Ifsomethingbewantinginthisdefence，itmayperhapsbesuppliedfromMillhimself。Theimportanceofcultivatingasensitiveloveoftruthis，hesays，sogreatastopossessa’transcendentexpediency’72*nottobeviolatedbytemporaryconsiderations。WhendiscussingthequestionofjusticeMillinsistsupontheimportanceoftheconfidenceinourfellow-creaturesascorrespondingtothe’verygroundworkofourexistence。’Thegeneralrule，thatis，correspondstoanindividualqualitywhichisessentialtothesocialunion。A
strongsenseofveracityisunconditionallygood，thoughcircumstancesmayrequireexceptionstoanyrulewhenstatedintermsofoutwardconduct。Lyingmaybenecessary，butshouldalwaysbepainful。Thisisfamiliargroundonwhichitisneedlesstodwell。Butanothercriticismofthe’criterion’ismoreimportantandleadstooneofMill’smostcharacteristicarguments。Thegreatesthappinesscriterion，itisoftensaid，willbeinterpreteddifferentlyasmenformdifferentjudgmentsofwhatconstituteshappiness。The’felicificcalculus’willgivedifferentresultsforthephilosopherandtheclown，thesensualistandtheascetic，thesavageandthecivilisedman；anditispartoftheempiricistcontentionthatinfactthestandardhasvariedwidely。Millhimselfobserves，andheisonlyfollowingLocke73*andHume，’thatmoralityhasvariedwidely；
hasinsomecasessanctionedpracticesthemostrevolting’toothers，andthatthe’universalwillofmankindisuniversalonlyinitsdiscordance。’74*ItisindeedpreciselyforthatreasonthattheUtilitarianhasdefinedtoaccepttheauthorityofthe’moralsense’andappealedtofacts。Thebeliefthatourfeelingisright，simplybecauseitisours，isthe’mentalinfirmitywhichBentham’sphilosophytendstocorrectandDrWhewell’stoperpetuate。’75*Thatistosay，Benthamcanlaydownan’objectivecriterion’becausehecalculatesactualpainsandpleasures。Butwillnotthiscriterionbeafterall’subjective’
becauseourestimateofpainsandpleasuresissodiscordant？
Milltriestomeetthisbyafamousdistinctionbetweenthequalitiesofpleasures。Benthamhadinsistedthatonepleasurewasasgoodasanother。’Quantityofpleasurebeingequal，push-pinisasgoodaspoetry。’76*Millnowdeclaresthatitisquitecompatiblewiththeprincipleofutilitytorecognisethefactthatsomekindsofpleasurearemoredesirableandmorevaluablethanothers。’Wemustconsider’quality’aswellas’quantity。’77*The’onlycompetentjudges，’heargues，arethosewhohaveknownboth。Now，itisan’unquestionablefact’
thatthosewhohavethisadvantagepreferthehigherorintellectualtothelowerorsensualpleasures。ItisbettertobeaSocratesdissatisfiedthanafoolsatisfied。Ifthefoolorthepigdissentsitisbecauseheonlyknowshisownsideofthequestion。78*
Answersareonlytooobvious。Whatis’quantity’asdistinguishedfrom’quality’ofpleasure？Thestatement，’Acubicfootofwaterweighslessthanacubicfootoflead’isintelligible；butwhatisthecorrespondingpropositionaboutpleasure？Canweask，Howmuchbenevolenceisequaltohowmuchhunger？The’howmuch’isstrictlymeaningless。Moreover，arenotbothSocratesandthepigrightintheirjudgment？Pig’s-washissurelybetterforthepigthandialogue；anddialoguemaybebetterforSocratesthanpig’s-wash。If’desirable’meansthatpleasurewhicheachdesires，eachmayberight。Ifitmeanssomequalityindependentoftheagent，wehavetheoldfallacywhichinpoliticaleconomymakes’value’something’objective。’All’value’mustdependuponthemanaswellasuponthething。AndthisagainsuggeststhatneitherSocratesnoraChristiansaintwouldreallymakethesupposedassertion。Itisnottrueabsolutelythat’intellectual’pleasuresaresimply’better’thansensual。Eachisbetterincertaincircumstances。Therearetimeswheneventhesaintprefersaglassofwatertoreligiousmusings；andmomentswhenevenafoolmayattimesfindsuchintellectualpleasuresashecanenjoybetterthanaglassofwine。ThisseemstobesoobviousthatwemustsuspectMillofhastilystoppingagapinhisargumentwithoutdulyworkingouttheimplications。Indeed，heseemstobemakingroomforsomethingverylikeanintuition。Heassumestheproposition，doubtfulinitselfandapparentlyinconsistentwithhisownposition，thatallcompetentpeopleagree，andthenmakesthisagreementdecisiveofadisputablequestion。
