Now，first，aconstantpartofthenotion，whichappearsinitevenwhentheJustisnotdistinguishedfromtheLegal，isimpartialityorthenegationofarbitraryinequality。Thisimpartiality，aswesawwhetherexhibitedintheestablishmentorintheadministrationoflaws，ismerelyaspecialapplicationofthewidermaximthatitcannotberighttotreattwopersonsdifferentlyiftheircasesaresimilarinallmaterialcircumstances。AndUtilitarianism，aswesaw，admitsthismaximnolessthanothersystemsofEthics。Atthesametime，thisnegativecriterionisclearlyinadequateforthecompletedeterminationofwhatisjustinlaws，orinconductgenerally；whenwehaveadmittedthis，itstillremainstoask，``Whataretheinequalitiesinlaws，andinthedistributionofpleasuresandpainsoutsidethesphereoflaw，whicharenotarbitraryandunreasonable？andtowhatgeneralprinciplescantheybereduced？’’
Hereinthefirstplacewemayexplain，onutilitarianprinciples，whyapparentlyarbitraryinequalityinacertainpartoftheconductofindividualsisnotregardedasinjusticeoreven——insomecases——asinanywaycensurable。Forfreedomofactionisanimportantsourceofhappinesstotheagents，andasociallyusefulstimulustotheirenergies:henceitisobviouslyexpedientthataman’sfreechoiceinthedistributionofwealthorkindservicesshouldnotberestrainedbythefearoflegalpenalties，orevenofsocialdisapprobation，beyondwhattheinterestsofothersclearlyrequire；andtherefore，whendistinctlyrecognisedclaimsaresatisfied，itisprotantoexpedientthatthemerepreferencesofanindividualshouldbetreatedbyothersaslegitimategroundsforinequalityinthedistributionofhispropertyorservices。Nay，aswehavebeforeseen，itiswithincertainlimitsexpedientthateachindividualshouldpracticallyregardhisownunreasonedimpulsesasreasonablegroundsofaction:asintherenderingofservicespromptedbysuchaffectionsasarenormallyandproperlyspontaneousandunforced。
Passingtoconsiderthegeneralprinciplesuponwhich`justclaims’ascommonlyrecognisedappeartobebased，wenoticethatthegroundsofanumberofsuchclaimsmaybebroughtunderthegeneralheadof`normalexpectations’；
butthatthestringencyofsuchobligationsvariesmuchindegree，accordingastheexpectationsarebasedupondefiniteengagements，oronsomevaguemutualunderstanding，oraremerelysuchasanaveragemanwouldformfrompastexperienceoftheconductofothermen。IntheselattercasesCommonSenseappearedtobesomewhatperplexedastothevalidityoftheclaims。
ButfortheUtilitarianthedifficultyhasceasedtoexist。Hewillholdanydisappointmentofexpectationstobeprotantoanevil，butagreaterevilinproportiontotheprevioussecurityoftheexpectantindividual，fromthegreatershockthusgiventohisrelianceontheconductofhisfellow-mengenerally:andmanytimesgreaterinproportionastheexpectationisgenerallyrecognisedasnormalandreasonable，asinthiscasetheshockextendstoallwhoareinanywaycognisantofhisdisappointment。
Theimportancetomankindofbeingabletorelyoneachother’sactionsissogreat，thatinordinarycasesofabsolutelydefiniteengagementsthereisscarcelyanyadvantagethatcancounterbalancetheharmdonebyviolatingthem。Still，wefoundthatseveralexceptionsandqualificationstotheruleofGoodFaithweremoreorlessdistinctlyrecognisedbyCommonSense:andmostofthesehaveautilitarianbasis，whichitdoesnotneedmuchpenetrationtodiscern。Tobegin，wemaynoticethatthesuperficialviewoftheobligationofapromisewhichmakesitdependontheassertionofthepromiser，andnot，asUtilitarianshold，ontheexpectationsproducedinthepromisee，cannotfairlybeattributedtoCommonSense:whichcertainlycondemnsabreachofpromisemuchmorestronglywhenothershaveactedinrelianceonit，thanwhenitsobservancedidnotdirectlyconcernothers，sothatitsbreachinvolvesforthemonlytheindirectevilofabadprecedent，aswhenamanbreaksapledgeoftotalabstinence。Wesee，again，howtheutilitarianreasonsforkeepingapromisearediminishedbyamaterialchangeofcircumstances，forinthatcasetheexpectationsdisappointedbybreakingitareatleastnotthosewhichthepromiseoriginallycreated。
