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　　Onesuchprinciplewasgiveninchap。i。&sect；3

　　ofthisBook；whereIpointedoutthatwhateveractionanyofusjudgestoberightforhimself，heimplicitlyjudgestoberightforallsimilarpersonsinsimilarcircumstances。Or，aswemayotherwiseputit，`ifakindofconductthatisrightorwrongformeisnotrightorwrong

　　forsomeoneelse，itmustbeonthegroundofsomedifferencebetweenthetwocases，otherthanthefactthatIandhearedifferentpersons。’

　　Acorrespondingpropositionmaybestatedwithequaltruthinrespectofwhatoughttobedoneto——notby——differentindividuals。

　　Theseprincipleshavebeenmostwidelyrecognised，notintheirmostabstractanduniversalform，butintheirspecialapplicationtothesituationoftwoormoreindividualssimilarlyrelatedtoeachother:assoapplied，theyappearinwhatispopularlyknownastheGoldenRule，`Dotoothersasyouwouldhavethemdotoyou。’Thisformulaisobviouslyunpreciseinstatement；foronemightwishforanother’sco-operationinsin，andbewillingtoreciprocateit。Norisiteventruetosaythatweoughttodotoothersonlywhatwethinkitrightforthemtodotous；fornoonewilldenythattheremaybedifferencesinthecircumstances——andeveninthenatures——oftwoindividuals，AandB，whichwouldmakeitwrongforAtotreatBinthewayinwhichitisrightforBtotreatA。

　　Inshorttheself-evidentprinciplestrictlystatedmusttakesomesuchnegativeformasthis；`itcannotberightforAtotreatBinamannerinwhichitwouldbewrongforBtotreatA，merelyonthegroundthattheyaretwodifferentindividuals，andwithouttherebeinganydifferencebetweenthenaturesorcircumstancesofthetwowhichcanbestatedasareasonablegroundfordifferenceoftreatment。’Suchaprinciplemanifestlydoesnotgivecompleteguidance——indeeditseffect，strictlyspeaking，ismerelytothrowadefiniteonusprobandionthemanwhoappliestoanotheratreatmentofwhichhe，wouldcomplainifappliedtohimself；

　　butCommonSensehasamplyrecognisedthepracticalimportanceofthemaxim:

　　anditstruth，sofarasitgoes，appearstomeself-evident。

　　AsomewhatdifferentapplicationofthesamefundamentalprinciplethatindividualsinsimilarconditionsshouldbetreatedsimilarlyfindsitssphereintheordinaryadministrationofLaw，oraswesay

　　of`Justice’。Accordinglyin&sect；1ofchap。v。ofthisBookIdrewattentionto`impartialityintheapplicationofgeneralrules’，asanimportantelementinthecommonnotionofJustice；indeed，thereultimatelyappearedtobenootherelementwhichcouldbeintuitivelyknownwithperfectclearnessandcertainty。Hereagainitmustbeplainthatthispreceptofimpartialityisinsufficientforthecompletedeterminationofjustconduct，asitdoesnothelpustodecidewhatkindofrulesshouldbethusimpartiallyapplied；

　　thoughalladmittheimportanceofexcludingfromgovernment，andhumanconductgenerally，allconsciouspartialityand`respectofpersons’。

　　Theprinciplejustdiscussed，whichseemstobemoreorlessclearlyimpliedinthecommonnotionof`fairness’or`equity’，isobtainedbyconsideringthesimilarityoftheindividualsthatmakeupaLogicalWholeorGenus。Thereareothers，nolessimportant，whichemergeintheconsiderationofthesimilarpartsofaMathematicalorQuantitativeWhole。SuchaWholeispresentedinthecommonnotionoftheGood——or，asissometimessaid，`goodonthewhole’——ofanyindividualhumanbeing。Theproposition`thatoneoughttoaimatone’sowngood’issometimesgivenasthemaximofRationalSelf-loveorPrudence:

　　butassostateditdoesnotclearlyavoidtautology；sincewemaydefine`good’as`whatoneoughttoaimat’。If，however，wesay’one’sgoodonthewhole’，theadditionsuggestsaprinciplewhich，whenexplicitlystated，is，atanyrate，nottautological。Ihavealreadyreferredtothisprincipleasthat`ofimpartialconcernforallpartsofourconsciouslife’:——wemightexpressitconciselybysaying`thatHereafterassuchistoberegardedneitherlessnormorethanNow’。Itisnot，ofcourse，meantthatthegoodofthepresentmaynotreasonablybepreferredtothatofthefutureonaccountofitsgreatercertainty:oragain，thataweektenyearshencemaynotbemoreimportanttousthanaweeknow，throughanincreaseinourmeansorcapacitiesofhappiness。Allthattheprincipleaffirmsisthatthemeredifferenceofpriorityandposteriorityintimeisnotareasonablegroundforhavingmoreregardtotheconsciousnessofonemomentthattothatofanother。Theforminwhichitpracticallypresentsitselftomostmenis`thatasmallerpresentgoodisnottobepreferredtoagreaterfuturegood’allowingfordifferenceofcertainty:

