InnationsinwhichtheprincipleofelectionextendstoeveryplaceintheStatenopoliticalcareercan，properlyspeaking，besaidtoexist。Menarepromotedasifbychancetotherankwhichtheyenjoy，andtheyarebynomeanssureofretainingit。Theconsequenceisthatintranquiltimespublicfunctionsofferbutfewlurestoambition。IntheUnitedStatesthepersonswhoengageintheperplexitiesofpoliticallifeareindividualsofverymoderatepretensions。Thepursuitofwealthgenerallydivertsmenofgreattalentsandofgreatpassionsfromthepursuitofpower，anditveryfrequentlyhappensthatamandoesnotundertaketodirectthefortuneoftheStateuntilhehasdiscoveredhisincompetencetoconducthisownaffairs。Thevastnumberofveryordinarymenwhooccupypublicstationsisquiteasattributabletothesecausesastothebadchoiceofthedemocracy。IntheUnitedStates，Iamnotsurethatthepeoplewouldreturnthemenofsuperiorabilitieswhomightsolicititssupport，butitiscertainthatmenofthisdescriptiondonotcomeforward。
ArbitraryPowerOfMagistratesUnderTheRuleOfTheAmericanDemocracyForwhatreasonthearbitrarypowerofMagistratesisgreaterinabsolutemonarchiesandindemocraticrepublicsthanitisinlimitedmonarchies—ArbitrarypoweroftheMagistratesinNewEngland。
Intwodifferentkindsofgovernmentthemagistrates*aexerciseaconsiderabledegreeofarbitrarypower;namely，undertheabsolutegovernmentofasingleindividual，andunderthatofademocracy。Thisidenticalresultproceedsfromcauseswhicharenearlyanalogous。
[Footnotea:Ihereusethewordmagistratesinthewidestsenseinwhichitcanbetaken;Iapplyittoalltheofficerstowhomtheexecutionofthelawsisintrusted。]
IndespoticStatesthefortuneofnocitizenissecure;andpublicofficersarenotmoresafethanprivateindividuals。Thesovereign，whohasunderhiscontrolthelives，theproperty，andsometimesthehonorofthemenwhomheemploys，doesnotscrupletoallowthemagreatlatitudeofaction，becauseheisconvincedthattheywillnotuseittohisprejudice。IndespoticStatesthesovereignissoattachedtotheexerciseofhispower，thathedislikestheconstraintevenofhisownregulations;andheiswellpleasedthathisagentsshouldfollowasomewhatfortuitouslineofconduct，providedhebecertainthattheiractionswillnevercounteracthisdesires。
Indemocracies，asthemajorityhaseveryyeartherightofdeprivingtheofficerswhomithasappointedoftheirpower，ithasnoreasontofearanyabuseoftheirauthority。AsthepeopleisalwaysabletosignifyitswishestothosewhoconducttheGovernment，itprefersleavingthemtomaketheirownexertionstoprescribinganinvariableruleofconductwhichwouldatoncefettertheiractivityandthepopularauthority。
Itmayevenbeobserved，onattentiveconsideration，thatundertheruleofademocracythearbitrarypowerofthemagistratemustbestillgreaterthanindespoticStates。Inthelatterthesovereignhasthepowerofpunishingallthefaultswithwhichhebecomesacquainted，butitwouldbevainforhimtohopetobecomeacquaintedwithallthosewhicharecommitted。Intheformerthesovereignpowerisnotonlysupreme，butitisuniversallypresent。TheAmericanfunctionariesare，inpointoffact，muchmoreindependentinthesphereofactionwhichthelawtracesoutforthemthananypublicofficerinEurope。Veryfrequentlytheobjectwhichtheyaretoaccomplishissimplypointedouttothem，andthechoiceofthemeansislefttotheirowndiscretion。
