§408。
ii。InsanityInconsequenceoftheimmediacy，whichstillmarkstheself—feeling，i。e。inconsequenceoftheelementofcorporealitywhichisstillundetachedfromthementallife，andasthefeelingtooisitselfparticularandboundupwithaspecialcorporealform，itfollowsthatalthoughthesubjecthasbeenbroughttoacquireintelligentconsciousness，itisstillsusceptibleofdisease，sofarastoremainfastinaspecialphaseofitsself—feeling，unabletorefineitto’ideality’andgetthebetterofit。Thefullyfurnishedselfofintelligentconsciousnessisaconscioussubject，whichisconsistentinitselfaccordingtoanorderandbehaviourwhichfollowsfromitsindividualpositionanditsconnectionwiththeexternalworld，whichisnolessaworldoflaw。Butwhenitisengrossedwithasinglephaseoffeeling，itfailstoassignthatphaseitsproperplaceandduesubordinationintheindividualsystemoftheworldwhichaconscioussubjectis。Inthiswaythesubjectfindsitselfincontradictionbetweenthetotalitysystematizedinitsconsciousness，andthesinglephaseorfixedideawhichisnotreducedtoitsproperplaceandrank。ThisisInsanityormentalDerangement。
Inconsideringinsanitywemust，asinothercases，anticipatethefull—grownandintelligentconscioussubject，whichisatthesametimethenaturalselfofself—feeling。Insuchaphasetheselfcanbeliabletothecontradictionbetweenitsownfreesubjectivityandaparticularitywhich，insteadofbeing’idealized’intheformer，remainsasafixedelementinself—feeling。Mindassuchisfree，andthereforenotsusceptibleofthismalady。Butinoldermetaphysicsmindwastreatedasasoul，asathing;anditisonlyasathing，i。e。assomethingnaturalandexistent，thatitisliabletoinsanity—thesettledfixtureofsomefiniteelementinit。Insanityisthereforeapsychicaldisease，i。e。adiseaseofbodyandmindalike：thecommencementmayappeartostartfromtheonemorethantheother，andsoalsomaythecure。
Theself—possessedandhealthysubjecthasanactiveandpresentconsciousnessoftheorderedwholeofhisindividualworld，intothesystemofwhichhesubsumeseachspecialcontentofsensation，idea，desire，inclination，etc。，asitarises，soastoinsertthemintheirproperplace，Heisthedominantgeniusovertheseparticularities。Betweenthisandinsanitythedifferenceislikethatbetweenwakinganddreaming：onlythatininsanitythedreamfallswithinthewakinglimits，andsomakespartoftheactualself—feeling。Errorandthatsortofthingisapropositionconsistentlyadmittedtoaplaceintheobjectiveinterconnectionofthings。Intheconcrete，however，itisoftendifficulttosaywhereitbeginstobecomederangement。Aviolent，butgroundlessandsenselessoutburstofhatred，etc。，may，incontrasttoapresupposedhigherself—possessionandstabilityofcharacter，makeitsvictimseemtobebesidehimselfwithfrenzy。Butthemainpointinderangementisthecontradictionwhichafeelingwithafixedcorporealembodimentsetsupagainstthewholemassofadjustmentsformingtheconcreteconsciousness。Themindwhichisinaconditionofmerebeing，andwheresuchbeingisnotrenderedfluidinitsconsciousness，isdiseased。Thecontentswhicharesetfreeinthisreversiontomerenaturearetheself—seekingaffectionsoftheheart，suchasvanity，pride，andtherestofthepassions—fanciesandhopes—
merelypersonalloveandhatred。Whentheinfluenceofself—possessionandofgeneralprinciples，moralandtheoretical，isrelaxed，andceasestokeepthenaturaltemperunderlockandkey，the，earthlyelementsaresetfree—thatevilwhichisalwayslatentintheheart，becausetheheartasimmediateisnaturalandselfish。Itistheevilgeniusofmanwhichgainstheupperhandininsanity，butindistinctionfromandcontrasttothebetterandmoreintelligentpart，whichistherealso。
Hencethisstateismentalderangementanddistress。Therightpsychicaltreatmentthereforekeepsinviewthetruththatinsanityisnotanabstractlossofreason（neitherinthepointofintelligencenorofwillanditsresponsibility），butonlyderangement，onlyacontradictioninastillsubsistingreason;—justasphysicaldiseaseisnotanabstract，i。e。mereandtotal，lossofhealth（ifitwerethat，itwouldbedeath），butacontradictioninit。Thishumanetreatment，nolessbenevolentthanreasonable（theservicesofPineltowardswhichdeservethehighestacknowledgement），presupposesthepatient’srationality，andinthatassumptionhasthesoundbasisfordealingwithhimonthisside—justasinthecaseofbodilydiseasethephysicianbaseshistreatmentonthevitalitywhichassuchstillcontainshealth。
（c）Habit§409。
Self—feeling，immersedinthedetailofthefeelings（insimplesensations，andalsodesires，instincts，passions，andtheirgratification），isundistinguishedfromthem。Butintheselfthereislatentasimpleself—relationofideality，anominaluniversality（whichisthetruthofthesedetails）：andassouniversal，theselfistobestampedupon，andmadeappearin，thislifeoffeeling，yetsoastodistinguishitselffromtheparticulardetails，andbearealizeduniversality。Butthisuniversalityisnotthefullandsterlingtruthofthespecificfeelingsanddesires;whattheyspecificallycontainisasyetleftoutofaccount。Andsotootheparticularityis，asnowregarded，equallyformal;itcountsonlyastheparticularbeingorimmediacyofthesoulinoppositiontoitsequallyformalandabstractrealization。Thisparticularbeingofthesoulisthefactorofitscorporeity;herewehaveitbreakingwiththiscorporeity，distinguishingitfromitself—itselfasimplebeing—andbecomingthe’ideal’，subjectivesubstantialityofit—justasinitslatentnotion（§389）itwasthesubstance，andthemeresubstance，ofit。
Butthisabstractrealizationofthesoulinitscorporealvehicleisnotyettheself—nottheexistenceoftheuniversalwhichisfortheuniversal。Itisthecorporeityreducedtoitsmereideality;andsofaronlydoescorporeitybelongtothesoulassuch。Thatistosay，justasspaceandtimeastheabstractone—outside—another，as，therefore，emptyspaceandemptytime，areonlysubjectiveforms，apureactofintuition;soisthatpurebeing（which，throughthesupersessioninitoftheparticularityofthecorporeity，oroftheimmediatecorporeityassuch，hasrealizeditself）mereintuitionandnomore，lackingconsciousness，butthebasisofconsciousness。Andconsciousnessitbecomes，whenthecorporcity，ofwhichitisthesubjectivesubstance，andwhichstillcontinuestoexist，andthatasabarrierforit，hasbeenabsorbedbyit，andithasbeeninvestedwiththecharacterofself—centredsubject。
§410。
Thesoul’smakingitselfanabstractuniversalbeing，andreducingtheparticularsoffeelings（andofconsciousness）toamerefeatureofitsbeingisHabit。Inthismannerthesoulhasthecontentsinpossession，andcontainstheminsuchmannerthatinthesefeaturesitisnotassentient，nordoesitstandinrelationshipwiththemasdistinguishingitselffromthem，norisabsorbedinthem，buthasthemandmovesinthem，withoutfeelingorconsciousnessofthefact。Thesoulisfreedfromthem，sofarasitisnotinterestedinoroccupiedwiththem：andwhilstexistingintheseformsasitspossession，itisatthesametimeopentobeotherwiseoccupiedandengaged—saywithfeelingandwithmentalconsciousnessingeneral。
Thisprocessofbuildinguptheparticularandcorporealexpressionsoffeelingintothebeingofthesoulappearsasarepetitionofthem，andthegenerationofhabitaspractice。For，thisbeingofthesoul，ifinrespectofthenaturalparticularphaseitbecalledanabstractuniversalitytowhichtheformeristransmuted，isareflexiveuniversality（§175）;i。e。theoneandthesame，thatrecursinaseriesofunitsofsensation，isreducedtounity，andthisabstractunityexpresslystated。
Habitlikememory，isadifficultpointinmentalorganization：habitisthemechanismofself—feeling，asmemoryisthemechanismofintelligence。Thenaturalqualitiesandalterationsofage，sleep，andwakingare’immediately’natural：habit，onthecontrary，isthemodeoffeeling（aswellasintelligence，will，etc。，sofarastheybelongtoself—feeling）madeintoanaturalandmechanicalexistence。Habitisrightlycalledasecondnature;nature，becauseitisanimmediatebeingofthesoul;asecondnature，becauseitisanimmediacycreatedbythesoul，impressingandmouldingthecorporealitywhichentersintothemodesoffeelingassuchandintotherepresentationsandvolitionssofarastheyhavetakencorporealform（§401）。
Inhabitthehumanbeing’smodeofexistenceis’natural’，andforthatreasonnotfree;butstillfree，sofarasthemerelynaturalphaseoffeelingisbyhabitreducedtoamerebeingofhis，andheisnolongerinvoluntarilyattractedorrepelledbyit，andsonolongerinterested，occupied，ordependentinregardtoit。Thewantoffreedominhabitispartlymerelyformal，ashabitmerelyattachestothebeingofthesoul;partlyonlyrelative，sofarasitstrictlyspeakingarisesonlyinthecaseofbadhabits，orsofarasahabitisopposedbyanotherpurpose：whereasthehabitofrightandgoodnessisanembodimentofliberty。ThemainpointaboutHabitisthatbyitsmeansmangetsemancipatedfromthefeelings，eveninbeingaffectedbythem。Thedifferentformsofthismaybedescribedasfollows：
（a）Theimmediatefeelingisnegatedandtreatedasindifferent。Onewhogetsinuredagainstexternalsensations（frost，heat，wearinessofthelimbs，etc。，sweettastes，etc。），andwhohardenstheheartagainstmisfortune，acquiresastrengthwhichconsistsinthis，thatalthoughthefrost，etc。—orthemisfortune—isfelt，theaffectionisdeposedtoamereexternalityandimmediacy;theuniversalpsychicallifekeepsitsownabstractindependenceinit，andtheself—feelingassuch，consciousness，reflection，andanyotherpurposesandactivity，arenolongerbotheredwithit。
（b）Thereisindifferencetowardsthesatisfaction：thedesiresandimpulsesarebythehabitoftheirsatisfactiondeadened。Thisistherationalliberationfromthem;whereasmonasticrenunciationandforcibleinterferencedonotfreefromthem，noraretheyinconceptionrational。Ofcourseinallthisitisassumedthattheimpulsesarekeptasthefinitemodestheynaturallyare，andthatthey，liketheirsatisfaction，aresubordinatedaspartialfactorstothereasonablewill。
（c）Inhabitregardedasaptitude，orskill，notmerelyhastheabstractpsychicallifetobekeptintactperse，butithastobeimposedasasubjectiveaim，tobemadeapowerinthebodilypart，whichisrenderedsubjectandthoroughlypervioustoit。Conceivedashavingtheinwardpurposeofthesubjectivesoulthusimposeduponit，thebodyistreatedasanimmediateexternalityandabarrier。Thuscomesoutthemoredecidedrupturebetweenthesoulassimpleself—concentration，anditsearliernaturalnessandimmediacy;ithaslostitsoriginalandimmediateidentitywiththebodilynature，andasexternalhasfirsttobereducedtothatposition。Specificfeelingscanonlygetbodilyshapeinaperfectlyspecificway（§
410）;andtheimmediateportionofbodyisaparticularpossibilityforaspecificaim（aparticularaspectofitsdifferentiatedstructure，aparticularorganofitsorganicsystem）。Tomouldsuchanaimintheorganicbodyistobringoutandexpressthe’ideality’whichisimplicitinmatteralways，andespeciallysointhespecificbodilypart，andthustoenablethesoul，underitsvolitionalandconceptualcharacters，toexistassubstanceinitscorporeity。Inthiswayanaptitudeshowsthecorporeityrenderedcompletelypervious，madeintoaninstrument，sothatwhentheconception（e。g。aseriesofmusicalnotes）isinme，thenwithoutresistanceandwitheasethebodygivesthemcorrectutterance。
Theformofhabitappliestoallkindsandgradesofmentalaction。Themostexternalofthem，i。e。
thespatialdirectionofanindividual，viz。hisuprightposture，hasbeenbywillmadeahabit—apositiontakenwithoutadjustmentandwithoutconsciousness—whichcontinuestobeanaffairofhispersistentwill;forthemanstandsonlybecauseandinsofarashewillstostand，andonlysolongashewillsitwithoutconsciousness。Similarlyoureyesightistheconcretehabitwhich，withoutanexpressadjustment，combinesinasingleacttheseveralmodificationsofsensation，consciousness，intuition，intelligence，etc。，whichmakeitup。Thinking，too，howeverfreeandactiveinitsownpureelementitbecomes，nolessrequireshabitandfamiliarity（thisimpromptuityorformofimmediacy），bywhichitisthepropertyofmysingleselfwhereIcanfreelyandinalldirectionsrange。ItisthroughthishabitthatIcometorealizemyexistenceasathinkingbeing。
Evenhere，inthisspontaneityofself—centredthought，thereisapartnershipofsoulandbody（hence，wantofhabitandtoo—long—continuedthinkingcauseheadache）;habitdiminishesthisfeeling，bymakingthenaturalfunctionanimmediacyofthesoul。Habitonanamplerscale，andcarriedoutinthestrictlyintellectualrange，isrecollectionandmemory，whereofweshallspeaklater。
Habitisoftenspokenofdisparaginglyandcalledlifeless，casual，andparticular。Anditistruethattheformofhabit，likeanyother，isopentoanythingwechancetoputintoit;anditishabitoflivingwhichbringsondeath，or，ifquiteabstract，isdeathitself：andyethabitisindispensablefortheexistenceofallintellectuallifeintheindividual，enablingthesubjecttobeaconcreteimmediacy，an’ideality’ofsoul—enablingthematterofconsciousness，religious，moral，etc。，tobehisasthisself，thissoul，andnoother，andbeneitheramerelatentpossibility，noratransientemotionoridea，noranabstractinwardness，cutofffromactionandreality，butpartandparcelofhisbeing。
