Wehaveseenthatindelineatingtheoutlineofduty，asintuitivelyrecognised，wehavetoattempttogivetocommontermsadefiniteandprecisemeaning。Thisprocessofdefinitionalwaysrequiressomereflectionandcare，andissometimesoneofconsiderabledifficulty。Butthereisnocasewherethedifficultyisgreater，ortheresultmoredisputed，thanwhenwetrytodefineJustice。
Beforemakingtheattempt，itmaybeaswelltoremindthereaderwhatitisthatwehavetodo。WehavenottoinquireintothederivationofthenotionofJustice，aswearenotnowstudyingthehistoryofourethicalthought，butitsactualcondition。Norcanweprofesstofurnishadefinitionwhichwillcorrespondtoeverypartofthecommonusageoftheterm；formanypersonsareundoubtedlyvagueandlooseintheirapplicationofcurrentmoralnotions。ButitisanassumptionoftheIntuitionalmethodthattheterm`justice’denotesaqualitywhichitisultimatelydesirabletorealiseintheconductandsocialrelationsofmen；andthatadefinitionmaybegivenofthiswhichwillbeacceptedbyallcompetentjudgesaspresenting，inaclearandexplicitform，whattheyhavealwaysmeantbytheterm，thoughperhapsimplicitlyandvaguely。Inseekingsuchadefinitionwemay，sotospeak，cliptheraggededgeofcommonusage，butwemustnotmakeexcisionofanyconsiderableportion。[2]
PerhapsthefirstpointthatstrikesuswhenwereflectuponournotionofJusticeisitsconnexionwithLaw。ThereisnodoubtthatjustconductistoagreatextentdeterminedbyLaw，andincertainapplicationsthetwotermsseeminterchangeable。Thuswespeakindifferentlyof`LawCourts’and`CourtsofJustice’andwhenaprivatecitizendemandsJustice，orhisjustrights，hecommonlymeanstodemandthatLawshouldbecarriedintoeffect。StillreflectionshowsthatwedonotmeanbyJusticemerelyconformitytoLaw。Forfirst，wedonotalwayscalltheviolatorsoflawunjust，butonlyofsomeLaws:not，forexample，duellistsorgamblers。Andsecondly，weoftenjudgethatLawasitexistsdoesnotcompletelyrealiseJustice；ournotionofJusticefurnishesastandardwithwhichwecompareactuallaws，andpronouncethemjustorunjust。And，thirdly，thereisapartofjustconductwhichliesoutsidethesphereevenofLawasitoughttobe；forexample，wethinkthatafathermaybejustorunjusttohischildreninmatterswherethelawleavesandoughttoleavehimfree。
WemustthendistinguishJusticefromwhathasbeencalledthevirtueordutyofOrder，orLaw-observance:andperhaps，ifweexaminethepointsofdivergencejustmentioned，weshallbeledtothetruedefinitionofJustice。
Letusthereforefirstask，OfwhatkindoflawsistheobservancegenerallythoughttobearealisationofJustice？Inmostcasestheymightbedescribedaslawswhichdefineandsecuretheinterestsofassignableindividuals。Butthisdescriptionisnotcomplete，asJusticeisadmittedlyconcernedintheapportionmentofadequatepunishmenttoeachoffender；thoughweshouldnotsaythatamanhadaninterestintheadequacyofhispunishment。Letussay，then，thatthelawsinwhichJusticeisoroughttoberealised，arelawswhichdistributeandallottoindividualseitherobjectsofdesire，libertiesandprivileges，orburdensandrestraints，orevenpainsassuch。Theselatter，however，areonlyallottedbylawtopersonswhohavebrokenotherlaws。Andasalllawisenforcedbypenalties，weseehowtheadministrationoflawgenerallymaybeviewedastheadministrationofJustice，inaccordancewiththisdefinition: