goodactisthatwhichagoodmanwouldperform。Ifabadman，undercompulsion，actsinthesameway，heactsfromfear，andhisactisthereforemorallyneutral，andtocallhimgoodonaccountofhisactionisthereforeamistake。Hesimplyshowsthatheisaman，anddislikeshangingevenmorethanhehateshisfellow-men。
An’externalsanction’reallymeansamotiveforactingasthoughyouweregoodevenifyouarenotgood。Thatsuchsanctionsareessentialtosociety，thattheyprovideashelterunderwhichtruemoralitymayormustgrowup，isobvious。Itistrue，also，thatinearlystagesthedistinctionbetweenthelawwhichrestsuponforceandthatwhichrestsuponthecharacterisnotmanifest。Butultimatelymoralitymeansnothingbuttheexpressionofthecharacteritself。Hencetofindauniversal’sanction’formoralityischimerical。Suchasanctionwouldbe’amotive’whichwouldapplytoallmengoodorbad；thatis，itwouldnotbeamoralmotive。Fearofhellorthegallowsmayindirectlyhelporhinderthedevelopmentofamoralcharacter；
butinitselfthefearisneithergoodnorbad。Theveryattempt，therefore，tofindsucha’sanction’impliesthe’external’oressentiallyinadequateviewofmorality，intowhichtheUtilitarianswiththeirlegalprepossessionsweretooapttofall。Thelaw，restinguponexternalsanctions，maybeusefulorprejudicialtomorals，butmustalwaysbesubordinate；foritsapplicationdependsuponinstinctsbywhichitisguidedandwhichitcannotcreate。
Millrecognisesthis，virtually，thoughnotexplicitly，inhisdiscussionofthe’Utilitariansanction。’Hedeclaresinratherawkwardphrasethatthe’ultimatesanctionofallmoralityexternalmotivesapart’is’asubjectivefeelinginourownminds。’Whereelsecansuchafeelingbe，andwhatis’anobjectivefeeling’？Thesefeelingsexist，asheargues，equallyfortheUtilitarianandthe’Transcendentalist，’thoughthe’Transcendentalists’thinkthattheirexistence’inthemind’
impliesthattheyhavea’rootoutofthemind。’81*The’conscience，’thatis，paininbreakingthemorallaw，existsasafact，whateveritsorigin。If’innate’itcanstillbeopposed，andthequestion，’WhyshouldIobeyit？’isequallydifficulttoanswer。Evenifinnate，again，itmaybeaninnateregardforothermen’spainsandpleasures，andsocoincidewiththeUtilitarianview。Hearguesaccordingly，that，inpointoffact，wemayacquirethat’feelingofunity’withotherswhichgivesthereally’ultimatesanction’tothe’Happinessmorality。’82*
WiththisresultIatleastcanhavenoquarrel。Iholdittobeperfectlycorrectandasgoodanaccountofmoralityascanbegiven。Thefaultisinplacingthe’externalsanction’onthesamelevelwiththe’internal’andfailingtoseethatitisnotproperly’moral’atall。Buthere，oncemore，itisnecessarytolookatthedifficultyofderivinghisconclusionfromthepremisesinheritedfromhisteachers。Theessentialdifficultyliesinthepsychologicalanalysisandthetheoryofassociation。
WeareagainatJamesMill’spointofview。Conductisdeterminedbypainandpleasure。Anactionsupposesanend，andthat’end’