Inscientificstudiesofthesoulandthemind，habitisusuallypassedover—eitherassomethingcontemptible—orratherforthefurtherreasonthatitisoneofthemostdifficultquestionsofpsychology。
（C）THEACTUALSOUL
§411。
TheSoul，whenitscorporeityhasbeenmouldedandmadethoroughlyitsown，findsitselfthereasinglesubject;andthecorporeityisanexternalitywhichstandsasapredicate，inbeingrelatedtowhich，itisrelatedtoitself。Thisexternality，inotherwords，representsnotitself，butthesoul，ofwhichitisthesign。Inthisidentityofinteriorandexterior，thelattersubjecttotheformer，thesoulisactual：initscorporeityithasitsfreeshape，inwhichitfeelsitselfandmakesitselffelt，andwhichastheSoul’sworkofarthashumanpathognomicandphysiognomicexpression。
Undertheheadofhumanexpressionareincluded，forexample，theuprightfigureingeneral，andtheformationofthelimbs，especiallythehand，astheabsoluteinstrument，ofthemouth—laughter，weeping，etc。，andthenoteofmentalitydiffusedoverthewhole，whichatonceannouncesthebodyastheexternalityofahighernature。Thisnoteissoslight，indefinite，andinexpressibleamodification，becausethefigureinitsexternalityissomethingimmediateandnatural，andcanthereforeonlybeanindefiniteandquiteimperfectsignforthemind，unabletorepresentitinitsactualuniversality。Seenfromtheanimalworld，thehumanfigureisthesupremephaseinwhichmindmakesanappearance。Butfortheminditisonlyitsfirstappearance，whilelanguageisitsperfectexpression。Andthehumanfigure，thoughtheproximatephaseofmind’sexistence，isatthesametimeinitsphysiognomicandpathognomicqualitysomethingcontingenttoit。Totrytoraisephysiognomyandaboveallcranioscopy（phrenology）totherankofsciences，wasthereforeoneofthevainestfancies，stillvainerthanasignaturarerum，whichsupposedtheshapeofaplanttoaffordindicationofitsmedicinalvirtue。
§412。
Implicitlythesoulshowstheuntruthandunrealityofmatter;forthesoul，initsconcentratedself，cutsitselfofffromitsimmediatebeing，placingthelatteroveragainstitasacorporeityincapableofofferingresistancetoitsmouldinginfluence。Thesoul，thussettinginoppositionitsbeingtoits（conscious）self，absorbingit，andmakingititsown，haslostthemeaningofmeresoul，orthe’immediacy’ofmind。Theactualsoulwithitssensationanditsconcreteself—feelingturnedintohabit，hasimplicitlyrealisedthe’ideality’ofitsqualities;inthisexternalityithasrecollectedandinwardizeditself，andisinfiniteself—relation。Thisfreeuniversalitythusmadeexplicitshowsthesoulawakingtothehigherstageoftheego，orabstractuniversality，insofarasitisfortheabstractuniversality。Inthiswayitgainsthepositionofthinkerandsubject—speciallyasubjectofthejudgementinwhichtheegoexcludesfromitselfthesumtotalofitsmerelynaturalfeaturesasanobject，aworldexternaltoit—butwithsuchrespecttothatobjectthatinititisimmediatelyreflectedintoitself。ThussoulrisestobecomeConsciousness。
413。
B。PHENOMENOLOGYOFMIND
CONSCIOUSNESS
（a）ConsciousnessProper—（b）Self—Consciousness—（c）ReasonConsciousnessconstitutesthereflectedorcorrelationalgradeofmind：thegradeofmindasappearance。Egoisinfiniteself—relationofmind，butassubjectiveorasself—certainty。Theimmediateidentityofthenaturalsoulhasbeenraisedtothispure’ideal’self—identity;andwhattheformercontainedisforthisself—subsistentreflectionsetforthasanobject。Thepureabstractfreedomofmindletsgofromititsspecificqualities—thesoul’snaturallife—toanequalfreedomasanindependentobject。Itisofthislatter，asexternaltoit，thattheegoisinthefirstinstanceaware（conscious），andassuchitisConsciousness。Ego，asthisabsolutenegativity，isimplicitlytheidentityintheotherness：theegoisitselfthatotherandstretchesovertheobject（asifthatobjectwereimplicitlycancelled）—itisonesideoftherelationshipandthewholerelationship—thelight，whichmanifestsitselfandsomethingelsetoo。
§414。
Theself—identityofthemind，thusfirstmadeexplicitastheEgo，isonlyitsabstractformalideality。
Assoulitwasunderthephaseofsubstantialuniversality;now，assubjectivereflectioninitself，itisreferredtothissubstantialityastoitsnegative，somethingdarkandbeyondit。Henceconsciousness，likereciprocaldependenceingeneral，isthecontradictionbetweentheindependenceofthetwosidesandtheiridentityinwhichtheyaremergedintoone。Themindasegoisessence;butsincereality，inthesphereofessence，isrepresentedasinimmediatebeingandatthesametimeas’ideal’，itisasconsciousnessonlytheappearance（phenomenon）ofmind。
§415。
Astheegoisbyitselfonlyaformalidentity，thedialecticalmovementofitsintelligibleunity，i。e。thesuccessivestepsinfurtherspecificationofconsciousness，doesnot，toit，seemtobeitsownactivity，butisimplicit，andtotheegoitseemsanalterationoftheobject。Consciousnessconsequentlyappearsdifferentlymodifiedaccordingtothedifferenceofthegivenobject;andthegradualspecificationofconsciousnessappearsasavariationinthecharacteristicsofitsobjects。
Ego，thesubjectofconsciousness，isthinking：thelogicalprocessofmodifyingtheobjectiswhatisidenticalinsubjectandobject，theirabsoluteinterdependence，whatmakestheobjectthesubject’sown。
TheKantianphilosophymaybemostaccuratelydescribedashavingviewedthemindasconsciousness，andascontainingthepropositionsonlyofaphenomenology（notofaphilosophy）
ofmind。TheEgoKantregardsasreferencetosomethingawayandbeyond（whichinitsabstractdescriptionistermedthething—in—itself）;anditisonlyfromthisfinitepointofviewthathetreatsbothintellectandwill。ThoughinthenotionofapowerofreflectivejudgementhetouchesupontheIdeaofmind—asubject—objectivity，anintuitiveintellect，etc。，andeventheIdeaofNature，stillthisIdeaisagaindeposedtoanappearance，i。e。toasubjectivemaxim（§58）。ReinholdmaythereforebesaidtohavecorrectlyappreciatedKantismwhenhetreateditasatheoryofconsciousness（underthenameof’facultyofideation’）。Fichtekepttothesamepointofview：hisnon—egoisonlysomethingsetoveragainsttheego，onlydefinedasinconsciousness：itismadenomorethananinfinite’shock’，i。e。athing—in—itself。Bothsystemsthereforehaveclearlynotreachedtheintelligibleunityorthemindasitactuallyandessentiallyis，butonlyasitisinreferencetosomethingelse。