Itisobvious，too，thatitisadisadvantagetothecommunitythatmenshouldbeabletorelyontheperformanceofpromisesprocuredbyfraudorunlawfulforce，sofarasencouragementistherebygiventotheuseoffraudorforceforthisend。Wesaw，again，thatwhentheperformancewouldbeinjurioustothepromisee，CommonSenseisdisposedtoadmitthatitsobligationissuperseded；andisatleastdoubtfulwhetherthepromiseshouldbekept，evenwhenitisonlythepromiserwhowouldbeinjured，iftheharmbeextreme；——bothwhichqualificationsareinharmonywithUtilitarianism。Andsimilarlyfortheotherqualificationsandexceptions:
theyallturnouttobeasclearlyutilitarian，asthegeneralutilityofkeepingone’swordisplainandmanifest。
Butfurther，theexpediencyofsatisfyingnormalexpectations，evenwhentheyarenotbaseduponadefinitecontract，isundeniable；itwillclearlyconducetothetranquillityofsocialexistence，andtothesettledandwell-adjustedactivityonwhichsocialhappinessgreatlydepends，thatsuchexpectationsshouldbeaslittleaspossiblebaulked。AndhereUtilitarianismrelievesusofthedifficultieswhichbesetthecommonviewofjustconductassomethingabsolutelypreciseanddefinite。Forinthisvaguerregionwecannotdrawasharplinebetweenvalidandinvalidclaims；`injustice’shadesgraduallyoffintomere`hardship’。
HencetheUtilitarianviewthatthedisappointmentofnaturalexpectationsisanevil，butanevilwhichmustsometimesbeincurredforthesakeofagreatergood，isthattowhichCommonSenseispracticallyforced，thoughitisdifficulttoreconcileitwiththetheoreticalabsolutenessofJusticeintheIntuitionalviewofMorality。
Thegainofrecognisingtherelativityofthisobligationwillbestillmorefelt，whenweconsiderwhatIdistinguishedasIdealJustice，andexaminethegeneralconceptionsofthiswhichwefindexpressedorlatentincurrentcriticismsoftheexistingorderofSociety。
Wehaveseenthattherearetwocompetingviewsofanideallyjustsocialorder——orperhapswemaysaytwoextremetypesbetweenwhichtheloosernotionsofordinarymenseemtofluctuate——whichIcalledrespectivelyIndividualisticandSocialistic。
AccordingtotheformerviewanidealsystemofLawoughttoaimatFreedom，orperfectmutualnon-interferenceofallthemembersofthecommunity，asanabsoluteend。Nowthegeneralutilitarianreasonsforleavingeachrationaladultfreetoseekhappinessinhisownwayareobviousandstriking:
for，generallyspeaking，eachisbestqualifiedtoprovideforhisowninterests，sinceevenwhenhedoesnotknowbestwhattheyareandhowtoattainthem，heisatanyratemostkeenlyconcernedforthem:andagain，theconsciousnessoffreedomandconcomitantresponsibilityincreasestheaverageeffectiveactivityofmen:andbesides，thediscomfortofconstraintisdirectlyanevilandprotantotobeavoided。Still，wesawthattheattempttoconstructaconsistentcodeoflaws，takingMaximumFreedominsteadofHappinessasanabsoluteend，mustleadtostartlingparadoxesandinsolublepuzzles:andinfactthepracticalinterpretationofthenotion`Freedom’，andthelimitswithinwhichitsrealisationhasbeenactuallysought，havealways——eveninthefreestsocieties——beenmoreorlessconsciouslydeterminedbyconsiderationsofexpediency。SothatwemayfairlysaythatinsofarasCommonSensehasadoptedtheIndividualisticidealinpolitics，ithasalwaysbeenassubordinatetoandlimitedbytheUtilitarianfirstprinciple。[7]
Itseems，however，thatwhatwecommonlydemandorlongfor，underthenameofIdealJustice，isnotsomuchtherealisationofFreedom，asthedistributionofgoodandevilaccordingtoDesert:indeeditisasameanstothislatterendthatFreedomisoftenadvocated；foritissaidthatifweprotectmencompletelyfrommutualinterference，eachwillreapthegoodandbadconsequencesofhisownconduct，andsobehappyorunhappyinproportiontohisdeserts。Inparticular，ithasbeenwidelyheldthatifafreeexchangeofwealthandservicesisallowed，eachindividualwillobtainfromsociety，inmoneyorotheradvantages，whathisservicesarereallyworth。Wesaw，however，thatthepricewhichanindividualobtainsunderasystemofperfectfreetrade，forwealthorservicesexchangedbyhim，mayforseveralreasonsbenotproportionedtothesocialutilityofwhatheexchanges:andreflectiveCommonSenseseemstoadmitthisdisproportionastosomeextentlegitimate，undertheinfluenceofutilitarianconsiderationscorrectingtheunreflectiveutterancesofmoralsentiments。
Totakeaparticularcase:
