HithertonocitizenhasshownanydispositiontoexposehishonorandhislifeinordertobecomethePresidentoftheUnitedStates;becausethepowerofthatofficeistemporary，limited，andsubordinate。Theprizeoffortunemustbegreattoencourageadventurersinsodesperateagame。Nocandidatehasasyetbeenabletoarousethedangerousenthusiasmorthepassionatesympathiesofthepeopleinhisfavor，fortheverysimplereasonthatwhenheisattheheadoftheGovernmenthehasbutlittlepower，butlittlewealth，andbutlittleglorytoshareamongsthisfriends;andhisinfluenceintheStateistoosmallforthesuccessortheruinofafactiontodependupontheelevationofanindividualtopower。
Thegreatadvantageofhereditarymonarchiesis，thatastheprivateinterestofafamilyisalwaysintimatelyconnectedwiththeinterestsoftheState，theexecutivegovernmentisneversuspendedforasingleinstant;andiftheaffairsofamonarchyarenotbetterconductedthanthoseofarepublic，atleastthereisalwayssomeonetoconductthem，wellorill，accordingtohiscapacity。InelectiveStates，onthecontrary，thewheelsofgovernmentceasetoact，asitwere，oftheirownaccordattheapproachofanelection，andevenforsometimeprevioustothatevent。Thelawsmayindeedacceleratetheoperationoftheelection，whichmaybeconductedwithsuchsimplicityandrapiditythattheseatofpowerwillneverbeleftvacant;but，notwithstandingtheseprecautions，abreaknecessarilyoccursinthemindsofthepeople。
Attheapproachofanelectiontheheadoftheexecutivegovernmentiswhollyoccupiedbythecomingstruggle;hisfutureplansaredoubtful;hecanundertakenothingnew，andthehewillonlyprosecutewithindifferencethosedesignswhichanotherwillperhapsterminate。\"Iamsonearthetimeofmyretirementfromoffice，\"saidPresidentJeffersononthe21stofJanuary，1809
（sixweeksbeforetheelection），\"thatIfeelnopassion，Itakenopart，Iexpressnosentiment。Itappearstomejusttoleavetomysuccessorthecommencementofthosemeasureswhichhewillhavetoprosecute，andforwhichhewillberesponsible。\"
Ontheotherhand，theeyesofthenationarecentredonasinglepoint;allarewatchingthegradualbirthofsoimportantanevent。Thewidertheinfluenceoftheexecutivepowerextends，thegreaterandthemorenecessaryisitsconstantaction，themorefatalisthetermofsuspense;andanationwhichisaccustomedtothegovernment，or，stillmore，oneusedtotheadministrativeprotectionofapowerfulexecutiveauthoritywouldbeinfalliblyconvulsedbyanelectionofthiskind。IntheUnitedStatestheactionoftheGovernmentmaybeslackenedwithimpunity，becauseitisalwaysweakandcircumscribed。*u[Footnoteu:[This，however，maybeagreatdanger。TheperiodduringwhichMr。Buchananretainedoffice，aftertheelectionofMr。Lincoln，fromNovember，1860，toMarch，1861，wasthatwhichenabledthesecedingStatesoftheSouthtocompletetheirpreparationsfortheCivilWar，andtheExecutiveGovernmentwasparalyzed。Nogreaterevilcouldbefallanation。—Translator’sNote。]]
OneoftheprincipalvicesoftheelectivesystemisthatitalwaysintroducesacertaindegreeofinstabilityintotheinternalandexternalpolicyoftheState。Butthisdisadvantageislesssensiblyfeltiftheshareofpowervestedintheelectedmagistrateissmall。InRometheprinciplesoftheGovernmentunderwentnovariation，althoughtheConsulswerechangedeveryyear，becausetheSenate，whichwasanhereditaryassembly，possessedthedirectingauthority。IftheelectivesystemwereadoptedinEurope，theconditionofmostofthemonarchicalStateswouldbechangedateverynewelection。InAmericathePresidentexercisesacertaininfluenceonStateaffairs，buthedoesnotconductthem;thepreponderatingpowerisvestedintherepresentativesofthewholenation。Thepoliticalmaximsofthecountrydependthereforeonthemassofthepeople，notonthePresidentalone;andconsequentlyinAmericatheelectivesystemhasnoveryprejudicialinfluenceonthefixedprinciplesoftheGovernment。ButthewantoffixedprinciplesisanevilsoinherentintheelectivesystemthatitisstillextremelyperceptibleinthenarrowspheretowhichtheauthorityofthePresidentextends。
