Itisinmonarchiesthatwebeholdthesubjectsencirclingthethrone，andcheeredbytheirradiancyofthesovereign；thereitisthateachpersonfilling，asitwere，alargerspace，iscapableofexercisingthosevirtueswhichadornthesoul，notwithindependence，butwithtruedignityandgreatness。
13。AnIdeaofDespoticPower。WhenthesavagesofLouisianaaredesirousoffruit，theycutthetreetotheroot，andgatherthefruit。[35]Thisisanemblemofdespoticgovernment。
14。InwhatMannertheLawsareinrelationtothePrinciplesofDespoticGovernment。Theprincipleofdespoticgovernmentisfear；butatimid，ignorant，andfaint—spiritedpeoplehavenooccasionforagreatnumberoflaws。
Everythingoughttodependhereontwoorthreeideas；hencethereisnonecessitythatanynewnotionsshouldbeadded。Whenwewanttobreakahorse，wetakecarenottolethimchangehismaster，hislesson，orhispace。Thusanimpressionismadeonhisbrainbytwoorthreemotions，andnomore。
Ifaprinceisshutupinaseraglio，hecannotleavehisvoluptuousabodewithoutalarmingthosewhokeephimconfined。Thevwillnotbearthathispersonandpowershouldpassintootherhands。Heseldomthereforewageswarinperson，andhardlyventurestoentrustthecommandtohisgenerals。
Aprinceofthisstamp，unaccustomedtoresistanceinhispalace，isenragedtoseehiswillopposedbyarmedforce；henceheisgenerallygovernedbywrathorvengeance。Besides，hecanhavenonotionoftrueglory。Warthereforeiscarriedonundersuchagovernmentinitsfullnaturalfury，andlessextentisgiventothelawofnationsthaninotherstates。
Suchaprincehassomanyimperfectionsthattheyareafraidtoexposehisnaturalstupiditytopublicview。Heisconcealedinhispalace，andthepeopleareignorantofhissituation。Itisluckyforhimthattheinhabitantsofthosecountriesneedonlythenameofaprincetogovernthem。
WhenCharlesXIIwasatBender，hemetwithsomeoppositionfromthesenateofSweden；uponwhichhewrotewordhomethathewouldsendoneofhisbootstocommandthem。Thisbootwouldhavegovernedlikeadespoticprince。
Iftheprinceisaprisoner，heissupposedtobedead，andanothermountsthethrone。Thetreatiesmadebytheprisonerarevoid，hissuccessorwillnotratifythem；andindeed，asheisthelaw，thestate，andtheprince：whenheisnolongeraprince，heisnothing：werehenotthereforedeemedtobedeceased，thestatewouldbesubverted。
OnethingwhichchieflydeterminedtheTurkstoconcludeaseparatepeacewithPeterIwastheMuscovitestellingtheVizirthatinSwedenanotherprincehadbeenplaceduponthethrone。[36]
Thepreservationofthestateisonlythepreservationoftheprince，orratherofthepalacewhereheisconfined。Whateverdoesnotdirectlymenacethispalaceorthecapitalmakesnoimpressiononignorant，proud，andprejudicedminds；andasfortheconcatenationofevents，theyareunabletotrace，toforesee，oreventoconceiveit。Politics，withitsseveralspringsandlaws，mustherebeverymuchlimited；thepoliticalgovernmentisassimpleasthecivil。[37]
Thewholeisreducedtoreconcilingthepoliticalandciviladministrationtothedomesticgovernment，theofficersofstatetothoseoftheseraglio。
Suchastateishappiestwhenitcanlookuponitselfastheonlyoneintheworld，whenitisenvironedwithdeserts，andseparatedfromthosepeoplewhomtheycallBarbarians。Sinceitcannotdependonthemilitia，itisproperitshoulddestroyapartofitself。
Asfearistheprincipleofdespoticgovernment，itsendistranquillity；butthistranquillitycannotbecalledapeace：no，itisonlythesilenceofthosetownswhichtheenemyisreadytoinvade。
