believeintheexistenceofCalcutta，ImeanthatIbelievethatifIweretransportedtothebanksoftheHoogly，IshouldhavethesensationsfromwhichCalcuttaisinferrible。72*Inotherwords，inmakingastatementabouttheexternalworld，I
constructahypotheticalanduniversalconsciousness。WhenI
exchangethegeocentricfortheheliocentricview，IamimaginingwhatIshouldseeifIwereuponthesuninsteadoftheearth。
Insteadofregardingmyownseriesofsensationsasthebasefromwhichtomeasure，Iregardthemasdeduciblefromtheserieswhichwouldbepresentedtoadifferentand，ofcourse，incomparablymoreextendedconsciousness。Icanthusfillupthegapsinmyownexperienceandgetaregularseriesinsteadofonefullofbreachesandinterruptions。ThatIdothissomehoworotherisMill’sview，andIshouldadmitwithhimthatIdonomore。But，then，thequestionremainswhetherMillcanaccountformydoingeventhis。Itsupposes，atleast，apowerofformingwhatCliffordcalled’ejects，’asdistinguishedfrom’objects。’I
mustbeabletothinknotofthingsoutsideconsciousnessbutofmyownconsciousnessunderotherconditions，andofothercentresofconsciousnessthanmine。Butthisabilityisnotexplicablefromsensations，asultimateatoms，combinedinvariouswaysby’association’；forthatprocess，itwouldseem，mighttakeplacewithoutinanywaysuggestinganexternalworldoradifferentconsciousness。HereMill，likehisfather，istryingtoexplainthoughtsbydealingwithsensationsasthingsandrefusingtoadmitanyactionofthemindinordertokeeptotheunsophisticatedfacts。Hewillnotallowthemindtohaveevenanorganisingpower，eventhoughitbeapowerwhichcannotbeseparatelyrevealedorgiverisetoindependenttruths，butappearssimplyasimpliedinitsproducts。Themindistheclusterofatomicsensations。Itmustnottamperwiththefactsinanyway，onpenaltyofcausingillusion。Icanonlyassociatesimpleatoms，andtheworldremainsachaosofindependentandincoherentfragments。Theysticktogethersomehow，butthedivisionintotheexternalandtheinternalworldstillremainsanunsolvedproblem。The’attribute’willnotdistinguishitselffromthe’sensation。’Wearestillunable，thatis，toexplainthemetaphysicalpuzzleleftunsolvedintheLogic。