Waitingthereonlylongenoughtofillourwagons，weagainbeganamarchwhich，forperil，labor，andresults，willcomparewithanyevermadebyanorganizedarmy。ThefloodsoftheSavannah，theswampsoftheCombaheeandEdisto，the\"highhills\"androcksoftheSantee，theflatquagmiresofthePedeeandCapeFearRivers，wereallpassedinmidwinter，withitsfloodsandrains，inthefaceofanaccumulatingenemy;and，afterthebattlesofAverysboro’andBentonsville，weoncemorecameoutofthewilderness，tomeetourfriendsatGoldsboro’。Eventhenwepausedonlylongenoughtogetnewclothing，toreloadourwagons，againpushedontoRaleighandbeyond，untilwemetourenemysuingforpeace，insteadofwar，andofferingtosubmittotheinjuredlawsofhisandourcountry。Aslongasthatenemywasdefiant，normountainsnorrivers，norswamps，norhunger，norcold，hadcheckedus;butwhenhe，whohadfoughtushardandpersistently，offeredsubmission，yourgeneralthoughtitwrongtopursuehimfarther，andnegotiationsfollowed，whichresulted，asyouallknow，inhissurrender。
HowfartheoperationsofthisarmycontributedtothefinaloverthrowoftheConfederacyandthepeacewhichnowdawnsuponus，mustbejudgedbyothers，notbyus;butthatyouhavedoneallthatmencoulddohasbeenadmittedbythoseinauthority，andwehavearighttojoinintheuniversaljoythatfillsourlandbecausethewarisover，andourGovernmentstandsvindicatedbeforetheworldbythejointactionofthevolunteerarmiesandnavyoftheUnitedStates。
Tosuchasremainintheservice，yourgeneralneedonlyremindyouthatsuccessinthepastwasduetohardworkanddiscipline，andthatthesameworkanddisciplineareequallyimportantinthefuture。Tosuchasgohome，hewillonlysaythatourfavoredcountryissogrand，soextensive，sodiversifiedinclimate，soil，andproductions，thateverymanmayfindahomeandoccupationsuitedtohistaste;noneshouldyieldtothenaturalimpatiencesuretoresultfromourpastlifeofexcitementandadventure。Youwillbeinvitedtoseeknewadventuresabroad;donotyieldtothetemptation，foritwillleadonlytodeathanddisappointment。
Yourgeneralnowbidsyoufarewell，withthefullbeliefthat，asinwaryouhavebeengoodsoldiers，soinpeaceyouwillmakegoodcitizens;andif，unfortunately，newwarshouldariseinourcountry，\"Sherman’sarmy\"willbethefirsttobuckleonitsoldarmor，andcomeforthtodefendandmaintaintheGovernmentofourinheritance。
ByorderofMajor—GeneralW。T。Sherman，L。M。DAYTON，AssistantAdjutant—General。
ListoftheAverageNumberofMilesmarchedbytheDifferentArmyCorpsoftheUnitedStatesForcesunderCommandofMajor—GeneralW。
T。SHERMAN，UnitedStatesArmy，duringhisCampaigns:1863—’64—’65。
4th14th15th16th17th20thCorps。Corps。Corps。CorpsCorps。Corps。
Miles:1101，5862，2895082，0761，525
CHAPTERXXV。
CONCLUSION——MILITARYLESSONSOFTHEWAR。
Havingthusrecordedasummaryofevents，mostlyundermyownpersonalsupervision，duringtheyearsfrom1846to1865，itseemsproperthatIshouldaddanopinionofsomeoftheusefulmilitarylessonstobederivedtherefrom。
Thatcivilwar，byreasonoftheexistenceofslavery，wasapprehendedbymostoftheleadingstatesmenofthehalf—centuryprecedingitsoutbreak，isamatterofnotoriety。GeneralScotttoldmeonmyarrivalatNewYork，asearlyas1850，thatthecountrywasontheeveofcivilwar;andtheSouthernpoliticiansopenlyassertedthatitwastheir。purposetoacceptasacasusbellitheelectionofGeneralFremontin1856;but，fortunatelyorunfortunately，hewasbeatenbyMr。Buchanan，whichsimplypostponeditsoccurrenceforfouryears。Mr。Sewardhadalsopubliclydeclaredthatnogovernmentcouldpossiblyexisthalfslaveandhalffree;yettheGovernmentmadenomilitarypreparation，andtheNorthernpeoplegenerallypaidnoattention，tooknowarningofitscoming，andwouldnotrealizeitsexistencetillFortSumterwasfiredonbybatteriesofartillery，handledbydeclaredenemies，fromthesurroundingislandsandfromthecityofCharleston。