Sincestrengthdoesnotlieinthestate，butinthearmythatfoundedit，inordertodefendthestatethearmymustbepreserved，howformidablesoevertotheprince。How，then，canwereconcilethesecurityofthegovernmenttothatoftheprince’sperson？
ObservehowindustriouslytheRussiangovernmentendeavourstotemperitsarbitrarypower，whichitfindsmoreburdensomethanthepeoplethemselves。Theyhavebrokentheirnumerousguards，mitigatedcriminalpunishments，erectedtribunals，enteredintoaknowledgeofthelaws，andinstructedthepeople。Butthereareparticularcausesthatwillprobablyoncemoreinvolvethemintheverymiserywhichtheynowendeavourtoavoid。
Inthosestatesreligionhasmoreinfluencethananywhereelse；itisfearaddedtofear。InMahomedancountries，itispartlyfromtheirreligionthatthepeoplederivethesurprisingvenerationtheyhavefortheirprince。
ItisreligionthatamendsinsomemeasuretheTurkishconstitution。Thesubjects，whohavenoattachmentofhonourtothegloryandgrandeurofthestate，areconnectedwithitbytheforceandprincipleofreligion。
Ofalldespoticgovernmentsthereisnonethatlaboursmoreunderitsownweightthanthatwhereintheprincedeclareshimselfproprietorofallthelands，andheirtoallhissubjects。Hencetheneglectofagriculturearises；andiftheprinceintermeddleslikewiseintrade，allmannerofindustryisruined。
Underthissortofgovernment，nothingisrepairedorimproved。[38]
Housesarebuiltonlyforthenecessityofhabitation；thereisnodiggingofditchesorplantingoftrees；everythingisdrawnfrom，butnothingrestoredto，theearth；thegroundliesuntilled，andthewholecountrybecomesadesert。
Isittobeimaginedthatthelawswhichabolishthepropertyoflandandthesuccessionofestateswilldiminishtheavariceandcupidityofthegreat？Bynomeans。Theywillratherstimulatethiscupidityandavarice。Thegreatmenwillbepromptedtouseathousandoppressivemethods，imaginingtheyhavenootherpropertythanthegoldandsilverwhichtheyareabletoseizeuponbyviolence，ortoconceal。
Toprevent，therefore，theutterruinofthestate，theavidityoftheprinceoughttobemoderatedbysomeestablishedcustom。Thus，inTurkey，thesovereignissatisfiedwiththerightofthreepercentonthevalueofinheritances。[39]Butashegivesthegreatestpartofthelandstohissoldiery，anddisposesofthemashepleases；asheseizesonalltheinheritancesoftheofficersoftheempireattheirdecease；
ashehasthepropertyofthepossessionsofthosewhodiewithoutissue，andthedaughtershaveonlytheusufruct；itthencefollowsthatthegreatestpartoftheestatesofthecountryareheldinaprecariousmanner。
BythelawsofBantam，[40]thekingseizesonthewholeinheritance，evenwife，children，andhabitation。Inordertoeludethecruelestpartofthislaw，theyareobligedtomarrytheirchildrenateight，nine，ortenyearsofage，andsometimesyounger，totheendthattheymaynotbeawretchedpartofthefather’ssuccession。
Incountrieswheretherearenofundamentallaws，thesuccessiontotheempirecannotbefixed。Thecrownisthenelective，andtherightofelectingisintheprince，whonamesasuccessoreitherofhisownorofsomeotherfamily。Invainwoulditbetoestablishherethesuccessionoftheeldestson；theprincemightalwayschooseanother。Thesuccessorisdeclaredbytheprincehimself，orbyacivilwar。Henceadespoticstateis，uponanotheraccount，moreliablethanamonarchicalgovernmenttodissolution。
