Modernwarshavenotmateriallychangedtherelativevaluesorproportionsoftheseveralarmsofservice:infantry，artillery，cavalry，andengineers。Ifanything，theinfantryhasbeenincreasedinvalue。Thedangerofcavalryattemptingtochargeinfantryarmedwithbreech—loadingrifleswasfullyillustratedatSedan，andwithusveryfrequently。Soimprobablehassuchathingbecomethatwehaveomittedtheinfantry—squarefromourrecenttactics。Still，cavalryagainstcavalry，andasauxiliarytoinfantry，willalwaysbevaluable，whileallgreatwarswill，asheretofore，dependchieflyontheinfantry。Artilleryismorevaluablewithnewandinexperiencedtroopsthanwithveterans。Intheearlystagesofthewarthefield—gunsoftenboretheproportionofsixtoathousandmen;buttowardthecloseofthewaronegun;oratmosttwo，toathousandmen，wasdeemedenough。
Sieges;suchascharacterizedthewarsofthelastcentury，aretooslowforthisperiodoftheworld，andthePrussiansrecentlyalmostignoredthemaltogether，penetratedFrancebetweentheforts，andleftasuperiorforce\"inobservation，\"towatchthegarrisonandacceptitssurrenderwhenthegreatereventsofthewaraheadmadefurtherresistanceuseless;butearth—forts，andespeciallyfield—works，willhereafterplayanimportantpartinwar，becausetheyenableaminorforcetoholdasuperioroneincheckforatime，andtimeisamostvaluableelementinallwars。
ItwasoneofProf。Mahan’smaximsthatthespadewasasusefulinwarasthemusket，andtothisIwilladdtheaxe。Thehabitofintrenchingcertainlydoeshavetheeffectofmakingnewtroopstimid。Whenalineofbattleisoncecoveredbyagoodparapet，madebytheengineersorbythelaborofthementhemselves，itdoesrequireanefforttomakethemleaveitinthefaceofdanger;
butwhentheenemyisintrenched，itbecomesabsolutelynecessarytopermiteachbrigadeanddivisionofthetroopsimmediatelyopposedtothrowupacorrespondingtrenchfortheirownprotectionincaseofasuddensally。Weinvariablydidthisinallourrecentcampaigns，andithadnoilleffect，thoughsometimesourtroopswerealittletooslowinleavingtheirwell—coveredlinestoassailtheenemyinpositionoronretreat。Evenourskirmisherswereinthehabitofrollinglogstogether，orofmakingalunetteofrails，withdirtinfront，tocovertheirbodies;and，thoughitrevealedtheirposition，Icannotsaythatitworkedabadeffect;sothat，asarule，itmaysafelybelefttothementhemselves:Onthe\"defensive，\"thereisnodoubtoftheproprietyoffortifying;butintheassailingarmythegeneralmustwatchcloselytoseethathismendonotneglectanopportunitytodrophisprecautionarydefenses，andactpromptlyonthe\"offensive\"ateverychance。
Ihavemanyatimecreptforwardtotheskirmish—linetoavailmyselfofthecoverofthepickets\"littlefort，\"toobservemorecloselysomeexpectedresult;andalwaystalkedfamiliarlywiththemen，andwasastonishedtoseehowwelltheycomprehendedthegeneralobject，andhowaccuratelytheywereinformedofthesateoffactsexistingmilesawayfromtheirparticularcorps。Soldiersareveryquicktocatchthegeneraldriftandpurposeofacampaign，andarealwayssensiblewhentheyarewellcommandedorwellcaredfor。Onceimpressedwiththisfact，andthattheyaremakingprogress，theybearcheerfullyanyamountoflaborandprivation。
Incamp，andespeciallyinthepresenceofanactiveenemy，itismucheasiertomaintaindisciplinethaninbarracksintimeofpeace。Crimeandbreachesofdisciplinearemuchlessfrequent，andthenecessityforcourts—martialfarless。Thecaptaincanusuallyinflictallthepunishmentnecessary，andthecolonelshouldalways。Thefield—officers’courtisthebestformforwar，viz。，oneofthefield—officers—thelieutenant—colonelormajor—
—canexaminethecaseandreporthisverdict，andthecolonelshouldexecuteit。Ofcourse，therearestatutoryoffenseswhichdemandageneralcourt—martial，andthesemustbeorderedbythedivisionorcorpscommander;but，thepresenceofoneofourregularcivilianjudge—advocatesinanarmyinthefieldwouldbeafirst—classnuisance，fortechnicalcourtsalwaysworkmischief。
