TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesislikethoseexquisiteproductionsofhumanindustrywhichensurewealthandrenowntotheirinventors，butwhichareprofitlessinanyotherhands。ThistruthisexemplifiedbytheconditionofMexicoatthepresenttime。TheMexicansweredesirousofestablishingafederalsystem，andtheytooktheFederalConstitutionoftheirneighbors，theAnglo—Americans，astheirmodel，andcopieditwithconsiderableaccuracy。*sButalthoughtheyhadborrowedtheletterofthelaw，theywereunabletocreateortointroducethespiritandthesensewhichgiveitlife。Theywereinvolvedinceaselessembarrassmentsbetweenthemechanismoftheirdoublegovernment;thesovereigntyoftheStatesandthatoftheUnionperpetuallyexceededtheirrespectiveprivileges，andenteredintocollision;andtothepresentdayMexicoisalternatelythevictimofanarchyandtheslaveofmilitarydespotism。
[Footnotes:SeetheMexicanConstitutionof1824。]
ThesecondandthemostfatalofallthedefectsIhavealludedto，andthatwhichIbelievetobeinherentinthefederalsystem，istherelativeweaknessofthegovernmentoftheUnion。Theprincipleuponwhichallconfederationsrestisthatofadividedsovereignty。Thelegislatormayrenderthispartitionlessperceptible，hemayevenconcealitforatimefromthepubliceye，buthecannotpreventitfromexisting，andadividedsovereigntymustalwaysbelesspowerfulthananentiresupremacy。ThereaderhasseenintheremarksIhavemadeontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesthattheAmericanshavedisplayedsingularingenuityincombiningtherestrictionofthepoweroftheUnionwithinthenarrowlimitsofafederalgovernmentwiththesemblanceand，toacertainextent，withtheforceofanationalgovernment。BythismeansthelegislatorsoftheUnionhavesucceededindiminishing，thoughnotincounteractingthenaturaldangerofconfederations。
IthasbeenremarkedthattheAmericanGovernmentdoesnotapplyitselftotheStates，butthatitimmediatelytransmitsitsinjunctionstothecitizens，andcompelsthemasisolatedindividualstocomplywithitsdemands。ButiftheFederallawweretoclashwiththeinterestsandtheprejudicesofaState，itmightbefearedthatallthecitizensofthatStatewouldconceivethemselvestobeinterestedinthecauseofasingleindividualwhoshouldrefusetoobey。IfallthecitizensoftheStatewereaggrievedatthesametimeandinthesamemannerbytheauthorityoftheUnion，theFederalGovernmentwouldvainlyattempttosubduethemindividually;theywouldinstinctivelyuniteinacommondefence，andtheywouldderiveaready—preparedorganizationfromtheshareofsovereigntywhichtheinstitutionoftheirStateallowsthemtoenjoy。Fictionwouldgivewaytoreality，andanorganizedportionoftheterritorymightthencontestthecentralauthority。*tThesameobservationholdsgoodwithregardtotheFederaljurisdiction。IfthecourtsoftheUnionviolatedanimportantlawofaStateinaprivatecase，thereal，ifnottheapparent，contestwouldarisebetweentheaggrievedStaterepresentedbyacitizenandtheUnionrepresentedbyitscourtsofjustice。*u[Footnotet:[Thisispreciselywhatoccurredin1862，andthefollowingparagraphdescribescorrectlythefeelingsandnotionsoftheSouth。GeneralLeeheldthathisprimaryallegiancewasdue，nottotheUnion，buttoVirginia。]]
[Footnoteu:Forinstance，theUnionpossessesbytheConstitutiontherightofsellingunoccupiedlandsforitsownprofit。SupposingthattheStateofOhioshouldclaimthesamerightinbehalfofcertainterritorieslyingwithinitsboundaries，uponthepleathattheConstitutionreferstothoselandsalonewhichdonotbelongtothejurisdictionofanyparticularState，andconsequentlyshouldchoosetodisposeofthemitself，thelitigationwouldbecarriedoninthenamesofthepurchasersfromtheStateofOhioandthepurchasersfromtheUnion，andnotinthenamesofOhioandtheUnion。ButwhatwouldbecomeofthislegalfictioniftheFederalpurchaserwasconfirmedinhisrightbythecourtsoftheUnion，whilsttheothercompetitorwasorderedtoretainpossessionbythetribunalsoftheStateofOhio？]