Aseveryprinceoftheroyalfamilyisheldequallycapableofbeingchosen，henceitfollowsthattheprincewhoascendsthethroneimmediatelystrangleshisbrothers，asinTurkey；orputsouttheireyes，asinPersia；orbereavesthemoftheirunderstanding，asintheMogul’scountry；oriftheseprecautionsarenotused，asinMorocco，thevacancyofthethroneisalwaysattendedwiththehorrorsofacivilwar。
BytheconstitutionofRussia[41]theCzarmaychoosewhomhehasamindforhissuccessor，whetherofhisownorofastrangefamily。Suchasettlementproducesathousandrevolutions，andrendersthethroneastotteringasthesuccessionisarbitrary。Therightofsuccessionbeingoneofthosethingswhichareofmostimportancetothepeopletoknow，thebestisthatwhichmostsensiblystrikesthem。Suchasacertainorderofbirth。Asettlementofthiskindputsastoptointrigues，andstiflesambition；themindofaweakprinceisnolongerenslaved，norishemadetospeakhiswillasheisjustexpiring。
Whenthesuccessionisestablishedbyafundamentallaw，onlyoneprinceisthesuccessor，andhisbrothershaveneitherarealnorapparentrighttodisputethecrownwithhim。Theycanneitherpretendtonortakeanyadvantageofthewillofafather。Thereisthennomoreoccasiontoconfineorkilltheking’sbrotherthananyothersubject。
Butindespoticgovernments，wheretheprince’sbrothersareequallyhisslavesandhisrivals，prudencerequiresthattheirpersonsbesecured；
especiallyinMahomedancountries，wherereligionconsidersvictoryorsuccessasadivinedecisionintheirfavour；sothattheyhavenosuchthingasamonarchdejure，butonlydefacto。
Thereisafargreaterincentivetoambitionincountrieswheretheprincesofthebloodaresensiblethatiftheydonotascendthethronetheymustbeeitherimprisonedorputtodeath，thanamongus，wheretheyareplacedinsuchastationasmaysatisfy，ifnottheirambition，atleasttheirmoderatedesires。
Theprincesofdespoticgovernmentshaveeverpervertedtheuseofmarriage。Theygenerallytakeagreatmanywives，especiallyinthatpartoftheworldwhereabsolutepowerisinsomemeasurenaturalised，namely，Asia。Hencetheycometohavesuchamultitudeofchildrenthattheycanhardlyhaveanygreataffectionforthem，northechildrenforoneanother。
Thereigningfamilyresemblesthestate；itistooweakitself，anditsheadtoopowerful；itseemsverynumerousandextensive，andyetissuddenlyextinct。Artaxerxes[42]putallhischildrentodeathforconspiringagainsthim。
Itisnotatallprobablethatfiftychildrenwouldconspireagainsttheirfather，andmuchlessthatthisconspiracywouldbeowingtohishavingrefusedtoresignhisconcubinetohiseldestson。Itismorenaturaltobelievethatthewholewasanintrigueofthoseorientalseraglios，wherefraud，treachery，anddeceitreigninsilenceanddarkness；andwhereanoldprince，growneverydaymoreinfirm，isthefirstprisonerofthepalace。
Afterwhathasbeensaid，onewouldimaginethathumannatureshouldperpetuallyriseupagainstdespotism。Butnotwithstandingtheloveofliberty，sonaturaltomankind，notwithstandingtheirinnatedetestationofforceandviolence，mostnationsaresubjecttothisverygovernment。
Thisiseasilyaccountedfor。Toformamoderategovernment，itisnecessarytocombinetheseveralpowers；toregulate，temper，andsettheminmotion；togive，asitwere，ballasttoone，inordertoenableittocounterpoisetheother。Thisisamasterpieceoflegislation；
rarelyproducedbyhazard，andseldomattainedbyprudence。Onthecontrary，adespoticgovernmentoffersitself，asitwere，atfirstsight；itisuniformthroughout；andaspassionsonlyarerequisitetoestablishit，thisiswhateverycapacitymayreach。