InNewEngland，forinstance，theselectmenofeachtownshipareboundtodrawupthelistofpersonswhoaretoserveonthejury;theonlyrulewhichislaiddowntoguidethemintheirchoiceisthattheyaretoselectcitizenspossessingtheelectivefranchiseandenjoyingafairreputation。*bInFrancethelivesandlibertiesofthesubjectswouldbethoughttobeindangerifapublicofficerofanykindwasentrustedwithsoformidablearight。InNewEnglandthesamemagistratesareempoweredtopostthenamesofhabitualdrunkardsinpublic—houses，andtoprohibittheinhabitantsofatownfromsupplyingthemwithliquor。*cAcensorialpowerofthisexcessivekindwouldberevoltingtothepopulationofthemostabsolutemonarchies;here，however，itissubmittedtowithoutdifficulty。
[Footnoteb:SeetheActofFebruary27，1813。\"GeneralCollectionoftheLawsofMassachusetts，\"vol。ii。p。331。Itshouldbeaddedthatthejurorsareafterwardsdrawnfromtheselistsbylot。]
[Footnotec:SeeActofFebruary28，1787。\"GeneralCollectionoftheLawsofMassachusetts，\"vol。i。p。302。]
Nowherehassomuchbeenleftbythelawtothearbitrarydeterminationofthemagistrateasindemocraticrepublics，becausethisarbitrarypowerisunattendedbyanyalarmingconsequences。Itmayevenbeassertedthatthefreedomofthemagistrateincreasesastheelectivefranchiseisextended，andasthedurationofthetimeofofficeisshortened。Hencearisesthegreatdifficultywhichattendstheconversionofademocraticrepublicintoamonarchy。Themagistrateceasestobeelective，butheretainstherightsandthehabitsofanelectedofficer，whichleaddirectlytodespotism。
Itisonlyinlimitedmonarchiesthatthelaw，whichprescribesthesphereinwhichpublicofficersaretoact，superintendsalltheirmeasures。Thecauseofthismaybeeasilydetected。InlimitedmonarchiesthepowerisdividedbetweentheKingandthepeople，bothofwhomareinterestedinthestabilityofthemagistrate。TheKingdoesnotventuretoplacethepublicofficersunderthecontrolofthepeople，lesttheyshouldbetemptedtobetrayhisinterests;ontheotherhand，thepeoplefearslestthemagistratesshouldservetooppressthelibertiesofthecountry，iftheywereentirelydependentupontheCrown;
theycannotthereforebesaidtodependoneitheroneortheother。Thesamecausewhichinducesthekingandthepeopletorenderpublicofficersindependentsuggeststhenecessityofsuchsecuritiesasmaypreventtheirindependencefromencroachingupontheauthorityoftheformerandthelibertiesofthelatter。
Theyconsequentlyagreeastothenecessityofrestrictingthefunctionarytoalineofconductlaiddownbeforehand，andtheyareinterestedinconfininghimbycertainregulationswhichhecannotevade。
ChapterXIII:GovernmentOfTheDemocarcyInAmerica—PartII
InstabilityOfTheAdministrationInTheUnitedStatesInAmericathepublicactsofacommunityfrequentlyleavefewertracesthantheoccurrencesofafamily—Newspaperstheonlyhistoricalremains—Instabilityoftheadministrationprejudicialtotheartofgovernment。
TheauthoritywhichpublicmenpossessinAmericaissobrief，andtheyaresosooncommingledwiththeever—changingpopulationofthecountry，thattheactsofacommunityfrequentlyleavefewertracesthantheoccurrencesofaprivatefamily。Thepublicadministrationis，sotospeak，oralandtraditionary。Butlittleiscommittedtowriting，andthatlittleiswaftedawayforever，liketheleavesoftheSibyl，bythesmallestbreeze。
TheonlyhistoricalremainsintheUnitedStatesarethenewspapers;butifanumberbewanting，thechainoftimeisbroken，andthepresentisseveredfromthepast。IamconvincedthatinfiftyyearsitwillbemoredifficulttocollectauthenticdocumentsconcerningthesocialconditionoftheAmericansatthepresentdaythanitistofindremainsoftheadministrationofFranceduringtheMiddleAges;andiftheUnitedStateswereeverinvadedbybarbarians，itwouldbenecessarytohaverecoursetothehistoryofothernationsinordertolearnanythingofthepeoplewhichnowinhabitsthem。