Toomanycourts—martialinanycommandareevidenceofpoordiaciplineandinefficientofficers。
Fortherapidtransmissionofordersinanarmycoveringalargespaceofground，themagnetictelegraphisbyfarthebest，thoughhabituallythepaperandpencil，withgoodmountedorderlies，answereverypurpose。Ihavelittlefaithinthesignal—servicebyflagsandtorches，thoughwealwaysusedthem;because，almostinvariablywhentheyweremostneeded，theviewwascutoffbyinterveningtrees，orbymistsandfogs。Therewasonenotableinstanceinmyexperience，whenthesignal—flagscarriedamessage。
ofvitalimportanceovertheheadsofHood’sarmy，whichhadinterposedbetweenmeandAllatoona，andhadbrokenthetelegraph—wires——asrecordedinChapterXIX。;butthevalueofthemagnetictelegraphinwarcannotbeexaggerated，aswasillustratedbytheperfectconcertofactionbetweenthearmiesinVirginiaandGeorgiaduring1864。HardlyadayintervenedwhenGeneralGrantdidnotknowtheexactstateoffactswithme，morethanfifteenhundredmilesawayasthewiresran。Soonthefieldathininsulatedwiremayberunonimprovisedstakesorfromtreetotreeforsixormoremilesinacoupleofhours，andIhaveseenoperatorssoskillful，thatbycuttingthewiretheywouldreceiveamessagewiththeirtonguesfromadistantstation。Asamatterofcourse，theordinarycommercialwiresalongtherailwaysformtheusualtelegraph—linesforanarmy，andtheseareeasilyrepairedandextendedasthearmyadvances，buteacharmyandwingshouldhaveasmallpartyofskilledmentoputupthefield—wire，andtakeitdownwhendone。Thisisfarbetterthanthesignal—flagsandtorches。Ourcommercialtelegraph—lineswillalwayssupplyforwarenoughskillfuloperators。
Thevalueofrailwaysisalsofullyrecognizedinwarquiteasmuchas，ifnotmoresothan，inpeace。TheAtlantacampaignwouldsimplyhavebeepimpossiblewithouttheuseoftherailroadsfromLouisvilletoNashville—onehundredandeighty—fivemiles——fromNashvilletoChattanooga—onehundredandfifty—onemiles——andfromChattanoogatoAtlanta—onehundredandthirty—sevenmiles。Everymileofthis\"singletrack\"wassodelicate，thatonemancouldinaminutehavebrokenormovedarail，butourtrainsusuallycarriedalongthetoolsandmeanstorepairsuchabreak。Wehad，however，tomaintainstrongguardsandgarrisonsateachimportantbridgeortrestle——thedestructionofwhichwouldhavenecessitatedtimeforrebuilding。Fortheprotectionofabridge，oneortwologblockhouses，twostorieshigh，withapieceofordnanceandasmallinfantryguard，usuallysufficed。Theblock—househadasmallparapetandditchaboutit，andtheroofwasmadeshotproofbyearthpiledon。Thesepointscouldusuallybereachedonlybyadashoftheenemy’scavalry，andmanyoftheseblockhousessuccessfullyresistedseriousattacksbybothcavalryandartillery。Theonlyblock—housethatwasactuallycapturedonthemainwastheonedescribednearAllatoona。OurtrainsfromNashvilleforwardwereoperatedundermilitaryrules，andranabouttenmilesanhouringangsoffourtrainsoftencarseach。Foursuchgroupsoftrainsdailymadeonehundredandsixtycars，oftentonseach，carryingsixteenhundredtons，whichexceededtheabsolutenecessityofthearmy，andallowedfortheaccidentsthatwerecommonandinevitable。But，asIhaverecorded，thatsinglestemofrailroad，fourhundredandseventy—threemileslong，suppliedanarmyofonehundredthousandmenandthirty—fivethousandanimalsfortheperiodofonehundredandninety—sixdays，viz。，fromMay1toNovember12，1864。Tohavedeliveredregularlythatamount。offoodandforagebyordinarywagonswouldhaverequiredthirty—sixthousandeighthundredwagonsofsixmuleseach，allowingeachwagontohavehauledtwotonstwentymileseachday，asimpleimpossibilityinroadssuchasthenexistedinthatregionofcountry。Therefore，IreiteratethattheAtlantacampaignwasanimpossibilitywithouttheserailroads;andonlythen，becausewehadthemenandmeanstomaintainanddefendthem，inadditiontowhatwerenecessarytoovercometheenemy。