Bentham，fromhisownpointofview，was，Ithink，perfectlyrightinhisstatement。Tocalculatepleasures，theonlyquestionmustbewhicharethegreatestpleasures，andtheonlyanswer，thosewhich，asafact，attractpeoplemost。Ifamanismoreattractedby’push-pin’thanbypoetry，thepresumptionisthatpush-pingiveshimmostpleasure。Wearesimplyinvestigatingfacts；andcannotoverlooktheobviousfactthatestimatesofpleasurevaryindefinitely。Somethingsarepleasanttotherefinedalone，whileothersaremoreorlesspleasanttoeverybody，andothers，again，ceasetobepleasantorbecomedisgustingasmenadvance。Tointroducethemoralvaluationinanestimateoffactstochangethe’desirable’as’thatwhichisdesired’intothe’desirable’as’thatwhichoughttobedesired’
istobegthequestionortoargueincircle。
YetMillwasaimingatanobvioustruth。Asmenadvanceintellectually，intellectualpleasureswillclearlyfillalargerspaceintheiridealoflife。Thepurelysensualpleasureswillhavetheirvalueaslongasmenhavebodiesandappetites；buttheywillcometohaveasubordinateplaceindefiningthewholeendsofhumanconduct。Themoralityofthehigherbeingwillincludehigheraspirations。Wehavethentoinquire，Inwhatsenseisa’felicificcalculus’possibleorrequired？Themoralruleis，asMillholds，astatementofcertainfundamentalconditionsofsociallife，giving，asheputsit，the’ground-work’uponwhichallsocialrelationsarebuiltup。Thisagainsupposesessentiallyasocietymadeofthemostvaryingelements，poetsandmenofscience，philosophersandfools，nay，accordingtohim，includingbothSocratesandthepig。IncriticisingWhewell，forexample，hequotes79*withmostemphaticalapprovalthat’admirablepassage’inwhichBenthamincludesanimalhappinessinhiscriterion。Wearetopromotethepig’shappinesssofarasthepigis’sentient，’littleashemaycareforaSocraticdialogue。Butifso，the’greatesthappiness’
rulemusthaveforitsendtheconditionsunderwhichthemostvaryingtypesofhappinessmaybepromotedandeachkindofhappinesspromotedaccordingtothecharacterofthesubject。Andinpointoffact，theactualmoralrules，’Loveyourneighbourasyourself，’betruthful，honest，andsoforth，donotassuchdefineanyspecialtypeofhappinessasgood。Theyassumeratherthathappiness，ashappiness，issofargood；andthatweoughttopromotethehappinessofothersifouractionbenotobjectionableuponsomeotherground。ThisindicatesareallyweakpointoftheoldUtilitarianism，whichMillwastryingtoremedy。If，asBenthamwouldseemtoimply，wearetoformOurestimateofhappinesssimplybyacceptingaverageestimatesofexistinghumanbeings，weshallbetemptedtoapproveconductconducivetothelowerkindsofhappinessalone。Ishouldreplythatthisistomisunderstandthetruenatureofmorality。Ifmorality，asMillwouldadmit，correspondsessentiallytotheprimaryrelationsofsociallife，itisdefinednotbyanyaverageestimatesofhappiness，butbyastatementoftheconditionsofthewelfareofthesocialorganism。Itstatesthefundamentaltermsuponwhichmencanbestassociate。Itgivesthefundamental’socialcompact’ifwemayacceptthephrasewithoutitsfallaciousconnotationimpliedinanorderedsystemofsociety。Thehappinessofeachisgood，sofarasitdoesnotimplyanti-socialcharacteristics。Butmoralityleavesroomfortheexistenceofthemostvariedtypesofcharacterfromthesainttothepig，andaimsatproducinghappiness——notbytakingtheexistingaveragemanasanultimateunalterabletype，but——byleavingroomforsuchadevelopmentofmenthemselvesaswillaltertheircharacterandthereforetheirviewsofhappiness。