60。Publishedin1848beforetheappearanceofMill’sPoliticalEconomy。Millreadtheproofsofhisfriend’sbook。Bain’sJ。S。
Mill，p。86n。
61。Autobiography，p。231。Thedatesofthesechangesarerathervaguelyindicated。
62。Autobiography，p。235。
63。Ibid。p。236。
64。ArticleinDissertations，ii，republishedfromWestminsterReviewofApril1849。
65。Autobiography，p。238。
66。SeereferencetoMrsMillinthesuppresseddedicationofthePoliticalEconomygiveninBain’sJ。S。Mill，p。175；thededicationoftheLiberty；thenoteinDissertation，ii，412；andAutobiography，pp。184-90and240-45。
67。Bain’sJ。S。Mill，p。167。
68。Bain’sJ。S。Mill，p。173。
69。Autobiography，p。229。
70。Autobiography，p。244-47。
71。Autobiography，p。262。
72。FirstinFraser’sMagazinein1861；republishedin1863。
73。FirstintheWestminsterfor1864，reprintedseparatelyin1865。
74。TheessaysuponNatureandTheUtilityofReligionarestatedtohavebeenwrittenbetween1850and1858；thatuponTheismbetween1868and1870。
75。Autobiography，p。230。HedefendsthisreticenceinalettertoComteof18thDecember1841——Correspondence，p。12。
76。Autobiography，p。240。
77。Publishedin1869。
78。ArticleinFraser’sMagazine，January1861。
79。IheardsomehisfirstspeechesfromthepressgalleryoftheHouseofCommons。
80。Autobiography，p。289。
81。Disraeliissaidtohavesummeduptheimpressionmadeuponpracticalpoliticiansbycallinghima’politicalfinishinggoverness’。
82。Seehispamphlet，EnglandandIreland，1869。
83。Autobiography，p。286。
84。Autobiography，p。308。
85。Green’sMiscellaneousWorks，iii，cxliv。
86。Miscellaniessecondseries。
87。Autobiography，p。109。
ChapterII
Mill’sLogicI。IntuitionismandEmpiricismMill’sSystemofLogicmayberegardedasthemostimportantmanifestoofUtilitarianphilosophy。ItlaysdownexplicitlyandintheirripestformtheprinciplesimplicitlyassumedbyBenthamandtheelderMill。Itmodifiesaswellasexpounds。ItrepresentstheprocessbywhichJ。S。Mill，onbecomingawareofcertaindefectsintheUtilitarians’philosophy，endeavouredtorestatethefirstprinciplessoastoavoidtheerroneousconclusions。Thecoincidencewithhispredecessorsremainsfarcloserthanthedivergence。Thefundamentaltenetsaredevelopedratherthanwithdrawn。TheLogicthusmostdistinctlyraisestheultimateissues。Ithastheimpressivenesswhichbelongsinsomedegreetoeverygenuineexertionofapowerfulmind。Millisstrugglingwithrealdifficulties；nottryingtobolsterupatheorycommendedtohimbyextraneousconsiderations。Heisdoinghisbesttogiveananswertohisproblem；nottohideanevasion。Hishonourablecandourincidentallyrevealstheweaknessasfranklyasthestrengthofhisposition。Heneithershirksnorhidesdifficulties，andifweareforcedtoadmitthatsomeofhisreasoningisfallacious，theadmissionscarcelyaddstothestatementthatheiswritingatreatiseuponphilosophicalproblems。Hisfranknesshasmadethetaskofcriticscomparativelyeasy。Ittakessomanyvolumestosettlewhatsomephilosophershavemeantthatwescarcelyreachthequestionwhethertheirmeaning，orratheranyoftheirmanypossiblemeanings，wasright。InthecaseofMill，thatpreparatorylabourisnotrequired。Hisbook，too，hasbeensufficientlytestedbytimetoenableustomarkthepointsatwhichhisstructurehasfailedtostandthewearandtearofgeneraldiscussion。Imusttrytobringoutthevitalpointsofthedoctrine。