Theinstabilityoftheadministrationhaspenetratedintothehabitsofthepeople:itevenappearstosuitthegeneraltaste，andnoonecaresforwhatoccurredbeforehistime。Nomethodicalsystemispursued;noarchivesareformed;andnodocumentsarebroughttogetherwhenitwouldbeveryeasytodoso。Wheretheyexist，littlestoreissetuponthem;andIhaveamongstmypapersseveraloriginalpublicdocumentswhichweregiventomeinanswertosomeofmyinquiries。InAmericasocietyseemstolivefromhandtomouth，likeanarmyinthefield。Nevertheless，theartofadministrationmayundoubtedlyberankedasascience，andnosciencescanbeimprovedifthediscoveriesandobservationsofsuccessivegenerationsarenotconnectedtogetherintheorderinwhichtheyoccur。Oneman，intheshortspaceofhisliferemarksafact;anotherconceivesanidea;theformerinventsameansofexecution，thelatterreducesatruthtoafixedproposition;andmankindgathersthefruitsofindividualexperienceuponitswayandgraduallyformsthesciences。ButthepersonswhoconducttheadministrationinAmericacanseldomaffordanyinstructiontoeachother;andwhentheyassumethedirectionofsociety，theysimplypossessthoseattainmentswhicharemostwidelydisseminatedinthecommunity，andnoexperiencepeculiartothemselves。Democracy，carriedtoitsfurthestlimits，isthereforeprejudicialtotheartofgovernment;andforthisreasonitisbetteradaptedtoapeoplealreadyversedintheconductofanadministrationthantoanationwhichisuninitiatedinpublicaffairs。
Thisremark，indeed，isnotexclusivelyapplicabletothescienceofadministration。Althoughademocraticgovernmentisfoundeduponaverysimpleandnaturalprinciple，italwayspresupposestheexistenceofahighdegreeofcultureandenlightenmentinsociety。*dAtthefirstglanceitmaybeimaginedtobelongtotheearliestagesoftheworld;butmaturerobservationwillconvinceusthatitcouldonlycomelastinthesuccessionofhumanhistory。
[Footnoted:ItisneedlesstoobservethatIspeakhereofthedemocraticformofgovernmentasappliedtoapeople，notmerelytoatribe。]
ChargesLeviedByTheStateUnderTheRuleOfTheAmericanDemocracyInallcommunitiescitizensdivisibleintothreeclasses—Habitsofeachoftheseclassesinthedirectionofpublicfinances—
Whypublicexpendituremusttendtoincreasewhenthepeoplegoverns—WhatrenderstheextravaganceofademocracylesstobefearedinAmerica—Publicexpenditureunderademocracy。
Beforewecanaffirmwhetherademocraticformofgovernmentiseconomicalornot，wemustestablishasuitablestandardofcomparison。Thequestionwouldbeoneofeasysolutionifweweretoattempttodrawaparallelbetweenademocraticrepublicandanabsolutemonarchy。Thepublicexpenditurewouldbefoundtobemoreconsiderableundertheformerthanunderthelatter;
suchisthecasewithallfreeStatescomparedtothosewhicharenotso。Itiscertainthatdespotismruinsindividualsbypreventingthemfromproducingwealth，muchmorethanbydeprivingthemofthewealththeyhaveproduced;itdriesupthesourceofriches，whilstitusuallyrespectsacquiredproperty。
Freedom，onthecontrary，engendersfarmorebenefitsthanitdestroys;andthenationswhicharefavoredbyfreeinstitutionsinvariablyfindthattheirresourcesincreaseevenmorerapidlythantheirtaxes。
Mypresentobjectistocomparefreenationstoeachother，andtopointouttheinfluenceofdemocracyuponthefinancesofaState。
Communities，aswellasorganicbodies，aresubjecttocertainfixedrulesintheirformationwhichtheycannotevade。