Habitually，apassenger—carwillcarryfiftymenwiththeirnecessarybaggage。Box—cars，andevenplatform—cars，answerthepurposewellenough，butthey，shouldalwayshaveroughboard—seats。Forsickandwoundedmen，box—carsfilledwithstraworbusheswereusuallyemployed。Personally，Isawbutlittleofthepracticalworkingoftherailroads，forIonlyturnedbackonceasfarasResaca;butIhaddailyreportsfromtheengineerincharge，andofficerswhocamefromtherearoftenexplainedtomethewholething，withadescriptionofthewreckedtrainsallthewayfromNashvilletoAtlanta。Iamconvincedthattherisktolifetotheengineersandmenonthatrailroadfullyequaledthatontheskirmish—line，calledforashighanorderofcourage，andfullyequaleditinimportance。Still，Idoubtiftherebeanynecessityintimeofpeacetoorganizeacorpsspeciallytoworkthemilitaryrailroadsintimeofwar，becauseinpeacethesesamemengainallthenecessaryexperience，possessallthedaringandcourageofsoldiers，andonlyneedtheoccasionalprotectionandassistanceofthenecessarytrain—guard，whichmaybecomposedofthefurloughedmencomingandgoing，orofdetailsmadefromthelocalgarrisonstotherear。
Forthetransferoflargearmiesbyrail，fromonetheatreofactiontoanotherbytherear——thecasesofthetransferoftheEleventhandTwelfthCorps—GeneralHooker，twenty—threethousandmen——fromtheEasttoChattanooga，elevenhundredandninety—twomilesinsevendays，inthefallof1863;andthatoftheArmyoftheOhio——GeneralSchofield，fifteenthousandmen——fromthevalleyoftheTennesseetoWashington，fourteenhundredmilesinelevendays，enroutetoNorthCarolinainJanuary，1865，arethebestexamplesofwhichIhaveanyknowledge，andreferencetotheseismadeinthereportoftheSecretaryofWar，Mr。Stanton，datedNovember22，1865。
Engineertroopsattachedtoanarmyarehabituallyemployedinsupervisingtheconstructionoffortsorfieldworksofanaturemorepermanentthanthelinesneedbythetroopsinmotion，andinrepairingroadsandmakingbridges。Ihadseveralregimentsofthiskindthatweremostuseful，butasaruleweusedtheinfantry，oremployedpartiesoffreedmen，whoworkedonthetrenchesatnightwhilethesoldiersslept，andtheseinturnrestedbyday。Habituallytherepairoftherailroadanditsbridgeswascommittedtohiredlaborers，liketheEnglishnavvies，underthesupervisionofColonelW。W。Wright，arailroad—engineer，whowasinthemilitaryserviceatthetime，andhissuccessfullaborswerefrequentlyreferredtcintheofficialreportsofthecampaign。
Forthepassageofrivers，eacharmycorpshadapontoon—trainwithadetachmentofengineers，and，onreachingariver，theleadinginfantrydivisionwaschargedwiththelaborofputtingitdown。
Generallythesinglepontoon—traincouldprovideforninehundredfeetofbridge，whichsufficed;butwhentheriverswereverywidetwosuchtrainswouldbebroughttogether，orthesingletrainwassupplementedbyatrestle—bridge，orbridgesmadeoncrib—work，outoftimberfoundneartheplace。Thepontoonsingeneralusewereskeletonframes，madewithahinge，soastofoldbackandconstituteawagon—body。Inthissamewagonwerecarriedthecottoncanvascover，theanchorandchains，andadueproportionofthebalks，cheeses，andlashings。Allthetroopsbecameveryfamiliarwiththeirmechanismanduse，andwewererarelydelayedbyreasonofariver，howeverbroad。Isaw，recently，inAldershot，England，averycompletepontoon—train;theboatsweresheathedwithwoodandfelt，madeverylight;butIthinktheseweremoreliabletochafinganddamageinroughhandlingthanwereourlessexpensiveandrougherboats。Onthewhole，IwouldprefertheskeletonframeandcanvascovertoanystyleofpontoonthatI
haveeverseen。
Inrelationtoguards，pickets，andvedettes，Idoubtifanydiscoveriesorimprovementsweremadeduringourwar，orinanyofthemodernwarsinEurope。Theseprecautionsvarywiththenatureofthecountryandthesituationofeacharmy。Whenadvancingorretreatinginlineofbattle，theusualskirmish—lineconstitutesthepicket—line，andmayhave\"reserves，\"butusuallythemainlineofbattleconstitutesthereserve;andinthisconnectionIwillstatethattherecentinnovationintroducedintothenewinfantrytacticsbyGeneralUptonisadmirable，forbyiteachregiment，brigade，anddivisiondeployed，sendsforwardas\"skirmishers\"theonemanofeachsetoffours，tocoveritsownfront，andthesecanberecalledorreenforcedatpleasurebythebugle—signal。
