Iamnotnowconcernedtocriticiseit,——mypointisthatifweacceptthisviewofFreedomatall,itmustobviouslybeNeutralFreedom:itmustexpresstherelationofanoü;menonthatmanifestsitselfasascoundreltoaseriesofbadvolitions,inwhichthemorallawisviolated,nolessthantherelationofanoü;menonthatmanifestsitselfasasainttogoodorrationalvolitions,inwhichthemorallaworcategoricalimperativeisobeyed。And,asIbeforesaid,Kantinthispassage——beingespeciallyconcernedtoexplainthepossibilityofmoralimputation,andjustifythejudicialsentencesofconsciencespeciallytakesashisillustrationsnoü;menathatexhibitbadphenomena。Thequestionheexpresslyraisesis``Howamanwhocommitsatheft’’can``becalledquitefree’’atthemomentofcommittingit?andanswersthatitisinvirtueofhis``transcendentalfreedom’’that``therationalbeingcanjustlysayofeveryunlawfulactionthatheperformsthathecouldverywellhaveleftitundone’’,althoughasphenomenonitisdeterminedbyantecedents,andsonecessary;
``forit,withallthepastwhichdeterminesit,belongstotheonesinglephenomenonofhischaracterwhichhemakesforhimself,inconsequenceofwhichheimputestohimself’’thebadactionsthatresultnecessarilyfromhisbadcharactertakeninconjunctionwithothercauses。Hence,howeverhemayaccountforhiserrorfrombadhabitswhichhehasallowedtogrowonhim,whateverarthemayusetopainttohimselfanunlawfulactheremembersassomethinginwhichhewascarriedawaybythestreamofphysicalnecessity,thiscannotprotecthimfromself-reproach:——notevenifhehaveshowndepravitysoearlythathemayreasonablybethoughttohavebeenborninamorallyhopelesscondition——hewillstillberightlyjudged,andwilljudgehimself``justasresponsibleasanyotherman’’:sinceinrelationtohisnoü;menalselfhislifeasawhole,fromfirsttolast,istoberegardedasasinglephenomenonresultingfromanabsolutelyfreechoice。
Ineednotlabourthispointfurther;itisevidentthatthenecessitiesofKant’smetaphysicalexplanationofmoralresponsibilitymakehimexpresswithpeculiaremphasisandfulnessthenotionofwhatIhavecalledNeutralFreedom,akindofcausalitymanifestedinbadandirrationalvolitionsnolessthaninthegoodandrational。
Ontheotherhand,itisnolesseasytofindpassagesinwhichthetermFreedomseemstomemostdistinctlytostandforGoodorRationalFreedom。Indeed,suchpassagesare,Ithink,morefrequentthanthoseinwhichtheothermeaningisplainlyrequired。Thus,hetellsusthat``afreewillmustfinditsprincipleofdeterminationinthe[moral]`Law’’’,[3]andthat``freedom,whosecausalitycanbedeterminedonlybythelaw,consistsjustinthis,thatitrestrictsallinclinationsbytheconditionofobediencetopurelaw’’。[4]Whereas,intheargumentpreviouslyexamined,hiswholeeffortwastoprovethatthenoü;menonorsupersensiblebeing,ofwhicheachvolitionisaphenomenon,exercises``freecausality’’inunlawfulacts,hetellsuselsewhere,inthesametreatise,thatthe``supersensiblenature’’ofrationalbeings,whohavealsoa``sensiblenature’’,istheir``existenceaccordingtolawswhichareindependentofeveryempiricalcondition,andthereforebelongtotheautonomyofpure[practical]reason’’。[5]
Similarly,inanearlierwork,heexplainsthat``sincetheconceptionofcausalityinvolvesthatoflaws?thoughfreedomisnotapropertyofthewilldependingonphysicallaws,yetitisnotforthatreasonlawless;
onthecontrary,itmustbeacausalityaccordingtoimmutablelaws,butofapeculiarkind;otherwise,afreewillwouldbeachimæ;raUnding’’。[6]
Andthisimmutablelawofthe``free’’or``autonomous’’willis,ashegoesontosay,thefundamentalprincipleofmorality,``sothatafreewillandawillsubjecttomorallawsareoneandthesame’’。
Ihavequotedthislastphrase,notbecauseitclearlyexhibitsthenotionofRationalFreedom,——onthecontrary,itrathershowshoweasilythisnotionmaybeconfoundedwiththeother。
Awillsubjecttoitsownmorallawsmaymeanawillthat,sofarasfree,conformstotheselaws;butitalsomaybeconceivedascapableoffreelydisobeyingtheselaws——exercisingNeutralFreedom。ButwhenFreedomissaidtobea``causalityaccordingtoimmutablelaws’’theambiguityisdispelled;forthisevidentlycannotmeanmerelyafacultyoflayingdownlawswhichmayormaynotbeobeyed;itmustmeanthatthewill,quâ;free,actsinaccordancewiththeselaws;——thehumanbeing,doubtless,oftenactscontrarytothem;butthen,accordingtothisview,itschoiceinsuchactionsisdeterminednot``freely’’but``mechanically’’,by``physical’’