TheAmericanshaveadmittedthattheheadoftheexecutivepower，whohastobearthewholeresponsibilityofthedutiesheiscalledupontofulfil，oughttobeempoweredtochoosehisownagents，andtoremovethematpleasure:thelegislativebodieswatchtheconductofthePresidentmorethantheydirectit。Theconsequenceofthisarrangementis，thatateverynewelectionthefateofalltheFederalpublicofficersisinsuspense。Mr。
QuincyAdams，onhisentryintooffice，dischargedthemajorityoftheindividualswhohadbeenappointedbyhispredecessor:andIamnotawarethatGeneralJacksonallowedasingleremovablefunctionaryemployedintheFederalservicetoretainhisplacebeyondthefirstyearwhichsucceededhiselection。ItissometimesmadeasubjectofcomplaintthatintheconstitutionalmonarchiesofEuropethefateofthehumblerservantsofanAdministrationdependsuponthatoftheMinisters。ButinelectiveGovernmentsthisevilisfargreater。Inaconstitutionalmonarchysuccessiveministriesarerapidlyformed;
butastheprincipalrepresentativeoftheexecutivepowerdoesnotchange，thespiritofinnovationiskeptwithinbounds;thechangeswhichtakeplaceareinthedetailsratherthanintheprinciplesoftheadministrativesystem;buttosubstituteonesystemforanother，asisdoneinAmericaeveryfouryears，bylaw，istocauseasortofrevolution。Astothemisfortuneswhichmayfalluponindividualsinconsequenceofthisstateofthings，itmustbeallowedthattheuncertainsituationofthepublicofficersislessfraughtwithevilconsequencesinAmericathanelsewhere。ItissoeasytoacquireanindependentpositionintheUnitedStatesthatthepublicofficerwholoseshisplacemaybedeprivedofthecomfortsoflife，butnotofthemeansofsubsistence。
IremarkedatthebeginningofthischapterthatthedangersoftheelectivesystemappliedtotheheadoftheStateareaugmentedordecreasedbythepeculiarcircumstancesofthepeoplewhichadoptsit。Howeverthefunctionsoftheexecutivepowermayberestricted，itmustalwaysexerciseagreatinfluenceupontheforeignpolicyofthecountry，foranegotiationcannotbeopenedorsuccessfullycarriedonotherwisethanbyasingleagent。Themoreprecariousandthemoreperilousthepositionofapeoplebecomes，themoreabsoluteisthewantofafixedandconsistentexternalpolicy，andthemoredangerousdoestheelectivesystemoftheChiefMagistratebecome。ThepolicyoftheAmericansinrelationtothewholeworldisexceedinglysimple;foritmayalmostbesaidthatnocountrystandsinneedofthem，nordotheyrequiretheco—operationofanyotherpeople。Theirindependenceisneverthreatened。Intheirpresentcondition，therefore，thefunctionsoftheexecutivepowerarenolesslimitedbycircumstancesthanbythelaws;andthePresidentmayfrequentlychangehislineofpolicywithoutinvolvingtheStateindifficultyordestruction。
Whatevertheprerogativesoftheexecutivepowermaybe，theperiodwhichimmediatelyprecedesanelectionandthemomentofitsdurationmustalwaysbeconsideredasanationalcrisis，whichisperilousinproportiontotheinternalembarrassmentsandtheexternaldangersofthecountry。FewofthenationsofEuropecouldescapethecalamitiesofanarchyorofconquesteverytimetheymighthavetoelectanewsovereign。InAmericasocietyissoconstitutedthatitcanstandwithoutassistanceuponitsownbasis;nothingistobefearedfromthepressureofexternaldangers，andtheelectionofthePresidentisacauseofagitation，butnotofruin。
ModeOfElectionSkilloftheAmericanlegislatorsshowninthemodeofelectionadoptedbythem—Creationofaspecialelectoralbody—Separatevotesoftheseelectors—CaseinwhichtheHouseofRepresentativesiscalledupontochoosethePresident—ResultsofthetwelveelectionswhichhavetakenplacesincetheConstitutionhasbeenestablished。