15。ThesameSubjectcontinued。Inwarmclimates，wheredespoticpowergenerallyprevails，thepassionsdisclosethemselvesearlier，andaresoonerextinguished；[43]theunderstandingissoonerripened；theyarelessindangerofsquanderingtheirfortunes；thereislessfacilityofdistinguishingthemselvesintheworld；lesscommunicationbetweenyoungpeople，whoareconfinedathome；theymarrymuchearlier，andconsequentlymaybesoonerofagethaninourEuropeanclimates。InTurkeytheyareofageatfifteen。[44]
Theyhavenosuchthingasacessionofgoods；inagovernmentwherethereisnofixedproperty，peopledependratheronthepersonthanonhisestate。
Thecessionofgoodsisnaturallyadmittedinmoderategovernments，[45]
butespeciallyinrepublics，becauseofthegreaterconfidenceusuallyplacedintheprobityofthecitizens，andthelenityandmoderationarisingfromaformofgovernmentwhicheverysubjectseemstonavepreferredtoallothers。
HadthelegislatorsoftheRomanrepublicestablishedthecessionofgoods，[46]theyneverwouldhavebeenexposedtosomanyseditionsandcivildiscords；neitherwouldtheyhaveexperiencedthedangeroftheevils，northeinconvenienceoftheremedies。
Povertyandtheprecariousnessofpropertyinadespoticstaterenderusurynatural，eachpersonraisingthevalueofhismoneyinproportiontothedangerheseesinlendingit。Miserythereforepoursfromallpartsintothoseunhappycountries；theyarebereftofeverything，evenoftheresourceofborrowing。
Henceitisthatamerchantunderthisgovernmentisunabletocarryonanextensivecommerce；helivesfromhandtomouth；andwerehetoencumberhimselfwithalargequantityofmerchandise，hewouldlosemorebytheexorbitantinteresthemustgiveformoneythanhecouldpossiblygetbythegoods。Hencetheyhavenolawshererelatingtocommerce；theyareallreducedtowhatiscalledthebarepolice。
Agovernmentcannotbeunjustwithouthavinghandstoexerciseitsinjustice。Now，itisimpossiblebutthatthesehandswillbegraspingforthemselves。Theembezzlingofthepublicmoneyisthereforenaturalindespoticstates。
Asthisisacommoncrimeundersuchagovernment，confiscationsareveryuseful。Bythesethepeopleareeased；themoneydrawnbythismethodbeingaconsiderabletributewhichcouldhardlyberaisedontheexhaustedsubject：neitheristhereinthosecountriesanyonefamilywhichtheprincewouldbegladtopreserve。
Inmoderategovernmentsitisquiteadifferentthing。Confiscationswouldrenderpropertyuncertain，wouldstripinnocentchildren，woulddestroyawholefamily，insteadofpunishingasinglecriminal。Inrepublicstheywouldbeattendedwiththemischiefofsubvertingequality，whichistheverysoulofthisgovernment，bydeprivingacitizenofhisnecessarysubsistence。[47]
ThereisaRomanlaw[48]againstconfiscations，exceptinthecaseofcrimenmajestatis，orhightreasonofthemostheinousnature。Itwouldbeaprudentthingtofollowthespiritofthislaw，andtolimitconfiscationstoparticularcrimes。Incountrieswherealocalcustomhasrenderedrealestatesalienable，Bodinveryjustlyobservesthatconfiscationsshouldextendonlytosuchasarepurchasedoracquired。[49]
16。OftheCommunicationofPower。Inadespoticgovernmentthepoweriscommunicatedentiretothepersonentrustedwithit。Thevizirhimselfisthedespoticprince；andeachparticularofficeristhevizir。Inmonarchiesthepowerislessimmediatelyapplied，beingtemperedbythemonarchashegivesit。[50]Hemakessuchadistributionofhisauthorityasnevertocommunicateapartofitwithoutreservingagreatersharetohimself。