Theyarecomposedofcertainelementswhicharecommontothematalltimesandunderallcircumstances。Thepeoplemayalwaysbementallydividedintothreedistinctclasses。Thefirstoftheseclassesconsistsofthewealthy;thesecond，ofthosewhoareineasycircumstances;andthethirdiscomposedofthosewhohavelittleornoproperty，andwhosubsistmoreespeciallybytheworkwhichtheyperformforthetwosuperiororders。Theproportionoftheindividualswhoareincludedinthesethreedivisionsmayvaryaccordingtotheconditionofsociety，butthedivisionsthemselvescanneverbeobliterated。
ItisevidentthateachoftheseclasseswillexerciseaninfluencepeculiartoitsownpropensitiesupontheadministrationofthefinancesoftheState。Ifthefirstofthethreeexclusivelypossessesthelegislativepower，itisprobablethatitwillnotbesparingofthepublicfunds，becausethetaxeswhichareleviedonalargefortuneonlytendtodiminishthesumofsuperfluousenjoyment，andare，inpointoffact，butlittlefelt。Ifthesecondclasshasthepowerofmakingthelaws，itwillcertainlynotbelavishoftaxes，becausenothingissoonerousasalargeimpostwhichislevieduponasmallincome。Thegovernmentofthemiddleclassesappearstometobethemosteconomical，thoughperhapsnotthemostenlightened，andcertainlynotthemostgenerous，offreegovernments。
Butletusnowsupposethatthelegislativeauthorityisvestedinthelowestorders:therearetwostrikingreasonswhichshowthatthetendencyoftheexpenditurewillbetoincrease，nottodiminish。Asthegreatmajorityofthosewhocreatethelawsarepossessedofnopropertyuponwhichtaxescanbeimposed，allthemoneywhichisspentforthecommunityappearstobespenttotheiradvantage，atnocostoftheirown;andthosewhoarepossessedofsomelittlepropertyreadilyfindmeansofregulatingthetaxessothattheyareburdensometothewealthyandprofitabletothepoor，althoughtherichareunabletotakethesameadvantagewhentheyareinpossessionoftheGovernment。
Incountriesinwhichthepoor*eshouldbeexclusivelyinvestedwiththepowerofmakingthelawsnogreateconomyofpublicexpenditureoughttobeexpected:thatexpenditurewillalwaysbeconsiderable;eitherbecausethetaxesdonotweighuponthosewholevythem，orbecausetheyareleviedinsuchamannerasnottoweighuponthoseclasses。Inotherwords，thegovernmentofthedemocracyistheonlyoneunderwhichthepowerwhichlaysontaxesescapesthepaymentofthem。
[Footnotee:Thewordpoorisusedhere，andthroughouttheremainderofthischapter，inarelative，notinanabsolutesense。PoormeninAmericawouldoftenappearrichincomparisonwiththepoorofEurope;buttheymaywithproprietybystyledpoorincomparisonwiththeirmoreaffluentcountrymen。]
Itmaybeobjected（buttheargumenthasnorealweight）
thatthetrueinterestofthepeopleisindissolublyconnectedwiththatofthewealthierportionofthecommunity，sinceitcannotbutsufferbytheseveremeasurestowhichitresorts。
Butisitnotthetrueinterestofkingstorendertheirsubjectshappy，andthetrueinterestofnoblestoadmitrecruitsintotheirorderonsuitablegrounds？Ifremoteadvantageshadpowertoprevailoverthepassionsandtheexigenciesofthemoment，nosuchthingasatyrannicalsovereignoranexclusivearistocracycouldeverexist。
Again，itmaybeobjectedthatthepoorareneverinvestedwiththesolepowerofmakingthelaws;butIreply，thatwhereveruniversalsuffragehasbeenestablishedthemajorityofthecommunityunquestionablyexercisesthelegislativeauthority;
andifitbeprovedthatthepooralwaysconstitutethemajority，itmaybeadded，withperfecttruth，thatinthecountriesinwhichtheypossesstheelectivefranchisetheypossessthesolepowerofmakinglaws。Butitiscertainthatinallthenationsoftheworldthegreaternumberhasalwaysconsistedofthosepersonswhoholdnoproperty，orofthosewhosepropertyisinsufficienttoexemptthemfromthenecessityofworkinginordertoprocureaneasysubsistence。Universalsuffragedoestherefore，inpointoffact，investthepoorwiththegovernmentofsociety。