Besidesthedangerswhichareinherentinthesystem，manyotherdifficultiesmayarisefromthemodeofelection，whichmaybeobviatedbytheprecautionofthelegislator。Whenapeoplemetinarmsonsomepublicspottochooseitshead，itwasexposedtoallthechancesofcivilwarresultingfromsomartialamodeofproceeding，besidesthedangersoftheelectivesysteminitself。ThePolishlaws，whichsubjectedtheelectionofthesovereigntothevetoofasingleindividual，suggestedthemurderofthatindividualorpreparedthewaytoanarchy。
IntheexaminationoftheinstitutionsandthepoliticalaswellassocialconditionoftheUnitedStates，wearestruckbytheadmirableharmonyofthegiftsoffortuneandtheeffortsofman。Thenationpossessedtwoofthemaincausesofinternalpeace;itwasanewcountry，butitwasinhabitedbyapeoplegrownoldintheexerciseoffreedom。Americahadnohostileneighborstodread;andtheAmericanlegislators，profitingbythesefavorablecircumstances，createdaweakandsubordinateexecutivepowerwhichcouldwithoutdangerbemadeelective。
Itthenonlyremainedforthemtochoosetheleastdangerousofthevariousmodesofelection;andtheruleswhichtheylaiddownuponthispointadmirablycorrespondtothesecuritieswhichthephysicalandpoliticalconstitutionofthecountryalreadyafforded。Theirobjectwastofindthemodeofelectionwhichwouldbestexpressthechoiceofthepeoplewiththeleastpossibleexcitementandsuspense。Itwasadmittedinthefirstplacethatthesimplemajorityshouldbedecisive;butthedifficultywastoobtainthismajoritywithoutanintervalofdelaywhichitwasmostimportanttoavoid。Itrarelyhappensthatanindividualcanatoncecollectthemajorityofthesuffragesofagreatpeople;andthisdifficultyisenhancedinarepublicofconfederateStates，wherelocalinfluencesareapttopreponderate。Themeansbywhichitwasproposedtoobviatethissecondobstaclewastodelegatetheelectoralpowersofthenationtoabodyofrepresentatives。Thismodeofelectionrenderedamajoritymoreprobable;forthefewertheelectorsare，thegreateristhechanceoftheircomingtoafinaldecision。Italsoofferedanadditionalprobabilityofajudiciouschoice。Itthenremainedtobedecidedwhetherthisrightofelectionwastobeentrustedtoalegislativebody，thehabitualrepresentativeassemblyofthenation，orwhetheranelectoralassemblyshouldbeformedfortheexpresspurposeofproceedingtothenominationofaPresident。TheAmericanschosethelatteralternative，fromabeliefthattheindividualswhowerereturnedtomakethelawswereincompetenttorepresentthewishesofthenationintheelectionofitschiefmagistrate;andthat，astheyarechosenformorethanayear，theconstituencytheyrepresentmighthavechangeditsopinioninthattime。Itwasthoughtthatifthelegislaturewasempoweredtoelecttheheadoftheexecutivepower，itsmemberswould，forsometimebeforetheelection，beexposedtothemanoeuvresofcorruptionandthetricksofintrigue;whereasthespecialelectorswould，likeajury，remainmixedupwiththecrowdtillthedayofaction，whentheywouldappearforthesolepurposeofgivingtheirvotes。
ItwasthereforeestablishedthateveryStateshouldnameacertainnumberofelectors，*vwhointheirturnshouldelectthePresident;andasithadbeenobservedthattheassembliestowhichthechoiceofachiefmagistratehadbeenentrustedinelectivecountriesinevitablybecamethecentresofpassionandofcabal;thattheysometimesusurpedanauthoritywhichdidnotbelongtothem;andthattheirproceedings，ortheuncertaintywhichresultedfromthem，weresometimesprolongedsomuchastoendangerthewelfareoftheState，itwasdeterminedthattheelectorsshouldallvoteuponthesameday，withoutbeingconvokedtothesameplace。*wThisdoubleelectionrenderedamajorityprobable，thoughnotcertain;foritwaspossiblethatasmanydifferencesmightexistbetweentheelectorsasbetweentheirconstituents。