believeintheexistenceofCalcutta，ImeanthatIbelievethatifIweretransportedtothebanksoftheHoogly，IshouldhavethesensationsfromwhichCalcuttaisinferrible。72*Inotherwords，inmakingastatementabouttheexternalworld，I
constructahypotheticalanduniversalconsciousness。WhenI
exchangethegeocentricfortheheliocentricview，IamimaginingwhatIshouldseeifIwereuponthesuninsteadoftheearth。
Insteadofregardingmyownseriesofsensationsasthebasefromwhichtomeasure，Iregardthemasdeduciblefromtheserieswhichwouldbepresentedtoadifferentand，ofcourse，incomparablymoreextendedconsciousness。Icanthusfillupthegapsinmyownexperienceandgetaregularseriesinsteadofonefullofbreachesandinterruptions。ThatIdothissomehoworotherisMill’sview，andIshouldadmitwithhimthatIdonomore。But，then，thequestionremainswhetherMillcanaccountformydoingeventhis。Itsupposes，atleast，apowerofformingwhatCliffordcalled’ejects，’asdistinguishedfrom’objects。’I
mustbeabletothinknotofthingsoutsideconsciousnessbutofmyownconsciousnessunderotherconditions，andofothercentresofconsciousnessthanmine。Butthisabilityisnotexplicablefromsensations，asultimateatoms，combinedinvariouswaysby’association’；forthatprocess，itwouldseem，mighttakeplacewithoutinanywaysuggestinganexternalworldoradifferentconsciousness。HereMill，likehisfather，istryingtoexplainthoughtsbydealingwithsensationsasthingsandrefusingtoadmitanyactionofthemindinordertokeeptotheunsophisticatedfacts。Hewillnotallowthemindtohaveevenanorganisingpower，eventhoughitbeapowerwhichcannotbeseparatelyrevealedorgiverisetoindependenttruths，butappearssimplyasimpliedinitsproducts。Themindistheclusterofatomicsensations。Itmustnottamperwiththefactsinanyway，onpenaltyofcausingillusion。Icanonlyassociatesimpleatoms，andtheworldremainsachaosofindependentandincoherentfragments。Theysticktogethersomehow，butthedivisionintotheexternalandtheinternalworldstillremainsanunsolvedproblem。The’attribute’willnotdistinguishitselffromthe’sensation。’Wearestillunable，thatis，toexplainthemetaphysicalpuzzleleftunsolvedintheLogic。
Anotherquestionarises：Iftheworldisstillanincoherentheapof’attributes’or’sensations，’whatarewetosayofthemind？WithhisusualcandourMillapplieshisprinciplestotheproblem。Weget，asheadmits，toarealdifficulty。Themind，inthephraseadoptedfromhisfather，isa’threadofconsciousness。’Itisaseriesoffeelingswiththecuriouspeculiaritythatbesides’presentsensations’ithas’memoriesandexpectations。’Whatarethese？heasks。Theyinvolvebeliefsinsomething’beyondthemselves。’Ifwecallthemind’aseriesoffeelings，’wehavetoaddthatitisaserieswhichis’awareofitselfaspastandfuture。’Isit，then，somethingdifferentfromthefeelings，ormustweaccepttheparadoxthatsomething’whichinhypothesisisaseriesoffeelingscanbeawareofitselfasaseries？’Hereisthefinal’inexplicability’whichmustarrive，asheadmitswithHamilton，whenwegettoanultimatefact。The’wisestthingwecandoistoaccepttheinexplicablefactwithoutanytheoryofhowittakesplace。’73*
Thatwhatwecallpersonalidentityis’inexplicable’willhardlybedenied。YetMill’spositionseemstomaketheparadoxsomethingnearlyapproachingtoacontradiction。Ifthementalprocessesaretobedescribedasfeelings，separablebutsimplyformingclustersmoreorlesscomplicatedandlinkedtoeachother，weseemtogetridnotonlyofasomethingwhichorganisesexperience，butoforganisationitself。Itbecomesdifficulttounderstandnotmerelywhatthemindorsoulcanbe，butwhatarethementalprocessestowhichtheconceptioncorresponds。This，however，leadstoadifferentsetofquestionsandoneoffargreaterinterest。
IV。THEORIESOFTHEABSOLUTE