ifamoralmanwereaskedhowfaritisrighttotakeadvantageinbargainingofanother’signorance，probablyhisfirstimpulsewouldbetocondemnsuchaprocedurealtogether。Butreflection，Ithink，wouldshowhimthatsuchacensurewouldbetoosweeping:thatitwouldbecontrarytoCommonSenseto``blameAforhaving，innegotiatingwithastrangerB，takenadvantageofhisignoranceoffactsknowntohimself，providedthatA’ssuperiorknowledgehadbeenobtainedbyalegitimateuseofdiligenceandforesight，whichBmighthaveusedwithequalsuccess？Whatpreventsusfromcensuringinthisandsimilarcasesis，Iconceive，amoreorlessconsciousapprehensionoftheindefinitelosstothewealthofthecommunitythatislikelytoresultfromanyeffectivesocialrestrictionsonthefreepursuitandexercise’’ofeconomicknowledge。Andforsomewhatsimilarreasonsofgeneralexpediency，ifthequestionberaisedwhetheritisfairforaclassofpersonstogainbytheunfavourableeconomicsituationofanyclasswithwhichtheydeal，CommonSenseatleasthesitatestocensuresuchgains——atanyratewhensuchunfavourablesituationisdue``tothegradualactionofgeneralcauses，fortheexistenceofwhichthepersonswhogainarenotspeciallyresponsible’’。[8]
Thegeneralprincipleof`requitinggooddesert’，sofarasCommonSensereallyacceptsitaspracticallyapplicabletotherelationsofmeninsociety，isbroadlyinharmonywithUtilitarianism；
sinceweobviouslyencouragetheproductionofgeneralhappinessbyrewardingmenforfelicificconduct；onlytheUtilitarianscaleofrewardswillnotbedeterminedentirelybythemagnitudeoftheservicesperformed，butpartlyalsobythedifficultyofinducingmentoperformthem。Butthislatterelementseemstobealwaystakenintoaccountthoughperhapsunconsciously
byCommonSense:for，aswehavebeenledtonotice，wedonotcommonlyrecognisemeritinrightactions，iftheyaresuchasmenarenaturallyinclinedtoperformrathertoomuchthantoolittle。Again，incaseswheretheIntuitionalprinciplethatill-desertliesinwrongintentionconflictswiththeUtilitarianviewofpunishmentaspurelypreventive，wefindthatintheactualadministrationofcriminaljustice，CommonSenseisforced，howeverreluctantly，intopracticalagreementwithUtilitarianism。Thusafteracivilwaritdemandstheexecutionofthemostpurelypatrioticrebels；andafterarailwayaccidentitclamoursfortheseverepunishmentofunintentionalneglects，which，exceptfortheirconsequences，wouldhavebeenregardedasveryvenial。
If，however，inanydistributionofpleasuresandprivileges，orofpainsandburdens，considerationsofdesertdonotproperlycomeini。e。ifthegoodoreviltobedistributedhavenorelationtoanyconductonthepartofthepersonswhoaretoreceiveeither——orifitispracticallyimpossibletotakesuchconsiderationsintoaccount——thenCommonSenseseemstofallbackonsimpleequalityastheprincipleofjustapportionment。[10]AndwehaveseenthattheUtilitarian，inthecasesupposed，willreasonablyacceptEqualityastheonlymodeofdistributionthatisnotarbitrary；anditmaybeobservedthatthismodeofapportioningthemeansofhappinessislikelytoproducemorehappinessonthewhole，notonlybecausemenhaveadisinterestedaversiontounreason，butstillmorebecausetheyhaveanaversiontoanykindofinferioritytootherswhichismuchintensifiedwhentheinferiorityseemsunreasonable。
Thislatterfeelingissostrongthatitoftenprevailsinspiteofobviousclaimsofdesert；anditmayevenbesometimesexpedientthatitshouldsoprevail。
For，finally，itmustbeobservedthatUtilitarianismfurnishesuswithacommonstandardtowhichthedifferentelementsincludedinthenotionofJusticemaybereduced。Suchastandardisimperativelyrequired:asthesedifferentelementsarecontinuallyliabletoconflictwitheachother。Theissue，forexample，inpracticalpoliticsbetweenConservativesandReformersoftenrepresentssuchaconflict:thequestionis，whetherweoughttodoacertainviolencetoexpectationsarisingnaturallyoutoftheexistingsocialorder，withtheviewofbringingaboutadistributionofthemeansofhappinessmoreinaccordancewithidealjustice。Here，ifmyanalysisofthecommonnotionofJusticebesound，theattempttoextractfromitacleardecisionofsuchanissuemustnecessarilyfail:
astheconflictis，sotosay，permanentlylatentintheverycoreofCommonSense。ButtheUtilitarianwillmerelyusethisnotionofJusticeasaguidetodifferentkindsofutilities；andinsofarastheseareincompatible，hewillbalanceonesetofadvantagesagainsttheother，anddecideaccordingtothepreponderance。