GeneralBragg，whocertainlywasamanofintelligence，andwho，inearlylife，ridiculedathousandtimes，inmyhearing，thethreatsofthepeopleofSouthCarolinatosecedefromtheFederalUnion，saidtomeinNewOrleans，inFebruary，1861，thathewasconvincedthatthefeelingbetweentheslaveandfreeStateshadbecomesoembitteredthatitwasbettertopartinpeace;bettertopartanyhow;and，asaseparationwasinevitable，thattheSouthshouldbeginatonce，becausethepossibilityofasuccessfuleffortwasyearlylessenedbytherapidandincreasinginequalitybetweenthetwosections，fromthefactthatalltheEuropeanimmigrantswerecomingtotheNorthernStatesandTerritories，andnonetotheSouthern。
Theslavepopulationm1860wasnearfourmillions，andthemoneyvaluethereofnotfarfromtwenty—fivehundredmilliondollars。
Now，ignoringthemoralsideofthequestion，acausethatendangeredsovastamoneyedinterestwasanadequatecauseofanxietyandpreparation，andtheNorthernleaderssurelyoughttohaveforeseenthedangerandpreparedforit。AftertheelectionofMr。Lincolnin1860，therewasnoconcealmentofthedeclarationandpreparationforwarintheSouth。InLouisiana，asIhaverelated，menwereopenlyenlisted，officerswereappointed，andwarwasactuallybegun，inJanuary，1861。ThefortsatthemouthoftheMississippiwereseized，andoccupiedbygarrisonsthathauleddowntheUnitedStatesflagandhoistedthatoftheState。TheUnitedStatesArsenalatBatonRougewascapturedbyNewOrleansmilitia，itsgarrisonignominiouslysentoff，andthecontentsofthearsenaldistributed。ThesewereasmuchactsofwaraswasthesubsequentfiringonFortSumter，yetnopublicnoticewastakenthereof;andwhen，monthsafterward，IcameNorth，Ifoundnotonesinglesignofpreparation。Itwasforthisreason，somewhat，thatthepeopleoftheSouthbecameconvincedthatthoseoftheNorthwerepusillanimousandcowardly，andtheSouthernleadersweretherebyenabledtocommittheirpeopletothewar，nominallyindefenseoftheirslaveproperty。UptothehourofthefiringonFortSumter，inApril，1861，itdoesseemtomethatourpublicmen，ourpoliticians，wereblamablefornotsoundingthenoteofalarm。
Then，whenwarwasactuallybegun，itwasbyacallforseventy—
fivethousand\"ninety—day\"men，IsupposetofulfillMr。Seward’sprophecythatthewarwouldlastbutninetydays。
TheearlierstepsbyourpoliticalGovernmentwereextremelywaveringandweak，forwhichanexcusecanbefoundinthefactthatmanyoftheSouthernrepresentativesremainedinCongress，sharinginthepubliccouncils，andinfluencinglegislation。ButassoonasMr。Lincolnwasinstalled，therewasnolongeranyreasonwhyCongressandthecabinetshouldhavehesitated。Theyshouldhavemeasuredthecause，providedthemeans，andlefttheExecutivetoapplytheremedy。
AtthetimeofMr。Lincoln’sinauguration，viz。，March4，1861，theRegularArmy，bylaw，consistedoftworegimentsofdragoons，tworegimentsofcavalry，oneregimentofmountedrifles，fourregimentsofartillery，andtenregimentsofinfantry，admittingofanaggregatestrengthofthirteenthousandandtwenty—fourofficersandmen。Onthesubsequent4thofMaythePresident，byhisownorders（afterwardsanctionedbyCongress），addedaregimentofcavalry，aregimentofartillery，andeightregimentsofinfantry，which，withtheformerarmy，admittedofastrengthofthirty—ninethousandninehundredandseventy—three;butatnotimeduringthewardidtheRegularArmyattainastrengthoftwenty—fivethousandmen。
Tothenewregimentsofinfantrywasgivenanorganizationdifferingfromanythathadheretoforeprevailedinthiscountry——
ofthreebattalionsofeightcompanieseach;butatnotimedidmorethanoneoftheseregimentsattainitsfullstandard;norinthevastarmyofvolunteersthatwasraisedduringthewarwereanyoftheregimentsofinfantryformedonthethree—battalionsystem，butthesewereuniversallysinglebattalionsoftencompanies;sothat，onthereorganizationoftheRegularArmyatthecloseofthewar，Congressadoptedtheformoftwelvecompaniesfortheregimentsofcavalryandartillery，andthatoftencompaniesfortheinfantry，whichisthepresentstandard。
InasmuchastheRegularArmywillnaturallyformthestandardoforganizationforanyincreaseorfornewregimentsofvolunteers，itbecomesimportanttostudythissubjectinthelightofpastexperience，andtoselectthatformwhichisbestforpeaceaswellaswar。
