But，again，tolaydownabsolutelythatthelawsofanycommunityoughttoexpressthewillofthemajorityofitsmembersseemsincompatiblewiththeviewsovigorouslymaintainedbySocratesandhismostfamousdisciples，thatlawsoughttobemadebypeoplewhounderstandlaw-making。Forthoughthemajorityofarepresentativeassemblyinaparticularcountryataparticulartimemaybemorefittomakelawsfortheircountrythananysetofexpertsotherwiseselected，itiscertainlynotself-evidentthatthiswillbeuniversallythecase。YetsurelytheSocraticpropositionwhichismerelyaspecialapplicationoftheprinciplenoticedinthelatterpartoftheprecedingchapter，`thatfunctionshouldbeallottedtothefittest’hasasmuchclaimtobeconsideredaprimaryintuitionastheonethatwehavebeendiscussing。Indeed，thesecularcontroversybetweenAristocracyandDemocracyseemsultimatelyreducibletoaconflictbetweenthosetwoprinciples:aconflictofwhichitisimpossibletofindasolution，solongastheargumentremainsintheaprioriregion。
However，todiscussthisexhaustivelywouldcarryustoofarbeyondtherangeofEthicsproper:butwemayperhapsconcludethatitisimpossibletoelicitfromCommonSenseanyclearandcertainintuitionsastotheprinciplesonwhichanidealconstitutionshouldbeconstructed。Andthereisanequalwantofagreementastotheintrinsiclawfulnessofintroducingsuchaconstitutioninviolationofthetraditionalandestablishedorderinanycommunity。Forsomethinkthatanationhasanaturalrighttoagovernmentapproximatelyconformedtotheideal，andthatthisrightmaybemaintainedbyforceinthelastresort。Others，however，holdthat，thoughtheidealpolitymayrightlybeputforwardandcommended，andeverymeansusedtopromoteitsrealisationwhichtheestablishedgovernmentinanycountrypermits，——still，rebellioncanneverbejustifiableforthispurposealone。Whileothers，——perhapsthemajority，——woulddecidethequestionongroundsofexpediency，balancingtheadvantagesofimprovementagainsttheevilsofdisorder。
Butfurther，aswesaw，itisnotsoeasytosaywhattheestablishedgovernmentis。Forsometimesanauthoritydeclaredbylawtobeillegitimateissuesordinancesandcontrolstheadministrationofjustice。Thequestionthenarises，howfarobedienceisduetosuchanauthority。Allareagreedthatusurpationoughttoberesisted；butastotherightbehaviourtowardsanestablishedgovernmentwhichhassprungfromasuccessfulusurpation，thereisagreatdifferenceofopinion。Somethinkthatitshouldberegardedaslegitimate，assoonasitisfirmlyestablished:othersthatitoughttobeobeyedatonce，butunderprotest，withthepurposeofrenewingtheconflictonafavourableopportunity:
othersthinkthatthislatteristherightattitudeatfirst，butthatausurpinggovernment，whenfirmlyestablished，losesitsillegitimacygradually，andthatitbecomes，afterawhile，ascriminaltorebelagainstitasitwasoriginallytoestablishit。Andthislastseems，onthewhole，theviewofCommonSense；butthepointatwhichthemetamorphosisisthoughttotakeplacecanhardlybedeterminedotherwisethanbyconsiderationsofexpediency。
Butagain，itisonlyinthecaseofanabsolutegovernment，wherecustomaryobedienceisunconditionallyduetooneormorepersons，thatthefundamentaldifficultiesofascertainingthelegitimacyofauthorityareofthesimplekindjustdiscussed。Inaconstitutionallygovernedstatenumerousothermoraldisagreementsarise。