Forflank—guardsandrear—guards，oneormorecompaniesshouldbedetachedundertheirownofficers，insteadofmakinguptheguardbydetailingmenfromtheseveralcompanies。
Forregimentalorcampguards，thedetailsshouldbemadeaccordingtoexistingarmyregulations;andalltheguardsshouldbepostedearlyintheevening，soastoaffordeachsentinelorvedetteachancetostudyhisgroundbeforeitbecomestoodark。
Inlikemannerastothestaff。Themoreintimatelyitcomesintocontactwiththetroops，themoreusefulandvaluableitbecomes。
Thealmostentireseparationofthestafffromtheline，asnowpractisedbyus，andhithertobytheFrench，hasprovedmischievous，andthegreatretinuesofstaff—officerswithwhichsomeofourearliergeneralsbeganthewarweresimplyridiculous。
Idon’tbelieveinachiefofstaffatall，andanygeneralcommandinganarmy，corps，ordivision，thathasastaff—officerwhoprofessestoknowmorethanhischief，istobepitied。Eachregimentshouldhaveacompetentadjutant，quartermaster，andcommissary，withtwoorthreemedicalofficers。Eachbrigadecommandershouldhavethesamestaff，withtheadditionofacoupleofyoungaides—de—camp，habituallyselectedfromthesubalternsofthebrigade，whoshouldbegoodriders，andintelligentenoughtogiveandexplaintheordersoftheirgeneral。
Thesamestaffwillanswerforadivision。Thegeneralincommandofaseparatearmy，andofacorpsd’armee，shouldhavethesameprofessionalassistance，withtwoormoregoodengineers，andhisadjutant—generalshouldexerciseallthefunctionsusuallyascribedtoachiefofstaff，viz。，heshouldpossesstheabilitytocomprehendthescopeofoperations，andtomakeverballyandinwritingalltheordersanddetailsnecessarytocarryintoeffecttheviewsofhisgeneral，aswellastokeepthereturnsandrecordsofeventsfortheinformationofthenexthigherauthority，andforhistory。Abulkystaffimpliesadivisionofresponsibility，slownessofaction，andindecision，whereasasmallstaffimpliesactivityandconcentrationofpurpose。ThesmallnessofGeneralGrant’sstaffthroughoutthecivilwarformsthebestmodelforfutureimitation。Sooftents，officersfurniture，etc。，etc。Inrealwartheseshouldallbediacarded，andanarmyisefficientforactionandmotionexactlyintheinverseratioofitsimpedimenta。Tentsshouldbeomittedaltogether，saveonetoaregimentforanoffice，andafewforthedivisionhospital。
Officersshouldbecontentwithatentfly，improvisingpolesandshelteroutofbushes。Thetentsd’abri，orshelter—tent，carriedbythesoldierhimself，isallsufficient。Officersshouldneverseekforhouses，butsharetheconditionoftheirmen。
Arecentmessage（July18，1874）madetotheFrenchAssemblybyMarshalMacMahon，PresidentoftheFrenchRepublic，submitsaprojetdeloi，withareportpreparedbyaboardofFrenchgeneralson\"armyadministration，\"whichisfullofinformation，andisasapplicabletousastotheFrench。Iquotefromitsverybeginning:\"Themisfortunesofthecampaignof1870havedemonstratedtheinferiorityofoursystem……Twoseparateorganizationsexistedwithparallelfunctions——the’general’moreoccupiedingivingdirectiontohistroopsthaninprovidingfortheirmaterialwants，whichheregardedasthespecialprovinceofthestaff，andthe’intendant’（staff）oftenworkingatrandom，takingonhisshouldersacrushingburdenoffunctionsandduties，exhaustinghimselfwithuselessefforts，andaimingtoaccomplishaninsufficientservice，tothedisappointmentofeverybody。Thisseparationoftheadministrationandcommand，thiscoexistenceoftwowills，eachindependentoftheother，whichparalyzedbothandannulledthedualism，wascondemned。Itwasdecidedbytheboardthatthiserrorshouldbe\"proscribed\"inthenewmilitarysystem。
Thereportthengoesonatgreatlengthdiscussingtheprovisions。