Acavalryregimentisnowcomposedoftwelvecompanies，usuallydividedintosixsquadrons，oftwocompanieseach，orbettersubdividedintothreebattalionsoffourcompanieseach。Thisisanexcellentform，easilyadmittingofsubdivisionaswellasunionintolargermasses。
Asinglebattalionoffourcompanies，withafield—officer，willcomposeagoodbodyforagarrison，foraseparateexpedition，orforadetachment;and，inwar，threeregimentswouldcomposeagoodbrigade，threebrigadesadivision，andthreedivisionsastrongcavalrycorps，suchaswasformedandfoughtbyGeneralsSheridanandWilsonduringthewar。
Intheartilleryarm，theofficersdifferwidelyintheiropinionofthetrueorganization。Asinglecompanyformsabattery，andhabituallyeachbatteryactsseparately，thoughsometimesseveralareunitedor\"massed;\"butthesealwaysactinconcertwithcavalryorinfantry。
Nevertheless，theregimentalorganizationforartilleryhasalwaysbeenmaintainedinthiscountryforclassificationandpromotion。
Twelvecompaniescomposearegiment，and，thoughprobablynocolonelevercommandedhisfullregimentintheformoftwelvebatteries，yetinpeacetheyoccupyourheavysea—coastfortsoractasinfantry;thentheregimentalorganizationisbothnecessaryandconvenient。
Buttheinfantrycomposesthegreatmassofallarmies，andthetrueformoftheregimentorunithasbeenthesubjectofinfinitediscussion;and，asIhavestated，duringthecivilwartheregimentwasasinglebattalionoftencompanies。Inoldentimestheregimentwascomposedofeightbattalioncompaniesandtwoflankcompanies。Thefirstandtenthcompanieswerearmedwithrifles，andwerestyledandusedas\"skirmishers;\"butduring’thewartheywereneverusedexclusivelyforthatspecialpurpose，andinfactnodistinctionexistedbetweenthemandtheothereightcompanies。
Theten—companyorganizationisawkwardinpractice，andIamsatisfiedthattheinfantryregimentshouldhavethesameidenticalorganizationasexistsforthecavalryandartillery，viz。，twelvecompanies，soastobesusceptibleofdivisionintothreebattalionsoffourcompanieseach。
Thesecompaniesshouldhabituallybeaboutahundredonemenstrong，givingtwelvehundredtoaregiment，whichinpracticewouldsettledowntoaboutonethousandmen。
Threesuchregimentswouldcomposeabrigade，threebrigadesadivision，andthreedivisionsacorps。Then，byallowingtoaninfantrycorpsabrigadeofcavalryandsixbatteriesoffield—artillery，wewouldhaveanefficientcorpsd’armeeofthirtythousandmen，whoseorganizationwouldbesimpleandmostefficient，andwhosestrengthshouldneverbeallowedtofallbelowtwenty—fivethousandmen。
Thecorpsisthetrueunitforgrandcampaignsandbattle，shouldhaveafullandperfectstaff，andeverythingrequisiteforseparateaction，readyatalltimestobedetachedandsentoffforanynatureofservice。Thegeneralincommandshouldhavetherankoflieutenant—general，andshouldbe，byexperienceandeducation，equaltoanythinginwar。Habituallywithushewasamajor—
general，speciallyselectedandassignedtothecommandbyanorderofthePresident，constituting，infact，aseparategrade。
Thedivisionistheunitofadministration，andisthelegitimatecommandofamajorgeneral。
Thebrigadeisthenextsubdivision，andiscommandedbyabrigadier—general。
Theregimentisthefamily。Thecolonel，asthefather，shouldhaveapersonalacquaintancewitheveryofficerandman，andshouldinstillafeelingofprideandaffectionforhimself，sothathisofficersandmenwouldnaturallylooktohimforpersonaladviceandinstruction。Inwartheregimentshouldneverbesubdivided，butshouldalwaysbemaintainedentire。Inpeacethisisimpossible。
Thecompanyisthetrueunitofdiscipline，andthecaptainisthecompany。Agoodcaptainmakesagoodcompany，andheshouldhavethepowertorewardaswellaspunish。Thefactthatsoldiersworldnaturallyliketohaveagoodfellowfortheircaptainisthebestreasonwhyheshouldbeappointedbythecolonel，orbysomesuperiorauthority，insteadofbeingelectedbythemen。