For，insuchastate，whileitisofcourseheldthatthesovereignismorallyboundtoconformtotheconstitution，[1]itisstilldisputedwhetherthesubjects’obligationtoobedienceisproperlyconceivedasconditionaluponthisconformity:andwhethertheyhavethemoralright1torefuseobediencetoanunconstitutionalcommand；and2eventoinflictonthesovereignthepenaltyofrebellionforviolatingtheconstitution。Again，indeterminingwhattheconstitutionalobligationsreallyarewefindmuchperplexityanddisagreement，notmerelyastotheexactascertainmentoftherelevanthistoricalfactsbutastotheprinciplesonwhichthesefactsoughttobetreated。Forthevariouslimitationsofsovereignauthoritycomprisedintheconstitutionhaveoftenbeenoriginallyconcessionsextortedbyfearfromasovereignpreviouslyabsolute；anditisdoubtedbowfarsuchconcessionsaremorallybindingonthesovereignfromwhomtheywerewrested，andstillmorehowfartheyarebindingonsucceedingsovereigns。
Or，viceversâ；，apeoplemayhaveallowedlibertiesonceexercisedtofallintodisuse；anditisdoubtedwhetheritretainstherightofreclaimingthem。And，generally，whenaconstitutionalrulehastobeelicitedfromacomparisonofprecedents，itisopentodisputewhetheraparticularactofeitherpartyshouldberegardedasaconstitutiveprecedentorasanillegitimateencroachment。Andhencewefindthat，in。constitutionalcountries，men’sviewofwhattheirconstitutiontraditionallyishasoftenbeengreatlyinfluencedbytheirviewofwhatitideallyoughttobe:infact，thetwoquestionshaverarelybeenkeptquitedistinct。
Butevenincaseswherewecanascertainclearlytowhatauthorityobedienceisproperlydue，furtherdifficultiesareliabletoarisewhenweattempttodefinethelimitsofsuchobedience。Forinmodernsociety，aswehaveseen，alladmitthatanyauthorityoughttobedisobeyedwhichcommandsimmoralacts；butthisisoneofthosetautologicalpropositions，socommoninpopularmorality，whichconveynorealinformation；thequestionis，whatactstherearewhichdonotceasetobeimmoralwhentheyhavebeencommandedbyarightfulauthority。Thereseemstobenoclearprincipleuponwhichthesecanbedetermined。IthassometimesbeensaidthattheLawcannotoverridedefiniteduties；buttheobligationoffidelitytocontractispeculiarlydefinite，andyetwedonotconsideritrighttofulfilacontractofwhichalaw，passedsubsequentlytothemakingofthecontract，hasforbiddentheexecution。
And，infact，wedonotfindanypracticalagreementonthisquestion，amongpersonswhowouldnotconsciouslyaccepttheutilitarianmethodofdecidingitbyabalanceofconflictingexpediences。Forsomewouldsaythatthedutiesofthedomesticrelationsmustyieldtothedutyoflaw-observance，andthate。g。asonoughtnottoaidaparentactivelyorpassivelyinescapingthepunishmentofcrime:whileotherswouldconsiderthisruletooinhumantobelaiddown，andotherswoulddrawthelinebetweenassistanceandconnivance。Andsimilarly，whenarightlyconstitutedgovernmentcommandsactsunjustandoppressivetoothers；CommonSenserecoilsfromsayingeitherthatallsuchcommandsoughttobeobeyedorthatalloughttobedisobeyedbut——apartfromutilitarianconsiderations——Icanfindnoclearacceptedprinciplefordistinguishingthoseunjustcommandsofalegitimategovernmentwhichoughttobeobeyedfromthosewhichoughtnottobeobeyed。
Again，somejuristsholdthatwearenotstrictlyboundtoobeylaws，whentheycommandwhatisnototherwiseaduty，orforbidwhatisnototherwiseasin；onthegroundthatinthecaseofdutiesprescribedonlybypositivelaws，thealternativesofobeyingorsubmittingtothepenaltyaremorallyopentous。Others，however，thinkthisprincipletoolax；andcertainlyifawidespreadpreferenceofpenaltytoobediencewereshowninthecaseofanyparticularlaw，thelegislationinquestionwouldbethoughttohavefailed。Nor，ontheotherhand，doesthereseemtobeanyagreementastowhetheroneisboundtosubmittounjustpenalties。