DiscussionssuchasIhavetouchedoftenseemtobelittlemorethanadisplayofdialecticalskill。HamiltonandMillprobablybelievedequallyandinthesamesenseintherealityofEdinburghorLondon。Whenabeliefisadmitted，thequestionwhywebelieveisofinterestchieflyinsofarastheanswermaygivecanonsapplicabletoreallydisputablequestions。NowtheapplicationofHamilton’stheoriestotheologycertainlyinvolvedissuesinregardtowhichmengenerallysupposethemselvestobeprofoundlyinterested。Weclearlybelieveinan’externalworld，’
whateverpreciselywemeanbyit。ButdowebelieveinGod？or，ifwebelieve，whatpreciselyismeantbybelievinginGod？Thatisaproblemuponwhichturnallthemostimportantcontroversieswhichhavedividedmeninallages——andthecontroversywhichnowragedoverHamilton’stheorybetweenMillandManselcorrespondedtovitalissues。Hamilton’sessentialpositionwasgiveninthefamousCousinarticlein1830。Hefrequentlyrepeats，buthenevermuchmodifiesordevelopstheargument。Inthecourseoflecturesrepeatedfortwentyyears，hedivideshissubjectintothreedepartments：’empiricalpsychology’and’rationalpsychology’；orthefactsandlawsofconsciousness；
andthirdly，’ontology，’whichwastodealwiththeideasofGod，thesoul，andsoforth。74*Thisthirddepartmentwasneverwritten；andthoughWemayguessatitsgeneralnature，hisdoctrineischieflyindicatedbyhiscriticismofCousin。
Oneresultisunfortunate。Idoubtwhethersomanysayingscapableofdifferentinterpretationswereeverbroughttogetherinthesamespace。Theartofwritingabout’ontology’is，itwouldseem，todisguiseaself-evidenttruismbypompousphrasestillthewordsarevagueenoughtoallowtheintroductionofparadoxicalmeaning。SchellingandCousinbetweenthemhadprovidedasoundingterminology；andHamilton，thoughhismainpurposeistoshowthatthesefinephraseswereonlyphrases，takesthemup，tossesthemaboutasiftheyhadarealmeaning，andleavesusinsomedoubthowfarheismerelyusingthewordstoshowtheiremptiness，orsuggestingthat，whenthebubblesareburst，thereisstillsomeresiduumofsolidmatter。’Theunconditioned，’hesaysgivinghisownview，’isincognisableandinconceivable。’75*What，then，is’theunconditioned’？
’TheUnconditionedisthegenusofwhichtheInfiniteandtheAbsolutearespecies。’76*Thesetechnicalphrasesaretheballswithwhichthemetaphysicaljugglerplayshistrickstillwearereducedtohopelessconfusion。Millgivesthestraightforwardand，Ithink，conclusivecriticism。77*Whatisthesenseoftalkingabout’TheAbsolute’or’TheInfinite’ashypostatisedabstractions？Applytheepithetstoconcretethingsorpersonsandwemayunderstandwhatisreallymeant。Apredicategoingaboutatlargecannotbereallygrasped；andthediscussionwouldonlyberelevantifwewerespeakingofsomethingwhichisabsoluteandnothingbutabsolute。Thewordsthemselveshavemeaningswhichbecomedifferentwhentheyarepartsofdifferentassertions。’Inconceivable’isawordwhichvariesfromself-contradictorytomeredifficultyofimagining。’Absolute，’
accordingtoHamilton，hastwochiefmeanings，oneofwhichisnotopposedtotheInfiniteandtheothercontradictoryoftheInfinite。ManseltakesMilltotaskfornotseeingthatHamiltonusesthewordintwo’distinctandevencontradictorysenses，’
andfornotperceivingwhichmeaningisimpliedinwhichcases。78*ItmaybeverywrongofMill，butHamilton’spracticeiscertainlyconfusing。ThereisCousin’s’Absolute’andHamilton’s’Absolute’andMansel’sown’Absolute’；79*andthedifferenceistobeinferredfromthenatureoftheargument。