IntheUnitedStatesthepeoplearethe\"sovereign，\"allpoweroriginallyproceedsfromthem，andthereforetheelectionofofficersbythemenisthecommonrule。Thisiswrong，becauseanarmyisnotapopularorganization，butananimatedmachine，aninstrumentinthehandsoftheExecutiveforenforcingthelaw，andmaintainingthehonoranddignityofthenation;andthePresident，astheconstitutionalcommander—in—chiefofthearmyandnavy，shouldexercisethepowerofappointment（subjecttotheconfirmationoftheSenate）oftheofficersof\"volunteers，\"aswellasof\"regulars。\"
Noarmycanbeefficientunlessitbeaunitforaction;andthepowermustcomefromabove，notfrombelow:thePresidentusuallydelegateshispowertothecommander—in—chief，andhetothenext，andsoondowntothelowestactualcommanderoftroops，howeversmallthedetachment。Nomatterhowtroopscometogether，whenonceunited，thehighestofficerinrankisheldresponsible，andshouldbeconsequentlyarmedwiththefullestpoweroftheExecutive，subjectonlytolawandexistingorders。Themoresimpletheprinciple，thegreaterthelikelihoodofdeterminedaction;andthelessacommandingofficeriscircumscribedbyboundsorbyprecedent，thegreateristheprobabilitythathewillmakethebestuseofhiscommandandachievethebestresults。
TheRegularArmyandtheMilitaryAcademyatWestPointhaveinthepastprovided，anddoubtlesswillinthefutureprovideanamplesupplyofgoodofficersforfuturewars;but，shouldtheirnumbersbeinsufficient，wecanalwayssafelyrelyonthegreatnumberofyoungmenofeducationandforceofcharacterthroughoutthecountry，tosupplementthem。Atthecloseofourcivilwar，lastingfouryears，someofourbestcorpsanddivisiongenerals，aswellasstaff—officers，werefromcivillife;butIcannotrecallanyofthemostsuccessfulwhodidnotexpressaregretthathehadnotreceivedinearlylifeinstructionintheelementaryprinciplesoftheartofwar，insteadofbeingforcedtoacquirethisknowledgeinthedangerousandexpensiveschoolofactualwar。
Butthevitaldifficultywas，andwillbeagain，toobtainanadequatenumberofgoodsoldiers。Wetriedalmosteverysystemknowntomodernnations，allwithmoreorlesssuccess——voluntaryenlistments，thedraft，andboughtsubstitutes—andIthinkthatallofficersofexperiencewillconfirmmyassertionthatthemenwhovoluntarilyenlistedattheoutbreakofthewarwerethebest，betterthantheconscript，andfarbetterthantheboughtsubstitute。WhenaregimentisonceorganizedinaState，andmusteredintotheserviceoftheUnitedStates，theofficersandmenbecomesubjecttothesamelawsofdisciplineandgovernmentastheregulartroops。Theyareinnosense\"militia，\"butcomposeapartoftheArmyoftheUnitedStates，onlyretaintheirStatetitleforconvenience，andyetmaybeprincipallyrecruitedfromtheneighborhoodoftheiroriginalorganization:Once。organized，theregimentshouldbekeptfullbyrecruits，andwhenitbecomesdifficulttoobtainmorerecruitsthepayshouldberaisedbyCongress，insteadoftemptingnewmenbyexaggeratedbounties。I
believeitwouldhavebeenmoreeconomicaltohaveraisedthepayofthesoldiertothirtyorevenfiftydollarsamonththantohaveheldoutthepromiseofthreehundredandevensixhundreddollarsintheformofbounty。Towardthecloseofthewar，Ihaveoftenheardthesoldierscomplainthatthe\"stayat—home\"mengotbetterpay，bounties，andfood，thantheywhowereexposedtoallthedangersandvicissitudesofthebattlesandmarchesatthefront。
Thefeelingofthesoldiershouldbethat，ineveryevent，thesympathyandpreferenceofhisgovernmentisforhimwhofights，ratherthanforhimwhoisonprovostorguarddutytotherear，and，likemostmen，hemeasuresthisbytheamountofpay。Ofcourse，thesoldiermustbetrainedtoobedience，andshouldbe\"contentwithhiswages;\"butwhoeverhascommandedanarmyinthefieldknowsthedifferencebetweenawilling，contentedmassofmen，andonethatfeelsacauseofgrievance。Thereisasoultoanarmyaswellastotheindividualman，andnogeneralcanaccomplishthefullworkofhisarmyunlesshecommandsthesoulofhismen，aswellastheirbodiesandlegs。