ofthe\"newlaw，\"whichisdescribedtobearadicalchangefromtheoldoneonthesamesubject。WhileconcedingtotheMinisterofWarinParisthegeneralcontrolandsupervisionoftheentiremilitaryestablishmentprimarily，especiallyoftheannualestimatesorbudget，andthegreatdepotsofsupply，itdistributestothecommandersofthecorpsd’armeeintimeofpeace，andtoallarmycommandersgenerallyintimeofwar，theabsolutecommandofthemoney，provisions，andstores，withthenecessarystaff—
officerstoreceive，issue，andaccountforthem。Iquotefurther:
\"Theobjectofthislawistoconferonthecommanderoftroopswhateverlibertyofactionthecasedemands。Hehasthepowereventogobeyondtheregulations，incircumstancesofurgencyandpressingnecessity。Theextraordinarymeasureshemaytakeontheseoccasionsmayrequiretheirexecutionwithoutdelay。Thestaff—officerhasbutonedutybeforeobeying，andthatistosubmithisobservationstothegeneral，andtoaskhisordersinwriting。
Withthisformalityhisresponsibilityceases，andtheresponsibilityfortheextraordinaryactfallssolelyonthegeneralwhogivestheorder。Theofficersandagentschargedwithsuppliesareplacedundertheordersofthegeneralincommandofthetroops，thatis，theyareobligedbothinwarandpeacetoobey，withthesinglequalificationabovenamed，offirstmakingtheirobservationsandsecuringthewrittenorderofthegeneral。\"
Withus，to—day，thelawandregulationsarethat，nomatterwhatmaybetheemergency，thecommandinggeneralinTexas，NewMexico，andtheremotefrontiers，cannotdrawfromthearsenalsapistol—
cartridge，oranysortofordnance—stores，withoutfirstprocuringanorderoftheSecretaryofWarinWashington。Thecommandinggeneral——thoughintrustedwiththelivesofhissoldiersandwiththesafetyofafrontierinaconditionofchronicwar——cannottouchorbetrustedwithordnance—storesorproperty，andthatisdeclaredtobethelaw！Everyofficeroftheoldarmyremembershow，in1861，wewerehamperedwiththeoldbluearmyregulations，whichtiedourhands，andthattodoanythingpositiveandnecessarywehadtotearitalltopieces——cutthered—tape，asitwascalled，adangerousthingforanarmytodo，foritwascalculatedtobringthelawandauthorityintocontempt;butwarwasuponus，andoverwhelmingnecessityoverridesalllaw。
ThisFrenchreportiswellworththestudyofourarmy—officers，ofallgradesandclasses，andIwillonlyreferagain，casually，toanotherpart，whereinitdiscussesthesubjectofmilitarycorrespondence:whetherthestaff—officershouldcorresponddirectlywithhischiefinParis，submittingtohisgeneralcopies，orwhetherheshouldberequiredtocarryonhiscorrespondencethroughhisgeneral，sothatthelattercouldpromptlyforwardthecommunication，indorsedwithhisownremarksandopinions。Thelatterisdeclaredbytheboardtobetheonlysaferole，because\"thegeneralshouldneverbeignorantofanythingthatistranspiringthatconcernshiscommand。\"
Inthiscountry，asinFrance，Congresscontrolsthegreatquestionsofwarandpeace，makesalllawsforthecreationandgovernmentofarmies，andvotesthenecessarysupplies，leavingtothePresidenttoexecuteandapplytheselaws，especiallythehardertaskoflimitingtheexpenditureofpublicmoneytotheamountoftheannualappropriations。Theexecutivepowerisfurthersubdividedintothesevengreatdepartments，andtotheSecretaryofWarisconfidedthegeneralcareofthemilitaryestablishment，andhispowersarefurthersubdividedintotendistinctandseparatebureaus。
ThechiefsofthesebureausareundertheimmediateordersoftheSecretaryofWar，who，throughthem，infactcommandsthearmyfrom\"hisoffice，\"butcannotdoso\"inthefield\"——anabsurdityinmilitaryifnotcivillaw。