Inthiscaseitwasnecessarytohaverecoursetooneofthreemeasures;eithertoappointnewelectors，ortoconsultasecondtimethosealreadyappointed，ortodefertheelectiontoanotherauthority。Thefirsttwoofthesealternatives，independentlyoftheuncertaintyoftheirresults，werelikelytodelaythefinaldecision，andtoperpetuateanagitationwhichmustalwaysbeaccompaniedwithdanger。Thethirdexpedientwasthereforeadopted，anditwasagreedthatthevotesshouldbetransmittedsealedtothePresidentoftheSenate，andthattheyshouldbeopenedandcountedinthepresenceoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives。Ifnoneofthecandidateshasamajority，theHouseofRepresentativesthenproceedsimmediatelytoelectaPresident，butwiththeconditionthatitmustfixupononeofthethreecandidateswhohavethehighestnumbers。*x[Footnotev:AsmanyasitsendsmemberstoCongress。Thenumberofelectorsattheelectionof1833was288。（See\"TheNationalCalendar，\"1833。）]
[Footnotew:TheelectorsofthesameStateassemble，buttheytransmittothecentralgovernmentthelistoftheirindividualvotes，andnotthemereresultofthevoteofthemajority。]
[Footnotex:InthiscaseitisthemajorityoftheStates，andnotthemajorityofthemembers，whichdecidesthequestion;sothatNewYorkhasnotmoreinfluenceinthedebatethanRhodeIsland。ThusthecitizensoftheUnionarefirstconsultedasmembersofoneandthesamecommunity;and，iftheycannotagree，recourseishadtothedivisionoftheStates，eachofwhichhasaseparateandindependentvote。ThisisoneofthesingularitiesoftheFederalConstitutionwhichcanonlybeexplainedbythejarofconflictinginterests。]
Thusitisonlyincaseofaneventwhichcannotoftenhappen，andwhichcanneverbeforeseen，thattheelectionisentrustedtotheordinaryrepresentativesofthenation;andeventhentheyareobligedtochooseacitizenwhohasalreadybeendesignatedbyapowerfulminorityofthespecialelectors。Itisbythishappyexpedientthattherespectwhichisduetothepopularvoiceiscombinedwiththeutmostcelerityofexecutionandthoseprecautionswhichthepeaceofthecountrydemands。
ButthedecisionofthequestionbytheHouseofRepresentativesdoesnotnecessarilyofferanimmediatesolutionofthedifficulty，forthemajorityofthatassemblymaystillbedoubtful，andinthiscasetheConstitutionprescribesnoremedy。
Nevertheless，byrestrictingthenumberofcandidatestothree，andbyreferringthemattertothejudgmentofanenlightenedpublicbody，ithassmoothedalltheobstacles*ywhicharenotinherentintheelectivesystem。
[Footnotey:Jefferson，in1801，wasnotelecteduntilthethirty—sixthtimeofballoting。]
Intheforty—fouryearswhichhaveelapsedsincethepromulgationoftheFederalConstitutiontheUnitedStateshavetwelvetimeschosenaPresident。TenoftheseelectionstookplacesimultaneouslybythevotesofthespecialelectorsinthedifferentStates。TheHouseofRepresentativeshasonlytwiceexerciseditsconditionalprivilegeofdecidingincasesofuncertainty;thefirsttimewasattheelectionofMr。Jeffersonin1801;thesecondwasin1825，whenMr。QuincyAdamswasnamed。
*z[Footnotez:[GeneralGrantisnow（1874）theeighteenthPresidentoftheUnitedStates。]]
CrisesOfTheElectionTheElectionmaybeconsideredasanationalcrisis—Why？—
Passionsofthepeople—AnxietyofthePresident—Calmwhichsucceedstheagitationoftheelection。
IhaveshownwhatthecircumstancesarewhichfavoredtheadoptionoftheelectivesystemintheUnitedStates，andwhatprecautionsweretakenbythelegislatorstoobviateitsdangers。
TheAmericansarehabituallyaccustomedtoallkindsofelections，andtheyknowbyexperiencetheutmostdegreeofexcitementwhichiscompatiblewithsecurity。Thevastextentofthecountryandthedisseminationoftheinhabitantsrenderacollisionbetweenpartieslessprobableandlessdangeroustherethanelsewhere。Thepoliticalcircumstancesunderwhichtheelectionshavehithertobeencarriedonhavepresentednorealembarrassmentstothenation。
