点击下载App，搜索"Methods of Ethics",免费读到尾

　　Iamnotnowconcernedtocriticiseit，——mypointisthatifweacceptthisviewofFreedomatall，itmustobviouslybeNeutralFreedom:itmustexpresstherelationofano&uuml；menonthatmanifestsitselfasascoundreltoaseriesofbadvolitions，inwhichthemorallawisviolated，nolessthantherelationofano&uuml；menonthatmanifestsitselfasasainttogoodorrationalvolitions，inwhichthemorallaworcategoricalimperativeisobeyed。And，asIbeforesaid，Kantinthispassage——beingespeciallyconcernedtoexplainthepossibilityofmoralimputation，andjustifythejudicialsentencesofconsciencespeciallytakesashisillustrationsno&uuml；menathatexhibitbadphenomena。Thequestionheexpresslyraisesis``Howamanwhocommitsatheft’’can``becalledquitefree’’atthemomentofcommittingit？andanswersthatitisinvirtueofhis``transcendentalfreedom’’that``therationalbeingcanjustlysayofeveryunlawfulactionthatheperformsthathecouldverywellhaveleftitundone’’，althoughasphenomenonitisdeterminedbyantecedents，andsonecessary；

　　``forit，withallthepastwhichdeterminesit，belongstotheonesinglephenomenonofhischaracterwhichhemakesforhimself，inconsequenceofwhichheimputestohimself’’thebadactionsthatresultnecessarilyfromhisbadcharactertakeninconjunctionwithothercauses。Hence，howeverhemayaccountforhiserrorfrombadhabitswhichhehasallowedtogrowonhim，whateverarthemayusetopainttohimselfanunlawfulactheremembersassomethinginwhichhewascarriedawaybythestreamofphysicalnecessity，thiscannotprotecthimfromself-reproach:——notevenifhehaveshowndepravitysoearlythathemayreasonablybethoughttohavebeenborninamorallyhopelesscondition——hewillstillberightlyjudged，andwilljudgehimself``justasresponsibleasanyotherman’’:sinceinrelationtohisno&uuml；menalselfhislifeasawhole，fromfirsttolast，istoberegardedasasinglephenomenonresultingfromanabsolutelyfreechoice。

　　Ineednotlabourthispointfurther；itisevidentthatthenecessitiesofKant’smetaphysicalexplanationofmoralresponsibilitymakehimexpresswithpeculiaremphasisandfulnessthenotionofwhatIhavecalledNeutralFreedom，akindofcausalitymanifestedinbadandirrationalvolitionsnolessthaninthegoodandrational。

　　Ontheotherhand，itisnolesseasytofindpassagesinwhichthetermFreedomseemstomemostdistinctlytostandforGoodorRationalFreedom。Indeed，suchpassagesare，Ithink，morefrequentthanthoseinwhichtheothermeaningisplainlyrequired。Thus，hetellsusthat``afreewillmustfinditsprincipleofdeterminationinthe[moral]`Law’’’，[3]andthat``freedom，whosecausalitycanbedeterminedonlybythelaw，consistsjustinthis，thatitrestrictsallinclinationsbytheconditionofobediencetopurelaw’’。[4]Whereas，intheargumentpreviouslyexamined，hiswholeeffortwastoprovethattheno&uuml；menonorsupersensiblebeing，ofwhicheachvolitionisaphenomenon，exercises``freecausality’’inunlawfulacts，hetellsuselsewhere，inthesametreatise，thatthe``supersensiblenature’’ofrationalbeings，whohavealsoa``sensiblenature’’，istheir``existenceaccordingtolawswhichareindependentofeveryempiricalcondition，andthereforebelongtotheautonomyofpure[practical]reason’’。[5]

　　Similarly，inanearlierwork，heexplainsthat``sincetheconceptionofcausalityinvolvesthatoflaws？thoughfreedomisnotapropertyofthewilldependingonphysicallaws，yetitisnotforthatreasonlawless；

　　onthecontrary，itmustbeacausalityaccordingtoimmutablelaws，butofapeculiarkind；otherwise，afreewillwouldbeachim&aelig；raUnding’’。[6]

　　Andthisimmutablelawofthe``free’’or``autonomous’’willis，ashegoesontosay，thefundamentalprincipleofmorality，``sothatafreewillandawillsubjecttomorallawsareoneandthesame’’。

　　Ihavequotedthislastphrase，notbecauseitclearlyexhibitsthenotionofRationalFreedom，——onthecontrary，itrathershowshoweasilythisnotionmaybeconfoundedwiththeother。