and``empirical’’springsofaction。
IfanyfurtherargumentisnecessarytoshowthatKantian``Freedom’’mustsometimesbeunderstoodasRationalorGoodFreedom,ImayquoteoneortwoofthenumerouspassagesinwhichKant,eitherexpresslyorbyimplication,identifiesWillandReason;forthisidentificationobviouslyexcludesthepossibilityofWill’schoosingbetweenReasonandnon-rationalimpulses。
ThusintheGrundlegungzurMetaphysikderSitten,hetellsusthat``asReasonisrequiredtodeduceactionsfromlaws,Willisnothingbutpurepracticalreason’’;[7]and,similarly,intheKritikderpraktischenVernunft,hespeaksofthe``objectiverealityofapureWillor,whichisthesamething,apurepracticalreason’’。[8]Accordingly,whereasinsomepassages[9]the``autonomy’’whichheidentifieswith``Freedom’’
isspokenofas``autonomyofwill’’,inotherswearetoldthatthe``morallawexpressesnothingelsethanautonomyofthepurepracticalreason:
thatis,Freedom’’。[10]
IthinkthatIhavenowestablishedtheverbalambiguitythatIundertooktobringhometoKant’saccountofFreeWill;
Ihaveshownthatinhisexpositionthisfundamentaltermoscillatesbetweenincompatiblemeanings。Butitmay,perhaps,bethoughtthatthedefectthuspointedoutcanbecuredbyamerelyverbalcorrection:thatthesubstanceofKant’sethicaldoctrinemaystillbemaintained,andmaystillbeconnectedwithhismetaphysicaldoctrine。ItmaystillbeheldthatReasondictatesthatweshouldatalltimesactfromamaximthatwecanwilltobeauniversallaw,andthatweshoulddothisfrompureregardforreasonandreason’slaw,admittingthatitisalawwhichwearefreetodisobey;anditmaystillbeheldthattherealityofthismoralfreedomistobereconciledwiththeuniversalityofphysicalcausationbyconceivingitasarelationbetweentheagentsnoü;menalself——independentoftime-conditions——andhischaracterasmanifestedintime;theonlycorrectionrequiredbeingtoavoididentifyingFreedomandGoodnessorRationalityasattributesofagentsoractions。
IshouldquiteadmitthatthemostimportantpartsbothofKant’sdoctrineofmorality,andofhisdoctrineofFreedommaybesaved:——orIshouldperhapsrathersaythatthelattermaybelefttoconductanunequalstrugglewiththemodernnotionsofheredityandevolution:atanyrateIadmitthatitisnotfundamentallyaffectedbymypresentargument。ButIthinkthatagooddealmorewillhavetogofromacorrectededitionofKantismthanmerelythe``word’’Freedomincertainpassages,iftheconfusionintroducedbytheambiguityofthiswordistobeeliminatedinthemannerthatIhavesuggested。Ithinkthatthewholetopicofthe``heteronomy’’ofthewill,whenityieldstoempiricalorsensibleimpulses,willhavetobeabandonedorprofoundlymodified。
AndIamafraidthatmostreadersofKantwillfeelthelosstobeserious;
sincenothinginKant’sethicalwritingismorefascinatingthantheidea——whichheexpressesrepeatedlyinvariousforms——thatamanrealisestheaimofhistrueselfwhenheobeysthemorallaw,whereas,whenhewronglyallowshisactiontobedeterminedbyempiricalorsensiblestimuli,bebecomessubjecttophysicalcausation,tolawsofabruteouterworld。
ButifwedismisstheidentificationofFreedomandRationality,andacceptdefinitelyandsinglyKant’sothernotionofFreedomasexpressingtherelationofthehumanthing-in-itselftoitsphenomenon,Iamafraidthatthisspirit-stirringappealtothesentimentofLibertymustbedismissedasidlerhetoric。Forthelifeofthesaintmustbeasmuchsubject——inanyparticularportionofit——tothenecessarylawsofphysicalcausationasthelifeofthescoundrel:andthescoundrelmustexhibitandexpresshischaracteristicself-hoodinhistranscendentalchoiceofabadlife,asmuchasthesaintdoesinhistranscendentalchoiceofagoodone。If,ontheotherhand,toavoidthisresult,wetaketheotherhornofthedilemma,andidentifyinnerfreedomwithrationality,thanamoreseriousexcisionwillberequired。For,alongwith`Neutral’or`Moral’Freedom,thewholeKantianviewoftherelationofthenoü;menontotheempiricalcharacterwillhavetobedropped,andwithitmustgothewholeKantianmethodofmaintainingmoralresponsibilityandmoralimputation:infact,allthathasmadeKant’sdoctrineinterestingandimpressivetoEnglishadvocatesofFreeWillintheordinarysense,evenwhentheyhavenotbeenconvincedofitssoundness,