　　sincePrudenceisgenerallyexercisedinrestrainingapresentdesiretheobjectorsatisfactionofwhichwecommonlyregardasprotanto`agood’，onaccountoftheremoterconsequencesofgratifyingit。Thecommonestviewoftheprinciplewouldnodoubtbethatthepresentpleasureorhappinessisreasonablytobeforegonewiththeviewofobtaininggreaterpleasureorhappinesshereafter:buttheprincipleneednotberestrictedtoahedonisticapplication；itisequallyapplicabletoanyotherinterpretationof`one’sowngood，’inwhichgoodisconceivedasamathematicalwhole，ofwhichtheintegrantpartsarerealisedindifferentpartsormomentsofalifetime。Andthereforeitisperhapsbettertodistinguishitherefromtheprinciple`thatPleasureisthesoleUltimateGood’，whichdoesnotseemtohaveanylogicalconnexionwithit。

　　Sofarwehaveonlybeenconsideringthe`GoodontheWhole’ofasingleindividual:butjustasthisnotionisconstructedbycomparisonandintegrationofthedifferent`goods’thatsucceedoneanotherintheseriesofourconsciousstates，sowehaveformedthenotionofUniversalGoodbycomparisonandintegrationofthegoodsofallindividualhuman——orsentient——existences。Andhereagain，justasintheformerme，byconsideringtherelationoftheintegrantpartstothewholeandtoeachother，Iobtaintheself-evidentprinciplethatthegoodofanyoneindividualisofnomoreimportance，fromthepointofviewifImaysaysooftheUniverse，thanthegoodofanyother；unless，thatis，therearespecialgroundsforbelievingthatmoregoodislikelytoberealisedintheonecasethanintheother。AnditisevidenttomethatasarationalbeingIamboundtoaimatgoodgenerally，——sofarasitisattainablebymyefforts，——notmerelyataparticularpartofit。

　　Fromthesetworationalintuitionswemaydeduce，asanecessaryinference，themaximofBenevolenceinanabstractform:

　　viz。thateachoneismorallyboundtoregardthegoodofanyotherindividualasmuchashisown，exceptinsofarashejudgesittobeless，whenimpartiallyviewed，orlesscertainlyknowableorattainablebyhim。IbeforeobservedthatthedutyofBenevolenceasrecognisedbycommonsenseseemstofallsomewhatshortofthis。ButIthinkitmaybefairlyurgedinexplanationofthisthatpracticallyeachman，evenwithaviewtouniversalGood，oughtchieflytoconcernhimselfwithpromotingthegoodofalimitednumberofhumanbeings，andthatgenerallyinproportiontotheclosenessoftheirconnexionwithhim。Ithinkthata`plainman’，inamoderncivilisedsociety，ifhisconsciencewerefairlybroughttoconsiderthehypotheticalquestion，whetheritwouldbemorallyrightforhimtoseekhisownhappinessonanyoccasionifitinvolvedacertainsacrificeofthegreaterhappinessofsomeotherhumanbeing，——withoutanycounterbalancinggaintoanyoneelse，——wouldanswerunhesitatinglyinthenegative。

　　IhavetriedtoshowhowintheprinciplesofJustice，Prudence，andRationalBenevolenceascommonlyrecognisedthereisatleastaself-evidentelement，immediatelycognisablebyabstractintuition；dependingineachcaseontherelationwhichindividualsandtheirparticularendsbearaspartstotheirwholes，andtootherpartsofthesewholes。Iregardtheapprehension，withmoreorlessdistinctness，oftheseabstracttruths，asthepermanentbasisofthecommonconvictionthatthefundamentalpreceptsofmoralityareessentiallyreasonable。Nodoubttheseprinciplesareoftenplacedsidebysidewithotherpreceptstowhichcustomandgeneralconsenthavegivenamerelyillusoryairofself-evidence:butthedistinctionbetweenthetwokindsofmaximsappearstometobecomemanifestbymerelyreflectinguponthem。Iknowbydirectreflectionthatthepropositions，`Ioughttospeakthetruth’，`Ioughttokeepmypromises’——howevertruetheymaybe——arenotself-evidenttome；theypresentthemselvesaspropositionsrequiringrationaljustificationofsomekind。Ontheotherhand，thepropositions，`Ioughtnottopreferapresentlessergoodtoafuturegreatergood’，and`Ioughtnottoprefermyownlessergoodtothegreatergoodofanother’，[2]dopresentthemselvesasself-evident；asmuche。g。asthemathematicalaxiomthat`ifequalsbeaddedtoequalsthewholesareequal。’