Nevertheless，theepochoftheelectionofaPresidentoftheUnitedStatesmaybeconsideredasacrisisintheaffairsofthenation。Theinfluencewhichheexercisesonpublicbusinessisnodoubtfeebleandindirect;butthechoiceofthePresident，whichisofsmallimportancetoeachindividualcitizen，concernsthecitizenscollectively;andhowevertriflinganinterestmaybe，itassumesagreatdegreeofimportanceassoonasitbecomesgeneral。ThePresidentpossessesbutfewmeansofrewardinghissupportersincomparisontothekingsofEurope，buttheplaceswhichareathisdisposalaresufficientlynumeroustointerest，directlyorindirectly，severalthousandelectorsinhissuccess。
PoliticalpartiesintheUnitedStatesareledtorallyroundanindividual，inordertoacquireamoretangibleshapeintheeyesofthecrowd，andthenameofthecandidateforthePresidencyisputforwardasthesymbolandpersonificationoftheirtheories。
Forthesereasonspartiesarestronglyinterestedingainingtheelection，notsomuchwithaviewtothetriumphoftheirprinciplesundertheauspicesofthePresident—electastoshowbythemajoritywhichreturnedhim，thestrengthofthesupportersofthoseprinciples。
Foralongwhilebeforetheappointedtimeisathandtheelectionbecomesthemostimportantandtheall—engrossingtopicofdiscussion。Theardoroffactionisredoubled;andalltheartificialpassionswhichtheimaginationcancreateinthebosomofahappyandpeacefullandareagitatedandbroughttolight。
ThePresident，ontheotherhand，isabsorbedbythecaresofself—defence。HenolongergovernsfortheinterestoftheState，butforthatofhisre—election;hedoeshomagetothemajority，andinsteadofcheckingitspassions，ashisdutycommandshimtodo，hefrequentlycourtsitsworstcaprices。Astheelectiondrawsnear，theactivityofintrigueandtheagitationofthepopulaceincrease;thecitizensaredividedintohostilecamps，eachofwhichassumesthenameofitsfavoritecandidate;thewholenationglowswithfeverishexcitement;theelectionisthedailythemeofthepublicpapers，thesubjectofprivateconversation，theendofeverythoughtandeveryaction，thesoleinterestofthepresent。Assoonasthechoiceisdetermined，thisardorisdispelled;andasacalmerseasonreturns，thecurrentoftheState，whichhadnearlybrokenitsbanks，sinkstoitsusuallevel:*abutwhocanrefrainfromastonishmentatthecausesofthestorm。
[Footnotea:[Notalways。TheelectionofPresidentLincolnwasthesignalofcivilwar。—Translator’sNote。]]
ChapterVIII:TheFederalConstitution—PartIII
Re—electionOfThePresidentWhentheheadoftheexecutivepowerisre—eligible，itistheStatewhichisthesourceofintrigueandcorruption—Thedesireofbeingre—electedthechiefaimofaPresidentoftheUnitedStates—DisadvantageofthesystempeculiartoAmerica—Thenaturalevilofdemocracyisthatitsubordinatesallauthoritytotheslightestdesiresofthemajority—There—electionofthePresidentencouragesthisevil。
ItmaybeaskedwhetherthelegislatorsoftheUnitedStatesdidrightorwronginallowingthere—electionofthePresident。
Itseemsatfirstsightcontrarytoallreasontopreventtheheadoftheexecutivepowerfrombeingelectedasecondtime。
Theinfluencewhichthetalentsandthecharacterofasingleindividualmayexerciseuponthefateofawholepeople，incriticalcircumstancesorarduoustimes，iswellknown:alawpreventingthere—electionofthechiefmagistratewoulddeprivethecitizensofthesurestpledgeoftheprosperityandthesecurityofthecommonwealth;and，byasingularinconsistency，amanwouldbeexcludedfromthegovernmentattheverytimewhenhehadshownhisabilityinconductingitsaffairs。
Butiftheseargumentsarestrong，perhapsstillmorepowerfulreasonsmaybeadvancedagainstthem。Intrigueandcorruptionarethenaturaldefectsofelectivegovernment;butwhentheheadoftheStatecanbere—electedtheseevilsrisetoagreatheight，andcompromisetheveryexistenceofthecountry。
