ThegreaternumberoftheConstitutionsoftheStatesassignoneyearforthedurationoftheHouseofRepresentatives，andtwoyearsforthatoftheSenate;sothatmembersofthelegislativebodyareconstantlyandnarrowlytieddownbytheslightestdesiresoftheirconstituents。ThelegislatorsoftheUnionwereofopinionthatthisexcessivedependenceoftheLegislaturetendedtoalterthenatureofthemainconsequencesoftherepresentativesystem，sinceitvestedthesource，notonlyofauthority，butofgovernment，inthepeople。Theyincreasedthelengthofthetimeforwhichtherepresentativeswerereturned，inordertogivethemfreerscopefortheexerciseoftheirownjudgment。
TheFederalConstitution，aswellastheConstitutionsofthedifferentStates，dividedthelegislativebodyintotwobranches。ButintheStatesthesetwobrancheswerecomposedofthesameelements，andelectedinthesamemanner。Theconsequencewasthatthepassionsandinclinationsofthepopulacewereasrapidlyandasenergeticallyrepresentedinonechamberasintheother，andthatlawsweremadewithallthecharacteristicsofviolenceandprecipitation。BytheFederalConstitutionthetwohousesoriginateinlikemannerinthechoiceofthepeople;buttheconditionsofeligibilityandthemodeofelectionwerechanged，totheendthat，if，asisthecaseincertainnations，onebranchoftheLegislaturerepresentsthesameinterestsastheother，itmayatleastrepresentasuperiordegreeofintelligenceanddiscretion。Amatureagewasmadeoneoftheconditionsofthesenatorialdignity，andtheUpperHousewaschosenbyanelectedassemblyofalimitednumberofmembers。
Toconcentratethewholesocialforceinthehandsofthelegislativebodyisthenaturaltendencyofdemocracies;forasthisisthepowerwhichemanatesthemostdirectlyfromthepeople，itismadetoparticipatemostfullyinthepreponderatingauthorityofthemultitude，anditisnaturallyledtomonopolizeeveryspeciesofinfluence。Thisconcentrationisatonceprejudicialtoawell—conductedadministration，andfavorabletothedespotismofthemajority。ThelegislatorsoftheStatesfrequentlyyieldedtothesedemocraticpropensities，whichwereinvariablyandcourageouslyresistedbythefoundersoftheUnion。
IntheStatestheexecutivepowerisvestedinthehandsofamagistrate，whoisapparentlyplaceduponalevelwiththeLegislature，butwhoisinrealitynothingmorethantheblindagentandthepassiveinstrumentofitsdecisions。Hecanderivenoinfluencefromthedurationofhisfunctions，whichterminatewiththerevolvingyear，orfromtheexerciseofprerogativeswhichcanscarcelybesaidtoexist。TheLegislaturecancondemnhimtoinactionbyintrustingtheexecutionofthelawstospecialcommitteesofitsownmembers，andcanannulhistemporarydignitybydeprivinghimofhissalary。TheFederalConstitutionvestsalltheprivilegesandalltheresponsibilityoftheexecutivepowerinasingleindividual。ThedurationofthePresidencyisfixedatfouryears;thesalaryoftheindividualwhofillsthatofficecannotbealteredduringthetermofhisfunctions;heisprotectedbyabodyofofficialdependents，andarmedwithasuspensiveveto。Inshort，everyeffortwasmadetoconferastrongandindependentpositionupontheexecutiveauthoritywithinthelimitswhichhadbeenprescribedtoit。
IntheConstitutionsofalltheStatesthejudicialpoweristhatwhichremainsthemostindependentofthelegislativeauthority;nevertheless，inalltheStatestheLegislaturehasreservedtoitselftherightofregulatingtheemolumentsofthejudges，apracticewhichnecessarilysubjectsthesemagistratestoitsimmediateinfluence。InsomeStatesthejudgesareonlytemporarilyappointed，whichdeprivesthemofagreatportionoftheirpowerandtheirfreedom。Inothersthelegislativeandjudicialpowersareentirelyconfounded;thustheSenateofNewYork，forinstance，constitutesincertaincasestheSuperiorCourtoftheState。TheFederalConstitution，ontheotherhand，carefullyseparatesthejudicialauthorityfromallexternalinfluences;anditprovidesfortheindependenceofthejudges，bydeclaringthattheirsalaryshallnotbealtered，andthattheirfunctionsshallbeinalienable。