ThereisafalseInfiniteandatrueInfinite；andthissuggestsanotherdifficulty。Theobvious’contradictory’ofinfiniteisfinite；butwordscannotbereallycontradictoryatalltilltheyformpartofaproposition。Itiscontradictorytocallathingfiniteandinfiniteinthesamesense；but，ifweadmitofinfinitedivisibility，athingmustbeatonceinfiniteincomparisonwithaninfinitesimal，finiteinrelationtootherthings，andinfinitesimalinrelationtothosewhichinrelationtoitareinfinite。Somewords，again，refertoourknowledgeofthings，andaremeaninglesswhenpredicatedofobjects。Afactmaybe’certain’tomeandonly’probable’toyou，simplybecausetheprobabilitytoeachdependsupontheevidencewhichhepossesses。Whenthisissupposedtocorrespondtosomedifferenceinthefactsthemselves，endlessfallaciesareproduced。’Thecertain’iscontradictoryofthe’uncertain’；butagivenfactmaybeboth’certain’and’uncertain。’Adiscussionnaturallybecomesperplexed，whichisreallytreatingaquestionoflogicintermsappropriatetoaquestionoffact。
Iwillnotattempttofollowacontroversysoperplexedinitselfandinwhichtheantagonistsseemtobenormallyatcrosspurposes。Imusttrytobringoutthemainissuewhichisobscuredbythesingularconfusionsofthecontest；andtothisthereseemstobeasimpleclue。Hamilton’stheoryisadmittedlya’modificationofthatofKant，’80*andintendedtoeliminatetheinconsistencybywhichKanthadleftanopeningforthesystemsofSchellingandHegel。NowKant’sfamousargument，givenintheCritiqueofPureReason，isamostcrabbedpieceofwriting。ItmakesanEnglishreaderlongforDavidHume。Still，beneathitselaboratepanoplyoflogicaltechnicalities，itcontainsaveryclearandcogentargument，whichgivestherealdifficultyandwhichisstrangelydistortedbyHamilton。
AccordingtoKanttherearethreeIdeasofthepureReason——
theSoul，theWorld，andGod。Nobodyreallydoubtstheexistenceoftheworld；butdoubtsastotheexistenceofthesoulorofGodarepossibleandhavebeenmetbyprofessedlydemonstrativearguments。The’dogmatists’whomKantcriticisedhad，astheythought，provedtheexistenceofamonad，an’indiscerptible’
unitcalledthesoul；andofaSupremeBeing，or’EnsRealissimum，’whoistakentobeinsomesenseabsoluteandsimple。Kantholdstheseargumentstobeessentiallyamisapplicationoflogicalmethod。Itisthefunctionofthereasontounifyourknowledge。Theidealwouldbereachedifallknowledgecouldberegardedasasystemofdeductionsfromasingleprinciple。This，inreasoningaboutthesoul，producesa’paralogism。’Allourthoughtsandfacultiesareboundtogetherintoaunitywhichisconsistentwithmultiplicity。Weinterpretthisunjustifiablyasimplyingtheexistenceofanabsolutelysimpleunit。Wehypostatisetheunityandregarditasathingwhen，intruth，itrepresentsacomplexsystemofreciprocalrelations。TheargumentsuponthesupposedproofsoftheexistenceofasupremeBeing，thoughtheyareexpandedandconsideredinmanydifferentforms，reachasimilarconclusion。
Weareperfectlyrightinunifyingasmuchaspossibleourwholeknowledgeoftheworld，butthoughwemaycontinuetheprocessindefinitely，wecanneverlogicallyarriveattheknowledgeofasingleBeingexistingindependentlyasthefoundationofallotherbeing。Inthissense，Kantcallstheidea’regulative。’Itcorrespondstothelegitimateprocessofthought；wemustunify，butnoreasoningcanrevealanentitylyingbeyondallexperience。Wearethusledto’irresistibleillusions，’fromwhich，however，wecanescape，thoughonly’bytheseverestandmostsubtlecriticism。’Kantcomparesthistotheillusionproducedbyamirror，whichmakesobjectsreallyinfrontappeartobebehindit，ortotheapparentincreaseofthemoon’ssizewhennearthehorizon。Still，itisimpossible，asheemphaticallysays，thatreasonshouldbeitselfundeservingofconfidence。Itisonlyfromitsmisuseinaninappropriatesphere，or，inotherwords，fromitsattempttotranscendexperience，thatthefallacyarises。81*
ItisneedlesstoaskhowthisargumentcanbereconciledwiththetheismwhichKantaccepts。Hamilton’scriticismofCousinisessentiallyastatementoftheconverseargument。