AsagainstSpinozism，again，itistobenotedthatthemindinthejudgementbywhichit’constitutes’itselfanego（afreesubjectcontrastedwithitsqualitativeaffection）hasemergedfromsubstance，andthatthephilosophy，whichgivesthisjudgementastheabsolutecharacteristicofmind，hasemergedfromSpinozism。
§416。
Theaimofconsciousmindistomakeitsappearanceidenticalwithitsessence，toraiseitsself—certaintytotruth。Theexistenceofmindinthestageofconsciousnessisfinite，becauseitismerelyanominalself—relation，ormerecertainty。Theobjectisonlyabstractlycharacterizedasits;
inotherwords，intheobjectitisonlyasanabstractegothatthemindisreflectedintoitself：henceitsexistencetherehasstillacontent，whichisnotasitsown。
§417。
Thegradesofthiselevationofcertaintytotrutharethreeinnumber：first（a）consciousnessingeneral，withanobjectsetagainstit;（b）self—consciousness，forwhichegoistheobject;（c）unityofconsciousnessandself—consciousness，wherethemindseesitselfembodiedintheobjectandseesitselfasimplicitlyandexplicitlydeterminate，asReason，thenotionofmind。
（a）CONSCIOUSNESSPROPER
i。Sensuousconsciousness§418。
Consciousnessis，first，immediateconsciousness，anditsreferencetotheobjectaccordinglythesimple，andunderivedcertaintyofit。Theobjectsimilarly，beingimmediate，anexistent，reflectedinitself，isfurthercharacterizedasimmediatelysingular。Thisissense—consciousness。
Consciousness—asacaseofcorrelation—comprisesonlythecategoriesbelongingtotheabstractegoorformalthinking;andtheseittreatsasfeaturesoftheobject（§415）。Sense—consciousnessthereforeisawareoftheobjectasanexistent，asomething，anexistingthing，asingular，andsoon。
Itappearsaswealthiestinmatter，butaspoorestinthought。Thatwealthofmatterismadeoutofsensations：theyarethematerialofconsciousness（§414），thesubstantialandqualitative，whatthesoulinitsanthropologicalsphereisandfindsinitself。Thismaterialtheego（thereflectionofthesoulinitself）separatesfromitself，andputsitfirstunderthecategoryofbeing。SpatialandtemporalSingularness，hereandnow（thetermsbywhichinthePhenomenologyoftheMind（Werkeii，p。73），Idescribedtheobjectofsense—consciousness）strictlybelongstointuition。Atpresenttheobjectisatfirsttobeviewedonlyinitscorrelationtoconsciousness，i。e。asomethingexternaltoit，andnotyetasexternalonitsownpart，orasbeingbesideandoutofitself。
§419。
Thesensibleassomewhatbecomesanother：thereflectioninitselfofthissomewhat，thething，hasmanyproperties;andasasingle（thing）initsimmediacyhasseveralpredicates。Themuchnessofthesense—singularthusbecomesabreadth—avarietyofrelations，reflectionalattributes，anduniversalities。Thesearelogicaltermsintroducedbythethinkingprinciple，i。e。inthiscasebytheEgo，todescribethesensible。ButtheEgoasitselfapparentseesinallthischaracterizationachangeintheobject;andsensuousconsciousness，soconstruingtheobject，issense—perception。
ii。Sense—perception§420。
Consciousness，havingpassedbeyondthesensible，wantstotaketheobjectinitstruth，notasmerelyimmediate，butasmediated，reflectedinitself，anduniversal。Suchanobjectisacombinationofsensequalitieswithattributesofwiderrangebywhichthoughtdefinesconcreterelationsandconnections。Hencetheidentityofconsciousnesswiththeobjectpassesfromtheabstractidentityof’Iamsure’tothedefiniteidentityof’Iknow，andamaware’。
TheparticulargradeofconsciousnessonwhichKantismconceivesthemindisperception：whichisalsothegeneralpointofviewtakenbyordinaryconsciousness，andmoreorlessbythesciences。Thesensuouscertitudesofsingleapperceptionsorobservationsformthestarting—point：
thesearesupposedtobeelevatedtotruth，bybeingregardedintheirbearings，reflectedupon，andonthelinesofdefinitecategoriesturnedatthesametimeintosomethingnecessaryanduniversal，viz。experiences。
§421。
Thisconjunctionofindividualanduniversalisadmixture—theindividualremainsatthebottomhardandunaffectedbytheuniversal，towhich，however，itisrelated。Itisthereforeatissueofcontradictions—betweenthesinglethingsofsenseapperception，whichformtheallegedgroundofgeneralexperience，andtheuniversalitywhichhasahigherclaimtobetheessenceandground—
betweentheindividualityofathingwhich，takeninitsconcretecontent，constitutesitsindependenceandthevariouspropertieswhich，freefromthisnegativelinkandfromoneanother，areindependentuniversalmatters（§123）。Thiscontradictionofthefinitewhichrunsthroughallformsofthelogicalspheresturnsoutmostconcrete，whenthesomewhatisdefinedasobject（§§
194seqq。）。
iii。TheIntellect§422。
Theproximatetruthofperceptionisthatitistheobjectwhichisanappearance，andthattheobject’sreflectioninselfisonthecontraryaself—subsistentinwardanduniversal。Theconsciousnessofsuchanobjectisintellect。Thisinward，aswecalledit，ofthethingis，ononehand，thesuppressionofthemultiplicityofthesensible，and，inthatmanner，anabstractidentity：ontheotherhand，however，italsoforthatreasoncontainsthemultiplicity，butasaninterior’simple’
difference，whichremainsself—identicalinthevicissitudesofappearance。Thesimpledifferenceistherealmofthelawsofthephenomena—acopyofthephenomenon，butbroughttorestanduniversality。
§423。
Thelaw，atfirststatingthemutualdependenceofuniversal，permanentterms，has，insofarasitsdistinctionistheinwardone，itsnecessityonitsownpart;theoneoftheterms，asnotexternallydifferentfromtheother，liesimmediatelyintheother。Butinthismannertheinteriordistinctionis，whatitisintruth，thedistinctiononitsownpart，orthedistinctionwhichisnone。Withthisnewform—characteristic，onthewhole，consciousnessimplicitlyvanishes：forconsciousnessassuchimpliesthereciprocalindependenceofsubjectandobject。Theegoinitsjudgementhasanobjectwhichisnotdistinctfromit—ithasitself。Consciousnesshaspassedintoself—consciousness。
（b）SELF—CONSCIOUSNESS
§424。
Self—consciousnessisthetruthofconsciousness：thelatterisaconsequenceoftheformer，allconsciousnessofanotherobjectbeingasamatteroffactalsoself—consciousness。Theobjectismyidea：Iamawareoftheobjectasmine;andthusinitIamawareofme。Theformulaofself—consciousnessisI=I：—abstractfreedom，pure’Ideality’;andthusitlacks’reality’：forasitisitsownobject，thereisstrictlyspeakingnoobject，becausethereisnodistinctionbetweenitandtheobject。
§425。