Thegreatestmistakemadeinourcivilwarwasinthemodeofrecruitmentandpromotion。Whenaregimentbecamereducedbythenecessarywearandtearofservice，insteadofbeingfilledupatthebottom，andthevacanciesamongtheofficersfilledfromthebestnoncommissionedofficersandmen，thehabitwastoraisenewregiments，withnewcolonels，captains，andmen，leavingtheoldandexperiencedbattalionstodwindleawayintomereskeletonorganizations。IbelievewiththevolunteersthismatterwaslefttotheStatesexclusively，andIrememberthatWisconsinkeptherregimentsfilledwithrecruits，whereasotherStatesgenerallyfilledtheirquotasbynewregiments，andtheresultwasthatweestimatedaWisconsinregimentequaltoanordinarybrigade。I
believethatfivehundrednewmenaddedtoanoldandexperiencedregimentweremorevaluablethanathousandmenintheformofanewregiment，fortheformerbyassociationwithgood，experiencedcaptains，lieutenants，andnon—commissionedofficers，soonbecameveterans，whereasthelatterweregenerallyunavailableforayear。
TheGermanmethodofrecruitmentissimplyperfect，andthereisnogoodreasonwhyweshouldnotfollowitsubstantially。
Onaroad，marchingbytheflank，itwouldbeconsidered\"goodorder\"tohavefivethousandmentoamile，sothatafullcorpsofthirtythousandmenwouldextendsixmiles，butwiththeaveragetrainsandbatteriesofartillerytheprobabilitiesarethatitwoulddrawouttotenmiles。Onalongandregularmarchthedivisionsandbrigadesshouldalternateinthelead，theleadingdivisionshouldbeontheroadbytheearliestdawn，andmarchattherateofabouttwomiles，or，atmost，twoandahalfmilesanhour，soastoreachcampbynoon。Eventhenthereardivisionsandtrainswillhardlyreachcampmuchbeforenight。Theoretically，amarchingcolumnshouldpreservesuchorderthatbysimplyhaltingandfacingtotherightorleft，itwouldbeinlineofbattle;butthisisrarelythecase，andgenerallydeploymentsaremade\"forward，\"byconductingeachbrigadebytheflankobliquelytotherightorlefttoitsapproximatepositioninlineofbattle，andtheredeployed。Insuchalineofbattle，abrigadeofthreethousandinfantrywouldoconpyamileof\"front;\"butforastronglineofbattlefive—thousandmenwithtwobatteriesshouldbeallowedtoeachmile，oradivisionwouldhabituallyconstituteadoublelinewithskirmishersandareserveonamileof\"front。\"
The\"feeding\"ofanarmyisamatterofthemostvitalimportance，anddemandstheearliestattentionofthegeneralintrustedwithacampaign。Tobestrong，healthy，andcapableofthelargestmeasureofphysicaleffort，thesoldierneedsaboutthreepoundsgrossoffoodperday，andthehorseormuleabouttwentypounds。
Whenageneralfirstestimatesthequantityoffoodandforageneededforanarmyoffiftyoronehundredthousandmen，heisapttobedismayed，andhereagoodstaffisindispensable，thoughthegeneralcannotthrowoffonthemtheresponsibility。Hemustgivethesubjecthispersonalattention，forthearmyreposesinhimalone，andshouldneverdoubtthefactthattheirexistenceoverridesinimportanceallotherconsiderations。Oncesatisfiedofthis，andthatallhasbeendonethatcanbe，thesoldiersarealwayswillingtobearthelargestmeasureofprivation。ProbablynoarmyeverhadamorevariedexperienceinthisregardthantheoneIcommandedin1864’65。
OurbaseofsupplywasatNashville，suppliedbyrailwaysandtheCumberlandRiver，thencebyrailtoChattanooga，a\"secondarybase，\"andthenceforwardasingle—trackrailroad。Thestorescameforwarddaily，butIendeavoredtohaveonhandafullsupplyfortwentydaysinadvance。Thesestoreswerehabituallyinthewagon—trains，distributedtocorps，divisions，andregiments，inchargeofexperiencedquartermastersandcommissaries，andbecamesubjecttotheordersofthegeneralscommandingthesebodies。
Theyweregenerallyissuedonprovisionreturns，butthesehadtobecloselyscrutinized，fortoooftenthecolonelswouldmakerequisitionsforprovisionsformorementhantheyreportedforbattle。Ofcourse，therearealwaysagoodmanynon—combatantswithanarmy，but，aftercarefulstudy，Ilimitedtheiramounttotwenty—fivepercent。ofthe\"effectivestrength，\"andthatwasfoundtobeliberal。Anordinaryarmy—wagondrawnbysixmulesmaybecountedontocarrythreethousandpoundsnet，equaltothefoodofafullregimentforoneday，but，bydrivingalongbeef—cattle，acommissarymaysafelycountthecontentsofonewagonassufficientfortwodays’foodforaregimentofathousandmen;andasacorpsshouldhavefoodonhandfortwentydaysreadyfordetachment，itshouldhavethreehundredsuchwagons，asaprovision—train;andforforage，ammunition，clothing，andothernecessarystores，itwasfoundnecessarytohavethreehundredmorewagons，orsixhundredwagonsinall，foracorpsd’armee。