　　Itisonaccountofthefundamentalandmanifestimportance，inmyview，ofthedistinctionabovedrawnbetween1themoralmaximswhichreflectionshowsnottopossessultimatevalidity，and2themoralmaximswhichareorinvolvegenuineethicalaxioms，thatIrefrainedattheoutsetofthisinvestigationfromenteringatlengthintothepsychogonicalquestionastotheoriginofapparentmoralintuitions。

　　FornopsychogonicaltheoryhaseverbeenputforwardprofessingtodiscreditthepropositionsthatIregardasreallyaxiomatic，byshowingthatthecauseswhichproducedthemweresuchashadatendencytomakethemfalse:

　　whileasregardstheformerclassofmaxims，apsychogonicalproofthattheyareuntrustworthywhentakenasabsolutelyandwithoutqualificationtrueisinmyview，superfluous:sincedirectreflectionshowsmetheyhavenoclaimtobesotaken。Ontheotherhand，sofaraspsychogonicaltheoryrepresentsmoralrulesas，speakingbroadlyandgenerally，meanstotheendsofindividualandsocialgoodorwell-being，itobviouslytendstogiveageneralsupporttotheconclusionstowhichtheprecedingdiscussionhasbroughtusbyadifferentmethod:sinceitleadsustoregardothermoralrulesassubordinatetotheprinciplesofPrudenceandBenevolence。[3]

　　1should，however，relylessconfidentlyontheconclusionssetforthintheprecedingsection，iftheydidnotappeartometobeinsubstantialagreement——inspiteofsuperficialdifferences——withthedoctrinesofthosemoralistswhohavebeenmostinearnestinseekingamongcommonlyreceivedmoralrulesforgenuineintuitionsofthePracticalReason。I

　　havealreadypointedoutthatinthehistoryofEnglishEthicstheearlierintuitionalschoolshow，inthisrespect，aturnofthoughtonthewholemorephilosophicalthanthatwhichthereactionagainstHumerenderedprevalent。

　　Amongthewritersofthisschoolthereisnoonewhoshowsmoreearnestnessintheefforttopenetratetoreallyself-evidentprinciplesthanClarke。

　　Accordingly，IfindthatClarkelaysdown，inrespectofourbehaviourtowardsourfellow-men，twofundamental``rulesofrighteousness’’:thefirstofwhichhetermsEquity，andthesecondLoveorBenevolence。TheRuleofEquityhestatesthus:``WhateverIjudgereasonableorunreasonablethatanothershoulddoforme:thatbythesamejudgmentIdeclarereasonableorunreasonablethatIshouldinthelikecasedoforhim’’[4]——whichisofcourse，the`GoldenRule’preciselystated。Theobligationto``UniversalLoveorBenevolence’’heexhibitsasfollows:——

　　``IftherebeanaturalandnecessarydifferencebetweenGoodandEvil:andthatwhichisGoodisfitandreasonable，andthatwhichisEvilisunreasonable，tobedone:

　　aridthatwhichistheGreatestGoodisalwaysthemostfitandreasonabletobechosen:then？everyrationalcreatureoughtinitssphereandstation，accordingtoitsrespectivepowersandfaculties，todoalltheGooditcantoitsfellow-creatures:towhichend，universalLoveandBenevolenceisplainlythemostcertain，direct，andeffectualmeans。’’[5；

　　Herethemerestatementthatarationalagentisboundtoaimatuniversalgoodisopentothechargeoftautology，sinceClarkedefines`Good’as`thatwhichisfitandreasonabletobedone’。

　　ButClarkeobviouslyholdsthateachindividual`rationalcreature’iscapableofreceivinggoodinagreaterorlessdegree，suchgoodbeinganintegrantpartofuniversalgood。Thisindeedisimpliedinthecommonnotion，whichheuses，of`doingGoodtoone’sfellow-creatures’，or，asheotherwiseexpressesit，`promotingtheirwelfareandhappiness。’Andthushisprincipleisimplicitlywhatwasstatedabove，thatthegoodorwelfareofanyoneindividualmustassuchbeanobjectofrationalaimtoanyotherreasonableindividualnolessthanhisownsimilargoodorwelfare。

　　Itshouldbeobserved，however，thatthepropositionthatUniversalBenevolenceistherightmeanstotheattainmentofuniversalgood，isnotquiteself-evident；sincetheendmaynotalwaysbebestattainedbydirectlyaimingatit。ThusRationalBenevolence，likeRationalSelf-Love，maybeself-limiting；maydirectitsownpartialsuppressioninfavourofotherimpulses。