ThedisastrousinfluencewhichpopularauthoritymaysometimesexerciseuponthefinancesofaStatewasveryclearlyseeninsomeofthedemocraticrepublicsofantiquity，inwhichthepublictreasurewasexhaustedinordertorelieveindigentcitizens，ortosupplythegamesandtheatricalamusementsofthepopulace。Itistruethattherepresentativesystemwasthenveryimperfectlyknown，andthat，atthepresenttime，theinfluenceofpopularpassionislessfeltintheconductofpublicaffairs;butitmaybebelievedthatthedelegatewillintheendconformtotheprinciplesofhisconstituents，andfavortheirpropensitiesasmuchastheirinterests。
Theextravaganceofdemocracyis，however，lesstobedreadedinproportionasthepeopleacquiresashareofproperty，becauseontheonehandthecontributionsofthericharethenlessneeded，and，ontheother，itismoredifficulttolayontaxeswhichdonotaffecttheinterestsofthelowerclasses。OnthisaccountuniversalsuffragewouldbelessdangerousinFrancethaninEngland，becauseinthelattercountrythepropertyonwhichtaxesmaybeleviedisvestedinfewerhands。America，wherethegreatmajorityofthecitizenspossesssomefortune，isinastillmorefavorablepositionthanFrance。
Therearestillfurthercauseswhichmayincreasethesumofpublicexpenditureindemocraticcountries。Whenthearistocracygoverns，theindividualswhoconducttheaffairsofStateareexemptedbytheirownstationinsocietyfromeverykindofprivation;theyarecontentedwiththeirposition;powerandrenownaretheobjectsforwhichtheystrive;and，astheyareplacedfarabovetheobscurerthrongofcitizens，theydonotalwaysdistinctlyperceivehowthewell—beingofthemassofthepeopleoughttoredoundtotheirownhonor。Theyarenotindeedcalloustothesufferingsofthepoor，buttheycannotfeelthosemiseriesasacutelyasiftheywerethemselvespartakersofthem。
Providedthatthepeopleappeartosubmittoitslot，therulersaresatisfied，andtheydemandnothingfurtherfromtheGovernment。Anaristocracyismoreintentuponthemeansofmaintainingitsinfluencethanuponthemeansofimprovingitscondition。
When，onthecontrary，thepeopleisinvestedwiththesupremeauthority，theperpetualsenseoftheirownmiseriesimpelstherulersofsocietytoseekforperpetualameliorations。
Athousanddifferentobjectsaresubjectedtoimprovement;themosttrivialdetailsaresoughtoutassusceptibleofamendment;
andthosechangeswhichareaccompaniedwithconsiderableexpensearemoreespeciallyadvocated，sincetheobjectistorendertheconditionofthepoormoretolerable，whocannotpayforthemselves。
Moreover，alldemocraticcommunitiesareagitatedbyanill—
definedexcitementandbyakindoffeverishimpatience，thatengenderamultitudeofinnovations，almostallofwhichareattendedwithexpense。
Inmonarchiesandaristocraciesthenaturaltastewhichtherulershaveforpowerandforrenownisstimulatedbythepromptingsofambition，andtheyarefrequentlyincitedbythesetemptationstoverycostlyundertakings。Indemocracies，wheretherulerslaborunderprivations，theycanonlybecourtedbysuchmeansasimprovetheirwell—being，andtheseimprovementscannottakeplacewithoutasacrificeofmoney。Whenapeoplebeginstoreflectuponitssituation，itdiscoversamultitudeofwantstowhichithadnotbeforebeensubject，andtosatisfytheseexigenciesrecoursemustbehadtothecoffersoftheState。Henceitarisesthatthepublicchargesincreaseinproportionascivilizationspreads，andthatimpostsareaugmentedasknowledgepervadesthecommunity。