Theseshouldbeabsolutelyundertheimmediatecontrolofthecorpscommander，whowill，however，finditeconomicaltodistributethemindueproportiontohisdivisions，brigades，andevenregiments。
Eachregimentoughtusuallytohaveatleastonewagonforconveniencetodistributestores，andeachcompanytwopack—mules，sothattheregimentmayalwaysbecertainofamealonreachingcampwithoutwaitingforthelargertrains。
Onlongmarchestheartilleryandwagon—trainsshouldalwayshavetherightofway，andthetroopsshouldimproviseroadstooneside，unlessforcedtouseabridgeincommon，andalltrainsshouldhaveescortstoprotectthem，andtoassisttheminbadplaces。Tothisendthereisnothinglikeactualexperience，only，unlesstheofficersincommandgivethesubjecttheirpersonalattention，theywillfindtheirwagon—trainsloadeddownwithtents，personalbaggage，andeventhearmsandknapsacksoftheescort。Eachsoldiershould，ifnotactually\"sickorwounded，\"
carryhismusketandequipmentscontainingfromfortytosixtyroundsofammunition，hisshelter—tent，ablanketorovercoat，andanextrapairofpants，socks，anddrawers，intheformofascarf，wornfromtheleftshouldertotherightsideinlieuofknapsack，andinhishaversackheshouldcarrysomebread，cookedmeat，salt，andcoffee。Idonotbelieveasoldiershouldbeloadeddowntoomuch，but，includinghisclothing，arms，andequipment，hecancarryaboutfiftypoundswithoutimpairinghishealthoractivity。
Asimplecalculationwillshowthatbysuchadistributionacorpswill—thuscarrytheequivalentoffivehundredwagon—loads——animmenserelieftothetrains。
Whereanarmyisnearoneofourmanylargenavigablerivers，orhasthesafeuseofarailway，itcanusuallybesuppliedwiththefullarmyration，whichisbyfarthebestfurnishedtoanyarmyinAmericaorEurope;butwhenitiscompelledtooperateawayfromsuchabase，andisdependentonitsowntrainofwagons，thecommandingofficermustexerciseawisediscretionintheselectionofhisstores。Inmyopinion，thereisnobetterfoodformanthanbeef—cattledrivenonthehoof，issuedliberally，withsalt，bacon，andbread。Coffeehasalsobecomealmostindispensable，thoughmanysubstituteswerefoundforit，suchasIndian—corn，roasted，ground，andboiledascoffee;thesweet—potato，andtheseedoftheokraplantpreparedinthesameway。AllthesewereusedbythepeopleoftheSouth，whoforyearscouldprocurenocoffee，butI
noticedthatthewomenalwaysbeggedofussomerealcoffee，whichseemstosatisfyanaturalyearningorcravingmorepowerfulthancanbeaccountedforonthetheoryofhabit。ThereforeIwouldalwaysadvisethatthecoffeeandsugarrationbecarriedalong，evenattheexpenseofbread，forwhichtherearemanysubstitutes。
Ofthese，Indian—cornisthebestandmostabundant。Parchedinafrying—pan，itisexcellentfood，orifground，orpoundedandboiledwithmeatofanysort，itmakesamostnutritiousmeal。Thepotato，bothIrishandsweet，formsanexcellentsubstituteforbread，andatSavannahwefoundthatricealsosuitable，bothformenandanimals。Fortheformeritshouldbecleanedofitshuskinahominyblock，easilypreparedoutofalog，andsiftedwithacoarsecornbag;butforhorsesitshouldbefedinthestraw。
DuringtheAtlantacampaignweweresuppliedbyourregularcommissarieswithallsortsofpatentcompounds，suchasdesiccatedvegetables，andconcentratedmilk，meat—biscuit，andsausages，butsomehowthemenpreferredthesimplerandmorefamiliarformsoffood，andusuallystyledthese\"desecratedvegetablesandconsecratedmilk。\"Wewerealsosuppliedliberallywithlime—juice，sauerkraut，andpickles，asanantidotetoscurvy，andInowrecalltheextremeanxietyofmymedicaldirector，Dr。Kittoe，aboutthescurvy，whichhereportedatonetimeasspreadingandimperilingthearmy。