Abstractself—consciousnessisthefirstnegationofconsciousness，andforthatreasonitisburdenedwithanexternalobject，or，nominally，withthenegationofit。Thusitisatthesametimetheantecedentstage，consciousness：itisthecontradictionofitselfasself—consciousnessandasconsciousness。ButthelatteraspectandthenegationingeneralisinI=Ipotentiallysuppressed;
andhenceasthiscertitudeofselfagainsttheobjectitistheimpulsetorealizeitsimplicitnature，bygivingitsabstractself—awarenesscontentandobjectivity，andintheotherdirectiontofreeitselffromitssensuousness，tosetasidethegivenobjectivityandidentifyitwithitself。Thetwoprocessesareoneandthesame，theidentificationofitsconsciousnessandself—consciousness。
i。AppetiteorInstinctiveDesire§426。
Self—consciousness，initsimmediacy，isasingular，andadesire（appetite）—thecontradictionimpliedinitsabstractionwhichshouldyetbeobjective—orinitsimmediacywhichhastheshapeofanexternalobjectandshouldbesubjective。Thecertitudeofone’sself，whichissuesfromthesuppressionofmereconsciousness，pronouncestheobjectnull：andtheoutlookofself—consciousnesstowardstheobjectequallyqualifiestheabstractidealityofsuchself—consciousnessasnull。
§427。
Self—consciousness，therefore，knowsitselfimplicitintheobject，whichinthisoutlookisconformabletotheappetite。Inthenegationofthetwoone—sidedmomentsbytheego’sownactivity，thisidentitycomestobefortheego。Tothisactivitytheobject，whichimplicitlyandforself—consciousnessisself—less，canmakenoresistance：thedialectic，implicitinit，towardsself—suppressionexistsinthiscaseasthatactivityoftheego。Thuswhilethegivenobjectisrenderedsubjective，thesubjectivitydivestsitselfofitsone—sidednessandbecomesobjectivetoitself。
§428。
Theproductofthisprocessisthefastconjunctionoftheegowithitself，itssatisfactionrealized，anditselfmadeactual。Ontheexternalsideitcontinues，inthisreturnuponitself，primarilydescribableasanindividual，andmaintainsitselfassuch;becauseitsbearingupontheself—lessobjectispurelynegative，thelatter，therefore，beingmerelyconsumed。Thusappetiteinitssatisfactionisalwaysdestructive，andinitscontentselfish：andasthesatisfactionhasonlyhappenedintheindividual（andthatistransient）theappetiteisagaingeneratedintheveryactofsatisfaction。
§429。
Butontheinnerside，orimplicitly，thesenseofselfwhichtheegogetsinthesatisfactiondoesnotremaininabstractself—concentrationorinmereindividuality;onthecontrary—asnegationofimmediacyandindividualitytheresultinvolvesacharacterofuniversalityandoftheidentityofself—consciousnesswithitsobject。Thejudgementordiremptionofthisself—consciousnessistheconsciousnessofa’free’object，inwhichegoisawareofitselfasanego，whichhoweverisalsostilloutsideit。
ii。Self—consciousnessRecognitive§430。
Herethereisaself—consciousnessforaself—consciousness，atfirstimmediately，asoneoftwothingsforanother。InthatotherasegoIbeholdmyself，andyetalsoanimmediatelyexistingobject，anotheregoabsolutelyindependentofmeandopposedtome。（Thesuppressionofthesinglenessofself—consciousnesswasonlyafirststepinthesuppression，anditmerelyledtothecharacterizationofitasparticular。）Thiscontradictiongiveseitherself—consciousnesstheimpulsetoshowitselfasafreeself，andtoexistassuchfortheother：—theprocessofrecognition。
§431。
Theprocessisabattle。Icannotbeawareofmeasmyselfinanotherindividual，solongasIseeinthatotheranotherandanimmediateexistence：andIamconsequentlybentuponthesuppressionofthisimmediacyofhis。ButinlikemeasureIcannotberecognizedasimmediate，exceptsofarasIovercomethemereimmediacyonmyownpart，andthusgiveexistencetomyfreedom。Butthisimmediacyisatthesametimethecorporeityofself—consciousness，inwhichasinitssignandtoolthelatterhasitsownsenseofself，anditsbeingforothers，andthemeansforenteringintorelationwiththem。
§432。
Thefightofrecognitionisalifeanddeathstruggle：eitherself—consciousnessimperilstheother’slife，andincursalikeperilforitsown—butonlyperil，foreitherisnolessbentonmaintaininghislife，astheexistenceofhisfreedom。Thusthedeathofone，thoughbytheabstract，thereforerude，negationofimmediacy，it，fromonepointofview，solvesthecontradiction，isyet，fromtheessentialpointofview（i。e。theoutwardandvisiblerecognition），anewcontradiction（forthatrecognitionisatthesametimeundonebytheother’sdeath）andagreaterthantheother。
§433。
Butbecauselifeisasrequisiteaslibertytothesolution，thefightendsinthefirstinstanceasaone—sidednegationwithinequality。Whiletheonecombatantpreferslife，retainshissingleself—consciousness，butsurrendershisclaimforrecognition，theotherholdsfasttohisself—assertionandisrecognizedbytheformerashissuperior。Thusarisesthestatusofmasterandslave。
Inthebattleforrecognitionandthesubjugationunderamaster，wesee，ontheirphenomenalside，theemergenceofman’ssociallifeandthecommencementofpoliticalunion。Force，whichisthebasisofthisphenomenon，isnotonthataccountabasisofright，butonlythenecessaryandlegitimatefactorinthepassagefromthestateofself—consciousnesssunkinappetiteandselfishisolationintothestateofuniversalself—consciousness。Force，then，istheexternalorphenomenalcommencementofstates，nottheirunderlyingandessentialprinciple。
§434。
Thisstatus，inthefirstplace，impliescommonwantsandcommonconcernfortheirsatisfaction—
forthemeansofmastery，theslave，mustlikewisebekeptinlife。Inplaceoftherudedestructionoftheimmediateobjectthereensuesacquisition，preservation，andformationofit，astheinstrumentalityinwhichthetwoextremesofindependenceandnon—independenceareweldedtogether。Theformofuniversalitythusarisinginsatisfyingthewant，createsapermanentmeansandaprovisionwhichtakescareforandsecuresthefuture。
§435。
Butsecondly，whenwelooktothedistinctionofthetwo，themasterbeholdsintheslaveandhisservitudethesupremacyofhissingleself—hoodresultingfromthesuppressionofimmediateself—hood，asuppression，however，whichfallsonanother。Thisother，theslave，however，intheserviceofthemaster，worksoffhisindividualistself—will，overcomestheinnerimmediacyofappetite，andinthisdivestmentofselfandin’thefearofhislord’makes’thebeginningofwisdom’
—thepassagetouniversalself—consciousness。
iii。UniversalSelf—consciousness§436。