mustbeapleasure。Ifweask，pleasuretowhom？theanswermustbe，pleasuretotheagent。Allconduct，itwouldseem，mustbedirectlyorindirectlyself-regarding，forthe’end’mustalwaysbemyownpleasure。Millmaintainsthat’virtue’may，fortheUtilitarianaswellasforothers，bea’thingdesirableinitself。’83*Thatisa’psychologicalfact，’independentlyoftheexplanation。Butatthispointhelapsesintotheolddoctrine。Virtue，headmits，isnot’naturallyandoriginallypartoftheend。’Virtuewasonce-desiredsimply’foritsconducivenesstopleasure’andespecially’toprotectionfrompain。’Itbecomesagoodinitself。Thisisenforcedbythefamiliarillustrationofthe’loveofmoney’andoftheloveofpowerorfame。Eachpassionaimedoriginallyatafurtherend，whichhasdroppedoutwhilethedesireformeanshasbecomeoriginal。Themoralfeelings，ashesaysinanswertoWhewell，84*are’eminentlyartificialandtheproductofculture。’Wemaygrowcorn，orwemayaseasilygrowhemlocksorthistles。Yet，ashedeclaresintheUtilitarianism，85*’moralfeelings’arenot’thelessnatural’because’acquired。’The’moralfaculty’isa’naturaloutgrowth’ofournature。Theantithesisof’natural’and’artificial’isgenerallyambiguous；
butMill’sviewisclearenoughuponthemainpoint。Virtueistheproductofthegreatforce’indissolubleassociation。’Now’artificialassociations’aredissolved’asintellectualculturegoeson。’Buttheassociationbetweenvirtueandutilityisindissoluble，becausethereisa’naturalbasisofsentiment’
whichstrengthensit——thatbasisbeing’ourdesiretobeinunitywithourfellow-creatures。’86*Onefurthercorollarydeservesnotice。Tobecomevirtuous，itisnecessarytoacquirevirtuoushabits。We’will’atfirstsimplybecausewedesire。
Afterwardswecometodesireathingbecausewewillit。’Willisthechildofdesire，andpassesoutofthedominionofitsparentonlytocomeunderthatofhabit。’87*Thus，ashehadsaidintheLogic，88*welearntowillathing’withoutreferencetoitsbeingpleasurable’——afactillustratedbythehabitof’hurtfulexcess’andequallybymoralheroism。Itwouldsurelybemoreconsistenttosaythathabitisamodificationofcharacterwhichaltersourpainsandpleasuresbutdoesnotenableustoactagainstourjudgmentofpainsandpleasures。Heistryingtoescapefromanawkwardconsequence；butthemodeofevasionwillhardlybearinspection。
Mill’sargumentsimplyhisthoroughadherencetothe’associationpsychology。’Theyreallyindicate，Ithink，anattempttoreacharightconclusionfromdefectivepremises。Theerrorisimpliedintheanalysisof’ends’ofaction。Whenamanactswithaviewtoan’end’thetrueaccountisthathisimmediateactionisaffectedbyalltheconsequenceswhichheforesees。Thisorthatmotiveconquersbecauseitincludesaperceptionofmoreorlessremoteresults。Butwhatdeterminesconductisnotacalculationofsomefuturepainsorpleasures，buttheactualpainfulnessorpleasurablenessofthewholeactionatthemoment。Ishrinkfromthepainofawoundorfromthepainofgivingawoundtoanotherperson。Bothareequallymyimmediatefeelings；anditisanerrortoanalysethesympatheticpainintotwodifferentfactors，onetheimmediateactionandtheothertheanticipatedreaction。Itisoneindissolublemotive，justasnaturalororiginalasthedisliketotheunpleasantsensationofmyownwound。Todistinguishitintotwofactsandmakeonesubordinateandaproductofassociationisafallacy。