Thesubordinatesofthesestaff—corpsanddepartmentsareselectedandchosenfromthearmyitself，orfreshfromWestPoint，andtoocommonlyconstruethemselvesintotheelite，asmadeofbetterclaythanthecommonsoldier。Thustheyseparatethemselvesmoreandmorefromtheircomradesoftheline，andinprocessoftimerealizetheconditionofthatoldofficerofartillerywhothoughtthearmywouldbeadelightfulplaceforagentlemanifitwerenotforthed—dsoldier;or，betterstill，theconclusionoftheyounglordin\"HenryIV。，\"whotoldHarryPercy（Hotspur）that\"butforthesevilegunshewouldhimselfhavebeenasoldier。\"Thisisallwrong;utterlyatvariancewithourdemocraticformofgovernmentandofuniversalexperience;andnowthattheFrench，fromwhomwehadcopiedthesystem，haveutterly\"proscribed\"it，IhopethatourCongresswillfollowsuit。Iadmit，initsfullestforce，thestrengthofthemaximthatthecivillawshouldbesuperiortothemilitaryintimeofpeace;thatthearmyshouldbeatalltimessubjecttothedirectcontrolofCongress;andIassertthat，fromtheformationofourGovernmenttothepresentday，theRegularArmyhassetthehighestexampleofobediencetolawandauthority;
but，fortheveryreasonthatourarmyiscomparativelysoverysmall，Iholdthatitshouldbethebestpossible，organizedandgovernedontruemilitaryprinciples，andthatintimeofpeaceweshouldpreservethe\"habitsandusagesofwar，\"sothat，whenwardoescome，wemaynotagainbecompelledtosufferthedisgrace，confusion，anddisorderof1861。
Thecommandingofficersofdivisions，departments，andposts，shouldhavetheamplestpowers，notonlytocommandtheirtroops，butallthestoresdesignedfortheiruse，andtheofficersofthestaffnecessarytoadministerthem，withintheareaoftheircommand;andthenwithfairnesstheycouldbeheldtothemostperfectresponsibility。ThePresidentandSecretaryofWarcancommandthearmyquiteaswellthroughthesegeneralsasthroughthesubordinatestaff—officers。Ofcourse，theSecretarywould，asnow，distributethefundsaccordingtotheappropriationbills，andreservetohimselftheabsolutecontrolandsupervisionofthelargerarsenalsanddepotsofsupply。Theerrorliesinthelaw，orinthejudicialinterpretationthereof，andnocodeofarmyregulationscanbemadethatmeetsthecase，untilCongress，liketheFrenchCorpsLegislatif，utterlyannihilatesand\"proscribes\"
theoldlawandthesystemwhichhasgrownupunderit。
ItisrelatedofNapoleonthathislastwordswere，\"Teted’armee！\"
Doubtless，astheshadowofdeathobscuredhismemory，thelastthoughtthatremainedforspeechwasofsomeeventwhenhewasdirectinganimportant\"headofcolumn。\"Ibelievethateverygeneralwhohashandledarmiesinbattlemostrecallfromhisownexperiencetheintensityofthoughtonsomesimilaroccasion，whenbyasinglecommandhehadgiventhefinishingstroketosomecomplicatedaction;buttomerecursanotherthoughtthatisworthyofrecord，andmayencourageotherswhoaretofollowusinourprofession。IneversawtherearofanarmyengagedinbattlebutIfearedthatsomecalamityhadhappenedatthefronttheapparentconfusion，brokenwagons，crippledhorses，menlyingaboutdeadandmaimed，partieshasteningtoandfroinseemingdisorder，andageneralapprehensionofsomethingdreadfulabouttoensue;allthesesigns，however，lessenedasInearedthefront，andtherethecontrastwascomplete——perfectorder，menandhorses——fullofconfidence，anditwasnotunusualforgeneralhilarity，laughing，andcheering。Althoughcannonmightbefiring，themusketryclattering，andtheenemy’sshothittingclose，therereignedageneralfeelingofstrengthandsecuritythatboreamarkedcontrasttothebloodysignsthathaddriftedrapidlytotherear;
therefore，forcomfortandsafety，Isurelywouldratherbeatthefrontthantherearlineofbattle。Soalsoonthemarch，theheadofacolumnmovesonsteadily，whiletherearisalternatelyhaltingandthenrushingforwardtocloseupthegap;andallsortsofrumors，especiallytheworst，floatbacktotherear。Oldtroopsinvariablydeemitaspecialprivilegetobeinthefront—
—tobeatthe\"headofcolumn\"——becauseexperiencehastaughtthemthatitistheeasiestandmostcomfortableplace，anddangeronlyaddszestandstimulustothisfact。
Thehardesttaskinwaristolieinsupportofsomepositionorbattery，underfirewithouttheprivilegeofreturningit;ortoguardsometrainleftintherear，withinhearingbutoutofdanger;ortoprovideforthewoundedanddeadofsomecorpswhichistoobusyaheadtocareforitsown。