Universalself—consciousnessistheaffirmativeawarenessofselfinanotherself：eachselfasafreeindividualityhashisown’absolute’independence，yetinvirtueofthenegationofitsimmediacyorappetitewithoutdistinguishingitselffromthatother。Eachisthusuniversalself—consciousnessandobjective;eachhas’real’universalityintheshapeofreciprocity，sofaraseachknowsitselfrecognizedintheotherfreeman，andisawareofthisinsofarasitrecognizestheotherandknowshimtobefree。
Thisuniversalreappearanceofself—consciousness—thenotionwhichisawareofitselfinitsobjectivityasasubjectivityidenticalwithitselfandforthatreasonuniversal—istheformofconsciousnesswhichliesattherootofalltruementalorspirituallife—infamily，fatherland，state，andofallvirtues，love，friendship，valour，honour，fame。Butthisappearanceoftheunderlyingessencemayalsobeseveredfromthatessence，andbemaintainedapartinworthlesshonour，idlefame，etc。
§437。
Thisunityofconsciousnessandself—consciousnessimpliesinthefirstinstancetheindividualsmutuallythrowinglightuponeachother。Butthedifferencebetweenthosewhoarethusidentifiedismerevaguediversity—orratheritisadifferencewhichisnone。Henceitstruthisthefullyandreallyexistentuniversalityandobjectivityofself—consciousness—whichisReason。
Reason，astheIdea（§213）asithereappears，istobetakenasmeaningthatthedistinctionbetweennotionandrealitywhichitunifieshasthespecialaspectofadistinctionbetweentheself—concentratednotionorconsciousness，andtheobjectsubsistingexternalandopposedtoit。
（c）REASON
§438。
Theessentialandactualtruthwhichreasonis，liesinthesimpleidentityofthesubjectivityofthenotionwithitsobjectivityanduniversality。Theuniversalityofreason，therefore，whilstitsignifiesthattheobject，whichwasonlygiveninconsciousnessquaconsciousness，isnowitselfuniversal，permeatingandencompassingtheego，alsosignifiesthatthepureegoisthepureformwhichoverlapstheobjectandencompassesit。
§439。
Self—consciousness，thuscertifiedthatitsdeterminationsarenolessobjective，ordeterminationsoftheverybeingofthings，thantheyareitsownthoughts，isReason，whichassuchanidentityisnotonlytheabsolutesubstance，butthetruththatknowsit。Fortruthherehas，asitspeculiarmodeandimmanentform，theself—centredpurenotion，ego，thecertitudeofselfasinfiniteuniversality。
Truth，awareofwhatitis，ismind（spirit）。
440。
C。PSYCHOLOGY
MIND
（a）TheoreticalMind—（b）PracticalMind—（c）FreeMindMindhasdefineditselfasthetruthofsoulandconsciousness—theformerasimpleimmediatetotality，thelatternowaninfiniteformwhichisnot，likeconsciousness，restrictedbythatcontent，anddoesnotstandinmerecorrelationtoitastoitsobject，butisanawarenessofthissubstantialtotality，neithersubjectivenorobjective。Mind，therefore，startsonlyfromitsownbeingandisincorrelationonlywithitsownfeatures。
Psychologyaccordinglystudiesthefacultiesorgeneralmodesofmentalactivityquamental—
mentalvision，ideation，remembering，etc。，desires，etc。—apartbothfromthecontent，whichonthephenomenalsideisfoundinempiricalideation，inthinkingalsoandindesireandwill，andfromthetwoformsinwhichthesemodesexist，viz。inthesoulasaphysicalmode，andinconsciousnessitselfasaseparatelyexistentobjectofthatconsciousness。This，however，isnotanarbitraryabstractionbythepsychologist。Mindisjustthiselevationabovenatureandphysicalmodes，andabovethecomplicationwithanexternalobject—inoneword，abovethematerial，asitsconcepthasjustshown。Allithasnowtodoistorealisethisnotionofitsfreedom，andgetridoftheformofimmediacywithwhichitoncemorebegins。Thecontentwhichiselevatedtointuitionsisitssensations：itisitsintuitionsalsowhicharetransmutedintorepresentations，anditsrepresentationswhicharetransmutedagainintothoughts，etc。
§441。
Thesoulisfinite，sofarasitsfeaturesareimmediateorconnatural。Consciousnessisfinite，insofarasithasanobject。Mindisfinite，insofaras，thoughitnolongerhasanobject，ithasamodeinitsknowledge;i。e。itisfinitebymeansofitsimmediacy，or，whatisthesamething，bybeingsubjectiveoronlyanotion。Anditisamatterofnoconsequence，whichisdefinedasitsnotion，andwhichastherealityofthatnotion。Saythatitsnotionistheutterlyinfiniteobjectivereason，thenitsrealityisknowledgeorintelligence：saythatknowledgeisitsnotion，thenitsrealityisthatreason，andtherealisationofknowledgeconsistsinappropriatingreason。Hencethefinitudeofmindistobeplacedinthe（temporary）failureofknowledgetogetholdofthefullrealityofitsreason，or，equally，inthe（temporary）failureofreasontoattainfullmanifestationinknowledge。
Reasonatthesametimeisonlyinfinitesofarasitis’absolute’freedom;sofar，thatis，aspresupposingitselfforitsknowledgetoworkupon，ittherebyreducesitselftofinitude，andappearsaseverlastingmovementofsupersedingthisimmediacy，ofcomprehendingitself，andbeingarationalknowledge。
§442。
Theprogressofmindisdevelopment，insofarasitsexistentphase，viz。knowledge，involvesasitsintrinsicpurposeandburdenthatutterandcompleteautonomywhichisrationality;inwhichcasetheactionoftranslatingthispurposeintorealityisstrictlyonlyanominalpassageoverintomanifestation，andiseventhereareturnintoitself。Sofarasknowledgewhichhasnotshakenoffitsoriginalqualityofmereknowledgeisonlyabstractorformal，thegoalofmindistogiveitobjectivefulfilment，andthusatthesametimeproduceitsfreedom。
Thedevelopmentheremeantisnotthatoftheindividual（whichhasacertainanthropologicalcharacter），wherefacultiesandforcesareregardedassuccessivelyemergingandpresentingthemselvesinexternalexistencesseriesofsteps，ontheascertainmentofwhichtherewasforalongtimegreatstresslaid（bythesystemofCondillac），asifaconjecturalnaturalemergencecouldexhibittheoriginofthesefacultiesandexplainthem。InCondillac’smethodthereisanunmistakableintentiontoshowhowtheseveralmodesofmentalactivitycouldbemadeintelligiblewithoutlosingsightofmentalunity，andtoexhibittheirnecessaryinterconnection。Butthecategoriesemployedindoingsoareofawretchedsort。Theirrulingprincipleisthatthesensibleistaken（andwithjustice）asthepriusortheinitialbasis，butthatthelatterphasesthatfollowthisstarting—pointpresentthemselvesasemerginginasolelyaffirmativemanner，andthenegativeaspectofmentalactivity，bywhichthismaterialistransmutedintomindanddestroyedasasensible，ismisconceivedandoverlooked。AsthetheoryofCondillacstatesit，thesensibleisnotmerelytheempiricalfirst，butisleftasifitwerethetrueandessentialfoundation。