Since，then，onallthesepointsthereisfoundtobesomuchdifferenceofopinion，itseemsidletomaintainthatthereisanyclearandpreciseaxiomorfirstprincipleofOrder，intuitivelyseentobetruebythecommonreasonandconscienceofmankind。Thereis，nodoubt，avaguegeneralhabitofobediencetolawsassuchevenifbadlaws，whichmayfairlyclaimtheuniversalconsensusofcivilisedsociety:butwhenwetrytostateanyexplicitprinciplecorrespondingtothisgeneralhabit，theconsensusseemstoabandonus，andweareinevitablydrawnintocontroversieswhichseemtoadmitofnosolutionexceptthatofferedbytheutilitarianmethod。[2]
WehavenexttotreatofGoodFaith，orFidelitytoPromises；whichitisnaturaltoconsiderinthisplace，because，ashasbeenseen，theDutyofLaw-observancehasbysomethinkersbeenbaseduponapriordutyoffulfillingacontract。TheSocialContracthowever，asaboveexamined，seemsatbestmerelyaconvenientfiction，alogicalartifice，bywhichthemutualjuralrelationsofthemembersofacivilisedcommunitymaybeneatlyexpressed:andinstatingtheethicalprinciplesofCommonSense，suchafictionwouldseemtobeoutofplace。Itmust，however，beallowedthattherehasfrequentlybeenaclosehistoricalconnectionbetweentheDutyofLaw-observanceandthedutyofGoodFaith。Inthefirstplace，aconsiderableamountofConstitutionalLawatleast，incertainagesandcountries，hasbeenestablishedorconfirmedbycompactsexpresslymadebetweendifferentsectionsofthecommunity；whoagreethatforthefuturegovernmentshallbecarriedonaccordingtocertainrules。ThedutyofobservingtheserulesthuspresentsitselfasaDutyofFidelitytocompact。Yetmoreisthisthecase，whenthequestionisoneofimposingnotalaw，butalaw-giver；whoseauthorityisstrengthenedbytheexactionofanoathofallegiancefromhissubjectsgenerallyorarepresentativeportionofthem。Still，eveninsuchcases，itcanonlybebyapalpablefictionthatthemassofthecitizenscanberegardedasboundbyanengagementwhichonlyafewofthemhaveactuallytaken。
WemaybeginourexaminationofthedutyofKeepingPromisesbynoticingthatsomemoralistshaveclassifiedorevenidentifieditwithVeracity。Fromonepointofviewtherecertainlyseemstobeananalogy，betweenthetwo；aswefulfiltheobligationsofVeracityandGoodFaithalikebyeffectingacorrespondencebetweenwordsandfacts——intheonecasebymakingfactcorrespondwithstatement，andintheotherbymakingstatementcorrespondwithfact。Buttheanalogyisobviouslysuperficialandimperfect；forwearenotboundtomakeouractionscorrespondwithourassertionsgenerally，butonlywithourpromises。IfImerelyassertmyintentionofabstainingfromalcoholforayear，andthenafteraweektakesome，Iamatworstridiculedasinconsistent:butifIhavepledgedmyselftoabstain，Iamblamedasuntrustworthy。ThustheessentialelementoftheDutyofGoodFaithseemstobenotconformitytomyownstatement，buttoexpectationsthatIhaveintentionallyraisedinothers。
Onthisview，however，thequestionariseswhether，whenapromisehasbeenunderstoodinasensenotintendedbythepromiser，heisboundtosatisfyexpectationswhichhedidnotvoluntarilycreate。
Itis，Ithink，cleartoCommonSensethatheissoboundinsomecases，iftheexpectationwasnaturalandsuchasmostmenwouldformunderthecircumstances:butthiswouldseemtobeoneofthemoreorlessindefinitedutiesofJustice，andnotproperlyofGoodFaith，astherehasnotbeen，strictlyspeaking，anypromiseatall。Thenormaleffectoflanguageistoconveythespeaker’smeaningtothepersonaddressedherethepromiser’stothepromisee，andwealwayssupposethistohavetakenplacewhenwespeakofapromise。Ifthroughanyaccidentthisnormaleffectismissed，wemaysaythatthereisnopromise，ornotaperfectpromise。
Themoralobligation，then，ofapromiseisperfectlyconstitutedwhenitisunderstoodbybothpartiesinthesamesense。Andbytheterm`promise’weincludenotwordsonly，butallsignsandeventacitunderstandingsnotexpresslysignifiedinanyway，ifsuchclearlyformapartoftheengagement。Thepromiserisboundtoperformwhatbothheandthepromiseeunderstoodtobeundertaken。