Mill，Ihavesaid，hadaverydefinitepurposebeyondthepurelyphilosophical。’Badinstitutions，’hesays，1*aresupportedbyfalsephilosophy。Thefalsephilosophytowhichherefersisthatoftheso-called’intuitionistschool。’Its’stronghold，’hethought，layinappealstothemathematicalandphysicalsciences。Todriveitfromthispositionwastodepriveitof’speculativesupport’；and，thoughitcouldstillappealtoprejudice，thedestructionofthissupportwasanindispenSablesteptocompletevictory。Millwishedtoprovidealogicalarmouryforallassailantsofestablisheddogmatism，andhissuccessasapropagandistsurprisedhim。Thebookwasread，tohisastonishment，evenintheuniversities。Indeed，IcantestifyfrompersonalobservationthatitbecameakindofsacredbookforstudentswhoclaimedtobegenuineLiberals。Itgavethephilosophicalcreedofanimportantsectionoftherisinggeneration，partlybiassed，itmaybe，bytheapplicationto’badinstitutions。’Mill’slogic，thatis，fellinwiththeonemaincurrentofpoliticalopinion。HisreadingsinlogicwithGroteandotherfriendsenabledhimtofashiontheweaponsneededfortheassault。Thusinitsoriginandbyitsexecutionthetaskwasinfactanattempttogiveanorganisedstatementofsoundphilosophyinaformapplicabletosocialandpoliticalspeculations。
Millconsideredthattheschoolofmetaphysicianswhichheattackedhadlongpredominatedinthiscountry。2*WhenTainecalledhisviewspeciallyEnglish，Millprotested。TheScottishreactionagainstHume，hesaid，which’assumedlongagotheGermanform，’hadendedby’prevailinguniversally’inthiscountry。Whenhefirstwrotehewasalmostaloneinhisopinions，andtherewerestill’twentyaprioriandspiritualistphilosophersforeverypartisanofthedoctrineofExperience。’3*Thephilosophicalworld，hesayselsewhere，4*
is’bisected’bythelinebetweenthe’Intuitional’andthe’Experiential’schools。Mill’sconvictionthatamajorityofEnglishmenwerereally’intuitionists’inanyshapeissignificant，Ithink，ofhisisolatedposition。UndoubtedlymostEnglishmendislikedUtilitarians，andrespectableprofessorsofphilosophywereanxioustodisavowsympathywithcovertatheism。
Yetthegeneraltendencyofthoughtwas，Isuspect，farmorecongenialtoMill’sdoctrinethanheadmitted。Englishmenwerepractically，ifnotavowedly，predisposedtoempiricism。Inanycase，hewascarryingonthetraditionwhichTainerightly，asI
shouldsay，regardedasspecificallyEnglish。ItsadherentstraceditsoriginbackthroughJamesMilltoHartley，Hume，Locke，Hobbes，andFrancisBacon，andperhapsitmightevencountamongitsremoterancestorssuchmenasWilliamofOckhamandRogerBacon。Theseriesofnamessuggestssomepermanentcongenialitytothenationalcharacter。5*Although，moreover，thistraditionhadinlatertimesbeenbrokenbyReidandhisfollowers，theircondemnationdidnotreallyimplysofundamentalanantithesisofthoughtasMillsupposed。Theyandtheempiricistshad，intheirownopinionatleast，acommonancestorinBacon，ifnotinLocke。But，howeverthismaybe，theScottishschoolhadmaintainedthepositionswhichMillthoughthimselfconcernedtoattack；andforhimrepresentedtherejectionof’experience。’
