Nobody’s’consciousness，’wemaybesure，evertoldhimthatheperceivednotthesunbuttheactionofraysoflightonhiseye。
Hamiltonhasdivergedfromaconsiderationoftheconsciousnessitselftoaconsiderationofthephysicalconditionsofconsciousness。HavingstartedwithReid，henextadmitsKanttobeconclusive，andendsbyescapingtowhatisonlyexpressibleintermsofmaterialism。Thedeliveranceofconsciousnesshascometobeastatementthatmyfingersaredifferentfrommytoes，andthat，asIamfingersandtoes，Iamawareofthefact。
IwillnotaskwhetheritispossiblebyanyinterpretationtoputatenableconstructionuponHamilton’slanguage。Hamiltonbeginsbydiscardingthephilosopher’scrotchetthatthedifferencebetweenmindandmatterpreventsthemfromaffectingeachother；andnowheseemstoadmititsforcesofullythatheconceivesofthenervousorganismasakindofamalgamofmindandmatter。61*
IhavefollowedHamiltonsofarinordertoillustratethewayinwhich，bysuperposinginsteadofreconcilingtwodifferentsetsofdogma，hebecamehopelesslyconfused。TheoldScottishdoctrinereallybecomesbankruptinhisversion。HamiltonisstillstrugglingwithReid’soldproblem，andattackingthe’cosmotheticidealism’asReidattackedtheidealsystem。Howarewetocrossthegulfbetweenmindandmatter，especiallywhenweknownothingabouteithermindormattertakenapartfrommatterormind？Theproblemisinsolubleonthesetermsbecauseitisreallymeaningless。TheanswersuggestedbyKantwaseffectiveprecisely——asItakeit——becauseitdrewthelinedifferently，andthereforealteredthewholequestion。Kantdidnotprovideanewbridge，butpointedoutthatthechasmwasnotrightlyconceived。Totrytosettlewhetherthe’primaryqualities’belongto’thingsexternaltothemind’isidle。Itleadstotheinevitabledilemma。Ifthe’primaryqualities’
belongtothethingsortheobject，geometrybecomesempiricalanddeducibleonlyfromparticularexperiments，likeotherphysicalsciences。Thenwecannotaccountforitsuniquecharacteranditsatleastapparent’necessity。’If，ontheotherhand，theprimaryqualitiesbelongtothemind，wecanunderstandhowthemindevolvesorconstructs，butitisatthecostofadmittingthemtobeafterallunreal，because’subjective，’orderivingknowledgeoffactfromasimpleanalysisofthought。Butthedilemmaisreallyillusory。Wecannotsaythatthetruthsofgeometryrefereithertothings’outofthemind’ortothings’inthemind。’Theyare’subjective’inthesensethattheyareconstructedbythemindintheveryactofexperiencing。Theyarenotsubjectiveinthesenseofvaryingfromoneexperiencetoanotherorfromonemindtoanother。Theybelongtoperceptionasperception，ortotheperceiverasperceiving。Itis，therefore，meaninglesstoaskwhethertheyare’objective’or’subjective，’