Tobeattheheadofastrongcolumnoftroops，intheexecutionofsometaskthatrequiresbrain，isthehighestpleasureofwar——agrimoneandterrible，butwhichleavesonthemindandmemorythestrongestmark;todetecttheweakpointofanenemy’sline;tobreakthroughwithvehemenceandthusleadtovictory;ortodiscoversomekey—pointandholditwithtenacity;ortodosomeotherdistinctactwhichisafterwardrecognizedastherealcauseofsuccess。Theseallbecomemattersthatareneverforgotten。
Othergreatdifficulties，experiencedbyeverygeneral，aretomeasuretrulythethousand—and—onereportsthatcometohiminthemidstofconflict;topreserveaclearandwell—definedpurposeateveryinstantoftime，andtocausealleffortstoconvergetothatend。
Todothesethingshemustknowperfectlythestrengthandqualityofeachpartofhisownarmy，aswellasthatofhisopponent，andmustbewherehecanpersonallyseeandobservewithhisowneyes，andjudgewithhisownmind。Nomancanproperlycommandanarmyfromtherear，hemustbe\"atitsfront;\"andwhenadetachmentismade，thecommanderthereofshouldbeinformedoftheobjecttobeaccomplished，andleftasfreeaspossibletoexecuteitinhisownway;andwhenanarmyisdividedupintoseveralparts，thesuperiorshouldalwaysattendthatonewhichheregardsasmostimportant。Somementhinkthatmodernarmiesmaybesoregulatedthatageneralcansitinanofficeandplayonhisseveralcolumnsasonthekeysofapiano;thisisafearfulmistake。Thedirectingmindmustbeattheveryheadofthearmy——mustbeseenthere，andtheeffectofhismindandpersonalenergymustbefeltbyeveryofficerandmanpresentwithit，tosecurethebestresults。Everyattempttomakewareasyandsafewillresultinhumiliationanddisaster。
Lastly，mailfacilitiesshouldbekeptupwithanarmyifpossible，thatofficersandmenmayreceiveandsendletterstotheirfriends，thusmaintainingthehomeinfluenceofinfiniteassistancetodiscipline。Newspapercorrespondentswithanarmy，asarule，aremischievous。Theyaretheworld’sgossips，pickupandretailthecampscandal，andgraduallydrifttotheheadquartersofsomegeneral，whofindsiteasiertomakereputationathomethanwithhisowncorpsordivision。Theyarealsotemptedtoprophesyeventsandstatefactswhich，toanenemy，revealapurposeintimetoguardagainstit。Moreover，theyarealwaysboundtoseefactscoloredbythepartisanorpoliticalcharacteroftheirownpatrons，andthusbringarmyofficersintothepoliticalcontroversiesoftheday，whicharealwaysmischievonsandwrong。
Yet，sogreedyarethepeopleatlargeforwarnews，thatitisdoubtfulwhetheranyarmycommandercanexcludeallreporters，withoutbringingdownonhimselfaclamorthatmayimperilhisownsafety。Timeandmoderationmustbringajustsolutiontothismoderndifficulty。
CHAPTERXXVI。
AFTERTHEWAR
IntheforegoingpagesIhaveendeavoredtodescribethepubliceventsinwhichIwasanactororspectatorbeforeandduringthecivilwarof1861—’65，anditnowonlyremainsformetotreatofsimilarmattersofgeneralinterestsubsequenttothecivilwar。
WithinafewdaysofthegrandreviewofMay24，1865，ItookleaveofthearmyatWashington，andwithmyfamilywenttoChicagotoattendafairheldintheinterestofthefamiliesofsoldiersimpoverishedbythewar。Iremainedthereabouttwoweeks;onthe22dofJunewasatSouthBend，Indiana，wheretwoofmychildrenwereatschool，andreachedmynativeplace，Lancaster，Ohio，onthe24th。Onthe4thofJulyIvisitedatLouisville，Kentucky，theFourteenth，Fifteenth，Sixteenth，andSeventeenthArmyCorps，whichhadcomefromWashington，underthecommandofGeneralJohnA。Logan，for\"musterout，\"or\"furtherorders。\"IthenmadeashortvisittoGeneralGeorgeH。ThomasatNashville，andreturnedtoLancaster，whereIremainedwiththefamilytillthereceiptofGeneralOrdersNo。118ofJune27，1865，whichdividedthewholeterritoryoftheUnitedStatesintonineteendepartmentsandfivemilitarydivisions，thesecondofwhichwasthemilitarydivisionofthe\"Mississippi，\"afterwardchangedto\"Missouri，\"Major—
GeneralW。T。Shermantocommand，with，headquartersatSt。Louis，toembracetheDepartmentsoftheOhio，Missouri，andArkansas。