Wecanhardybelievethat’association’accountsevenfor’loveofmoney’or’fame。’Avariceandvanitymeananexaggeratedfearofpovertyorregardtootherpeople’sopinions。Theydonotimplyanyforgetfulnessofendformeans，butanerroneousestimateoftheproportionofmeanstoends。Thereallynoticeablepoint，again，hasalreadymetusinJamesMill’sethics。WhenMillspeaksof’virtue’as’artificial’orderivative，heisassertingatruthnottobedeniedbyanevolutionist。Undoubtedlythesocialsentimentshavebeenslowlydeveloped；andundoubtedytheyhavegrownupundertheprotectionofexternal’sanctions。’Theprimitivesocietydidnotdistinguishbetweenlawandmorality；thepressureofexternalcircumstancesuponcharacterandtheinfluenceofthecharacteritselfuponthesociety。AdifficultyarisesfromthedefectiveviewwhichforcesMilltoregardthewholeprocessastakingplacewithinthelifeoftheindividual。Theunitisthenabeingwithoutmoralinstinctsatall，andtheyhavetobeinsertedbythehelpoftheassociationmachinery。Sympathyisnotanintrinsicpartofhumannatureinitsmoreadvancedstages，butsomethingartificialstuckonbyindissolubleassociation。Mill，himself，whendiscussingthevirtueofjusticeinhislastchapter，substantiallyadoptsalineofargumentwhich，ifnotsatisfactoryindetails，sufficientlyrecognisesthispointofview。And，ifhestillfailstoexplainmoralitysufficiently，itisinthemainbecauseheneverfreedhimselffromtheunsatisfactoryassumptionsoftheoldpsychology。Here，asinsomanyothercases，heseestheinadequacyoftheoldconclusions，butpersuadeshimselfthatabetterresultcanbereachedwithoutthethoroughrevisionwhichwasreallynecessary。
NOTES：
1。Autobiography，p。50。themostelaborateattackupontheLibertyiscontainedinLiberty，EqualityandFraternity1873，bymybrotherSirJamesFitzJamesStephen，inwhoseIlifeIhavegivenanaccountofthebook。Ishallnotheregointothecontroversy。Iamcontenttosaythat，thoughIcannotagreewithmybrother，IthinkthathestrikesveryforciblyatsomeweakpointsinMill’sscheme。ThemostremarkablepointisthatthebookissubstantiallyacriticismofMill’sfromtheolderUtilitarianpointofview。Itshows，therefore，howMilldivergedfromBentham。
2。IreferfortheLibertyandtheRepresentativeGovernmenttothePeople’sEditionsof1867。
3。Works，ii。451。
4。Autobiography，p。231。
5。Ibid。，pp。191-95。
6。LibertyPeople’sEdition，1867，p。3
7。Ibid。，p。5。
8。Liberty，17n。TheBradlaughcaseshowedthattheoldspiritwasnotextincttwenty-fiveyearslater。
9。SeeBain’sJamesMill，p。304。
10。Liberty，pp。30，31。
11。Liberty，p。21。TheexcellentAbrahamTuckerremarksthatifhemet’apersonofcredit，candour，andunderstanding。’whodeniedthattwoandtwomadefour，hewouldgivehimahearing——
LightofNature1834，p。125。
12。Liberty，pp。25，26。’Tobecomeproperlyacquaintedwithatruth，’saysNovalisquotedinCarlyle’sessayuponhim，’wemustfirsthavedisbelievedanddisputedagainstit。’ButNovalisalsoobservedthat’myfaithgainsinfinitelythemomentIseeitshouldbysomeoneelse。’
13。Liberty，p。24。
14。Liberty，p。22。
15。Liberty，p。17。
16。NoteinLibertyMill’stheorythattheimpulsegivenat’threeperiods’——theReformation，thelasthalfoftheeighteenthcentury，andthe’GoetheanandFichtean’periodinGermany——havemadeEuropewhatitis。Yeteach’period’isonlytheproductoftheprecedingperiods。HasEuropeowednothingtotheseventeenthcentury？
17。SubjectionofWomen，p。6。
18。Dissertations，p。351。SoinSubjectionofWomensecondedition，1869，p。129heremarksthatoriginalitygenerallypresupposes’elaboratediscipline，’andagreeswithF。D。Mauricethatthemostoriginalthinkersarethosewhoknowmostthoroughlywhathasbeendonebytheirpredecessors。