfessionofphilosophicalbankruptcy。Thewholeaimofreasoningistoreducetheuniversetounity，andthisistoadmitthatthereisanultimateandinsolubledualism。Fromthepointofviewoftheontologist，indeed，themoraldifficultywhichManichaeismissupposedtomeetisirrelevant。GodisthegroundorFirstCause。Eviliscausedasmuchasgood，andifafirstcauseoranabsolutesubstancebeanecessaryassumption，wemustascribetoitthewholesystemofthings，goodorbad，painfulorpleasurable，withouttryingtoseparatewhatisinextricablyintertwined。Anargumentfromcausationleavesnolocusstandiforanymoralobjection。Mill，however，deniesthenecessityfor，orindeedthepossibilityof，suchreasoning。Heisfullypreparedtoadmitthatinthelastresortwecometoindependentandequallyuncausedfactors。Thequestion，then，remains，whatpositivegroundwecanassignforabeliefinanyfirstcauseorcausesor’supernaturalentities。’
HavingrejectedthemetaphysicalargumentsforaDeity，wereachatlast，saysMill，anargumentofareallyscientificcharacter——theargument，namely，fromdesign。137*Thatistosay，hetriestofindroomforanempiricaldeitywhomustthereforecorrespondtoapartofnature，nottothewhole。Hedoesnotholdthattheknowledgeofnatureanywhereinvolvesantinomiesorcontraryinconceivables。Itisacoherentandthroughoutintelligiblesystem，butitwouldcorrespondtotheidealofcompletedscience，nottoanymetaphysicalbelief。
Withinthissystemthereisroomforabeingwho，thoughheislimitedbysomethingexternaltohimself，mayyetbeanobjectofworship。Infact，therecanbenoaprioriobjectiontothetheoryofapowerfulbeing，whomaybediscovered，likeanyotherbeingsknowntous，byhisactioninparticularcases。