Thelastcausewhichfrequentlyrendersademocraticgovernmentdearerthananyotheris，thatademocracydoesnotalwayssucceedinmoderatingitsexpenditure，becauseitdoesnotunderstandtheartofbeingeconomical。Asthedesignswhichitentertainsarefrequentlychanged，andtheagentsofthosedesignsarestillmorefrequentlyremoved，itsundertakingsareoftenillconductedorleftunfinished:intheformercasetheStatespendssumsoutofallproportiontotheendwhichitproposestoaccomplish;inthesecond，theexpenseitselfisunprofitable。*f[Footnotef:ThegrossreceiptsoftheTreasuryoftheUnitedStatesin1832wereabout$28，000，000;in1870theyhadrisento$411，000，000。Thegrossexpenditurein1832was$30，000，000;in1870，$309，000，000。]
TendenciesOfTheAmericanDemocracyAsRegardsTheSalariesOfPublicOfficersInthedemocraciesthosewhoestablishhighsalarieshavenochanceofprofitingbythem—TendencyoftheAmericandemocracytoincreasethesalariesofsubordinateofficersandtolowerthoseofthemoreimportantfunctionaries—Reasonofthis—
ComparativestatementofthesalariesofpublicofficersintheUnitedStatesandinFrance。
Thereisapowerfulreasonwhichusuallyinducesdemocraciestoeconomizeuponthesalariesofpublicofficers。Asthenumberofcitizenswhodispensetheremunerationisextremelylargeindemocraticcountries，sothenumberofpersonswhocanhopetobebenefitedbythereceiptofitiscomparativelysmall。Inaristocraticcountries，onthecontrary，theindividualswhofixhighsalarieshavealmostalwaysavaguehopeofprofitingbythem。Theseappointmentsmaybelookeduponasacapitalwhichtheycreatefortheirownuse，oratleastasaresourcefortheirchildren。
Itmust，however，beallowedthatademocraticStateismostparsimonioustowardsitsprincipalagents。InAmericathesecondaryofficersaremuchbetterpaid，andthedignitariesoftheadministrationmuchworse，thantheyareelsewhere。
Theseoppositeeffectsresultfromthesamecause;thepeoplefixesthesalariesofthepublicofficersinbothcases;
andthescaleofremunerationisdeterminedbytheconsiderationofitsownwants。Itisheldtobefairthattheservantsofthepublicshouldbeplacedinthesameeasycircumstancesasthepublicitself;*gbutwhenthequestionturnsuponthesalariesofthegreatofficersofState，thisrulefails，andchancealonecanguidethepopulardecision。Thepoorhavenoadequateconceptionofthewantswhichthehigherclassesofsocietymayfeel。Thesumwhichisscantytotherichappearsenormoustothepoormanwhosewantsdonotextendbeyondthenecessariesoflife;andinhisestimationtheGovernorofaState，withhistwelveorfifteenhundreddollarsayear，isaveryfortunateandenviablebeing。*hIfyouundertaketoconvincehimthattherepresentativeofagreatpeopleoughttobeabletomaintainsomeshowofsplendorintheeyesofforeignnations，hewillperhapsassenttoyourmeaning;butwhenhereflectsonhisownhumbledwelling，andonthehard—earnedproduceofhiswearisometoil，heremembersallthathecoulddowithasalarywhichyousayisinsufficient，andheisstartledoralmostfrightenedatthesightofsuchuncommonwealth。Besides，thesecondarypublicofficerisalmostonalevelwiththepeople，whilsttheothersareraisedaboveit。Theformermaythereforeexcitehisinterest，butthelatterbeginstoarousehisenvy。
[Footnoteg:TheeasycircumstancesinwhichsecondaryfunctionariesareplacedintheUnitedStatesresultalsofromanothercause，whichisindependentofthegeneraltendenciesofdemocracy;everykindofprivatebusinessisverylucrative，andtheStatewouldnotbeservedatallifitdidnotpayitsservants。Thecountryisinthepositionofacommercialundertaking，whichisobligedtosustainanexpensivecompetition，notwithstandingitstastesforeconomy。]
[Footnoteh:TheStateofOhio，whichcontainsamillionofinhabitants，givesitsGovernorasalaryofonly$1，200ayear。]