Similarly，iftheactivitiesofmindaretreatedasmeremanifestations，forces，perhapsintermsstatingtheirutilityorsuitabilityforsomeotherinterestofheadorheart，thereisnoindicationofthetruefinalaimofthewholebusiness。Thatcanonlybetheintelligibleunityofmind，anditsactivitycanonlyhaveitselfasaim;i。e。itsaimcanonlybetogetridoftheformofimmediacyorsubjectivity，toreachandgetholdofitself，andtoliberateitselftoitself。Inthiswaytheso—calledfacultiesofmindasthusdistinguishedareonlytobetreatedasstepsofthisliberation。Andthisistheonlyrationalmodeofstudyingthemindanditsvariousactivities。
§443。
Asconsciousnesshasforitsobjectthestagewhichprecededit，viz。thenaturalsoul（§413），somindhasorrathermakesconsciousnessitsobject：i。e。whereasconsciousnessisonlythevirtualidentityoftheegowithitsother（§415），themindrealisesthatidentityastheconcreteunitywhichitanditonlyknows。Itsproductionsaregovernedbytheprincipleofallreasonthatthecontentsareatoncepotentiallyexistent，andarethemind’sown，infreedom。Thus，ifweconsidertheinitialaspectofmind，thataspectistwofold—asbeingandasitsown：bytheone，themindfindsinitselfsomethingwhichis，bytheotheritaffirmsittobeonlyitsown。Thewayofmindistherefore（a）tobetheoretical：ithastodowiththerationalasitsimmediateaffectionwhichitmustrenderitsown：orithastofreeknowledgefromitspresupposednessandthereforefromitsabstractness，andmaketheaffectionsubjective。Whentheaffectionhasbeenrendereditsown，andtheknowledgeconsequentlycharacterisedasfreeintelligence，i。e。ashavingitsfullandfreecharacterisationinitself，itis（b）Will：practicalmind，whichinthefirstplaceislikewiseformal—i。e。itscontentisatfirstonlyitsown，andisimmediatelywilled;anditproceedsnexttoliberateitsvolitionfromitssubjectivity，whichistheone—sidedformofitscontents，sothatit（c）confrontsitselfasfreemindandthusgetsridofbothitsdefectsofone—sidedness。
§444。
ThetheoreticalaswellasthepracticalmindstillfallunderthegeneralrangeofMindSubjective。
Theyarenottobedistinguishedasactiveandpassive。Subjectivemindisproductive：butitisamerelynominalproductivity。Inwards，thetheoreticalmindproducesonlyits’ideal’world，andgainsabstractautonomywithin;whilethepractical，whileithastodowithautonomousproducts，withamaterialwhichisitsown，hasamaterialwhichisonlynominallysuch，andthereforearestrictedcontent，forwhichitgainstheformofuniversality。Outwards，thesubjectivemind（whichasaunityofsoulandconsciousness，isthusalsoareality—arealityatonceanthropologicalandconformabletoconsciousness）hasforitsproducts，inthetheoreticalrange，theword，andinthepractical（notyetdeedandaction，but）enjoyment。
Psychology，likelogic，isoneofthosescienceswhichinmoderntimeshaveyetderivedleastprofitfromthemoregeneralmentalcultureandthedeeperconceptionofreason。Itisstillextremelyilloff。TheturnwhichtheKantianphilosophyhastakenhasgivenitgreaterimportance：ithas，andthatinitsempiricalcondition，beenclaimedasthebasisofmetaphysics，whichistoconsistofnothingbuttheempiricalapprehensionandtheanalysisofthefactsofhumanconsciousness，merelyasfacts，justastheyaregiven。Thispositionofpsychology，mixingitupwithformsbelongingtotherangeofconsciousnessandwithanthropology，hasledtonoimprovementinitsowncondition：butithashadthefurthereffectthat，bothforthemindassuch，andformetaphysicsandphilosophygenerally，allattemptshavebeenabandonedtoascertainthenecessityofessentialandactualreality，togetatthenotionandthetruth。
（a）THEORETICALMIND
§445。
iIntuition—iiRepresentation—iiiThinkingIntelligencefindsitselfdetermined：thisisitsapparentaspectfromwhichinitsimmediacyitstarts。
Butasknowledge，intelligenceconsistsintreatingwhatisfoundasitsown。Itsactivityhastodowiththeemptyform—thepretenseoffindingreason：anditsaimistorealiseitsconceptortobereasonactual，alongwithwhichthecontentisrealisedasrational。Thisactivityiscognition。Thenominalknowledge，whichisonlycertitude，elevatesitself，asreasonisconcrete，todefiniteandconceptualknowledge。Thecourseofthiselevationisitselfrational，andconsistsinanecessarypassage（governedbytheconcept）ofonegradeortermofintelligentactivity（aso—calledfacultyofmind）intoanother。Therefutationwhichsuchcognitiongivesofthesemblancethattherationalisfound，startsfromthecertitudeorthefaithofintelligenceinitscapabilityofrationalknowledge，andinthepossibilityofbeingabletoappropriatethereason，whichitandthecontentvirtuallyis。
ThedistinctionofIntelligencefromWillisoftenincorrectlytakentomeanthateachhasafixedandseparateexistenceofitsown，asifvolitioncouldbewithoutintelligence，ortheactivityofintelligencecouldbewithoutwill。Thepossibilityofacultureoftheintellectwhichleavestheheartuntouched，asitissaid，andoftheheartwithouttheintellect—ofheartswhichinone—sidedwaywantintellect，andheartlessintellects—onlyprovesatmostthatbadandradicallyuntrueexistencesoccur。Butitisnotphilosophywhichshouldtakesuchuntruthsofexistenceandofmereimaginingfortruth—taketheworthlessfortheessentialnature。Ahostofotherphrasesusedofintelligence，e。g。thatitreceivesandacceptsimpressionsfromoutside，thatideasarisethroughthecausaloperationsofexternalthingsuponit，etc。，belongtoapointofviewutterlyalientothementallevelortothepositionofphilosophicstudy。
Afavoritereflectionalformisthatofpowersandfacultiesofsoul，intelligence，ormind。Faculty，likepowerorforce，isthefixedqualityofanyobjectofthought，conceivedasreflectedintoself。
Force（§136）isnodoubttheinfinityofform—oftheinwardandtheoutward：butitsessentialfinitudeinvolvestheindifferenceofcontenttoform（ib。note）。Inthisliesthewantoforganicunitywhichbythisreflectionalform，treatingmindasa’lot’offorces，isbroughtintomind，asitisbythesamemethodbroughtintonature。Anyaspectwhichcanbedistinguishedinmentalactionisstereotypedasanindependententity，andthemindthusmadeaskeleton—likemechanicalcollection。Itmakesabsolutelynodifferenceifwesubstitutetheexpression’activities’forpowersandfaculties。Isolatetheactivitiesandyousimilarlymakethemindamereaggregate，andtreattheiressentialcorrelationasanexternalincident。