ThisterritorialcommandincludedtheStatesnorthoftheOhioRiver，andtheStatesandTerritoriesnorthofTexas，asfarwestastheRockyMountains，includingMontana，Utah，andNewMexico，buttheparteastoftheMississippiwassoontransferredtoanotherdivision。ThedepartmentcommanderswereGeneralE。O。C。
Ord，atDetroit;GeneralJohnPope，atFortLeavenworth;andGeneralJ。J。Reynolds，atLittleRock，butthesealsoweresoonchanged。Iatonceassumedcommand，andorderedmystaffandheadquartersfromWashingtontoSt。Louis，Missouri，goingthereinpersononthe16thofJuly。
MythoughtsandfeelingsatoncerevertedtotheconstructionofthegreatPacificRailway，whichhadbeencharteredbyCongressinthemidstofwar，andwastheninprogress。Iputmyselfincommunicationwiththepartiesengagedinthework，visitingtheminperson，andassuredthemthatIwouldaffordthemallpossibleassistanceandencouragement。Dr。Durant，theleadingmanoftheUnionPacific，seemedtomeapersonofardentnature，ofgreatabilityandenergy，enthusiasticinhisundertaking，anddeterminedtobuildtheroadfromOmahatoSanFrancisco。Hehadanablecorpsofassistants，collectingmaterials，lettingoutcontractsforties，grading，etc。，andIattendedthecelebrationofthefirstcompleteddivisionofsixteenandahalfmiles，fromOmahatoPapillon。Whentheoratorsspokesoconfidentlyofthedeterminationtobuildtwothousandmilesofrailwayacrosstheplains，mountains，anddesert，devoidoftimber，withnopopulation，butonthecontraryraidedbytheboldandbloodySiouxandCheyennes，whohadalmostsuccessfullydefiedourpowerforhalfacentury，Iwasdisposedtotreatitjocularly，becauseI
couldnothelprecallourCaliforniaexperienceof1855—’56，whenwecelebratedthecompletionoftwenty—twoandahalfmilesofthesameroadeastwardofSacramento;onwhichoccasionEdwardBakerhadelectrifiedusbyhisunequalledoratory，paintingthegloriousthingswhichwouldresultfromunitingtheWesterncoastwiththeEastbybandsofiron。Bakerthen，withapoet’simagination，sawthevisionofthemightyfuture，butnotthegulfwhichmeantimewasdestinedtoswallowuphalfamillionofthebrightestandbestyouthofourland，andthathehimselfwouldbeoneofthefirstvictimsfarawayonthebanksofthePotomac（hewaskilledinbattleatBallsBluff，October21，1861）。
TheKansasPacificwasdesignedtounitewiththemainbranchaboutthe100deg。meridian，nearFortKearney。Mr。Shoemakerwasitsgeneralsuperintendentandbuildingcontractor，andthisbranchin1865wasfinishedaboutfortymilestoapointnearLawrence，Kansas。Imaynotbeabletorefertotheseroadsagainexceptincidentally，andwill，therefore，recordherethatthelocationofthisbranchafterwardwaschangedfromtheRepublicantotheSmokyHillForkoftheKansasRiver，andisnowthemainlinetoDenver。
TheUnionandCentralRailroadsfromthebeginningwerepushedwithaskill，vigor，andcouragewhichalwayscommandedmyadmiration，thetwomeetingatPromontoryPoint，Utah，July15，1869，andinmyjudgmentconstituteoneofthegreatestandmostbeneficentachievementsofmanonearth。
TheconstructionoftheUnionPacificRailroadwasdeemedsoimportantthatthePresident，atmysuggestion，constitutedonthe5thofMarch，1866，thenewDepartmentofthePlatte，GeneralP。
St。GeorgeCookecommanding，succeededbyGeneralC。C。Augur，headquartersatOmaha，withorderstogiveampleprotectiontotheworking—parties，andtoaffordeverypossibleassistanceintheconstructionoftheroad;andsubsequentlyinlikemannertheDepartmentofDakotawasconstituted，GeneralA。H。Terrycommanding，withheadquartersatSt。Paul，togivesimilarprotectionandencouragementtotheNorthernPacificRailroad。
Thesedepartments，withchangedcommanders，havecontinueduptothepresentday，andhavefulfilledperfectlytheusesforwhichtheyweredesigned。
Duringtheyears1865and1866thegreatplainsremainedalmostinastateofnature，beingthepasture—fieldsofabouttenmillionbuffalo，deer，elk，andantelope，andwereinfullpossessionoftheSioux，Cheyennes，Arapahoes，andKiowas，araceofboldIndians，whosawplainlythattheconstructionoftwoparallelrailroadsrightthroughtheircountrywouldprovedestructivetothegameonwhichtheysubsisted，andconsequentlyfataltothemselves。