ThisisveryclearlyseenintheUnitedStates，wherethesalariesseemtodecreaseastheauthorityofthosewhoreceivethemaugments*i[Footnotei:Torenderthisassertionperfectlyevident，itwillsufficetoexaminethescaleofsalariesoftheagentsoftheFederalGovernment。IhaveaddedthesalariesattachedtothecorrespondingofficersinFranceundertheconstitutionalmonarchytocompletethecomparison。
UnitedStatesTreasuryDepartmentMessenger……$700
Clerkwithlowestsalary……1，000
Clerkwithhighestsalary……1，600
ChiefClerk……2，000
SecretaryofState……6，000
ThePresident……25，000
FranceMinisteredesFinancesHussier……1，500fr。
Clerkwithlowestsalary，1，000to1，800fr。
Clerkwithhighestsalary3，200to8，600fr。
Secretaire—general……20，000fr。
TheMinister……80，000fr。
TheKing……12，000，000fr。
IhaveperhapsdonewronginselectingFranceasmystandardofcomparison。InFrancethedemocratictendenciesofthenationexerciseanever—increasinginfluenceupontheGovernment，andtheChambersshowadispositiontoraisethelowsalariesandtolowertheprincipalones。Thus，theMinisterofFinance，whoreceived160，000fr。undertheEmpire，receives80，000fr。in1835:theDirecteurs—generauxofFinance，whothenreceived50，000fr。nowreceiveonly20，000fr。[ThiscomparisonisbasedonthestateofthingsexistinginFranceandtheUnitedStatesin1831。Ithassincemateriallyalteredinbothcountries，butnotsomuchastoimpugnthetruthoftheauthor’sobservation。]]
Undertheruleofanaristocracyitfrequentlyhappens，onthecontrary，thatwhilstthehighofficersarereceivingmunificentsalaries，theinferioroneshavenotmorethanenoughtoprocurethenecessariesoflife。ThereasonofthisfactiseasilydiscoverablefromcausesveryanalogoustothosetowhichIhavejustalluded。Ifademocracyisunabletoconceivethepleasuresoftherichortowitnessthemwithoutenvy，anaristocracyisslowtounderstand，or，tospeakmorecorrectly，isunacquaintedwith，theprivationsofthepoor。Thepoormanisnot（ifweusethetermaright）thefellowoftherichone;
butheisabeingofanotherspecies。Anaristocracyisthereforeapttocarebutlittleforthefateofitssubordinateagents;andtheirsalariesareonlyraisedwhentheyrefusetoperformtheirservicefortooscantyaremuneration。
Itistheparsimoniousconductofdemocracytowardsitsprincipalofficerswhichhascountenancedasuppositionoffarmoreeconomicalpropensitiesthananywhichitreallypossesses。
Itistruethatitscarcelyallowsthemeansofhonorablesubsistencetotheindividualswhoconductitsaffairs;butenormoussumsarelavishedtomeettheexigenciesortofacilitatetheenjoymentsofthepeople。*jThemoneyraisedbytaxationmaybebetteremployed，butitisnotsaved。Ingeneral，democracygiveslargelytothecommunity，andverysparinglytothosewhogovernit。Thereverseisthecaseinaristocraticcountries，wherethemoneyoftheStateisexpendedtotheprofitofthepersonswhoareattheheadofaffairs。
[Footnotej:SeetheAmericanbudgetsforthecostofindigentcitizensandgratuitousinstruction。In1831$250，000werespentintheStateofNewYorkforthemaintenanceofthepoor，andatleast$1，000，000weredevotedtogratuitousinstruction。
（William’s\"NewYorkAnnualRegister，\"1832，pp。205and243。）
TheStateofNewYorkcontainedonly1，900，000inhabitantsintheyear1830，whichisnotmorethandoubletheamountofpopulationintheDepartmentduNordinFrance。]
DifficultyofDistinguishingTheCausesWhichContributeToTheEconomyOfTheAmericanGovernmentWeareliabletofrequenterrorsintheresearchofthosefactswhichexerciseaseriousinfluenceuponthefateofmankind，sincenothingismoredifficultthantoappreciatetheirrealvalue。Onepeopleisnaturallyinconsistentandenthusiastic;anotherissoberandcalculating;andthesecharacteristicsoriginateintheirphysicalconstitutionorinremotecauseswithwhichweareunacquainted。