Theactionofintelligenceastheoreticalmindhasbeencalledcognition（knowledge）。Yetthisdoesnotmeanintelligenceinteraliaknows—besideswhichitalsointuits，conceives，remembers，imagines，etc。Totakeupsuchapositionisinthefirstinstance，partandparcelofthatisolatingofmentalactivityjustcensured;butitisalsoinadditionconnectedwiththegreatquestionofmoderntimes，astowhethertrueknowledgeortheknowledgeoftruthispossible—which，ifansweredinthenegative，mustleadtoabandoningtheeffort。Thenumerousaspectsandreasonsandmodesofphrasewithwhichexternalreflectionswellsthebulkofthisquestionareclearedupintheirplace：
themoreexternaltheattitudeofunderstandinginthequestion，themorediffuseitmakesitssimpleobject。Atthepresentplacethesimpleconceptofcognitioniswhatconfrontsthequitegeneralassumptiontakenupbythequestion，viz。theassumptionthatthepossibilityoftrueknowledgeingeneralisindispute，andtheassumptionthatitispossibleforusatourwilleithertoprosecuteortoabandoncognition。Theconceptorpossibilityofcognitionhascomeoutasintelligenceitself，asthecertitudeofreason：theactofcognitionitselfisthereforetheactualityofintelligence。Itfollowsfromthisthatitisabsurdtospeakofintelligenceandyetatthesametimeofthepossibilityorchoiceofknowingornot。Butcognitionisgenuine，justsofarasitrealisesitself，ormakestheconceptitsown。Thisnominaldescriptionhasitsconcretemeaningexactlywherecognitionhasit。
Thestagesofitsrealisingactivityareintuition，conception，memory，etc。：theseactivitieshavenootherimmanentmeaning：theiraimissolelytheconceptofcognition（§445note）。Iftheyareisolated，however，thenanimpressionisimpliedthattheyareusefulforsomethingelsethancognition，orthattheyseverallyprocureacognitivesatisfactionoftheirown;andthatleadstoaglorificationofthedelightsofintuition，remembrance，imagination。Itistruethatevenasisolated（i。e。asnon—intelligent），intuition，imagination，etc。canaffordacertainsatisfaction：whatphysicalnaturesucceedsindoingbyitsfundamentalquality—itsout—of—selfness—exhibitingtheelementsorfactorsofimmanentreasonexternaltoeachother—thattheintelligencecandobyvoluntaryact，butthesameresultmayhappenwheretheintelligenceisitselfonlynaturalanduntrained。Butthetruesatisfaction，itisadmitted，isonlyaffordedbyanintuitionpermeatedbyintellectandmind，byrationalconception，byproductsofimaginationwhicharepermeatedbyreasonandexhibitideas—inaword，bycognitiveintuition，cognitiveconception，etc。Thetruthascribedtosuchsatisfactionliesinthis，thatintuition，conception，etc。arenotisolated，andexistonlyas’moments’
inthetotalityofcognitionitself。
i。Intuition（IntelligentPerception）
§446。
Themindwhichassoulisphysicallyconditioned—whichasconsciousnessstandstothisconditiononthesametermsastoanoutwardobject—butwhichasintelligencefindsitselfsocharacterised—is（1）aninarticulateembryoniclife，inwhichitistoitselfasitwerepalpableandhasthewholematerialofitsknowledge。Inconsequenceoftheimmediacyinwhichitisthusoriginally，itisinthisstageonlyasanindividualandpossessesavulgarsubjectivity。Itthusappearsasmindintheguiseoffeeling。
Iffeelingformerlyturnedup（§399）asamodeofthesoul’sexistence，thefindingofitoritsimmediacywasinthatcaseessentiallytobeconceivedasacongenitalorcorporealcondition;
whereasatpresentitisonlytobetakenabstractlyinthegeneralsenseofimmediacy。
§447。
Thecharacteristicformoffeelingisthatthoughitisamodeofsome’affection’，thismodeissimple。
Hencefeeling，evenshoulditsimportbemoststerlingandtrue，hastheformofcasualparticularity—nottomentionthatitsimportmayalsobethemostscantyandmostuntrue。
Itiscommonlyenoughassumedthatmindhasinitsfeelingthematerialofitsideas，butthestatementismoreusuallyunderstoodinasensetheoppositeofthatwhichithashere。Incontrastwiththesimplicityoffeelingitisusualrathertoassumethattheprimarymentalphaseisjudgementgenerally，orthedistinctionofconsciousnessintosubjectandobject;andthespecialqualityofsensationisderivedfromanindependentobject，externalorinternal。Withus，inthetruthofmind，themereconsciousnesspointofview，asopposedtotruemental’idealism’，isswallowedup，andthematteroffeelinghasratherbeensupposedalreadyasimmanentinthemind。—Itiscommonlytakenforgrantedthatasregardscontentthereismoreinfeelingthaninthought：thisbeingspeciallyaffirmedofmoralandreligiousfeelings。Nowthematerial，whichthemindasitfeelsistoitself，isheretheresultandthematureresultofafullyorganisedreason。henceundertheheadoffeelingiscomprisedallrationalandindeedallspiritualcontentwhatever。Buttheformofselfishsinglenesstowhichfeelingreducesthemindisthelowestandworstvehicleitcanhave—oneinwhichitisnotfoundasafreeandinfinitelyuniversalprinciple，butratherassubjectiveandprivate，incontentandvalueentirelycontingent。Trainedandsterlingfeelingisthefeelingofaneducatedmindwhichhasacquiredtheconsciousnessofthetruedifferencesofthings，oftheiressentialrelationshipsandrealcharacters;anditiswithsuchamindthatthisrectifiedmaterialentersintoitsfeelingandreceivesthisform。Feelingistheimmediate，asitweretheclosest，contactinwhichthethinkingsubjectcanstandtoagivencontent。Againstthatcontentthesubjectreactsfirstofallwithitsparticularself—feeling，whichthoughitmaybeofmoresterlingvalueandofwiderrangethanaone—sidedintellectualstandpoint，mayjustaslikelybenarrowandpoor;andinanycaseistheformoftheparticularandsubjective。Ifamanonanytopicappealsnottothenatureandnotionofthething，oratleasttoreasons—tothegeneralitiesofcommonsense—buttohisfeeling，theonlythingtodoistolethimalone，becausebyhisbehaviourherefusestohaveanylotorpartincommonrationality，andshutshimselfupinhisownisolatedsubjectivity—hisprivateandparticularself。
§448。
（2）Asthisimmediatefindingisbrokenupintoelements，wehavetheonefactorinAttention—theabstractidenticaldirectionofmind（infeeling，asalsoinallothermoreadvanceddevelopmentsofit）—anactiveself—collection—thefactoroffixingitasourown，butwithanasyetonlynominalautonomyofintelligence。Apartfromsuchattentionthereisnothingforthemind。Theotherfactoristoinvestthespecialqualityoffeeling，ascontrastedwiththisinwardnessofmind，withthecharacterofsomethingexistent，butasanegativeorastheabstractothernessofitself。Intelligencethusdefinesthecontentofsensationassomethingthatisoutofitself，projectsitintotimeandspace，whicharetheformsinwhichitisintuitive。Totheviewofconsciousnessthematerialisonlyanobjectofconsciousness，arelativeother：fromminditreceivestherationalcharacteristicofbeingitsveryother（§§247，254）。