Henceinmonarchiesthegovernorsoftownsarenotsodependentonthegovernoroftheprovinceasnottobestillmoresoontheprince；andtheprivateofficersormilitarybodiesarenotsofarsubjecttotheirgeneralasnottoowestillagreatersubjectiontotheirsovereign。
Inmostmonarchiesithasbeenwiselyregulatedthatthosewhohaveanextensivecommandshouldnotbelongtoanymilitarycorps；sothatastheyhavenoauthoritybutthroughtheprince’spleasure，andastheymaybeemployedornot，theyareinsomemeasureintheservice，andinsomemeasureoutofit。
Thisisincompatiblewithadespoticgovernment。Forifthosewhoarenotactuallyemployedwerestillinvestedwithprivilegesandtitles，theconsequencemustbethattherewouldbemeninthestatewhomightbesaidtobegreatofthemselves；athingdirectlyoppositetothenatureofthisgovernment。
Werethegovernorofatownindependentofthepasha，expedientswouldbedailynecessarytomakethemagree；whichishighlyabsurdinadespoticstate。Besides，ifaparticulargovernorshouldrefusetoobey，howcouldtheotheranswerforhisprovincewithhishead？
Inthiskindofgovernment，authoritymusteverbewavering；noristhatofthelowestmagistratemoresteadythanthatofthedespoticprince。
Undermoderategovernments，thelawisprudentinallitsparts，andperfectlywellknown，sothateventhepettiestmagistratesarecapableoffollowingit。Butinadespoticstate，wheretheprince’swillisthelaw，thoughtheprincewerewise，yethowcouldthemagistratefollowawillhedoesnotknow？Hemustcertainlyfollowhisown。
Again，asthelawisonlytheprince’swill，andastheprincecanonlywillwhatheknows，theconsequenceisthatthereareaninfinitenumberofpeoplewhomustwillforhim，andmaketheirwillskeeppacewithhis。Infine，asthelawisthemomentarywilloftheprince，itisnecessarythatthosewhowillforhimshouldfollowhissuddenmannerofwilling。
17。OfPresents。Itisareceivedcustomindespoticcountriesnevertoaddressanysuperiorwhomsoever，notexceptingtheirkings，withoutmakingthemapresent。TheMogul[51]neverreceivesthepetitionsofhissubjectsiftheycomewithemptyhands。Theseprincesspoileventheirownfavours。
Butthusitmusteverbeinagovernmentwherenomanisacitizen；
wheretheyhaveallanotionthatasuperiorisundernoobligationtoaninferior；wheremenimaginethemselvesboundbynoothertiethanthechastisementsinflictedbyonepartyuponanother；where，infine，thereisverylittletodo，andwherethepeoplehaveseldomanoccasionofpresentingthemselvesbeforethegreat，ofofferingtheirpetitions，andmuchlesstheircomplaints。
Inarepublic，presentsareodious，becausevirtuestandsinnoneedofthem。Inmonarchies，honourisamuchstrongerincentivethanpresents。
Butinadespoticgovernment，wherethereisneitherhonournorvirtue，peoplecannotbedeterminedtoactbutthroughhopeoftheconveniencesoflife。
ItisinconformitywithrepublicanideasthatPlato[52]orderedthosewhoreceivedpresentsfordoingtheirdutytobepunishedwithdeath。
\"Theymustnottakepresents，\"sayshe，\"neitherforgoodnorforevilactions。\"
AverybadlawwasthatamongtheRomans[53]whichgavethemagistratesleavetoacceptsmallpresents[[54]providedtheydidnotexceedonehundredcrownsinthewholeyear。Theywhoreceivenothingexpectnothing；theywhoreceivealittlesooncovetmore，tillatlengththeirdesiresswelltoanexorbitantheight。
Besides，itismucheasiertoconvictamanwhoknowshimselfobligedtoacceptnopresentatall，andyetwillacceptsomething，thanapersonwhotakesmorewhenheoughttotakeless，andwhoalwaysfindspretexts，excuses，andplausiblereasonsinjustificationofhisconduct。