Thesearenationswhicharefondofparadeandthebustleoffestivity，andwhichdonotregretthecostlygaietiesofanhour。Others，onthecontrary，areattachedtomoreretiringpleasures，andseemalmostashamedofappearingtobepleased。
Insomecountriesthehighestvalueissetuponthebeautyofpublicedifices;inotherstheproductionsofartaretreatedwithindifference，andeverythingwhichisunproductiveislookeddownuponwithcontempt。Insomerenown，inothersmoney，istherulingpassion。
Independentlyofthelaws，allthesecausesconcurtoexerciseaverypowerfulinfluenceupontheconductofthefinancesoftheState。IftheAmericansneverspendthemoneyofthepeopleingalas，itisnotonlybecausetheimpositionoftaxesisunderthecontrolofthepeople，butbecausethepeopletakesnodelightinpublicrejoicings。Iftheyrepudiateallornamentfromtheirarchitecture，andsetnostoreonanybutthemorepracticalandhomelyadvantages，itisnotonlybecausetheyliveunderdemocraticinstitutions，butbecausetheyareacommercialnation。Thehabitsofprivatelifearecontinuedinpublic;andweoughtcarefullytodistinguishthateconomywhichdependsupontheirinstitutionsfromthatwhichisthenaturalresultoftheirmannersandcustoms。
WhetherTheExpenditureOfTheUnitedStatesCanBeComparedToThatOfFranceTwopointstobeestablishedinordertoestimatetheextentofthepubliccharges，viz。，thenationalwealthandtherateoftaxation—ThewealthandthechargesofFrancenotaccuratelyknown—WhythewealthandchargesoftheUnioncannotbeaccuratelyknown—ResearchesoftheauthorwithaviewtodiscovertheamountoftaxationofPennsylvania—Generalsymptomswhichmayservetoindicatetheamountofthepublicchargesinagivennation—ResultofthisinvestigationfortheUnion。
ManyattemptshaverecentlybeenmadeinFrancetocomparethepublicexpenditureofthatcountrywiththeexpenditureoftheUnitedStates;alltheseattemptshave，however，beenunattendedbysuccess，andafewwordswillsufficetoshowthattheycouldnothavehadasatisfactoryresult。
Inordertoestimatetheamountofthepublicchargesofapeopletwopreliminariesareindispensable:itisnecessary，inthefirstplace，toknowthewealthofthatpeople;andinthesecond，tolearnwhatportionofthatwealthisdevotedtotheexpenditureoftheState。Toshowtheamountoftaxationwithoutshowingtheresourceswhicharedestinedtomeetthedemand，istoundertakeafutilelabor;foritisnottheexpenditure，buttherelationoftheexpendituretotherevenue，whichitisdesirabletoknow。
Thesamerateoftaxationwhichmayeasilybesupportedbyawealthycontributorwillreduceapooronetoextrememisery。
Thewealthofnationsiscomposedofseveraldistinctelements，ofwhichpopulationisthefirst，realpropertythesecond，andpersonalpropertythethird。Thefirstofthesethreeelementsmaybediscoveredwithoutdifficulty。Amongstcivilizednationsitiseasytoobtainanaccuratecensusoftheinhabitants;butthetwootherscannotbedeterminedwithsomuchfacility。Itisdifficulttotakeanexactaccountofallthelandsinacountrywhichareundercultivation，withtheirnaturalortheiracquiredvalue;anditisstillmoreimpossibletoestimatetheentirepersonalpropertywhichisatthedisposalofanation，andwhicheludesthestrictestanalysisbythediversityandthenumberofshapesunderwhichitmayoccur。And，indeed，wefindthatthemostancientcivilizednationsofEurope，includingeventhoseinwhichtheadministrationismostcentral，havenotsucceeded，asyet，indeterminingtheexactconditionoftheirwealth。