Whenasimplecandidateseekstorisebyintrigue，hismanoeuvresmustnecessarilybelimitedtoanarrowsphere;butwhenthechiefmagistrateentersthelists，heborrowsthestrengthofthegovernmentforhisownpurposes。Intheformercasethefeebleresourcesofanindividualareinaction;inthelatter，theStateitself，withallitsimmenseinfluence，isbusiedintheworkofcorruptionandcabal。Theprivatecitizen，whoemploysthemostimmoralpracticestoacquirepower，canonlyactinamannerindirectlyprejudicialtothepublicprosperity。Butiftherepresentativeoftheexecutivedescendsintothecombat，thecaresofgovernmentdwindleintosecond—rateimportance，andthesuccessofhiselectionishisfirstconcern。Alllawsandallthenegotiationsheundertakesaretohimnothingmorethanelectioneeringschemes;placesbecometherewardofservicesrendered，nottothenation，buttoitschief;andtheinfluenceofthegovernment，ifnotinjurioustothecountry，isatleastnolongerbeneficialtothecommunityforwhichitwascreated。
ItisimpossibletoconsidertheordinarycourseofaffairsintheUnitedStateswithoutperceivingthatthedesireofbeingre—electedisthechiefaimofthePresident;thathiswholeadministration，andevenhismostindifferentmeasures，tendtothisobject;andthat，asthecrisisapproaches，hispersonalinteresttakestheplaceofhisinterestinthepublicgood。Theprincipleofre—eligibilityrendersthecorruptinfluenceofelectivegovernmentstillmoreextensiveandpernicious。
InAmericaitexercisesapeculiarlyfatalinfluenceonthesourcesofnationalexistence。Everygovernmentseemstobeafflictedbysomeevilwhichisinherentinitsnature，andthegeniusofthelegislatorisshownineludingitsattacks。A
Statemaysurvivetheinfluenceofahostofbadlaws，andthemischieftheycauseisfrequentlyexaggerated;butalawwhichencouragesthegrowthofthecankerwithinmustprovefatalintheend，althoughitsbadconsequencesmaynotbeimmediatelyperceived。
Theprincipleofdestructioninabsolutemonarchiesliesintheexcessiveandunreasonableextensionoftheprerogativeofthecrown;andameasuretendingtoremovetheconstitutionalprovisionswhichcounterbalancethisinfluencewouldberadicallybad，evenifitsimmediateconsequenceswereunattendedwithevil。Byaparityofreasoning，incountriesgovernedbyademocracy，wherethepeopleisperpetuallydrawingallauthoritytoitself，thelawswhichincreaseoraccelerateitsactionarethedirectassailantsoftheveryprincipleofthegovernment。
ThegreatestproofoftheabilityoftheAmericanlegislatorsis，thattheyclearlydiscernedthistruth，andthattheyhadthecouragetoactuptoit。Theyconceivedthatacertainauthorityabovethebodyofthepeoplewasnecessary，whichshouldenjoyadegreeofindependence，without，however，beingentirelybeyondthepopularcontrol;anauthoritywhichwouldbeforcedtocomplywiththepermanentdeterminationsofthemajority，butwhichwouldbeabletoresistitscaprices，andtorefuseitsmostdangerousdemands。Tothisendtheycentredthewholeexecutivepowerofthenationinasinglearm;theygrantedextensiveprerogativestothePresident，andtheyarmedhimwiththevetotoresisttheencroachmentsofthelegislature。
Butbyintroducingtheprincipleofre—electiontheypartlydestroyedtheirwork;andtheyrenderedthePresidentbutlittleinclinedtoexertthegreatpowertheyhadvestedinhishands。
Ifineligibleasecondtime，thePresidentwouldbefarfromindependentofthepeople，forhisresponsibilitywouldnotbelessened;butthefavorofthepeoplewouldnotbesonecessarytohimastoinducehimtocourtitbyhumoringitsdesires。Ifre—eligible（andthisismoreespeciallytrueatthepresentday，whenpoliticalmoralityisrelaxed，andwhengreatmenarerare），thePresidentoftheUnitedStatesbecomesaneasytoolinthehandsofthemajority。Headoptsitslikingsanditsanimosities，hehastenstoanticipateitswishes，heforestallsitscomplaints，heyieldstoitsidlestcravings，andinsteadofguidingit，asthelegislatureintendedthatheshoulddo，heiseverreadytofollowitsbidding。Thus，inordernottodeprivetheStateofthetalentsofanindividual，thosetalentshavebeenrenderedalmostuseless;andtoreserveanexpedientforextraordinaryperils，thecountryhasbeenexposedtodailydangers。