18。OfRewardsconferredbytheSovereign。Indespoticgovernments，where，aswehavealreadyobserved，theprincipalmotiveofactionisthehopeoftheconveniencesoflife，theprincewhoconfersrewardshasnothingtobestowbutmoney。Inmonarchies，wherehonouralonepredominates，theprince’srewardswouldconsistonlyofmarksofdistinction，ifthedistinctionsestablishedbyhonourwerenotattendedwithluxury，whichnecessarilybringsonitswants：theprincethereforeisobligedtoconfersuchhonoursasleadtowealth。Butinarepublicwherevirtuereigns——amotiveself—sufficient，andwhichexcludesallothers——therecompensesofthestateconsistonlyofpublicattestationsofthisvirtue。
Itisageneralrulethatgreatrewardsinmonarchiesandrepublicsareasignoftheirdecline；becausetheyareaproofoftheirprinciplesbeingcorrupted，andthattheideaofhonourhasnolongerthesameforceinamonarchy，northetitleofcitizenthesameweightinarepublic。
TheveryworstRomanemperorswerethosewhoweremostprofuseintheirlargesses；forexample，Caligula，Claudius，Nero，Otho，Vitellius，Commodus，Heliogabalus，andCaracalla。Thebest，asAugustus，Vespasian，AntoninusPius，MarcusAurelius，andPertinax，wereeconomists。Undergoodemperorsthestateresumeditsprinciples；allothertreasuresweresuppliedbythatofhonour。
19。NewConsequencesofthePrinciplesofthethreeGovernments。I
cannotconcludethisbookwithoutmakingsomeapplicationsofmythreeprinciples。
1stQuestion。]Itisaquestionwhetherthelawsoughttoobligeasubjecttoacceptapublicemployment。Myopinionisthattheyoughtinarepublic，butnotinamonarchicalgovernment。Intheformer，publicemploymentsareattestationsofvirtue，depositionswithwhichacitizenisentrustedbyhiscountry，forwhosesakealoneheoughttolive，toact，andtothink，consequentlyliecannotrefusethem。[55]Inthelatter，publicofficesaretestimonialsofhonour；nowsuchisthecapriciousnessofhonourthatitchoosestoacceptnoneofthesetestimoniesbutwhenandinwhatmanneritpleases。
ThelateKingofSardinia[56]inflictedpunishmentsonhissubjectswhorefusedthedignitiesandpublicofficesofthestate。Inthisheunknowinglyfollowedrepublicanideas：buthismethodofgoverninginotherrespectssufficientlyprovesthatthiswasnothisintention。
2ndQuestion。]Secondly，itisquestionedwhetherasubjectshouldbeobligedtoacceptapostinthearmyinferiortothatwhichheheldbefore。AmongtheRomansitwasusualtoseeacaptainservethenextyearunderhislieutenant。[57]Thisisbecausevirtueinrepublicsrequiresacontinualsacrificeofourpersonsandofourrepugnancesforthegoodofthestate。Butinmonarchies，honour，trueorfalse，willneverbearwithwhatitcallsdegradingitself。
Indespoticgovernments，wherehonour，posts，andranksareequallyabused，theyindiscriminatelymakeaprinceascullion，andascullionaprince。
3rdQuestion。]Thirdly，itmaybeinquired，whethercivilandmilitaryemploymentsshouldbeconferredonthesameperson。InrepublicsIthinktheyshouldbejoined，butinmonarchiesseparated。Intheformeritwouldbeextremelydangeroustomaketheprofessionofarmsaparticularstate，distinctfromthatofcivilfunctions；andinthelatter，nolessdangerouswoulditbetoconferthesetwoemploymentsonthesameperson。
Inrepublicsapersontakesuparmsonlywithaviewtodefendhiscountryanditslaws；itisbecauseheisacitizenhemakeshimselfforawhileasoldier。Werethesetwodistinctstates，thepersonwhounderarmsthinkshimselfacitizenwouldsoonbemadesensibleheisonlyasoldier。