Experienceisawordwhichrequiresexposition；butinageneralwaytheaimoftheUtilitariansisabundantlyclear。Theyattacked’intuitions’asLockehadattacked’innateideas。’Thegreaterrorofphilosophy，accordingtothem，asaccordingtoLocke，hasbeentheattempttotranscendthelimitsofhumanintelligence，andsotowanderintotheregionsofmysticism；toseekknowledgebyspinninglogicalstructureswhich，havingnobaseinfact，endedinmerescholasticlogomachy；ortooverrideexperiencebyclaimingabsoluteauthorityfortheorieswhichdispensewithfurtherproofforthesimplereasonthatnoproofofthemcanbegiven。Tolimitspeculationandtomakeitfruitfulbyforcingitfromthefirsttodealwithfacts；totraceallitsevidencetoexperienceortheobservationoffacts；
andtoinsistuponitsverificationbycomparisonwithfacts，isthemainandsurelythelegitimatepurposeoftheUtilitariansasofalltheirphilosophicalcongeners。Thegulfbetweentheworldofspeculationandtheworldoffactisthegreatopprobriumofphilosophy。Thenecessityforfindingabasisoffactwasemphasisedatthistimebytherapiddevelopmentofthescienceswhichmaybecalledpurelyempirical，andwhichhadsprung，inanycase，frommethodsofdirectobservation。ThisdevelopmentsuggestedtheelaboratetreatisewrittenfromadifferentpointofviewbyWhewell。ThegreatambitionoftheBenthamiteshadbeentoapplyscientificmethodstoalltheproblemsoflegislation，jurisprudence，economics，ethics，andphilosophy。
Millcouldnowshow，withtheinvoluntaryhelpofWhewell，whatthosemethodsreallyimpliedThequestionsremain：Whatarefacts？and，Whatisexperience？and，Whataretheconsequentconditionsofreasoningaboutfacts？Admittingthat，somehoworother，avastandrapidlygrowingbodyofknowledgehasbeenattainedinthephysicalsciences，wemayaskhowithasbeengained，andproceedtoapplythemethodsinwhathavebeencalledthemoralsciences。Kant’sfamousproblemwas，Howisapriorisyntheticknowledgepossible？Milldeniesthatanysuchknowledgeexists。Hisproblemistherefore，Howcanknowledgebeexplainedwithoutapriorielements？Whenthiscanbesatisfactorilydone，weshallbeabletoshowhowbothmoralandphysicalsciencecanbefairlybaseduponexperience。
Mill’sviewoftheproperlimitsofhisinquiryischaracteristic。HeacceptsBacon’saccountoflogic。It，isthearsartium，thescienceofscienceitself。’6*Itimpliesaninvestigationintotheprocessesofinferencegenerally。Itisnotlimitedtotheoldformallogic，butincludeseveryoperationbywhichknowledgeisextended。Itisthus，asheafterwardsputsit，the’theoryofproof。’7*Thebook，indeed，owesitsinteresttothewidthofthefieldcovered。Ithasnottherepulsivedrynessofformallogic，butwouldleadtoanaturalhistoryofthewholegrowthofknowledge，andmakesconstantreferencetotheactualdevelopmentofthought。Ontheotherhand，Millgivesnoticethathehasnomoretodowithmetaphysicsthanwithanyofthespecialsciences。Logic，hedeclares，iscommongroundforallschoolsofphilosophy。Itis，hesays，theofficeofmetaphysicstodecidewhatareultimatefacts，butforthelogicianitisneedlesstogointothisanalysis。8*Accordingly，heofteninthecourseofthebookconsidershimselfentitledtohandovervariousproblemstothemetaphysicians。9*Thepossibilityofreallykeepingtothisdistinctionisdoubtful。SinceMill’sveryaimistoshowthatallknowledgecomesfromobservationof’facts，’itisapparentlyrelevanttoinquirewhatarethese’ultimatefacts。’Indeed，hisstatement，thoughmadeinallsincerity，almostsuggestsacontroversialartifice。Logic，asMillofcourseadmits，affectsmetaphysicsasitaffectsallsciences；butinonewayitaffectsthemverydifferently。Itjustifiesastronomy，butitapparentlymakesmetaphysicssuperfluous。Inquiryintothe’ultimatefacts’