ThisoccurredatacrisisaboutKenesaw，whentherailroadwastaxedtoitsutmostcapacitytoprovidethenecessaryammunition，food，andforage，andcouldnotpossiblybringusanadequatesupplyofpotatoesandcabbage，theusualanti—scorbutics，whenprovidentiallytheblackberriesripenedandprovedanadmirableantidote，andIhaveknowntheskirmish—line，withoutorders，tofightarespectablebattleforthepossessionofsomeoldfieldsthatwerefullofblackberries。Soon，thereafter，thegreencornorroasting—earcameintoseason，andIheardnomoreofthescurvy。Ourcountryaboundswithplantswhichcanbeutilizedforapreventiontothescurvy;besidestheabovearethepersimmon，thesassafrasrootandbud，thewild—mustard，the\"agave，\"turniptops，thedandelioncookedasgreens，andadecoctionoftheordinarypine—leaf。
ForthemoredelicateandcostlyarticlesoffoodforthesickwereliedmostlyontheagentsoftheSanitaryCommission。Idonotwishtodoubtthevalueoftheseorganizations，whichgainedsomuchapplauseduringourcivilwar，fornoonecanquestionthemotivesofthesecharitableandgenerouspeople;buttobehonestI
mustrecordanopinionthattheSanitaryCommissionshouldlimititsoperationstothehospitalsattherear，andshouldneverappearatthefront。Theyweregenerallylocalinfeeling，aimedtofurnishtheirpersonalfriendsandneighborswithabetterclassoffoodthantheGovernmentsupplied，andtheconsequencewas，thatoneregimentofabrigadewouldreceivepotatoesandfruitwhichwouldbedeniedanotherregimentcloseby:Jealousywouldbetheinevitableresult，andinanarmyallpartsshouldbeequal;thereshouldbeno\"partiality，favor，oraffection。\"TheGovernmentshouldsupplyallessentialwants，andinthehospitalstotherearwillbefoundabundantopportunitiesfortheexerciseofallpossiblecharityandgenerosity。DuringthewarIseveraltimesgainedtheill—willoftheagentsoftheSanitaryCommissionbecauseIforbadetheircomingtothefrontunlesstheywouldconsenttodistributetheirstoresequallyamongall，regardlessofthepartieswhohadcontributedthem。
Thesick，wounded，anddeadofanarmyarethesubjectsofthegreatestpossibleanxiety，andaddanimmenseamountoflabortothewellmen。Eachregimentinanactivecampaignshouldhaveasurgeonandtwoassistantsalwayscloseathand，andeachbrigadeanddivisionshouldhaveanexperiencedsurgeonasamedicaldirector。Thegreatmajorityofwoundsandofsicknessshouldbetreatedbytheregimentalsurgeon，ontheground，undertheeyeofthecolonel。Asfewshouldbesenttothebrigadeordivisionhospitalaspossible，forthemenalwaysreceivebettercarewiththeirownregimentthanwithstrangers，andasarulethecureismorecertain;butwhenmenreceivedisablingwounds，orhavesicknesslikelytobecomepermanent，thesoonertheygofartotherearthebetterforall。Thetentortheshelterofatreeisabetterhospitalthanahouse，whosewallsabsorbfetidandpoisonousemanations，andthengivethembacktotheatmosphere。
Tomenaccustomedtotheopenair，wholiveontheplainestfood，woundsseemtogivelesspain，andareattendedwithlessdangertolifethantoordinarysoldiersinbarracks。
Woundswhich，in1861，worldhavesentamantothehospitalformonths，in1865wereregardedasmerescratches，ratherthesubjectofajokethanofsorrow。Tonewsoldiersthesightofbloodanddeathalwayshasasickeningeffect，butsoonmenbecomeaccustomedtoit，andIhaveheardthemexclaimonseeingadeadcomradebornetotherear，\"Well，Billhasturneduphistoestothedaisies。\"
Ofcourse，duringaskirmishorbattle，armedmenshouldneverleavetheirrankstoattendadeadorwoundedcomrade——thisshouldbeseentoinadvancebythecolonel，whoshoulddesignatehismusiciansorcompanycooksashospitalattendants，withawhiteragontheirarmtoindicatetheiroffice。Awoundedmanshouldgohimself（ifable）tothesurgeonnearathand，or，ifheneedhelp，heshouldreceiveitfromoneoftheattendantsandnotacomrade。
Itiswonderfulhowsoonthemenaccustomthemselvestothesesimplerules。Ingreatbattlesthesematterscallforamoreenlargedattention，andthenitbecomesthedutyofthedivisiongeneraltoseethatproperstretchersandfieldhospitalsarereadyforthewounded，andtrenchesaredugforthedead。Thereshouldbenorealneglectofthedead，becauseithasabadeffectontheliving;foreachsoldiervalueshimselfandcomradeashighlyasthoughhewerelivinginagoodhouseathome。