　　Awillsubjecttoitsownmorallawsmaymeanawillthat，sofarasfree，conformstotheselaws；butitalsomaybeconceivedascapableoffreelydisobeyingtheselaws——exercisingNeutralFreedom。ButwhenFreedomissaidtobea``causalityaccordingtoimmutablelaws’’theambiguityisdispelled；forthisevidentlycannotmeanmerelyafacultyoflayingdownlawswhichmayormaynotbeobeyed；itmustmeanthatthewill，qu&acirc；free，actsinaccordancewiththeselaws；——thehumanbeing，doubtless，oftenactscontrarytothem；butthen，accordingtothisview，itschoiceinsuchactionsisdeterminednot``freely’’but``mechanically’’，by``physical’’

　　and``empirical’’springsofaction。

　　IfanyfurtherargumentisnecessarytoshowthatKantian``Freedom’’mustsometimesbeunderstoodasRationalorGoodFreedom，ImayquoteoneortwoofthenumerouspassagesinwhichKant，eitherexpresslyorbyimplication，identifiesWillandReason；forthisidentificationobviouslyexcludesthepossibilityofWill’schoosingbetweenReasonandnon-rationalimpulses。

　　ThusintheGrundlegungzurMetaphysikderSitten，hetellsusthat``asReasonisrequiredtodeduceactionsfromlaws，Willisnothingbutpurepracticalreason’’；[7]and，similarly，intheKritikderpraktischenVernunft，hespeaksofthe``objectiverealityofapureWillor，whichisthesamething，apurepracticalreason’’。[8]Accordingly，whereasinsomepassages[9]the``autonomy’’whichheidentifieswith``Freedom’’

　　isspokenofas``autonomyofwill’’，inotherswearetoldthatthe``morallawexpressesnothingelsethanautonomyofthepurepracticalreason:

　　thatis，Freedom’’。[10]

　　IthinkthatIhavenowestablishedtheverbalambiguitythatIundertooktobringhometoKant’saccountofFreeWill；

　　Ihaveshownthatinhisexpositionthisfundamentaltermoscillatesbetweenincompatiblemeanings。Butitmay，perhaps，bethoughtthatthedefectthuspointedoutcanbecuredbyamerelyverbalcorrection:thatthesubstanceofKant’sethicaldoctrinemaystillbemaintained，andmaystillbeconnectedwithhismetaphysicaldoctrine。ItmaystillbeheldthatReasondictatesthatweshouldatalltimesactfromamaximthatwecanwilltobeauniversallaw，andthatweshoulddothisfrompureregardforreasonandreason’slaw，admittingthatitisalawwhichwearefreetodisobey；anditmaystillbeheldthattherealityofthismoralfreedomistobereconciledwiththeuniversalityofphysicalcausationbyconceivingitasarelationbetweentheagentsno&uuml；menalself——independentoftime-conditions——andhischaracterasmanifestedintime；theonlycorrectionrequiredbeingtoavoididentifyingFreedomandGoodnessorRationalityasattributesofagentsoractions。

　　IshouldquiteadmitthatthemostimportantpartsbothofKant’sdoctrineofmorality，andofhisdoctrineofFreedommaybesaved:——orIshouldperhapsrathersaythatthelattermaybelefttoconductanunequalstrugglewiththemodernnotionsofheredityandevolution:atanyrateIadmitthatitisnotfundamentallyaffectedbymypresentargument。ButIthinkthatagooddealmorewillhavetogofromacorrectededitionofKantismthanmerelythe``word’’Freedomincertainpassages，iftheconfusionintroducedbytheambiguityofthiswordistobeeliminatedinthemannerthatIhavesuggested。Ithinkthatthewholetopicofthe``heteronomy’’ofthewill，whenityieldstoempiricalorsensibleimpulses，willhavetobeabandonedorprofoundlymodified。

　　AndIamafraidthatmostreadersofKantwillfeelthelosstobeserious；

　　sincenothinginKant’sethicalwritingismorefascinatingthantheidea——whichheexpressesrepeatedlyinvariousforms——thatamanrealisestheaimofhistrueselfwhenheobeysthemorallaw，whereas，whenhewronglyallowshisactiontobedeterminedbyempiricalorsensiblestimuli，bebecomessubjecttophysicalcausation，tolawsofabruteouterworld。

　　ButifwedismisstheidentificationofFreedomandRationality，andacceptdefinitelyandsinglyKant’sothernotionofFreedomasexpressingtherelationofthehumanthing-in-itselftoitsphenomenon，Iamafraidthatthisspirit-stirringappealtothesentimentofLibertymustbedismissedasidlerhetoric。Forthelifeofthesaintmustbeasmuchsubject——inanyparticularportionofit——tothenecessarylawsofphysicalcausationasthelifeofthescoundrel:andthescoundrelmustexhibitandexpresshischaracteristicself-hoodinhistranscendentalchoiceofabadlife，asmuchasthesaintdoesinhistranscendentalchoiceofagoodone。If，ontheotherhand，toavoidthisresult，wetaketheotherhornofthedilemma，andidentifyinnerfreedomwithrationality，thanamoreseriousexcisionwillberequired。For，alongwith`Neutral’or`Moral’Freedom，thewholeKantianviewoftherelationoftheno&uuml；menontotheempiricalcharacterwillhavetobedropped，andwithitmustgothewholeKantianmethodofmaintainingmoralresponsibilityandmoralimputation:infact，allthathasmadeKant’sdoctrineinterestingandimpressivetoEnglishadvocatesofFreeWillintheordinarysense，evenwhentheyhavenotbeenconvincedofitssoundness，