Asthesocietyprogressestheindividualwillhimselfbealtered，andthetypewhichimpliesagreaterdevelopmentofintellect，sympathy，andenergycometoprevailoverthelower，moresensual，selfish，andfeebletype。Thoughhappinessisstilltheultimatebase，themoralityappliesimmediatelytothesocialbond，whichcontemplatesageneraldevelopmentofthewholemanandamodificationoftheelementsofhappinessitself。Mill，perceivingthatsomethingwaswanted，makestheunfortunateattemptatsupplyingthegapbyhisassumptionofanimaginaryconsensusofthebetterminds。Whatistrueisthatallmenmayconsenttoconditionsofsocietywhichleaveafreeplaytothehigherinfluences：thatis，arefavourabletothemoreadvancedtypewithgreaterforceofintellectandrichnessofemotionalpower。
HerewereturntotheoldUtilitarianproblem：Whatisthe’sanction’ofmorality？The’sanction’canbenothingelsethanthesumofallthemotiveswhichinducementoactmorally。What，then，arethey？TheUtilitarians，startingfromthejuridicalpointofview，hadareadyanswerinthecaseofpositivelaw。
Thesanction，briefly，isthegallows。Lawmeanscoercion，andaseverybodywithveryinsignificantexceptionsobjectstobeinghanged，thegallowsmayberegardedasasanctionofuniversalefficacy。Ifthemorallawbetakeninthesamewayasimplyingaruleofconducttobeenforcedbyanexternalsanction，thecorrelativetothegallowswashell-fire。ThissatisfiedPaley，butastheUtilitarianshadabolishedhell，theywereatsomelossforasubstitute。
HereMillacceptstheprincipleslaiddownbyhisfather。HedefendstheUtilitariansuponthegroundthatthey’hadgonebeyondallothersinaffirmingthatthemotivehasnothingtodowiththemoralityoftheaction，thoughmuchwiththemoralityoftheagent。’80*Theybasedmoralityupon’consequences，’andtheconsequencesofanactionarenodoubtindependentofthemotive。
IfIburnamanforheresy，the’consequences’tohimarethesamewhethermymotivebeloveofhissoulorthehatredofabigotforafree-thinker。Toestimatethegoodnessorbadnessofanaction，wemustconsiderallthatitimplies。Wemustinquirewhetherasocietyinwhichhereticsarerepressedbythestakeisbetterorworsethanoneinwhichtheyareleftatliberty；andthatcannotbesettledbysimplyaskingwhetherthepersecutorisbenevolentormalevolent。Thepurestbenevolencemaybemisguidedifitisdirectedbyerroneousbelief。The’sentimentalism，’
denouncedbyUtilitarians，impliedrefusaltolookatconsequences，andthejustification，forexample，ofcorruptingcharityonthegroundthatitwaspleasanttothesympathyofthecorrupter。Theirespecialfunctionwastowarnphilanthropiststhatmisguidedphilanthropymightstimulatethegreatestevils。
Buttoinferfromthisthegeneralprinciplethatthe’motive’
wasindifferentinvolvesthecharacteristicfallacy。Thetrueinferenceisthatsoundmoralityhasanintellectualaswellasanemotionalbasis；itsupposesajustforesightofconsequencesaswellasadesireforhappiness。Conductdependsthroughoutuponcharacter；itcannotbealteredwithoutalteringcharacter，thoughthealterationmayimplyenlightenmentoftheintellectratherthandevelopmentofthefeelings。Whenwecometothemoral’sanction’themotivebecomesallimportant。Thelegislatormaybecontentedifhecaninduceabadmantoactlikeagoodmanortorefrainfrommurderinthepresenceofthepoliceman。
Hecantakethepolicemanandthegallowsforgranted；andassumetheexistenceofthefundamentalsocialinstinctsuponwhichthejudicialmachinerydepends。Butitispreciselywiththoseinstinctsthatthemoralistisconcerned。Hehastoaskwhataretheforceswhichworkthemachineryandcannotbeindifferenttothequestionof’motive。’Millonlyhalfrecognisesthepointwhenheadmitsthatthe’motive’hasmuchtodowiththe’moralityoftheagent。’If’motive’beinterpretedwidelyenoughitconstitutestheagent’smorality。Anactionismoralinsofarasitimpliesacharacterthoroughly’moralised’orfittedtoplaytherightpartinsociety。Thedistinctionbetweenthemoralityoftheconductandthemoralityoftheagentvanishes。A