FederalCourts*b[Footnoteb:Seechap。VI，entitled\"JudicialPowerintheUnitedStates。\"ThischapterexplainsthegeneralprinciplesoftheAmericantheoryofjudicialinstitutions。SeealsotheFederalConstitution，Art。3。See\"TheFederalists，\"Nos。
78—83，inclusive;andaworkentitled\"ConstitutionalLaw，\"beingaviewofthepracticeandjurisdictionofthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，byThomasSergeant。SeeStory，pp。134，162，489，511，581，668;andtheorganiclawofSeptember24，1789，inthe\"CollectionoftheLawsoftheUnitedStates，\"byStory，vol。i。
p。53。]
PoliticalimportanceofthejudiciaryintheUnitedStates—
Difficultyoftreatingthissubject—Utilityofjudicialpowerinconfederations—WhattribunalscouldbeintroducedintotheUnion—Necessityofestablishingfederalcourtsofjustice—
Organizationofthenationaljudiciary—TheSupremeCourt—Inwhatitdiffersfromallknowntribunals。
IhaveinquiredintothelegislativeandexecutivepoweroftheUnion，andthejudicialpowernowremainstobeexamined;butinthisplaceIcannotconcealmyfearsfromthereader。TheirjudicialinstitutionsexerciseagreatinfluenceontheconditionoftheAnglo—Americans，andtheyoccupyaprominentplaceamongstwhatareprobablycalledpoliticalinstitutions:inthisrespecttheyarepeculiarlydeservingofourattention。ButIamatalosstoexplainthepoliticalactionoftheAmericantribunalswithoutenteringintosometechnicaldetailsoftheirconstitutionandtheirformsofproceeding;andIknownothowtodescendtotheseminutiaewithoutwearyingthecuriosityofthereaderbythenaturalaridityofthesubject，orwithoutriskingtofallintoobscuritythroughadesiretobesuccinct。Icanscarcelyhopetoescapethesevariousevils;forifIappeartoolengthytoamanoftheworld，alawyermayontheotherhandcomplainofmybrevity。Butthesearethenaturaldisadvantagesofmysubject，andmoreespeciallyofthepointwhichIamabouttodiscuss。
Thegreatdifficultywas，nottodevisetheConstitutiontotheFederalGovernment，buttofindoutamethodofenforcingitslaws。Governmentshaveingeneralbuttwomeansofovercomingtheoppositionofthepeopletheygovern，viz。，thephysicalforcewhichisattheirowndisposal，andthemoralforcewhichtheyderivefromthedecisionsofthecourtsofjustice。
Agovernmentwhichshouldhavenoothermeansofexactingobediencethanopenwarmustbeverynearitsruin，foroneoftwoalternativeswouldthenprobablyoccur:ifitsauthoritywassmallanditscharactertemperate，itwouldnotresorttoviolencetillthelastextremity，anditwouldconniveatanumberofpartialactsofinsubordination，inwhichcasetheStatewouldgraduallyfallintoanarchy;ifitwasenterprisingandpowerful，itwouldperpetuallyhaverecoursetoitsphysicalstrength，andwouldspeedilydegenerateintoamilitarydespotism。Sothatitsactivitywouldnotbelessprejudicialtothecommunitythanitsinaction。
Thegreatendofjusticeistosubstitutethenotionofrightforthatofviolence，andtoplacealegalbarrierbetweenthepowerofthegovernmentandtheuseofphysicalforce。Theauthoritywhichisawardedtotheinterventionofacourtofjusticebythegeneralopinionofmankindissosurprisinglygreatthatitclingstothemereformalitiesofjustice，andgivesabodilyinfluencetotheshadowofthelaw。Themoralforcewhichcourtsofjusticepossessrenderstheintroductionofphysicalforceexceedinglyrare，andisveryfrequentlysubstitutedforit;butifthelatterprovestobeindispensable，itspowerisdoubledbytheassociationoftheideaoflaw。