Inmonarchies，theywhoseconditionengagesthemintheprofessionofarmshavenothingbutglory，oratleasthonourorfortune，inview。Tomen，therefore，likethese，theprinceshouldnevergiveanycivilemployments；onthecontrary，theyoughttobecheckedbythecivilmagistrate，thatthesamepersonsmaynothaveatthesametimetheconfidenceofthepeopleandthepowertoabuseit。[58]
Wehaveonlytocastaneyeonanationthatmaybejustlycalledarepublic，disguisedundertheformofmonarchy，andweshallseehowjealoustheyareofmakingaseparateorderoftheprofessionofarms，andhowthemilitarystateisconstantlyalliedwiththatofthecitizen，andevensometimesofthemagistrate，totheendthatthesequalitiesmaybeapledgefortheircountry，whichshouldneverbeforgotten。
Thedivisionofcivilandmilitaryemployments，madebytheRomansaftertheextinctionoftherepublic，wasnotanarbitrarything。ItwasaconsequenceofthechangewhichhappenedintheconstitutionofRome；itwasnaturaltoamonarchicalgovernment；andwhatwasonlycommencedunderAugustus[59]succeedingemperors[60]wereobligedtofinish，inordertotemperthemilitarygovernment。
Procopius，therefore，thecompetitorofValenstheemperor，wasverymuchtoblamewhen，conferringthepro—consulardignity[61]uponHormisdas，aprinceofthebloodroyalofPersia，herestoredtothismagistracythemilitarycommandofwhichithadbeenformerlypossessed；
unlessindeedhehadveryparticularreasonsforsodoing。Apersonthataspirestothesovereigntyconcernshimselflessaboutwhatisserviceabletothestatethanwhatislikelytopromotehisowninterest。
4thQuestion。]Fourthly，itisaquestionwhetherpublicemploymentsshouldbesold。Theyoughtnot，Ithink，indespoticgovernments，wherethesubjectsmustbeinstantaneouslyplacedordisplacedbytheprince。
Butinmonarchiesthiscustomisnotatallimproper，byreasonitisaninducementtoengageinthatasafamilyemploymentwhichwouldnotbeundertakenthroughamotiveofvirtue；itfixeslikewiseeveryoneinhisduty，andrenderstheseveralordersofthekingdommorepermanent。
SuidasveryjustlyobservesthatAnastasiushadchangedtheempireintoakindofaristocracy，bysellingallpublicemployments。
Plato[62]cannotbearwiththisprostitution：\"Thisisexactly，\"sayshe，\"asifapersonweretobemadeamarinerorpilotofashipforhismoney。Isitpossiblethatthisruleshouldbebadineveryotheremploymentoflife，andholdgoodonlyintheadministrationofarepublic？\"ButPlatospeaksofarepublicfoundedonvirtue，andweofamonarchy。Now，inmonarchies（where，thoughtherewerenosuchthingasaregularsaleofpublicoffices，stilltheindigenceandavidityofthecourtierwouldequallyprompthimtoexposethemtosale）chancewillfurnishbettersubjectsthantheprince’schoice。Inshort，themethodofattainingtohonoursthroughrichesinspiresandcherishesindustry，[63]athingextremelywantinginthiskindofgovernment。
5thQuestion。]Thefifthquestionisinwhatkindofgovernmentcensorsarenecessary。Myansweris，thattheyarenecessaryinarepublic，wheretheprincipleofgovernmentisvirtue。Wemustnotimaginethatcriminalactionsonlyaredestructiveofvirtue；itisdestroyedalsobyomissions，byneglects，byacertaincoolnessintheloveofourcountry，bybadexamples，andbytheseedsofcorruption：whateverdoesnotopenlyviolatebuteludethelaws，doesnotsubvertbutweakenthem，oughttofallundertheinquiryandcorrectionofthecensors。