Theregimentalchaplain，ifany，usuallyattendstheburialsfromthehospital，shouldmakenotesandcommunicatedetailstothecaptainofthecompany，andtothefamilyathome。Ofcourseitisusuallyimpossibletomarkthegravewithnames，dates，etc。，andconsequentlythenamesofthe\"unknown\"inournationalcemeteriesequalaboutone—halfofallthedead。
VeryfewofthebattlesinwhichIhaveparticipatedwerefoughtasdescribedinEuropeantext—books，viz。，ingreatmasses，inperfectorder，manoeuvringbycorps，divisions，andbrigades。Weweregenerallyinawoodedcountry，and，thoughourlinesweredeployedaccordingtotactics，themengenerallyfoughtinstrongskirmish—lines，takingadvantageoftheshapeofground，andofeverycover。Weweregenerallytheassailants，andinwoodedandbrokencountriesthe\"defensive\"hadapositiveadvantageoverus，fortheywerealwaysready，hadcover，andalwaysknewthegroundtotheirimmediatefront;whereaswe，theirassailants，hadtogropeourwayoverunknownground，andgenerallyfoundaclearedfieldorpreparedentanglementsthatheldusforatimeunderacloseandwitheringfire。Rarelydidtheopposinglinesincompactordercomeintoactualcontact，butwhen，asatPeach—TreeCreekandAtlanta，thelinesdidbecomecommingled，themenfoughtindividuallyineverypossiblestyle，morefrequentlywiththemusketclubbedthanwiththebayonet，andinsomeinstancesthemenclinchedlikewrestlers，andwenttothegroundtogether。
Europeansfrequentlycriticisedourwar，becausewedidnotalwaystakefulladvantageofavictory;thetruereasonwas，thathabituallythewoodsservedasascreen，andweoftendidnotrealizethefactthatourenemyhadretreatedtillhewasalreadymilesawayandwasagainintrenched，havingleftamereshirmish—linetocoverthemovement，inturntofallbacktothenewposition。
Ourwarwasfoughtwiththemuzzle—loadingrifle。TowardthecloseIhadonebrigade（Walcutt’s）armedwithbreech—loading\"Spencer’s;\"
thecavalrygenerallyhadbreach—loadingcarbines，\"Spencer’s\"and\"Sharp’s，\"bothofwhichweregoodarms。
Theonlychangethatbreech—loadingarmswillprobablymakeintheartandpracticeofwarwillbetoincreasetheamountofammunitiontobeexpended，andnecessarilytobecarriedalong;tostillfurther\"thinout\"thelinesofattack，andtoreducebattlestoshort，quick，decisiveconflicts。Itdoesnotintheleastaffectthegrandstrategy，orthenecessityforperfectorganization，drill，anddiscipline。The，companiesandbattalionswillbemoredispersed，andthemenwillbelessundertheimmediateeyeoftheirofficers，andthereforeahigherorderofintelligenceandcourageonthepartoftheindividualsoldierwillbeanelementofstrength。
Whenaregimentisdeployedasskirmishers，andcrossesanopenfieldorwoods，underheavyfire，ifeachmanrunsforwardfromtreetotree，orstumptostump，andyetpreservesagoodgeneralalignment，itgivesgreatconfidencetothementhemselves，fortheyalwayskeeptheireyeswelltotherightandleft，andwatchtheircomrades;butwhensomefewholdback，sticktoocloseortoolongtoacomfortablelog，itoftenstopsthelineanddefeatsthewholeobject。Therefore，themoreweimprovethefire—armthemorewillbethenecessityforgoodorganization，gooddisciplineandintelligenceonthepartoftheindividualsoldierandofficer。
Thereis，ofcourse，suchathingasindividualcourage，whichhasavalueinwar，butfamiliaritywithdanger，experienceinwaranditscommonattendants，andpersonalhabit，areequallyvaluabletraits，andthesearethequalitieswithwhichweusuallyhavetodealinwar。Allmennaturallyshrinkfrompainanddanger，andonlyincurtheirriskfromsomehighermotive，orfromhabit;sothatIwoulddefinetruecouragetobeaperfectsensibilityofthemeasureofdanger，andamentalwillingnesstoincurit，ratherthanthatinsensibilitytodangerofwhichIhaveheardfarmorethanIhaveseen。Themostcourageousmenaregenerallyunconsciousofpossessingthequality;therefore，whenoneprofessesittooopenly，bywordsorbearing，thereisreasontomistrustit。Iwouldfurtherillustratemymeaningbydescribingamanoftruecouragetobeonewhopossessesallhisfacultiesandsensesperfectlywhenseriousdangerisactuallypresent。