Afederalgovernmentstandsingreaterneedofthesupportofjudicialinstitutionsthananyother，becauseitisnaturallyweakandexposedtoformidableopposition。*cIfitwerealwaysobligedtoresorttoviolenceinthefirstinstance，itcouldnotfulfilitstask。TheUnion，therefore，requiredanationaljudiciarytoenforcetheobedienceofthecitizenstothelaws，andtorepealtheattackswhichmightbedirectedagainstthem。
Thequestionthenremainedastowhattribunalsweretoexercisetheseprivileges;weretheytobeentrustedtothecourtsofjusticewhichwerealreadyorganizedineveryState？orwasitnecessarytocreatefederalcourts？ItmayeasilybeprovedthattheUnioncouldnotadaptthejudicialpoweroftheStatestoitswants。TheseparationofthejudiciaryfromtheadministrativepoweroftheStatenodoubtaffectsthesecurityofeverycitizenandthelibertyofall。Butitisnolessimportanttotheexistenceofthenationthattheseseveralpowersshouldhavethesameorigin，shouldfollowthesameprinciples，andactinthesamesphere;inaword，thattheyshouldbecorrelativeandhomogeneous。Noone，Ipresume，eversuggestedtheadvantageoftryingoffencescommittedinFrancebyaforeigncourtofjustice，inordertosecuretheimpartialityofthejudges。TheAmericansformonepeopleinrelationtotheirFederalGovernment;butinthebosomofthispeoplediverspoliticalbodieshavebeenallowedtosubsistwhicharedependentonthenationalGovernmentinafewpoints，andindependentinalltherest;whichhavealladistinctorigin，maximspeculiartothemselves，andspecialmeansofcarryingontheiraffairs。ToentrusttheexecutionofthelawsoftheUniontotribunalsinstitutedbythesepoliticalbodieswouldbetoallowforeignjudgestopresideoverthenation。Nay，more;notonlyiseachStateforeigntotheUnionatlarge，butitisinperpetualoppositiontothecommoninterests，sincewhateverauthoritytheUnionlosesturnstotheadvantageoftheStates。ThustoenforcethelawsoftheUnionbymeansofthetribunalsoftheStateswouldbetoallownotonlyforeignbutpartialjudgestopresideoverthenation。
[Footnotec:Federallawsarethosewhichmostrequirecourtsofjustice，andthoseatthesametimewhichhavemostrarelyestablishedthem。ThereasonisthatconfederationshaveusuallybeenformedbyindependentStates，whichentertainednorealintentionofobeyingthecentralGovernment，andwhichveryreadilycededtherightofcommandtothefederalexecutive，andveryprudentlyreservedtherightofnon—compliancetothemselves。]
Butthenumber，stillmorethanthemerecharacter，ofthetribunalsoftheStatesrenderedthemunfitfortheserviceofthenation。WhentheFederalConstitutionwasformedtherewerealreadythirteencourtsofjusticeintheUnitedStateswhichdecidedcauseswithoutappeal。Thatnumberisnowincreasedtotwenty—four。TosupposethataStatecansubsistwhenitsfundamentallawsmaybesubjectedtofour—and—twentydifferentinterpretationsatthesametimeistoadvanceapropositionalikecontrarytoreasonandtoexperience。
TheAmericanlegislatorsthereforeagreedtocreateafederaljudiciarypowertoapplythelawsoftheUnion，andtodeterminecertainquestionsaffectinggeneralinterests，whichwerecarefullydeterminedbeforehand。TheentirejudicialpoweroftheUnionwascentredinonetribunal，whichwasdenominatedtheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates。But，tofacilitatetheexpeditionofbusiness，inferiorcourtswereappendedtoit，whichwereempoweredtodecidecausesofsmallimportancewithoutappeal，andwithappealcausesofmoremagnitude。ThemembersoftheSupremeCourtarenamedneitherbythepeoplenorthelegislature，butbythePresidentoftheUnitedStates，actingwiththeadviceoftheSenate。Inordertorenderthemindependentoftheotherauthorities，theirofficewasmadeinalienable;anditwasdeterminedthattheirsalary，whenoncefixed，shouldnotbealteredbythelegislature。*dItwaseasytoproclaimtheprincipleofaFederaljudiciary，butdifficultiesmultipliedwhentheextentofitsjurisdictionwastobedetermined。